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1 Introduction and Historical Background 
1.1 Introduction to Research 
As one of the most violent, ideological and intractable conflicts in modern 
history, sited in a very sensitive and strategic region, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has 
always been under the spotlight of media and politicians. The conflict is almost a 
constant item in the coverage of news outlets, especially since the outbreak of the 
spiraling violence that marked the end of the peace process and the beginning of the 
second Palestinian uprising in the fall of 2000. The discourse of the conflict is as 
ideological and controversial as the conflict itself. Even news reporting, which is 
governed by values of truthfulness, accuracy, balance, impartiality and integrity, has 
always been the object of scrutiny and criticism by members of both sides who often 
accuse newspapers of bias against them. The discourse of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
has been the object of a number of academic studies. This thesis aims to contribute to 
this body of knowledge about the discourse of the conflict by critically analysing the 
discourse of news reports on selected events of the second Intifada, both from cross-
cultural and inter-cultural perspectives, by exploring the way Arab and Western 
newspapers report on some recent events of the conflict and the way different 
newspapers issued in the UK cover the same events.  
The approach utilised in the study is Critical Discourse Analysis; henceforth 
(CDA) serves as an analytical framework to examine the representation of selected 
events from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the selected newspapers. The purpose of 
the research is to compare the representations of certain events and entities related to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict following on from the second Palestinian uprising, in selected 
newspapers in order to show how power relations and ideology shape discourse when 
reporting the same event in newspapers that are clearly sited in different political and 
historical contexts. Therefore, the representations of the same events and entities in an 
Arab newspaper (the Arab News) and an American newspaper (the New York Times), as 
well as in two UK newspapers with different political orientations (the Times) and (the 
Guardian) are compared by means of a linguistic analysis focusing on a number of 
discourse categories. Although this study considers contextual and ideological factors, it 
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is primarily a linguistic study, and those linguistic features are meant to inform the 
analysis. 
1.1.1 Aims of research 
 To compare the representation of selected events and entities relating to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict in American, Arab and British newspapers using a 
modified version of CDA. 
 To examine the role of ideology and power relations in news reportage of events 
of the conflict by means of a textual analysis focusing on a number of specific 
linguistic features which are present in the data, taking into consideration the 
historical and socio-political context, as well as the context of news production 
and consumption. 
1.1.2 Research questions  
This research aims to answer the following questions: 
 How is the difference in power between the different sides of the conflict 
reflected in the discourse of the conflict? 
 How does ideology influence discourse, i.e. how does it affect some of the 
discursive strategies implemented to represent the same event in different 
newspapers? 
 How are the three discursive levels selected for examination in this thesis, 
namely narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation, used differently in the selected 
newspapers to represent the same events and entities? 
 How do the historical, social and political contexts affect news discourse?  
 How have the representations of different sides of the conflict changed over the 
period of the second uprising?  
1.1.3 Research Hypotheses 
This research aims to test the following hypotheses: 
 The reporting of the events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the selected 
newspapers is not free from bias and values, but rather it reflects the interests, 
 5 
ideologies and different points of view of the different newspapers. 
 The disproportionate power between both sides of the conflict is reflected in their 
representations to the advantage of the more powerful group. 
 The discourse of reporting events of the conflict is a site of struggle between 
different ideologies.  
In the following section, the historical context is outlined. The history of the land of 
Palestine and the state of Israel is explained since the time of Abraham to the year 2006, 
and then perceptions of both sides of the conflict in the West are discussed. These are 
very important aspects for understanding the conflict and its representation in Arab and 
Western newspapers. 
1.2 History of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict 
The area of Israel and the Palestinian territories is about 10,000 square miles in 
size bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the west, the Jordan River and Jordan to the 
east, Lebanon to the north and Egypt to the south. Israel controls 88% of the land and the 
remaining part supposedly comprises the Palestinian territories; nevertheless, these 
territories have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. The Palestinian territories are 
divided into two unconnected sections: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There are also 
many Israeli settlements inside the Palestinian territories. There are more than two 
hundred Israeli settlements in the West Bank and twenty- nine in East Jerusalem. 
Although Israel evacuated the twenty- five settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005, it has 
continued to expand settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem despite international 
condemnation. The population of Israel was estimated to be 7.2 million people, and the 
population of the Palestinian Territories was estimated to be 4.01 million people in July 
2009. About one-third of the Palestinian population lives in the Gaza Strip while the 
remainder lives in the West Bank.  
The early history of Palestine is of extreme importance to the conflict since one 
of the fundamental claims of the Jews to the land of Palestine is based on its early 
history, i.e. 2000 BC. The Old Testament has a biblical promise that this land will 
eventually belong to the descendants of Abraham, and the Jews interpret this as a 
promise that the land is theirs. According to the Old Testament, the Lord ordered 
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Abraham to leave his homeland in Ur in Southern Iraq and move to Palestine to settle 
there with his descendants. 'The Lord had said to Abraham, ―Leave your country, your 
people and your father‘s household and go to the land I will show you‘ GENESIS 12:1. 
After traveling to Palestine, the Lord made a promise that this land would belong to 
Abraham‘s descendants forever. ‗To your descendants I give this land, from the river of 
Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates‘ GENESIS 15:18. According to the Old 
Testament, Abraham moved from one place to another in the hill land of Palestine and 
traveled to Egypt at the time of famine before returning to Palestine. At the end of the 
book of Genesis, the twelve sons of Jacob, Abraham‘s son, move to Egypt escaping 
famine (Chapman, 2002).  
After about four hundred years of settling in Egypt, the twelve tribes of Israel 
escaped the oppression of the Pharaoh under the leadership of Moses. They spent forty 
years in the Sinai Peninsula, but around 1280 BC they then tried to occupy Palestine 
under the leadership of Joshua. After that, they fell under the control of other peoples 
like the Philistines, the Canaanites, among others. Around 1050 BC, Saul managed to 
lead the tribes and controlled most of Palestine, and was succeeded by King David 
whose son, King Solomon, built a great temple in the heart of Jerusalem. The connection 
between the land, Jerusalem and the temple is emphasised in the Old Testament 
(Chapman, 2002). After the death of King Solomon, the tribes revolted against his 
successor, and two kingdoms were formed: Israel in the north and Judah in the south. In 
the sixth century BC, the Babylonians took over the land of the Assyrians and also 
annexed the southern kingdom. In 597 BC, Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon captured 
Jerusalem and deported most of its people; nevertheless, when the Persians took over 
from the Babylonians, they repatriated many groups from exile. After their return to 
Palestine the Jews fell under the control of the Greeks in 330 BC.  
Palestine was invaded by the Romans in 63 BC. Jerusalem was captured and the 
temple established by Solomon was destroyed. The Romans erected a pagan temple for 
Jupiter and forbade the Jews from entering into the city. The Christian Byzantine Empire 
attempted to convert the Jews to Christianity by force between 527 and 614. In 634, 
Palestine became part of the Muslim empire for nearly four hundred and fifty years. 
Muslims did not attempt to expel Jews or Christians from Palestine or to convert them to 
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Islam; however, many people converted to Islam either willingly or to avoid heavy 
taxation imposed on non-Muslims. Towards the end of the seventh century, Muslims 
built a mosque known as the Dome of the Rock on the stone platform where the Jewish 
temple once stood. On the same platform also exists Al-Aqsa Mosque which is the third 
most sacred place in the Islamic faith (Ovendale, 1999).  
In 1096, when Palestine was under the rule of the Mamluks, it was attacked by 
the Crusaders. They captured Jerusalem, slaughtered both the Muslims and the Jews and 
established a Christian kingdom. In 1187, Saladin defeated the Crusaders and expelled 
them from Palestine. After the Mamluks, Palestine fell under the control of the Ottoman 
Turks until the First World War. Meanwhile at the end of the nineteenth century, there 
had been a great deal of discrimination and persecution practised (against Jews in 
Europe, emanating from anti-Semitism which can be understood as ―an irrational or 
abstract hatred of Jews‖ (Finkelstein, 2003).  
The ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity embraced by the French revolution 
resulted in the emancipation of the Jews in France. But following Napoleon's defeat, 
riots started in many European countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, Hungary 
and Poland blaming Jewish bankers for the financial difficulties these countries were 
going through. In 1881, the Jews in Russia were massacred in a series of attacks known 
as the pogroms. Due to European persecution, more than three million Jews escaped 
Europe to the United States, Canada, Australia, Britain and South Africa. Many Jews 
around the world felt that this racial and religious discrimination would persist as long as 
they were treated as minorities in different countries, and many came to believe that the 
only solution for their dilemma was to establish a Jewish state. This movement came to 
be known as Zionism, i.e. ―a movement for the re-establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine, as promised in the Old Testament‖ (Vital, 1980).  
Theodor Herzl, a young Austro-Hungarian journalist, changed Zionism into a 
coherent political movement. He studied law but, being a Jew, he was unable to practise 
it. He worked as a journalist and reported on the trial of Alfred Dreyfuss, a Jewish 
officer in the French army who was accused of passing secrets to the Germans. Herzl 
was so influenced by this trial and by his personal life that he started to think of practical 
solutions to the problems of the Jews. He came to be regarded as ‗the father of political 
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Zionism‘ in 1896 after he wrote his famous book ‗Der Judenstaat‟, or ‗the State of the 
Jews‟ in which he asked that Jews be granted sovereignty over a territory that is 
adequate to serve as their political centre.  
Herzl thought of both Palestine and Argentina, but he preferred Palestine for its 
great symbolic value in Jewish history and faith. ―Palestine is our ever-memorable 
historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of 
marvelous potency‖ (Herzl, quoted in Chapman, 2002). Herzl planned everything in his 
book, except for the way to dispose of the local population which he wrote in his diary. 
He assumed that the land needed to form the Jewish state would already be populated by 
a few landowners and many poor peasants. The land would be purchased simultaneously 
from the rich owners, and the poor peasants would be deprived from employment and 
thus removed from the land by the new Jewish owners (Ovendale, 1999; Philo & Berry, 
2004).  
In 1896, Herzl tried to convince the Ottoman Sultan of his plans, but he failed. 
He realised that he should rally support for his ideas among the Jews first; thus, he 
organised the first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897. The World Zionist Organisation, a 
national flag, a national anthem and the Jewish National Fund came as products of this 
first congress. Herzl then moved to Britain hoping to convince the British to grant a 
Jewish company a charter with sovereign rights in the Middle East that would eventually 
lead to a sovereign state. He played on the imperial interests of Britain in the Middle 
East and on British concerns of the floods of Jewish immigrants to Britain. He suggested 
the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine, which appealed to British politicians 
(Ovendale, 1999). 
In 1904, Herzl died and was succeeded by Chaim Weizmann who succeeded 
brilliantly in promoting the Zionist programme in Britain. In 1906, Weizmann met 
Arthur James Balfour who was critical of anti-Semitism in Europe and who supported an 
act that restricted Jewish immigration to Britain on economic grounds. Weizmann 
succeeded in convincing Balfour of the establishment of a national home for the Jews in 
Palestine. In 1917, the British promised the Jews a sovereign state in Palestine although 
it was still under Turkish rule. The British promise was contained in a letter from Arthur 
Balfour to Lord Rothschild, an English Jew, who was the then British Foreign Secretary.  
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The Balfour Declaration encouraged more Jews to emigrate to Palestine. In 1919, 
the number of Jews in Palestine reached 60,000, representing about 9% of the total 
population; the remaining 91% were Arabs. By 1929, the immigration rate accelerated 
due to economic difficulties facing the Jews in Eastern Europe and American restrictions 
on Jewish immigration; thus, the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine reached 
82,000 people. Jewish settlers started to acquire land in Palestine by purchasing it from 
absentee landowners. About nine tenths of all land acquired by the Jews up to 1929 was 
sold by absentee Turkish landlords. Small holders were forced to borrow at interest rates 
of up to fifty per cent and under the burden of debt they were forced to abandon their 
little blots of land. Jewish settlement and land purchase was not resisted by Arab leaders 
who were weak and incompetent (Chapman, 2002; Hirst, 1984). 
The Arab territories were part of the Ottoman Empire, and they were in chaotic 
conditions which led to antagonism and resistance to the Ottoman Turks and the rise of 
Arab nationalism. Britain cultivated Arab feelings against Turkey to balance Turkish 
propaganda promoting Muslim sentiment and started to show profound interest in 
Palestine to protect Egypt and communications with the East. The Balfour Declaration 
increased alarm among the Arabs who felt that their interests were being threatened by 
Zionist plans. On the seventeenth of December 1917, the British forces captured 
Jerusalem and proclaimed that Britain's objective was to liberate all peoples oppressed 
by the Turks and to establish national governments for them. A Zionist commission was 
sent to Palestine, headed by Weizmann, as it felt it was necessary to put the Balfour 
Declaration into practice (Ovendale, 1999). 
Frictions between the Arabs and the Zionists increased as the Arabs feared the 
Zionist plans to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Britain recognised 
that Palestine was included in the areas and pledged to the Arabs  that Britain was 
committed to the independence of all Arab areas under  Turkish rule including Palestine; 
Britain also realised that the Balfour Declaration promised the Jews a Jewish nation in 
Palestine. In 1920, a conference was held at San Remo to decide the future of the Middle 
East. It was decided that the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were allotted to France and 
those for Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain, and that Britain was to implement the 
Balfour Declaration.  
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In May 1922, a White Paper on Palestine was published. It reassured the Arabs 
that Britain was not contemplating the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish national 
home, but rather that it could become a centre for the Jewish people with no 
subordination  of the Arab community. The document resulted in comparative calm 
among the Arabs. Britain wanted its overall policy in the Middle East to appear 
balanced, flexible and responsive to local needs; however, this became more difficult to 
attain with the growing number of Jewish immigrants coming into Palestine and the 
increased oppression of the Arabs in Palestine. In the period between 1919 and 1931, the 
Jewish population in Palestine grew from 60,000 to 170,000, i.e. from 9% to 18% of the 
total population. The Arabs suffered economically as a result of Jewish immigration and 
Jewish opposition to employing them (Ovendale, 1999).   
In September 1928, the Jews started a riot when police removed a wall that they 
had established illegally to separate women and men praying at the Wailing Wall, which 
resulted in the killing of one hundred and thirteen Jews and one hundred and sixteen 
Arabs in one week. The British Inquiry Commission suggested that Jewish immigration 
should be regulated in accordance to the economic capacity of the land of Palestine to 
absorb new arrivals. Britain sent Sir John Hope to Palestine to investigate the question of 
land, and he reported that cultivated land in Palestine was not sufficient to provide for 
the existing population of Arabs and Jews, and that there was no more room for more 
Jewish settlers. This report was the basis of the 1930 Passfield White Paper which 
initiated immigration restrictions. In response, there were anti-British demonstrations 
throughout the Jewish world, so the British government reaffirmed its intention to 
support Jews in creating a national home in Palestine by further settlement and 
immigration (Ovendale, 1999). 
 In January 1933, Aldof Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, and his 
persecution of the Jews increased. The following Zionist Congress in Prague demanded 
that the building of the Jewish national home in Palestine happen more quickly. Jewish 
immigration increased dramatically, and Arabs were alarmed by the numbers of Jewish 
immigrants and by news that Jews were smuggling arms into Palestine, so they ordered a 
general strike. A rebellion broke out and resulted in the death of thirty- eight Britons, 
eighty Jews and one hundred and forty- five Arabs. Following these events, the British 
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disarmed the Arabs and provided the Jews with weapons and trained them to suppress 
possible Arab riots. The British government also sent a commission to investigate the 
causes of the riots. In 1939, the Cabinet approved a policy that states that Palestine 
would be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. Jewish immigration was to be curtailed 
unless the Arabs of Palestine approved it. Zionists were alarmed and replied with a 
series of terrorist attacks targeting both Arabs and Britons; the Stern gang, an 
underground Zionist group assassinated Lord Moyne, the Minister Resident in the 
Middle East. For Britain, plans for the future of Palestine could not be considered in 
such a climate (Ovendale, 1999). 
After losing the sympathy of Britain, Zionists started to focus on the US. The 
identification of Americans with Zionism was not difficult, since Zionism is the attempt 
by European Jews to build a national home in Palestine in somewhat the same way as 
American settlers developed the West. The Arabs were regarded as the aboriginal who 
must go down before the march of progress (Finkelstein, 2003). Besides, the Jews in the 
United States threatened electoral punishments if the US failed to support a Jewish state 
in Palestine. Shortly after the American Zionist Conference in New York in 1942, David 
Ben-Gurion became the successor of Weizmann. He moved away from the gradualist 
approach that Weizmann had been advocating to an activist one and urged that the US 
should be stimulated into supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
Zionists succeeded in preventing the issuance of an Anglo-American statement about the 
question of Palestine, and this left a legacy in the US whereby American Zionist 
pressure groups were capable of changing policies. Zionists started to concentrate on the 
US president and Congressmen. The American Palestine Committee was formed in 
1941, and along with the Zionist Emergency Council, it supported the establishment of a 
Jewish army, unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and the reconstitution of 
Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth (Ovendale, 1999).  
 Zionist attacks against British soldiers in Palestine increased, e.g. five 
British officers were kidnapped, the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was blown up by the 
Irgun and the Haganah, and ninety-one people were killed. Moreover, Zionist terrorists 
murdered twenty British soldiers in an attack on the British Officers' Club in retaliation 
for death sentences passed on Zionist terrorists. These acts resulted in eroding the 
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morale of the British forces and outraged the British public. Consequently, Britain 
decided to withdraw from Palestine and handed the Palestine problem to the United 
Nations without any recommendations for a solution in February 1947 (Ovendale, 
1999).  
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed of 
eleven neutral states. In August 1947, UNSCOP's report suggested partition of Palestine 
into an Arab state and a Jewish state with Jerusalem under international trusteeship. 
Britain would administer the mandate during an interim period and 150,000 refugees 
would be admitted into the Jewish state. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly 
voted for partition. The Arabs refused to accept the partition plan, for before 1947 the 
Jews owned less than 10% of the land of Palestine and were less than a third of the 
population, but the plan gave them 55% of the land, including the most strategic areas 
(Ovendale, 1999). 
 Britain decided to withdraw as soon as possible due to continuing violence 
against British soldiers in Palestine. The British mandate over Palestine ended on the 
14
th
 of May 1948, and on the same day David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment 
of Israel, a Jewish state in Palestine. On the following day, Arab armies from Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon and Iraq entered Palestine. The combined Arab armies amounted to 
around 40,000 men; only 10,000 of them were trained. Zionists had 30,000 trained 
soldiers, 10,000 others for local defence and 25,000 in a home guard. In addition, there 
were 2,000 experienced terrorists in the Irgun and 800 in the Stern gangs. After the 
outbreak of war, each side suffered at least 1,200 casualties. The British forces tried not 
to get involved, but they arranged a ceasefire in order to evacuate civilians from conflict 
areas and to withdraw their troops. Haganah utilised information of the British 
withdrawal effectively to control Haifa. Most of the Arab population of 100,000 was 
terrorised by Zionists into leave their homes and their lands (Ovendale, 1999).  
The Irgun and Stern gang, under the Haganah command, attacked Arab villages 
and drove their inhabitants from them by force; for example, by the time Jaffa 
surrendered to the Jews only 3,000 of its Arab population of 70,000 remained. When 
they encountered resistance in the village of Deir Yasin, they murdered two hundred and 
forty- five men, women and children. In retaliation, Arabs besieged a Jewish medical 
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convoy, and killed seventy- seven doctors and nurses. The United Nations interfered and 
arranged a four-week truce, which the Israeli army used to turn itself into a modern 
fighting force with help from Europe.  
 Arabs increased their forces, but did nothing to improve their capabilities. When 
they started fighting again, the Israelis were largely successful. In February 1949, an 
armistice was signed in Rhodes between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Israel gained 
21% more land than the UN Partition Plan, covering almost 80% of the area of the 
Palestine mandate. As a result of Zionists' expulsions of Arab populations from villages 
during the war and not allowing them to return, the number of Palestinian refugees 
amounted to almost one million in 1949. Most Arab refugees moved to refugee camps in 
Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli government encouraged Jews from 
neighbouring Middle East countries to move to Israel; hence, more than 567,000 Jews 
from the Middle East and North Africa settled in Israel. Arabs resorted to economic 
strategies against Israel such as closing the Suez Canal and oil pipelines to Israel. 
However, these steps did little damage to Israel.  
Disappointed Arab peoples had a growing sense of Arab nationalism as a result 
of the profound sense of injustice they felt after losing part of their land. The defeat in 
war led to upheavals in many Arab countries, starting with Syria in March 1949. In 1950 
Nasser headed the Free Officers' Executive Committee in Egypt, and in July 1952 they 
seized power in a coup. General Mohammed Naguib became president, but in 1954 he 
was replaced by Nasser, and in the same year Britain and Egypt signed an agreement 
stating that British troops would withdraw from Egypt within twenty months. This 
agreement marked a significant decline in British dominance in the Middle East.   
In December 1954, Britain moved its headquarters from the Suez Canal Zone to 
Cyprus. Israel raided Gaza in February 1955, so Nasser decided to increase Egypt's 
armament immediately and to build the Aswan Dam to provide electricity. He turned to 
the West for a loan, but America and Britain refused and so, he nationalised the Suez 
Canal Company to use its revenues to finance the dam. Britain and France were 
determined to respond with resolution, and Paris invited Israel for discussions. In 
October 1956, Israel launched a full-scale attack on Egypt as an independent action, but 
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the attack did not reach the Suez Canal area. In November the UN demanded a ceasefire, 
and Israel agreed to withdraw.   
After the war, Israel gained the sympathy of the American administration and 
Britain and was able to enhance its international status as well as its domestic and 
military development. After the end of the 1956 War, Nasser became convinced that he 
needed to maintain peace on the borders with Israel. He declared a union between Egypt 
and Syria in February 1958, under the name of the United Arab Republic, but Syrian 
independence was proclaimed in September 1959. In 1964, a Palestine conference was 
organised in Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed 
with the aim of uniting all expatriate Palestinians. Nasser offered the PLO Egyptian 
instructors and equipment but still, he believed that a war between Arabs and Israel was 
not possible as Arabs lacked weapons and training.  
The West was unaware of the plight of Palestinian refugees whose number had 
reached two million by 1967. Jews in the US and Europe enjoyed distinguished 
positions as university professors, film directors, actors, authors, editors, publishers, 
managers of leading businesses, etc. Zionist propaganda succeeded in making the 
Western public forget Jewish terrorism against British and Arabs in Palestine, and made 
them rally support for Jews and their new state in Israel. American cinema tackled issues 
of anti-Semitism and at the same time depicted Arabs as devious, sadistic and 
treacherous. Nasser's anti-Western propaganda alienated him and Arabs from Western 
sympathies, and the Western public regarded Jews as Nasser's victims. Western media 
gave wide coverage to Israel, little to Arab states and none at all to Palestinian refugees. 
Thanks to Western aid, the Israeli economy grew rapidly, and Israel became an 
industrial and successful agricultural country.  
Israel increased its military force substantially and was prepared to face attacks 
on all its borders simultaneously and developed nuclear technology with French help. 
The whole population was provided with military training and was ready to bear arms in 
war. In the beginning of 1967, Israel was in a much stronger military position than the 
Arabs. Although Arab armies had modern weapons, they lacked proper training; they 
also lacked an effective defence strategy and lost the propaganda war in the West. Israeli 
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and Syrian forces clashed at the beginning of 1967. Syria and Jordan criticised Nasser 
for not doing anything against Israel. Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping 
in May, and Israel interpreted this as an act of aggression. In response, on the 5
th
 of June, 
Israeli planes destroyed the Egyptian air force, and Israeli forces advanced into Egyptian 
territories. By the 8
th
 of June, Israel gained control over the area from Gaza to the Suez 
Canal down to Sharm El-Sheikh. On the 7
th
 of June, Jordan had conceded Arab 
Jerusalem, Nablus, Jericho and the rest of the West Bank; nonetheless, Israel managed to 
drive the Jordanian forces out of the West Bank and occupied it. Israel also seized the 
Golan Heights from Syria by the 10
th
 of June. In the Six Day War of 1967, Israel lost 
1,000 men and Arabs lost 18,000 (Ovendale, 1999). 
 After the Six Day War, great powers soon interfered; Russia made good 
the military losses of the Arabs, and the US compensated Israel. The Palestinian refugee 
question started to gain world recognition. On the 22
nd
 of November 1967, the UN 
Security Council issued ‗Resolution 242‘ which provided for "just and lasting peace" 
within "secure recognised boundaries" and Israel was to withdraw "from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict." After the defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser worked on 
obtaining the most up-to-date Russian weapons, along with technical assistance and 
training. He started the War of Attrition to prevent de facto new borders of Israel being 
formed which included Sinai. Egypt was sustaining considerable losses, with more than 
10,000 killed. Therefore, Nasser agreed to the American-sponsored ceasefire on the 23
rd
 
of July 1970.  
The Palestinians in Jordan refused King Hussein's attempts to achieve a 
settlement with Israel and tried unsuccessfully to assassinate him in June and again in 
September 1970. After he survived both attempts, fighting broke out between the 
Palestinians and the Jordanian army. In the same year, the Marxist Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine hijacked an aircraft to Dawson Field, near Amman, and 
demanded the release of Palestinians held in Israeli, British and western jails. When 
western countries refused, they blew up the aircraft. In response, Hussein attacked 
Palestinian concentrations north of Jordan, killed thousands of Palestinians and moved 
the remaining Palestinians to Lebanon. In Syria, Hafiz Al-Asad attacked Palestinian 
refugee camps and moved them to Lebanon in 1971.  
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In 1972, eight Palestinian militants held eleven Israeli athletes hostage in Munich 
at the Olympic Village and demanded the release of two hundred Palestinian prisoners. 
The rescue operation resulted in the death of the eleven hostages and four of the captors. 
In response, Israel attacked Syria and Lebanon killing five hundred people. This incident 
was followed by a number of attacks organised by Palestinian militant groups against 
embassies and airliners in a number of countries, e.g. Palestinian militants hijacked some 
airliners and killed thirty-four American passengers in Rome Airport. In response, Israel 
shot down a Libyan airliner over Sinai killing all of its one hundred and six passengers 
(Philo & Berry, 2004).   
On the 28
th
 of September 1970, Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar El-
Sadat who obtained arms for Egypt from Moscow and tried to improve relations with 
Washington. He thought that war was the only way of achieving a settlement in the 
Middle East and getting the great powers to consider the Arab predicament. When 
preparing for war, Sadat had to consider Israel's air, technological and tactical 
superiority. He tried to achieve Arab unity and to win the support of different trends in 
the Arab world. Cairo started to send signals denoting that war was not imminent to 
benefit from the element of surprise.  
On the 6
th
 of October 1973, conditions were favourable for crossing the Suez 
Canal. It was also Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement and the Muslim fasting 
month of Ramadan. The Arab operation was well planned, and it achieved tremendous 
success. After four days of Israeli reverses, Washington started to make good the Israeli 
losses. On the 17
th
 of October, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporters decided to 
reduce oil production. Most Arab countries embargoed oil for the US after $2.2 billion 
was approved as emergency aid for Israel. On the 20
th
 of October, the US and Russia 
drafted a ceasefire agreement based on the implementation of UN ‗Resolution 242‘ and 
negotiations for just durable peace in the Middle East. The agreement was accepted by 
both sides on the 22
nd
 of October. However, the Israeli army violated the ceasefire and 
encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal; thus, another 
ceasefire was affected on the 24
th
 of October.  
A new movement, known as "political Messianism," started in Israel in the 
Seventies to link religion to policies of annexation. In 1975, Israel started a new policy 
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of settlement on the West Bank leading to annexation. In January 1976, the UN Security 
Council issued a resolution affirming the rights of the Palestinian people to establish a 
state, but it was vetoed by the US. In November 1977, Sadat announced that he was 
willing to go to the Knesset to negotiate peace with Israel. He offered Israel recognition 
and permanent peace in return for withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories 
including Arab Jerusalem, recognition for Palestinian statehood and secure boundaries 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours. On the 26
th
 of March 1979, Sadat and Begin 
signed a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. Arab reaction to the 
agreement was hostile; the Arab League imposed a political and economic boycott on 
Egypt and moved its headquarters to Tunis (Ovendale, 1999). 
In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees made significant changes, as they changed the 
ratio of Christian to Muslim population which was the basis of the Lebanese 
government. The Lebanese society became divided which resulted in the outbreak of the 
civil war in 1975. The conflict was solved by a ceasefire agreement in October 1976, 
and a deterrent Arab, predominantly Syrian, peacekeeping force was appointed. In 
March 1978, the PLO raided Israel from South Lebanon, and the Israeli forces 
responded by a massive attack into the Lebanese territories and a United Nations force 
(UNIFIL) was deployed  to South Lebanon.  
 In June 1982, there was an attempt to shoot the Israeli ambassador in London, 
which Israel used as a pretext to invade Lebanon. Israeli forces bombed PLO targets and 
reached West Beirut. Israel also destroyed eighty Syrian aircraft and damaged SAM 
missile sites.  Beirut was besieged and bombed for two months in 1982, which left 
18,000 people dead and 30,000 wounded- most of the casualties were civilians. Israel 
said that it would end the siege only if the PLO fighters, numbered 9,000, along with the 
Syrian troops in Lebanon surrendered and left Lebanon; thus, the PLO headquarters 
moved from Beirut to Tunis. A multinational peacekeeping force was deployed to 
Beirut. Phalangist militia and the Israelis surrounded Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra 
and Shatila and massacred about 2,000 civilian Palestinian refugees which resulted in 
international condemnation (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Ovendale, 1999). 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon resulted in great dissent inside Israel; moreover, 
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it triggered strong international condemnation of Israel, weakened the Israeli and 
American presence in Lebanon and strengthened the Syrian role. President Regan 
proposed a peace plan between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it was rejected by 
both sides. The Arabs proposed another peace plan which was rejected by Israel. In 
September 1985, three Israelis were killed by PLO members in Cyprus. Israel retaliated 
by bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunis in October, killing fifty- eight Palestinians 
and fifteen Tunisians. Consequently, members of militant Palestinian groups hijacked a 
TWA airliner and became involved in shootings in airport lounges in Rome and Vienna. 
Moreover, members of the PLF hijacked the cruise ship ‗Achille Lauro‘ and killed an 
elderly Jewish passenger. The escalation of violence and terrorism between both sides 
attracted world attention (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).  
 The Palestinian Intifada or Uprising started in December 1987, in a climate of 
prevailing frustration among Palestinians due to the practises of the Israeli occupation 
which dominated all aspects of their lives, the expansion of settlements and violence 
against them. In addition, they were frustrated with the failure of Arab governments in 
addressing their problems and the failure of the PLO to achieve self-determination for 
the Palestinian people. The Palestinians started an unorganised and unarmed uprising 
when Israeli tanks went through a line of cars, killing four Palestinians and wounding 
seven others. Israel used excessive force to try to curb the uprising, which resulted in the 
death of more than one hundred and fifty people and the wounding of over 11,500; 
furthermore, tough measures were taken, such as imposing curfews, closing universities 
and colleges, arrests, demolishing houses, breaking the bones of stone throwers, etc.  
The Intifada succeeded in drawing world attention to the situation of the 
Palestinians, due to the killing of so many people. In November 1989, the International 
Red Cross revealed that eight hundred Palestinians had been killed by Israeli security 
forces during the Intifada, two hundred of whom were children. Besides, 16,000 were 
imprisoned, and 1,100 were held in administrative detention. Moreover, three hundred 
Palestinian homes were demolished or confiscated. At the same time, Israel was still 
expanding settlements, expropriating properties and encouraging Israeli citizens to settle 
in the occupied territories. By the end of 1987, 55% of the West Bank and 30% of Gaza 
had been expropriated by Israel. In November 1988, the UN General Assembly issued a 
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resolution condemning Israeli oppression in the occupied territories and violations of 
Palestinians‘ human rights, by a vote of 130:2 (the two being Israel and USA). Arafat 
and the PLO tried to take credit for the Intifada, and to use it to establish a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and Gaza (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Hirst, 2003). 
 Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) started in Gaza and it established a 
large number of medical and educational institutions to serve the impoverished 
Palestinian community. These services increased in popularity among Palestinians. 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin became prominent as the founder and leader of Hamas. In mid 
November 1988 during an Arab League summit in Algiers, the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC), which is the Parliament of the PLO in exile, proclaimed the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and thirty- seven nations extended 
recognition to the Palestinian state within three days. Israel and USA rejected the 
declaration. The PNC announced that it accepted a two- state solution and that the 
Palestinians would limit their struggle to Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 
1967, i.e. 22% of the historical land of Palestine. Furthermore, the PLO implicitly 
recognised Israel. A group of American Jews met with PLO representatives in 
Stockholm in December 1988 and issued the Stockholm declaration which involved the 
A Zionist commission, headed by Weizmann, was sent to Palestine, as it felt it was 
necessary to put the Balfour Declaration into practise (Ovendale, 1999).PLO‘s  
recognition of Israel and condemnation of violence (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005). 
Arafat was to outline a peace proposal at the UN General Assembly, but he was 
denied a visa to enter the USA; hence, the UN General Assembly convened in Geneva 
where Arafat detailed his peace plan. Shamir announced that Israel was not ready to talk 
to the PLO. Arafat announced that the PLO accepted the UN ‗Resolution 242‘ and 
‗Resolution 338‘ which involved recognising the state of Israel and its right to exist and 
so the USA announced that it would open dialogue with the PLO. In May 1989, the US 
proposed a peace plan, and the Egyptian president represented the PLO in preliminary 
dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In March 1990, the Knesset passed a 
vote of no-confidence against Shamir‘s government, and no other government was 
formed through May which resulted in a complete halt to peace efforts. The Intifada was 
provoked again after an Israeli soldier killed seven Palestinians in Tel Aviv, and Arafat 
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called on the Palestinian people to step up protests (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Hirst, 
2003). 
The cold war had ended by 1990, and the Soviet Union collapsed in December 
1991. The new situation enhanced Israel‘s capabilities compared to the Arabs who 
obtained arms from the former Soviet Union. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, 
which raised the worries of industrial countries, especially the US, about the future of oil 
supplies from the Gulf. Massive multinational forces, led by the US, were immediately 
deployed. The US-led coalition launched operation ―Desert Storm,‖ on the 16th of 
January 1991, and President Bush announced the liberation of Kuwait on the 27
th
 of 
February. The Gulf War crisis distracted the world‘s attention from the Palestinian 
Intifada. Moreover, it weakened the Palestinians‘ position for supporting Saddam 
Hussein, and PLO credibility was severely eroded. Furthermore,  PLO funding 
diminished considerably (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).  
The Gulf War and conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia decreased attention 
to the Intifada. Israel took advantage of the situation to crack down harder on the 
Palestinians. The US increased pressures on Israel and Arab states to hold an 
international peace conference in Madrid in October 1991. It did not achieve much 
progress, as old positions were reiterated. In June 1992, Yitzhak Rabin formed a Labour-
led coalition Israeli government. He freed eight hundred political prisoners, halted 
settlement activities, and called for ‗land for peace‘. In January 1993, secret talks 
between the PLO and Israeli officials started in Oslo in which they agreed the main 
points of a framework for peace (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005). 
Under the sponsorship of President Clinton, on the 13
th
 of September 1993, 
Rabin and Arafat signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government for the 
Palestinians. The PLO and Israel recognised each other‘s existence and agreed to work 
together for peace. The peace process was seen as a great breakthrough by most people. 
However, agreement between both sides was not easy. The Palestinians regarded the 
peace process as a first step towards a Palestinian state, but Israel viewed it as a step 
towards Palestinian self-rule without any sovereignty; therefore, negotiators on both 
sides failed to conclude details of the agreement. In fact, Israel and the Palestinians did 
not have the same negotiating power, as Israel was the controller of all aspects of 
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Palestinians‘ lives and the historical ally of the US – the formal sponsor of the peace 
process. Hirst (2003) holds that during the peace process, Israel‘s ‗right to exist in peace 
and security‘ took precedence over the Palestinians‘ right to continue the struggle for 
their rights. Roy (1986) remarks that the most significant feature of the Oslo process is 
the abandonment of international law in favor of bilateral negotiations between two 
parties of grossly unequal power; therefore, Oslo agreements overwhelmingly reflect 
Israeli interests and concerns. 
Negotiations led to finalising the ―Gaza-Jericho First‖ agreement of interim self-
rule for the Palestinians, signed in Cairo in May 1994. After the signing, Israel withdrew 
from Jericho and Gaza, and the Palestinians began to take control of internal affairs. 
Palestinian militant groups escalated violence after signing the accord. In response, 
Israel stopped taking further steps to implement it and started to take measures to 
separate the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. Attacks by Palestinian militants 
undermined Arafat‘s authority, so he started to use extreme measures such as court 
martial against Palestinians accused of attacks against Israel. Palestinian and Israeli 
negotiators continued their discussions and agreed to increase the power of the 
Palestinians to areas such as industry and trade. They signed another agreement known 
as the Taba Accord or Oslo II in Egypt in September 1995. In November, a Jewish 
extremist assassinated Rabin. Peres formed a new government and worked on 
implementing Oslo Accords. The Palestinians elected Arafat president and elected 
members of the Legislative Council. The Israeli assassinations of leaders of two 
Palestinian groups provoked revenge attacks against Israel. Peres stopped peace 
negotiations and sealed off the Palestinian territories (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).  
In March 1996, Hizbullah militants in South Lebanon attacked an Israeli military 
post killing seven, and in April they fired two missiles on North Israel wounding thirty-
six. Israel responded by sending warplanes to Lebanon, destroying Lebanon‘s 
infrastructure, killing two hundred civilians and wounding thousands. In April, Israel 
shelled a UN shelter in Qana killing more than one hundred civilians. The Israeli 
operation triggered wide international criticism and alienated Israel from its allies in the 
Arab world. Peres announced early elections in Israel in May 1996. Benjamin 
Netanyahu became Israel‘s Prime Minister. He opposed the Palestinian statehood and 
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lifted the freeze on building new settlements which meant the expropriation of more 
Palestinian land. Peace negotiations came to a halt after Netanyahu‘s decision to expand 
settlements in Jerusalem and after a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in March 1997. 
Violence and repeated Israeli closures resulted in significant harm to the Palestinian 
economy. Netanyahu authorised an assassination attempt against a Hamas leader in 
Amman. The attempt failed, and King Hussein demanded the release of Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas who  was imprisoned in Israel, in return for the 
agents who attempted the assassination. Israel refused to implement the Oslo Accords, 
and the US made a new proposal for peace which the Palestinians accepted and the 
Israelis rejected. Clinton was distracted by the Lewinsky affair (Bickerton & Klausner, 
2005). 
Eventually, Israeli and Palestinian delegations met at Wye River. Slow and 
difficult negotiations resulted in the Wye River Agreement which was signed in October 
1998. Netanyahu refused to implement any articles of the agreement due to internal 
problems. The Knesset voted to dissolve the government and decided that new elections 
be held in May 1999. Ehud Barak, leader of the Labour Party, won the elections. He did 
not show willingness to make progress with the Peace Process. In his first meeting with 
Clinton, Barak expressed his wish to wrap up the Wye River Agreement into final status 
talks. This was not welcomed by the Palestinians, as the move to final status talks 
without the agreed withdrawal could mean more Palestinian concessions on the most 
controversial issues of settlements, refugees and Jerusalem (Hammami & Tamari, 2001). 
Under American sponsorship, the Sharm El Sheikh Agreement was signed to set 
out a timetable for a final peace settlement by September 2000. Final Status talks were 
very difficult, as both sides were unwilling to compromise on any of the sensitive issues, 
and both were pressurised domestically not to make compromises. The Palestinians 
demanded the dismantling of settlements, a state in the West Bank and Gaza, and the 
return of about three million refugees, but Israel refused. President Clinton invited 
Arafat and Barak for a summit at Camp David, but it ended with no resolution. The 
declaration of a Palestinian state which was scheduled for September the 13
th
 was 
postponed which resulted in a strong sense of frustration among the Palestinians. The 
Oslo peace process has not achieved much improvement to the lives of ordinary 
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Palestinians. During the peace process,  the settler community in Gaza and the West 
Bank increased 77%, from 110,000 to 195,000; Israeli settlements and bypass roads 
divided Palestinian territories; and Israeli restrictions made the movement of  
Palestinians from one area to another impossible, not to mention the systematic 
brutalisation and humiliation that the Palestinians had to undergo (Rabbani, 2001). 
During the Oslo period, the Palestinian economy suffered devastating losses, e.g. 
between 1992 and 1996, unemployment increased from 3% to 28%, Gross National 
Product (GNP) declined 18.4%, and per capita GNP declined 37%. This is mainly due to 
Israeli closures of Palestinian territories which restricted the movement of goods and 
labour. What Oslo agreements have granted the Palestinians is a limited self-rule over 
small, noncontiguous, isolated enclaves under Israeli jurisdiction. Under Oslo, there 
were 227 separate Palestinian enclaves under full or partial control of the Palestinian 
Authority. Almost 88% of them are less than 2 kilometers in size. Israel had all key 
resources in Palestinian territories and the territories that were given to the Palestinians 
are those least desirable and least productive economically (Carey, 2001; Searle & 
Adams, 1986). 
On the 28
th
 of September 2000, the second Palestinian Uprising, or Al-Aqsa 
Intifada started with a visit of the Israeli leader of the Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, to the  
Temple Mount or Haram Sharif, a site holy for both Muslims and Jews. Sharon was 
guarded by more than 1,000 Israeli officers, and he pledged that Israel would never give 
up the mount or any part of Jerusalem. This provoked the Palestinians and led to 
demonstrations in Jerusalem immediately after his visit and unrest rapidly extended to 
the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli security forces responded harshly to Palestinian 
demonstrations. The Al-Aqsa Intifada marked the end of the peace process and the 
beginning of a new violent phase of the conflict. Roy holds that the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
emanated from a context of continued occupation and dispossession that characterised 
the Oslo peace process (Searle & Adams, 1986). 
Mutual  escalation of violence has been the pattern since the beginning of the 
second uprising. The death toll increased to over sixty Palestinians in a single week, 
while Israel besieged all the Palestinian territories and shelled the offices of the 
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Palestinian Authority. Despite international calls for calm in the region, the situation 
deteriorated very quickly. Clashes between Arab and Jewish citizens inside Israel 
escalated resulting in the deaths of more people on both sides. Clinton, Arafat and Barak 
held a peace summit in Egypt, but they could not achieve any progress. As the UN 
Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Israel‘s excessive use of force against the 
Palestinians, Barak suspended talks with the Palestinians. Israel started a new tactic of 
targeted killings against Palestinians, euphemistically called ‗surgical strikes.‘ Barak 
declared early elections in Israel in November. Early in December the UN reported that 
the Palestinian economy was ruined since the beginning of the uprising.  
In 2001, Clinton proposed a new peace plan at the end of his presidency, but it 
did not succeed. On the 20
th
 of January, George W. Bush became president of the USA, 
and Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud Party, became Israel‘s Prime Minister in February. 
He ordered a blockade around all the Palestinian territories. Palestinian violence against 
the Israelis escalated, and Israel increased its policy of house demolitions and land 
confiscation for security purposes and for the expansion of settlements in the Palestinian 
territories. An international fact-finding committee led by the former United States 
Senator George J. Mitchell investigated the situation and issued a report calling on Israel 
to freeze settlements and the Palestinians to end ‗terror‘. The Bush administration 
decided to adopt the findings of the Mitchell report. The Palestinians and the Israelis 
accepted the report in principle and agreed to use it as a basis for negotiations, yet 
spiraling violence claiming more lives on both sides did not make negotiations possible. 
Israel increased the scope of assassination operations against Palestinian militants and 
politicians despite US objections and international condemnation. Palestinian militants 
responded with shootings and suicide bombings against Israelis, and Israel in turn 
responded by more incursions and attacks in the Palestinian territories.  
On the 11
th
 of September 2001, hijacked airliners destroyed the World Trade 
Centre and part of the Pentagon. As the world was shocked, Israel raided Jericho on the 
12
th
 of September and the Gaza Strip on the 15
th
 of September. The US, aiming to recruit 
Arab states to a broad war coalition, pressurised Israel for ceasefire talks, but Sharon 
refused and warned of plans to bring a million more Jews to Israel. This provoked more 
Palestinian attacks which in turn resulted in harsher retaliations by Israel  and it barred 
 25 
Arafat from travelling.   
Violence between both sides continued throughout 2002 with more Palestinian 
suicide bombings and Israeli assassinations, arrests, demolitions, closures, deportations, 
etc. Israel and the US blamed Arafat and the Palestinian Authority for the deteriorating 
situation, and the US threatened sanctions against the PA. The Palestinian economy 
collapsed, as the Palestinians were banned from work in Israel, and movement of goods 
between Israel and the Palestinian territories came to a halt.  The first week of March 
2002 witnessed the killing of more than eighty Palestinians and thirty-one Israelis. In 
April, Israel attacked Bethlehem; around two hundred and fourty Palestinians, some of 
them armed, took refuge in the Church of Nativity. Despite international condemnation, 
Israel besieged the church, and snipers targeted Palestinians inside the church killing 
seven and seriously injuring a priest. Finally, an agreement was reached to end the 
thirty-eight- day siege, with the exile of thirteen militants the deportation of twenty-six 
to Gaza for trial. Israeli forces undertook a major incursion in the West Bank and 
targeted the Jenin refugee camp with air and ground raids, killing more than one hundred 
and twenty-four Palestinians and wounding more than three hundred and thirty-seven 
others. Israel was strongly criticised by the international community and blocked a UN 
fact finding mission to Jenin. President Bush announced the ―Road Map‖ plan for Peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians in which he called for calm between both sides and 
envisaged a Palestinian state after three years.  
According to Amnesty International, violence between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis in 2002 resulted in the killing of more than one thousand Palestinians, including 
around one hundred and fifty children at the hands of Israeli forces. Moreover, about 
thirty-five Palestinians were assassinated in targeted killings. On the other hand, more 
than four hundred and twenty Israelis, at least two hundred and sixty-five of them 
civilians including forty-seven children, were killed in suicide bombings and other 
attacks by Palestinian armed groups. About two thousand Palestinian homes were 
destroyed, and thousands of Palestinians were arrested (Amnesty International Report, 
2003). 
Violence and counter violence continued throughout 2003. Israel closed 
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Palestinian universities and started to build a security fence around the Palestinian 
territories in the West Bank despite strong international criticisms. In April the new 
international Road Map was announced, but mutual violence hindered its 
implementation. The UN issued a resolution calling on Israel to tear down the West 
Bank security fence, but Israel decided to ignore it. In November, the EU formally 
condemned the West Bank fence, and the UN Secretary General declared Israel in 
violation of international law for flouting a UN resolution calling for dismantling the 
fence. Amnesty International reports that in 2003 Israel killed more than six hundred 
Palestinians, including more than one hundred children, most of them killed in raids and 
incursions. Palestinian armed groups killed two hundred Israelis, including twenty-one 
children. Israeli restrictions resulted in unprecedented poverty, unemployment and 
health problems among the Palestinians. Israel also continued house demolition and the 
destruction of Palestinian cultivated land.  
In 2004 Ariel Sharon revealed a unilateral disengagement plan which involved 
withdrawal from all Israeli settlements in Gaza in return for formally annexing all 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank. On the 22
nd
 of March, Israel assassinated Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas in an air strike. On the 25
th
 of 
March, the US blocked a UN resolution condemning Israel's assassination of Sheikh 
Yassin. His successor, Dr. Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi, was also assassinated by Israel in 
April. Hamas decided to keep the identity of its new leader secret, as Israel threatened to 
assassinate any Hamas leader. Ariel Sharon warned that Yasser Arafat could be the next 
Palestinian leader to be assassinated by Israel. In July, the World Court called Israel's 
West Bank barrier, a de facto land grab and ordered Israel to tear it down and 
compensate Palestinian victims. Ariel Sharon rejected the ruling and claimed that it 
encouraged terrorists. Arafat became seriously ill, and the Israeli government permitted 
him to be flown to Paris for medical treatment, but he died on the 11
th
 of November and 
was buried in Ramallah. During 2004, eight hundred and twenty-one Palestinians, 
including one hundred and seventy-six children were killed by Israeli forces, and one 
hundred and eight Israelis, including eight children were killed by Palestinian militants.  
In 2005, Mahmoud Abbas became the Palestinian president. A suicide bomber 
killed six Israelis in Gaza, and Israel announced suspending all contact with Abbas in 
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response. Israel confirmed that the government was continuing its expansion of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem's city council ordered the mass demolition 
of the homes of about one thousand Palestinians in a neighbourhood claimed by Jewish 
settlers. In August 2005, settlers started to evacuate settlements in the Gaza Strip, as 
Israel bombed targets in Gaza and raided West Bank towns. Sharon resigned as Prime 
Minister and set up the new Kadima party. 
At the beginning of 2006, the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered a massive 
stroke, which left him in a coma. Ehud Olmert succeeded him as prime minister and 
leader of Kadima party. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) won Palestinian 
parliamentary elections, and both Fatah and Hamas formed a coalition government, with 
Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas as Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah as 
President. Immediately after Hamas‘ victory, Israel ruled out working with Hamas or the 
Palestinian government. The U.S. and the EU, which brand Hamas as a terrorist group, 
stopped financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Israel imposed closures on Palestinian 
territories especially in Gaza where socioeconomic conditions deteriorated significantly, 
and the population became increasingly reliant on food aid.  
Israel destroyed Hamas offices and arrested Hamas ministers and Members of  
Parliament in response to a Palestinian raid in which elements from Hamas were 
involved. In June 2006, Palestinian militants raided an Israeli military post near Gaza 
killing three soldiers and kidnapping one. Militant groups holding the Israeli soldier 
refused to release him without a prisoner exchange agreement. This resulted in violent 
Israeli reactions including several incursions and raids against Gaza. All crossings to 
Gaza were closed which resulted in a humanitarian crisis and severe shortage in food 
and medicines. In November, the UN Security Council issued a resolution condemning 
Israeli attacks on Gaza, but it was vetoed by the US. Violence between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians which marked the long history of the conflict is still persistent until the 
time of writing this thesis. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict affects much more than the Israelis and the 
Palestinians; it affects the world as a whole. Its impacts are much wider than the 
immediate casualties on both sides. The conflict is generally perceived as one of the 
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most intractable conflicts in modern history. It can be argued that the conflict is one of 
the main factors that affects the relationship between  Arabs and the West. Historical 
sympathies and perceptions of different sides of the conflict have always been prominent 
elements that fuel tensions and underline differences between both sides. The following 
section deals with another aspect of the context which is perceptions of Israel and the 
Palestinians held in the West. In order to understand the representation of conflict in 
Arab and Western newspapers, it is important to consider how both sides of the conflict 
are perceived, the origins of these perceptions and their implications on the 
representation of the conflict. The perceptions of the Israelis and the Palestinians have 
been affected by the long history of rivalry between Islam and the West, especially that 
the Zionist ideology is based on Western ideals while the Palestinians are perceived as 
Arabs.  
1.3 Perceptions of Israel and the Palestinians in the West 
The relationship between Islam and the West is old and complex. It has long 
been regarded as a relationship of rivalry. Hitti (1962) traces it back to the emergence of 
Islam which posed a threat to the Christian West since its appearance, due to  Muslim 
Arab conquests of the territories of the Christian Byzantine neighbours. Therefore fear, 
hostility, and prejudice are the main factors that shaped the Western view of Islam. The 
Christian West regarded Muslims as the enemies and their beliefs as false. The negative 
image of Islam in the West was further distorted by medieval writings, Crusaders‘ 
literature, and by the writings of some Eastern Christians like St. John of Damascus who 
depicted Islam as an idolatrous worship of a false prophet. 
The Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula caused more hostility towards 
Islam that was clear in the writings of Spanish Christian theologians who distorted the 
image of Islam by introducing invented stories. After the failure of the Crusades, a new 
movement emerged to win the war against Islam by persuasion rather than conflict 
through Western missionaries. However, the activities of missionaries failed to achieve 
any success among Muslims, for it was very difficult to inculcate Christian Trinitarian 
doctrine in the minds of Unitarian Muslims. While the Western world was waging this 
war of words on Islam, the Islamic world was largely unaware of it and uninterested in 
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it. Muslims were blinded by what they regarded as their superiority and paid relatively 
little attention to the West. They apparently failed even to realise that they were 
scientifically and technologically surpassed by the West until after the French invasion 
of 1798.  
 Translations of the Qur‘an were attempted or commissioned by Christian 
scholars with the aim of promoting Christian knowledge. The first attempt was to 
translate it into Latin in France in 1141, and it was supplemented by ‗a refutation of the 
beliefs of the Mohammedans‘. This Latin translation was then translated into English 
and French. In the eighteenth century, traders and travellers to the Islamic world 
reported their journeys and helped refute some of the prevailing medieval fallacies, yet 
their attempts were encountered by more attacks on Islam by Christian missionaries.  
When the Ottomans ceased to be a threat to Europe and when trade and travel 
between the West and the Ottoman Empire increased, Oxford University created a Chair 
in Arabic and appointed Edward Pocock who lived in Syria and had first-hand 
experience with the Arabic language and Islam in the job. Pocock translated and edited a 
number of books about Islam and criticised the largely imaginary stories about Islam and 
Mohammed. Historians and philosophers were more perceptive in their treatment of 
Islam than literary writers and theologians; however, their knowledge of Islam was 
impaired by the fact that many of them were ignorant of the Arabic language. They 
treated medieval stories about Islam and Mohammed with some skepticism though. The 
translation of the Arabian Nights and their popularity among Westerners opened a new 
window to the Orient. Along with travel literature, the tales from the Orient made the 
world of Islam look more colourful, wonderful and mysterious and brought it nearer to 
the minds and hearts of Westerners. This new image of the Orient resulted in certain 
perceptions that later came under much criticism from the proponents of Orientalism. 
Orientalism is a very important concept that changed drastically in a relatively 
short period. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the word ‗‗orientalist‘ referred 
to ―a scholar versed in the language and literature of the orient (Turkey, Syria, Palestine, 
Mesopotamia, and Arabia, later also India, China and Japan, and even the whole of 
Asia)‖. Then, in the 1960s, the meaning of the word  changed, due to the critiques of 
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some scholars mostly  of Middle Eastern origins. The term ‗orientalism‘ came to acquire 
a number of new critical senses including: ―a corporate institution designed for dealing 
with the Orient; a partial view of the Islam; an instrument of Western imperialism; a 
style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between the 
orient and the occident‖ (Macfie, 2000: 1-2). 
  This transformation which turned the word ‗Orientalism‘ to one of the most 
highly charged words in modern scholarship came about as a result of the critiques of 
four scholars who adopted a critical attitude towards the representation of the Orient in 
the West. The most influential of these critiques was that of Edward Said, Orientalism 
(1978) in which he criticises Orientalism as ―a cumulative and corporate identity‖, and a 
―saturating hegemonic system.‖ Said argues that orientalists ‗created the Orient,‘ which 
is based on a number of stereotypical images, according to which ―Europe (the West, the 
‗self‘) is seen as rational, developed, humane, superior, authentic, active, creative and 
masculine, while the Orient (the East, the ‗other‘) … is seen as being irrational, aberrant, 
backward, crude, despotic, inferior, inauthentic, passive, feminine, and sexually 
corrupt.‖ Orientalism contributed to the creation of other concepts like an Arab mind, an 
oriental psyche, and an Islamic society. Together they contributed to the construction of 
a saturating hegemonic system that is designed to promote European imperialism and 
colonialism (Macfie, 2000: 4). 
In Orientalism, Said describes the ‗imaginative geography‘ that divides the 
Orient and the Occident which is not a natural division, but rather a human production 
(Boer, 2003). He argues that ―the Orient was almost a European invention, and had been 
since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, 
remarkable experiences‖ (Said, 1978: 12). He emphasises Orientalism as a discourse 
dealing with the Orient, which the West used to describe it, teach it, authorise views of 
it, and rule over it. Said regards this discourse as necessary for understanding the 
discipline by which ―European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the 
Orient during the post-Enlightenment period.‖ He also holds that continued investment 
made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for 
filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness. He also argues that Orientalist 
discourse divides the world into a conceptually evolving, modern, and superior 
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Occidental ‗‗us‘‘ versus a static, backward, and weakened Oriental ‗‗them‘‘ 
(Semmerling, 2006: 5-6). Orientalism can be viewed as a western style for dominating, 
restructuring and influencing authority over the Orient, and in this way Orientalist 
discourse is representative of the pattern of relative strength between East and West. 
Moreover, Orientalism has been a very important approach not only  in understanding 
the Orient, but also  in understanding Western culture and thought; ‗‗Orientalism is – 
and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-
intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‗our‘ 
world‘ (Said, 1978: 12).  
Other prominent critiques of Orientalism include those of Anouar Abdel-Malek 
who criticised Orientalism as ―an instrument of imperialism designed to secure the 
colonisation and enslavement of parts of the so-called Third World”; Tibawi who 
criticised Orientalism as ―a mode of understanding and interpreting Islam and Arab 
nationalism‖ with the aim of achieving ‗a better understanding of an old problem;‘ and 
Turner who criticised Orientalism as ―a justification for a syndrome of beliefs, attitudes 
and theories, affecting the geography, economics and sociology of the Orient.‖ These 
critiques, along with Said‘s, had a revolutionary impact on Western thought and outlook 
which resulted in the re-evaluation of many values and concepts. Consequently, the 
word ‗Orientalism‘ which once stood as a positive term came to be used negatively as a 
type of radicalism or imperialism (Macfie, 2000: 2-4).  
Orientalism has alerted the West to negative representations of the Orient, but it 
has not changed them significantly. Muslims and Arabs are regarded by many 
Westerners as the ‗Other‘, and they typically have a negative image in Western 
mentality. Ghareeb (1977: 17) argues that ―most Americans picture Arabs as 
‗backward,‘ ‗scheming,‘ ‗fanatic terrorists,‘ who are dirty, dishonest, oversexed and 
corrupt.‖ These negative stereotypes have been present in the West for centuries, and 
they are clearly noticed in the way Arabs are depicted in popular culture, e.g. in movies 
and novels where they still appear in negative images and roles. Shaheen examines the 
representations of Arabs on American television and argues that ―on television 
entertainment programs and documentaries the Arab is depicted as pimp, cheat, and 
backstabber ... All the worst possible images of the Arab, from the blood-feuding 
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Bedouin to the oil blackmailer, are offered‖ (Shaheen, 1977: 164).  
Although negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims in the West existed long 
before the creation of Israel, they have been further aggravated with the creation of the 
state of Israel in 1948, especially in the USA. Ghareeb holds that ―the American public 
today generally sees Israel as ‗little,‘ ‗brave,‘ ‗beleaguered,‘ ‗heroic,‘ while Arab nations 
are seen as ‗backward,‘ ‗ignorant,‘ and ‗bloodthirsty‘‖ (1977: vi). After the 1967 War, 
the Arab image was further distorted by stereotypes of the ‗bumbling, cowardly Arab‘; 
later, this image was replaced by that of an ―Arab terrorist.‖ Little holds that ―for 
Americans Israel‘s military triumph in June 1967 completed the transformation of Jews 
from victims to victors while branding the Arabs as feckless, reckless, and weak‖ (Little, 
2004: 48). Moreover, the 1973 War and Arab oil embargo gave rise to another image, 
i.e. the super-rich Arab sheikh who controls world oil and intimidates the West by 
threatening its oil supplies. All the negative stereotypes of Arabs persist in the US; 
however, there is now an increasing awareness of the Orientalist origins of these 
stereotypes.  
American Cinema and other forms of popular culture have contributed to 
disseminating negative stereotypes about Arabs. In Reel Bad Arabs, Shaheen explains 
how the American film industry abuses the character of the bad Arab, and he warns that 
―when one ethnic, racial, or religious group is vilified, innocent people suffer‘‘ and 
reminds us that cinema‘s hateful Arab stereotypes are reminiscent of abuses of earlier 
times of characters like Native Americans, blacks, and Jews (Shaheen, 2001: 4). 
Semmerling (2006) uses the American animated series  South Park to show how the 
‗‗evil‘‘ construction of the Arab has gone so far that the character is made more ‗‗evil‘‘ 
than evil itself. As the long time purveyor of evil, terror, and fear in human culture, 
Satan, is a wimp in comparison to this ‗‗evil‘‘ Arab. ―Saddam … is more evil than 
Satan. He is ruthless, uncaring, and selfish. He is oversexed, more sexually impetuous 
than Satan himself.‖ Semmerling links such views to American Orientalism and argues 
that: 
Our latest cultural discourse of national self, since the arrival of George W. Bush‘s 
administration and the events of September 11th, relies upon a world that is no longer 
multicultural, but rather strongly bifurcated between good and evil. The lines have been 
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drawn once again in the latest military endeavor of the United States and its allies against 
the ‗‗evil‘‘ Arabs. The ‗‗evil‘‘ Arabs and the Middle East have become our antithesis, 
and may continue to be so as our national self is more and more compared to the Other 
through the nexus of foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will continue 
to occupy Iraq, Palestinians will persist in struggling for statehood, and al-Qaeda will 
continue its call to attack the United States. Oil will continue to be imported from the 
Arab states, and oil embargoes, some thirty years after the first one, remain a frightening 
thought deep in the American psyche. (Semmerling, 2006: 267) 
On the other hand, the representation of the Israelis in American media generally 
carries positive images, as the Israelis are seen as ‗tough, energetic, hard-working, 
persecuted and courageous people.‖ They are modern pioneers who have made the 
desert bloom and democracy a reality amidst the backward Middle East. Israeli Jews are 
depicted in American media as ―high-minded, altruistic, trustworthy, compassionate, and 
deserving of sympathy and support.‖ These representations resulted in gaining a great 
deal of sympathy for the Israelis among the Americans who came to believe that the best 
course of action for a resolution of the conflict in the Middle East is to empathise with 
the more rational, democratic, and culturally similar Israelis (Ghareeb, 1977).  
Cultural proximity of Israel to the West, especially to the American culture, 
plays an important role in the perceptions of Israel in the USA and the West in general. 
The story of the Israelis settling in Palestine is often compared to the story of the 
American exploration of the West, and the Palestinians are compared to an aboriginal 
people; therefore, the American public identifies with the Israelis. ―Americans tend to 
identify themselves with foreign societies or cultures projecting a pioneering new spirit 
(e.g. Israel) of wrestling the land from ill use of savages‖ (Said, 1981: 64). Also, many 
Jews occupy distinguished positions in Western societies and contribute to these 
societies in many ways. Furthermore, the ideology of Zionism was based on European 
ideologies, and the chief architects of Zionism come from well-established Western 
intellectual traditions and thus, the ideas of Zionism were accessible to Western minds. 
The story of Zionist achievement in Israel has a steady, reassuring pulse to it. It is 
continuous, it is peopled with recognisably human figures who are themselves tied justly 
great and justly famous Jews in the West (Einstein, Freud, Chagall, Rubinstein, and so 
on); it can have a universal validity imputed to or felt in it. The people who speak the 
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narrative represent a world the average Westerner knows. Zionist history as incarnated in 
the narrative or modern Jewish achievements in short is official, or semi-official. Only a 
native or an alien terrorist and troublemaker will feel uncomfortable with it. And indeed 
most Palestinians speaking their history are unlikely to be of (however much they may be 
in) the West. Their language is Arabic; their religion is Islam or Eastern Christianity, 
their culture decidedly un-Western. Whereas for the Israeli Jew it has long been possible 
to describe the agonies of the Holocaust and the restitution provided by the return to 
Zion, for the Palestinians there is no vast historical tragedy of apocalyptic proportion to 
draw on, and certainly no vindicated return (Hitchens & Said, 1988: 6). 
A number of Jews occupy distinguished positions in Western societies, and they 
are familiar with narratives that appeal to Western audiences. This enables them to use 
the weapon of the media to present their cause and their point of view successfully to the 
Western public, while the Palestinians fail to do so, especially since the Israelis have 
used the media to support their Zionist cause. Prominent Israeli figures are often quoted 
in American and other Western media, and their rhetoric is then absorbed and 
transmitted by journalists in various media channels.  The Israelis understand that media 
is a weapon of popular persuasion, and they have always used it skillfully to promote 
and sustain their Zionist cause (Said, 2002). 
It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948 
occurred partly because the Zionists acquired control of most of the territory of Palestine, 
and partly because they had already won the political battle in the international world in 
which ideas, representations, rhetoric, and images were at issue (Hitchens & Said, 1988: 
1). 
On the other hand, the Palestinians have been ineffective in promoting their 
cause, and they failed to influence Western policies or even views regarding the conflict.  
From the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict almost a century ago, Palestinians 
have been particularly ineffective in advancing their own case and attempting to insert 
themselves and their cause into the framework that forms public thought and policy in 
the United States … Palestinian political disorganisation, the lack of a national political 
structure, and the lack of any public-relations effort in the years leading up to Israel‘s 
creation, as well as during the two decades in which Palestinians languished in shock and 
political quiescence following their dispossession and dispersal, have been noted 
(Christison, 1999: 285).  
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American and Western attitudes towards Israel have been influenced by other 
important considerations, such as the history of persecution of Jews in Europe which 
created a sense of guilt in the Western conscience and resulted in great historical 
concessions and apologies, not to mention the ensuing sensitivity towards criticising the 
Jews and Israel, which is often labelled ‗anti-Semitism‘. The Jewish lobbies, the Anti-
Defamation League, among other Jewish institutions in the West play a powerful role in 
the maintenance of a positive image of Israel and the suppression of any criticism of it. 
The ‗Jewish Lobby‘ comprises several organisations like the American Israeli Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Agency for Israel Appeal, the World Zionist 
Organisation, the Jewish Fund, etc. They are dedicated to the support and maintenance of 
the state of Israel. Historically, they have been intolerant of any criticisms to the state of 
Israel and respond to them by ‗anti-Semitism‘ charges and threats to withdraw  their 
support to the American administration in the Congress, in addition to threats of denying 
electoral support in presidential and other elections. Lilienthal argues that ―the mere 
presence of the powerful anti-Defamation League, even before the fearsome ―anti-
Semitic‖ label might be brandished, has imparted sensitivity so powerful as to smother 
any idea of private discussion, let alone public debate, on the grave issues involved‖ 
(1983: 4).  
Anti-Semitism has played an important role in silencing criticisms to Israel; ―the 
resort to charges of anti-Semitism (or in the case of Jews, Jewish self-hatred) to silence 
critics of Israel has been quite a general and often effective device‖ (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1994: 15). In the Holocaust Industry, Norman Finkelstein, an American Jew 
and son of two Holocaust survivors argues that invoking the Holocaust is used to 
delegitimise all criticism of Jews, and that organised Jewry has exploited the Nazi 
holocaust to deflect criticism of Israel and its morally indefensible policies. He explains 
that after the June 1967 war, some American politicians expressed their worries 
concerning Israel‘s occupation of neighbouring Arab states, its militarisation and 
alienation from the Arab world. American Jewish elites responded to critics of Israel by 
evoking memories of the Holocaust and by claiming that Israel did so because of its 
fears of a second Holocaust. Accordingly, Holocaust memory was moved center stage. 
By the 1970s, Jewish leaders warned of a ‗new anti-Semitism‘ which helped them 
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enhance the image of Israel as a last resort for American Jews in case they needed one, 
and also helped them raise funds to combat this new anti-Semitism. In addition, the 
October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was claimed to exacerbate American Jewish fears of 
Israel‘s vulnerability (Finkelstein, 2000).  
After the June 1967 war, American Jews advocated Israel strongly and 
endeavored to represent it as ―America‘s newest strategic asset.‖ They established the 
Israeli-American alliance which is now called ―the special relationship‖ (Finkelstein, 
2000: 20).  This special relationship is based on common biblical heritage; a shared 
belief that because of the Holocaust and earlier centuries of suffering, Jews must have a 
homeland and the US identification with what some have called Israel‘s ‗national style,‘ 
particularly in its pioneering beginnings and its commitment to Western democracy 
(Christison, 1999). Additionally, Israel has historically served as a symbol of US 
domination and supremacy in the Middle East.  
This special relationship has resulted in immense American support to Israel in 
every possible way, e.g. the US supports Israel politically by vetoing UN resolutions that 
involve criticism of Israel,  for example, between 1972 and 1997, the US used its veto 
thirty-two times to stop draft resolutions critical of Israel. Moreover, the US assists 
Israel financially  as no other nation in the world does, e.g. between 1978 and 1982, 
Israel received 48% of all US military aid and 35% of all its economic aid (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1994). The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs states that the Jewish 
state continued annually to receive more American economic and military aid than any 
other country, with $2.9 billion on tap for 2003 (Hanley, 2003). Nevertheless, Christison 
notes that the climate is now changing and criticism of Israeli policies in the US has 
become much more widely acceptable. However, ―the Palestinians are still not fully 
accepted as legitimate contenders for public and policymaker attention, and in many 
subtle ways the national mind-set remains closed to the Palestinian viewpoint‖ 
(Christison, 1999: 276). It has to be recognised that there are vast differences in 
perceptions of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict, not only in the Middle East; much of the 
world is not as supportive of Israel as the United States is (Seib, 2004).  
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2 Theoretical Background 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical approach utilised in the 
study, namely CDA, its objectives, methods, theoretical origins, main approaches and 
critiques. Various approaches will be outlined with special consideration to their 
respective lines of tradition, definitions of CDA, aims, central terms and concepts, 
critiques, as well as their relevance to the present research.  
2.1 Introduction to CDA, its Methods and Objectives 
CDA is a contemporary approach to the study of discourse structures in relation 
to social structures. It started in the late Eighties and developed rapidly to become one of 
the most influential approaches, not only in discourse analysis but in the social sciences 
in general. van Dijk (1993a) states that the aim of CDA is to investigate the relationships 
between power structures and discourse structures. CDA assumes that there are 
systematic connections between discourse practices and social practices and structures, 
and that systematic asymmetries of power and resources between language users can be 
linked to their unequal access to linguistic and social resources. These resources can be 
used to make asymmetric power relations and particular textual representations of the 
world appear natural, and it attempts to make these connections transparent by means of 
textual and contextual analyses. The aim of CDA is ―to investigate critically social 
inequality, as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language 
use‖ (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 2).  
―There is no single theory or method which is uniform and consistent throughout 
CDA‖ (Blackledge, 2005: 13), yet its various approaches have a common theoretical 
background, basic assumptions and goals. Its methodologies can be described with 
reference to specific approaches of theorists within the field, e.g. Fairclough, Wodak and 
van Dijk, among others. CDA draws on different disciplines, and it has been adopted by 
researchers from various fields with different research interests for a variety of purposes. 
It is a young approach since most of its developments and resources date from the 
Nineties, and it is continuously being developed by new insights from research in the 
field of CDA itself and by its applications to related fields (Jenner & Titscher, 2000: 78).  
CDA is problem-oriented, as it takes a specific social problem, e.g. ‗racism‘ or 
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‗sexism‘ as its object of study. Studies in CDA typically deal with data such as news 
reports, media interviews, organisational and institutional discourse in schools, hospitals, 
etc. This data is analysed with the aim of revealing the embodied manipulative structures 
that seem natural to most people (Teo, 2000). CDA is an interdisciplinary approach 
which is concerned with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and 
structures. Its view of discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between discourse structure and social structure, i.e. discourse is socially constituted and 
conditioned and at the same time socially constitutive and conditioning. It aims to 
explore power relations embedded in discourse and to relate them to wider social and 
cultural contexts. It also aims to make people aware of the relationships between 
discourse and social structures, of which they are normally unaware. Multidisciplinarity 
in CDA gives the opportunity to study the relationships between texts and their contexts, 
between discursive structures and social structures, and between language and power. 
CDA studies power in and over discourse and its ideological potential. It regards 
itself as a politically-involved approach with an explicit agenda, and seeks to have an 
effect on social and political practises. Therefore, it is important for analysts to be aware 
of their own stance towards discourses and phenomena under investigation. CDA aims 
to uncover the ideological assumptions hidden in discourse, as well as to resist power in 
and over discourse. It is concerned with analysing discourse to reveal the discursive 
sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias; and how these sources are initiated, 
maintained, reproduced and transformed within specific social, economic, political and 
historical contexts (van Dijk, 1988). Wodak  holds that the aim of CDA is to analyse 
―opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, 
power and control as manifested in language‖ (Wodak, 1995: 204). CDA is politically-
involved research with emancipatory objectives. It aims to challenge existing power 
structures and to help the oppressed resist them. In other words, ―CDA enables us to 
investigate the discursive dimension of power abuse which leads to injustice and 
inequality‖ (Flowerdew, Li & Tran, 2002: 323). 
CDA tends to avoid simple deterministic relations between discourse and the 
social; instead it examines discourse within a particular context and studies power in 
relation to discourse. It starts with the assumption that powerful groups try to naturalise 
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and conventionalise discourse in a way that makes the dominant ideology seem as 
‗given‘ or ‗taken-for-granted‘. Resistance to the dominant ideology involves questioning 
the existing conventions and trying to change them. To study the relationship between 
conventional and creative uses of language, it is important for CDA to examine 
discourse in context and to analyse its intertextual and interdiscursive properties. CDA 
also regards discourse as historical and argues that it can only be understood in relation 
to its context; this implies a systematic relationship between the text and its context 
(Wodak, 1996).   
CDA belongs to a tradition of language critique which brings critical social 
science together with linguistics in a single theoretical and analytical framework 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). It attempts to describe, interpret and explain the use 
of linguistic forms in relation to their functions in a particular socio-cultural context. It 
assumes that certain networks of form-function relationships are privileged for being 
valued in society more than others for their ideological effects. CDA studies investigate 
these networks and explain the form-function relationship by linking privileged systems 
of meaning to social practices. CDA is critical in the sense that it takes an explicit stance 
towards the study of ideology in discourse since it assumes that discourse is inevitably 
ideological (Rogers, 2004). Thus, CDA is critical in the sense that it addresses social 
problems and analyses the way discourse constructs and is constructed by social 
structures. The origins of CDA are traced to critical linguists, and it is associated with 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School which rejects naturalism, naturality and 
neutrality. Moreover, it argues for a dialectic between individual agency and social 
determinism (Rogers, 2004). The analytical approach of CDA is critical, as it involves 
having distance from the data, embedding the data in the social context, taking a 
political stance explicitly, and having a focus on self-reflection.  
In sum, CDA is an interdisciplinary analytic approach which aims at describing, 
interpreting, analysing and critiquing the social world. The principal unit of analysis for 
CDA is the text which can be written, spoken or multimodal, and it analyses texts at 
sentence and word level. The task of CDA is both deconstructive and constructive. In its 
deconstructive moment, it aims to deconstruct, i.e. analyse and disrupt the themes and 
power relations of everyday discourse; in its constructive moment, it aims to achieve a 
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more equitable distribution of discourse resources (Fairclough, 1992a). The theory and 
methods of CDA are derived from various linguistic, social and philosophical 
approaches.  
2.1.1 Theoretical Origins of CDA 
The theoretical framework for CDA is derived from various disciplines, 
including linguistics, social theory, critical theory, philosophy, etc. CDA draws heavily 
on Systemic Functional Linguistics, the linguistic theory of MAK Halliday (1985). 
Renkema (2004) argues that in CDA "more and more attempts are being made to ground 
analyses and interpretations of power relations on systematic descriptions of discourse.‖ 
It draws heavily on Louis Althusser‘s theories of ideology. (Althusser, 1976; Althusser, 
1984; Althusser & Brewster, 1971; Althusser & Brewster, 1972), For Althusser, 
ideology is not only a realm of ideas but also material social practices in social 
institutions; it is a way of positioning people as social subjects (Fairclough, 2001). CDA 
also benefits from Mikhail Bakhtin‘s genre theory (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981; Bakhtin, 
Holquist & Emerson, 1986), the philosophical traditions of the Frankfurt School, 
Michael Foucault‘s orders of discourse (Foucault, 1967; Foucault, 1972; Foucault, 1974; 
Foucault & Kritzman, 1990), among others. The core theoretical basis of CDA can be 
described as neo-Marxist, ―since it claims that cultural, rather than merely economic 
dimensions are significant in the creation and maintenance of power relations‖ (Jenner 
& Titscher, 2000).  
From neo-Marxism, CDA draws on the assumption that discourses are produced 
and consumed within political economies and thus produce and articulate broader 
ideologies, interests, social formations, and movements within those fields. Also 
relevant to CDA is Gramsci‘s notion of ‗hegemony‘, as the practise of power which 
operates mainly through discourse to represent the order of things with natural 
inevitability making them appear natural or universal. These theories investigate the 
relationship between political and social structures and recognise the role ideologies play 
in political and social institutions, and hence in discourse which can be regarded as a 
type of social practice (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Jenner & Titscher, 2000).  
CDA has also been influenced by the ideas of the Russian theorists Mikhail 
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Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, since their linguistic theory of ideology posits that all 
instances of language use are ideological. They regard the linguistic sign as the domain 
of class struggle. Bakhtin recognises the dialogic properties of texts, i.e. their 
―intertextuality‖ which views a text as part of a series of texts with which it reacts and 
refers. Bakhtin‘s genre theory has a great influence on CDA, since it sees every text as 
dependent on socially predetermined repertoires of genres which can be mixed in 
creative ways. 
The poststructuralist assumption that discourses have a constructive function in 
forming and shaping human identities and actions is also relevant to CDA. Foucault 
claims that language and discourse are not transparent or neutral means of describing or 
analysing the social world. They construct, regulate and control knowledge, social 
relationships, and institutions. He also argues that natural and social worlds are not 
knowable, accessible or analysable without discourse and he examines discourses as 
constitutive phenomena, in the sense that they shape the identities and practises of 
human subjects. The ideas of Foucault and Bourdieu on power relations are also 
influential to CDA theory and methods. Foucault‘s ideas on the ‗orders of discourse‘ and 
‗power-knowledge‘ have been particularly relevant to the approach. CDA draws on 
Bourdieu‘s assumption that textual practises and interactions with texts become 
―embodied‖ forms of ―cultural capital‖ with exchange values in particular social fields 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Thompson, 1990). 
CDA also benefits from the ideas of Habermas with regard to the relationship 
between linguistic or other semiotic and social processes (Habermas, 1983; Habermas, 
1988; Habermas, 1990; Habermas & Shapiro, 1971). His work on critical theory inspired 
CDA scholars to analyse and understand social problems that are mediated by 
mainstream ideology and power relations, and which in turn are perpetuated by 
discourse in everyday life. Habermas‘ conception of critical science is that it is self-
reflective, in the sense that critical scientists must reflect on their own ideas, biases and 
interests and consider their social implications.  
CDA is strongly influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in its 
investigation of power relations and  its  rejection of naturalism (that social practises, 
labels and programs represent reality), rationality (the assumption that truth is a result of 
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science or logic), neutrality (the assumption that truth does not reflect particular 
interests), and individualism  (Rogers, 2004). Moreover, CDA draws heavily on various 
linguistic fields, e.g. pragmatics, narratology and speech act theory, which argue that 
texts are forms of social action that occur in complex social contexts. Systemic 
Functional Theory shows that language forms can be systematically linked to social 
contexts and functions. CDA uses analytic tools from these fields to examine the 
discursive aspects of wider social and cultural issues. CDA aims to uncover the 
ideological assumptions underlying discourse to resist power over discourse in everyday 
texts. It attempts to study how discourse is ideologically constructed to serve and reflect 
the interests of a particular group.  
Ideology is a central concept in CDA. Thompson points out that the term 
―ideology‖ appeared in the eighteenth century in France, and since then it acquired a 
range of meanings. He defines it as ―meaning in the service of power‖ (Thompson, 
1990). He argues that the study of ideology investigates ways in which meaning is 
constructed and conveyed by various symbolic forms. Ideology establishes and 
maintains unequal power relations and makes them appear natural and unquestionable. 
CDA examines ideology invested in discourse as a means of establishing and 
maintaining unequal power relations. It questions the taken-for-granted uses of 
discourse, challenges existing power structures and attempts to change them, or at least 
to make people aware of things they are normally unaware of. This had also been the 
purpose of Critical Linguistics, the predecessor of CDA. 
2.1.2 Critical Linguistics 
Critical Linguistics (CL), an earlier version of CDA, was developed in the 
Seventies by researchers from the University of East Anglia; namely, Fowler, Kress, 
Hodge and Trew who aimed at utilising Halliday‘s Systemic Functional Theory "to 
isolate ideology in discourse" and to find how ideology manifests itself in discourse 
structures and processes (Fowler, 1991). Kress and Hodge (1979: 13) argue that 
―language should be seen more properly as the medium of consciousness for a society, 
its forms of consciousness externalised. Linguistics then, is an exceptionally subtle 
instrument for the analysis of consciousness and its ideological bases‖ Critical 
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Linguistics considers that language is an integral part of the social process (Fowler, 
1979). It holds that discourse cannot exist without social meanings and that a strong 
relationship exists between discourse structures and social structures; thus, all instances 
of language use are ideological. Critical Linguistics attempts to find the ways ideology 
manifests itself in discourse structures and processes. It regards the text as a whole and 
draws upon systemic grammar and speech act theory in its analysis.  
Important grammatical categories that are examined by critical linguists include: 
transitivity, nominalisation, passivisation, among others, and it uses them to examine the 
way language is used to represent a particular world-view and to see how texts embody 
particular ideologies. Its aim is ―recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse 
by analysing the linguistic structures in the light of their international and wider social 
contexts‖ (Fowler, 1979: 195-6). CL distinguishes itself from other linguistic approaches 
prevailing at the same time, namely, sociolinguistics and transformational grammar, as it 
aims at investigating the relationship between language and the social at a deeper level 
than sociolinguistics and refuses the opposition of form and content advocated by 
Chomskyan transformational grammar. Instead, CL calls for the analysis of authentic 
texts with an emphasis on their relationship to the context of their use. Its main objective 
is to read social meanings in texts, and to interpret them politically and ideologically.  
Critical Linguistics has been developed by a number of theorists – most notably 
Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk – into what is now known as CDA. Although various 
approaches to CDA share the same basic assumptions, especially regarding the 
relationship between discourse, power and ideology, they apply distinctive methods 
depending on the backgrounds of the theorists who develop them.  
2.1.3 Fairclough’s CDA 
Norman Fairclough became interested in CDA in the Eighties. In 1989, he 
started to develop ‗Critical Language Study‘ to examine the relationship between 
discourse and power. His later work developed the theory and methods of CDA 
significantly. In Discourse and Social Change (1992b), Fairclough constructs a social 
theory of discourse and provides the methodological blueprint for the practice of CDA 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). Fairclough defines CDA as: 
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"discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque 
relationships of causality and determination between texts, discursive practices, 
and wider social and cultural structures; and to investigate how such practices, 
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power 
and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships 
between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony" 
(Fairclough, 1995a: 132). 
 Fairclough reviewed the main approaches to discourse analysis, e.g. content 
analysis, sociolinguistics and pragmatics, and he concluded that they lacked a critical 
perspective and therefore proposed his approach to CDA in order to achieve a social 
theory of discourse. He holds that CDA developed as a response to the traditional 
division between linguistics and other areas of social science (Fairclough, 2003c). The 
challenge of CDA is to develop a microlinguistic analysis that is capable of informing a 
wider social analysis. It explores how discourse figures in relation to other social 
elements in processes of social change. It provides the resource for tracing the 
relationship between discursive processes, relations and patterns on the one hand, and 
wider social political, economic and cultural relations, processes, practises and structures 
on the other hand (Fairclough, Pardoe & Szerszynski, 2006). 
Fairclough‘s framework is based on a number of linguistic, philosophical and 
social approaches, e.g. Bakhtin‘s ―theory of genre‖, from which he borrows the concepts 
of productivity and creativity of discourse practise and its textual realisations. He also 
draws on Bakhtin‘s concept of intertextuality whereby texts become heterogeneous in 
form and meaning by virtue of being constituted from other texts and discourses. 
Moreover, he uses Gramsci‘s ‗theory of hegemony‘ to explain political and ideological 
dimensions of discursive practice. He argues that discourse can be regarded as a mode of 
political and ideological practice, and it can constitute, naturalise, sustain and change 
significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations, and that any 
discursive practise draws on conventions which naturalise particular power relations and 
ideologies.   
Fairclough‘s approach has been greatly influenced by Foucault‘s thinking, e.g. he 
draws upon claims related to the constitutive nature of discourse, i.e. the role of 
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discourse in constructing the social including ―objects‖ and ―subjects‖, and the claim 
related to the primacy of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, i.e. the relationship 
between any discursive practise and other discourses it draws upon. Central to 
Fairclough‘s approach are ideas related to the discursive nature of power, the political 
nature of discourse and the discursive nature of social change. From the field of 
linguistics, Fairclough‘s main point of reference is Halliday‘s Systemic Functional 
Linguistics which is considered to be a valuable resource for CDA because it is 
concerned with the relationship between language and other elements of social life.  
The aim of Fairclough‘s work is ―to bring together linguistically oriented 
discourse analysis and social and political thought related to discourse and language‖ 
(Fairclough, 1992b: 62). CDA sets out to demonstrate that discursive features are 
systematically connected with what is going on socially, and what is going on socially is 
indeed going on partly or wholly semiotically, or linguistically, or both (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999). Fairclough‘s CDA ―is based upon the assumption that language is an 
irreducible part of social life‖ (2003a: 2). The view of discourse as a form of social 
practise implies that discourse is both action and representation. Fairclough believes that 
there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure, i.e. discourse is 
shaped by social structure and shapes it at the same time. In other words, discourse not 
only represents the world, but it also constitutes it. Fairclough identifies three 
constitutive aspects of discourse in the social world; discourse contributes to the 
constitution of social identities, social relationships, and systems of knowledge and 
beliefs. Discourse also contributes to transforming them (Fairclough, 1992b).  
Fairclough describes CDA as a theory and method for studying language in its 
relation to power and ideology. He defines power both in terms of asymmetries between 
participants in discourse and their unequal power over the production, distribution and 
consumption of texts. In his ―three-dimensional‖ analytical framework, each discursive 
event is regarded as a textual practise, a discursive practise and a social practise. The 
framework can be conceptualised as three layers embedded in each other with analysis 
of language or text at the centre, analysis of the discursive practise in the middle, and an 
encompassing sociocultural analysis (Fairclough, 1995a). In the analysis of the first 
layer, namely ―discourse-as-text, Fairclough suggests studying textual features and the 
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linguistic organisation of text. He proposes systematic attention to all properties of text 
that are potentially ideological, e.g. choices of specific lexical domains or vocabulary 
patterns, certain grammatical structures and strategies. Textual properties of the text 
make them sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations and change. In his 
view, CDA should not attend to  only features present in the text but also those absent 
from it, as they can be equally significant indicators of the sociocultural context.  
The second layer, namely discourse as discursive practise, represents the link 
between text and social practise. In this dimension Fairclough suggests examining 
processes involved in text production, distribution and consumption in society. Complex 
processes involved in the practises of text production, circulation and consumption vary 
between different types of texts and discourses. For example, conversation is produced 
and consumed immediately while the production of a newspaper article is a complex 
process which requires the collective effort of groups of correspondents, reporters, 
editors, among others. The processes of text consumption are also complicated since 
they depend on the addressees‘ backgrounds and their different modes of interpretation. 
The process of text production leaves ―cues‖ in the text for interpretation. An analysis of 
this level involves the analysis of how participants in discourse produce texts and 
interpret them. Interpretation involves an interplay between cues and members‘ 
resources (Fairclough, 1992b).  
The analysis of this level also involves the relationship of a discursive event with 
other ―orders of discourse,‖ i.e. ―interdiscursivity‖, which views a text historically as 
transformation of past conventions of text production into the present form. This may 
happen in a relatively conventional and normative way, or it may happen in a more 
creative way where it involves new elements of orders of discourse. This process needs 
to be linked to socio-political change to explain discursive change within wider socio-
cultural change. Fairclough (2001) regards ‗orders of discourse‘ as diverse genres and 
discourses networked together, or ―a particular social ordering of relationships amongst 
different ways of making meaning.‖ Fairclough defines two other categories of 
discourse within orders of discourse; namely, ‗discourses‘ which relate to specific areas 
of experience and knowledge and ‗genres‘ which relate to particular types of activity.  
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For the actual analysis, Fairclough suggests attending to certain features of texts 
which act as an intermediate level or link between the textual and contextual levels. 
Intertextual analysis is a major dimension of Fairclough's CDA. Intertextuality is defined 
as  "basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may 
be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, 
ironically echo, and so forth" (Fairclough, 1992b: 84). It provides the basis for an 
interpretative analysis, as it bridges the gap between text and context. He distinguishes 
between two types of intertextuality: ‗manifest intertextuality‘ where specific other texts 
are overtly drawn upon in the text, and ‗constitutive intertextuality‘ or ‗interdiscursivity‘ 
where texts are constituted of elements of orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992b). 
At the level of discourse as social practise, Fairclough aims to relate discourse to 
ideology and power. Fairclough defines ideologies as representations of aspects of the 
world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social 
relations of power, domination and exploitation (Fairclough, 2003a). He argues that 
―ideologies embedded in discursive practises are most effective when they become 
naturalised and achieve the status of common sense‖ (Fairclough, 1992b: 87). Although 
he argues that ideology invests language in various ways at various levels, he claims that 
it is not possible to ‗read off‘ ideologies from texts because meanings are produced 
through interpretations, and texts are open for diverse interpretations which may differ in 
their ideological import (Fairclough, 1992b).  
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) outline a method of CDA which can be seen 
as an ‗evolution‘ of methods outlined in Fairclough‘s earlier works (Fairclough, 1989; 
Fairclough, 1992b; Fairclough, 1995a). This method aims to locate CDA within wider 
social theory and to outline the theoretical basis of CDA both within linguistics and 
other social theories. The authors aim to combine (micro)linguistic analysis with 
(macro) social analysis, i.e. to use linguistic description to explain the social. They draw 
on diverse theoretical approaches, and their framework is inspired by the applications of 
CDA to new areas of social life and by developments in theorisation of discourse. For 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, CDA begins from some perception of a discourse related 
problem in some part of social life. Problems can either be in activities or the reflexive 
construction of a social practise. They outline three types of analyses and obstacles to 
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them. 
The first stage concerns identifying a social problem which has a semiotic aspect 
and specifying the configurations of practises in which discourse is located. The 
complexity of this stage depends on the number and range of practises linked together. 
One aspect is to link discourse to its immediate context of production and consumption 
which gives rise to the question of how discourses are interpreted. The second stage 
concerns the analysis of particular practise or practises which the discourse in focus is a 
moment of, with particular regard to the dialectic between discourse and other moments, 
i.e. when discourse is part of the activity, or when discourse is in the reflexive 
construction of the activity, or both.  
The third stage concerns the analysis of discourse proper, which is oriented 
towards both structure and interaction, i.e. the social resource which enables and 
constructs interaction and the way that resource is interactively worked, i.e. its 
interdiscursivity and its relation to interdiscursivity and other systems. It is important to 
locate discourse in its relation to the network of orders of discourses and to specify how 
the discourse draws selectively upon the potential of that network, i.e. which genres, 
discourses, voices, and from which orders of discourse. From the perspective of 
interaction, the concern is with how genres and discourses which are drawn upon are 
worked together in the textual process of discourse and what articulatory work is done in 
the text. Questions of power link with questions of ideology, and they are best treated in 
terms of relations between the discourse moments of different practises and different 
orders of discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).  
2.1.4 Wodak’s CDA 
Ruth Wodak participated with her colleagues at the Vienna School in the 
development of the ‗discourse historical approach‘ which was used in the study of anti-
Semitism in Austria. Her approach is based on sociolinguistics, Critical Theory of the 
Frankfurt School, cultural studies and the sociology of Bourdieu, among other theories 
and approaches. It is particularly influenced by Quasthoff‘s (1978) sociopsychological 
assumptions about the social function of prejudice, the constructivist approach of 
Wetherll and Potter (1987), and on van Dijk‘s (1989) positive self-representation and 
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negative other-representation. The Discourse-Historical Approach is also influenced by 
Systemic Functional Linguistics, argumentative theory and the German ―politico-
linguistics‖ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). 
Wodak‘s interest in CDA started with her attempt to relate sociolinguistics to 
social theory. She tried to relate sociolinguistics to grand theories through middle range 
theories and to justify linguistic analysis in term of social theories by relating text to 
context and discourse to social structures. This link requires an interdisciplinary 
approach like CDA. For Wodak, CDA is not seen as a homogeneous approach, but 
rather as a heterogeneous school or ‗research program‘ with various theoretical and 
methodological approaches. This allows for open discussions and debates, for changes in 
the aims and goals, as well as for innovation  (Wodak, 2002). She holds that it is useful 
to think of CDA as ‗a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools.‘ The diversity of theory 
and methods can be considered a specific strength of CDA which provides opportunities 
for ―innovation and productive theory formation‖ (Weiss & Wodak, 2003: 9). 
CDA aims to analyse ―opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of 
dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language‖ (Wodak, 
1995: 204). It has emancipatory goals, and its practitioners always take the side of the 
oppressed. Starting from the problem-oriented nature of CDA, Wodak views discourse 
about a particular topic or problem as the starting point within one field of action, and 
moves through to another. Her approach favors undertaking an analysis of genres 
involved in a given discourse before embarking on a detailed analysis, since discourses, 
genres, and texts overlap and refer to each other, and they are socio-functionally linked 
to each other. This is known as intertextuality and interdiscursivity relations.  
In Wodak‘s approach, Hybridity refers to the heterogeneous mixture of different 
genres or genre features in a concrete linguistic token. Intertextuality can take the form 
of explicit reference or the form of topical correlations, evocations, allusions, or (direct 
and indirect) quotations. Interdiscursivity means both the mutual relationships of 
discourses and the connection, intersection or overlapping of different discourses in a 
particular heterogeneous linguistic product. Textual Chains refer to the sequence of 
succession of thematically and/or functionally related texts, which is pre-shaped by the 
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frame of particular configurations of conventionalised linguistic practises (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001).  
Wodak regards discourses as socially constitutive, as they contribute to the 
production of certain social conditions; they reproduce, justify and maintain a certain 
condition; they change or transform the status quo; and/or they contribute to dismantling 
or destroying the status quo. The Discourse Historical Approach involves contrasting 
linguistic manifestations of prejudice with historical facts. It attempts "to integrate 
systematically all available background information in the analysis and foregrounds the 
historical contexts of discourse in the process of explanation and interpretation." It also 
considers the textual, intertextual, interdiscursive and contextual features of discourse, as 
well as background social and political fields (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1999b: 
12-3).  
The Discourse Historical Approach is problem-oriented, and it involves 
movement back and forth between theory and analysis and the examination of 
intertextual and interdiscursive properties of discourse, as it looks into relations between 
various genres and discourses. The historical context is an integral part of the approach. 
The application of results and findings is of paramount importance. Wodak‘s approach 
follows a complex concept of social critique. It attempts to integrate as much as possible 
of available knowledge about historical sources and the social and political contexts in 
which discursive events are embedded. Furthermore, it analyses the historical dimension 
of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are 
subject to diachronic change (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
The Discourse Historical Approach endeavours to work with different 
approaches multi-methodically and empirically to minimise the risk of being biased. It 
follows the principle of triangulation which involves interdisciplinary, muti-
methodological work on the basis of a variety of empirical data including background 
information. This approach involves linguistic analysis, as well as systematic historical, 
political, sociological and/or psychological analysis. This principle is based on the 
concept of context which involves four levels: the immediate linguistic co-text; the 
intertextual and interdiscursive relations between texts, genres and discourses; the 
context of situation which involves social variables and institutional frames; and the 
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broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, e.g. the history of the event (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
Wodak‘s study of the construction of national identity in Austria focuses on the 
discursive construction of national sameness for the in-group and of difference which 
leads to the exclusion of the out-groups. The study identifies four types of discursive 
macrostrategies. A strategy is defined as ―a more or less accurate and a more or less 
intentional plan of practice including discursive practice adopted to achieve a particular 
social, political, psychological or linguistic aim.‖ The strategies identified are: 
constructive strategies; preservative or justificatory strategies; transformative strategies; 
and deconstructive strategies. The choice of a specific strategy depends on the social 
field and context (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
In the analyses that Wodak conducted using this approach, the starting point was 
defining the categories of analysis. They involved three steps: defining the topic of 
discourse, e.g. racism, anti-Semitism, etc; establishing the discursive strategies, e.g. 
argumentation; and examining the linguistic realisations of the discriminatory 
stereotypes. Wodak‘s analysis of discriminatory stereotypes within the framework of the 
Discourse Historical Approach attempts to draw up an inventory of discursive 
discriminatory strategies. Her model is influenced by van Leeuwen‘s representation of 
social actors (van Leeuwen, 1993; 1996). Based on his ideas, she argues that the 
inclusion or exclusion of social actors is a significant linguistic strategy. Exclusion can 
be used to conceal persons responsible for certain activities, or it can be used to exclude 
or marginalise a certain group of actors which may disadvantage them. It can also lead 
to the ―under-representation‖ of ethnic minorities. 
2.1.5 Van Dijk’s CDA 
Van Dijk is one of the major contributors to CDA. For him, the critical 
perspective on which CDA is based can be traced back to Aristotle, the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment, Marx, and scholars of the Frankfurt School, e.g. Adorno, Benjamin, 
Jürgen Habermas, and others. There is also a great influence from the work of Gramsci, 
Stuart Hall, Althusser, Foucault and Pêcheux, among others. Feminist ideas also play a 
significant role in the development of CDA (van Dijk, 1993b). According to van Dijk, 
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CDA is concerned with analysing discourse to uncover the discursive sources of power, 
dominance, inequality and bias within specific social, political and historical contexts.  
Van Dijk defines CDA as ―a type of discourse analytical research that primarily 
studies the way social-power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced 
and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context‖ (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 
89) He regards CDA as a multidisciplinary approach which involves the study of 
discourse in relation to social and political problems and issues. Such studies need to 
consider the relationships between discourse, social cognition, power, ideology, society, 
politics, culture, etc. Furthermore, he maintains that power and dominance are usually 
organised and institutionalised in a way that gives the power elite privileged access to 
discursive and other resources that enable them to control and manipulate the minds of 
others to serve the interests of the powerful groups (van Dijk, 2001) . 
Dominance involves not only manipulation, but also naturalisation where mind 
control happens through routine and everyday forms of text and talk which appear 
natural. The aim of CDA is to reveal the discursive strategies which legitimate or 
naturalise unequal power relationships, i.e. the discursive sources of power abuse and 
injustice. CDA should involve a critique of discourse and the political processes 
involved in the maintenance and resistance of dominance. Thus, CDA practitioners 
should take an explicit socio-political stance and show solidarity with the most 
vulnerable or powerless. The success of CDA is measured by its contribution to change, 
especially in areas such as class struggle, racism, sexism, etc. 
A very important concept in van Dijk‘s approach is ‗social cognition‘ which can 
be defined as ‗the socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and 
relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking, arguing, etc.‘ Van 
Dijk holds that such cognitions mediate between micro and macro levels of society, i.e. 
between discourse and action, or between the individual and the group. They are shared 
by group members and underlie the social and cultural organisation of society as a 
whole. They can be used theoretically to link dominance to discourse, as they explain 
the production and interpretation of dominant discourse. Van Dijk‘s approach to CDA is 
known as the socio-cognitive approach because it focuses on the role of social cognition 
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in discourse (van Dijk, 1993b).  
Van Dijk perceives discourse analysis as ideology analysis. He regards 
ideologies as ‗the basis of social representations shared by members of a social group,‘ 
and perceives ideology as a schema for the representation of the in-group or out-group, 
or ‗us‘ versus ‗them‘ as social groups (van Dijk, 1998). Ideologies are fundamental 
social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests, and values of groups and influence 
the personal cognition of group members. He maintains that "ideologies are typically, 
though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication" 
(van Dijk, 1995). Ideological mental representations "are often articulated along ‗Us‘ 
versus ‗Them‘ dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present 
themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms". 
CDA should provide a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways 
dominant discourses influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies 
(van Dijk, 1993b: 257).  
The discourse-based strategies for the reproduction of dominance in 
contemporary societies require justification or legitimation, e.g. by claiming that 
dominance is natural or necessary, or by the denial of the existence of dominance. 
Justification involves positive self-representation and negative other-representation. This 
is presented within the lines of ‗Us‘ and ‗Them‘, stressing the positive features of the in-
group and the negative characteristics of the out-group. Such representations help form 
mental models (schemata) for representing certain groups. There are several discursive 
persuasive strategies to achieve these representations, e.g. choice of certain lexical style, 
argumentation, storytelling, rhetorical figures, quoting credible sources, etc.  
Within the broad socio-cognitive model, van Dijk‘s approach focuses on the 
structure of text and talk. The aim of analysing discourse structures is to show how 
power relations are enacted and exhibited in discourse and how discourse manipulates 
the minds of a certain group to serve the interests of another. The discursive 
reproduction of dominance has two major dimensions; production and interpretation. 
This involves the analysis of both discursive structures and social cognitions. The 
enactment of dominance in discourse interpretation is a subtle phenomenon, and the 
socio-cognitive model is used for this purpose. The enactment of dominance in the 
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process of discourse production is more straightforward and can be studied by analysing 
discourse structures and social cognitions. Van Dijk‘s model examines aspects of access 
and control, i.e. how powerful groups have privileged access to certain types of 
discourse and how they control the context of interaction. This may result in the 
exclusion of some less powerful groups and in depriving them from a fair opportunity to 
take part in the process of discourse production. At the level of discourse structures, the 
analysis examines subtle manifestations of dominance at all linguistic levels, e.g. lexical, 
syntactic, rhetorical, semantic, stylistic, etc. The three approaches outlined above are the 
most prominent in the field, yet they are not the only ones. CDA has been applied to a 
large number of domains by different scholars 
2.1.6 Research Trends in CDA 
CDA is regarded as a politically and socially involved approach with 
emancipatory goals, and an agenda that advocates change and empowerment of weaker 
groups. Therefore, it has been applied to research in various fields, and it has proved to 
be a very useful tool for many researchers. In addition to major research work 
undertaken by Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk outlined in the previous sections, this 
section briefly outlines other research in the field. Most CDA research deals with current 
issues, topics and social domains. It deals with political discourse, racism, institutional 
discourse, gender, etc. CDA practitioners have applied CDA to a variety of discourses 
for various ends depending on their respective backgrounds and aims. 
Political discourse has been the focus of a great deal of research in CDA, 
including for example (Chilton, 2004; Chouliaraki, 2004; Fairclough, 2001; 2003b; 
Fairclough et al., 2006; Fowler, 1979; Lazuka, 2006; Wodak, 1989). Ideology, i.e. the 
role of discourse in the reproduction and dissemination of a certain ideology has been 
the main topic of some of the research of (Kress, 1983; Kress & Hodge, 1979; Kress & 
Trew, 1978; Lassen, Strunck & Vestergaard, 2006; Luke, 2002; van Dijk, 1998). Racism 
is another important issue that many CDA practitioners dealt with (Mehan, 1997; Reisigl 
& Wodak, 2000; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Dijk, 1987a; 
1989; 1992; 1993a; 1996; 1989; Wodak, 1999a). Gender, including gender inequalities 
and the representation of women in media has been the focal point of the research of 
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(Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Clark & Zyngier, 1998; Koller, 2004; Lazar, 
2005; Wodak, 1997). Institutional Discourse has been covered by the research of other 
scholars (Wodak, 1986; 1996; 1997). Cultural and identity analysis is another major 
topic for CDA research, as evident by many studies (Barker & Âski, 2001; Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006; Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, Clare Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009). 
Media language has received a great deal of attention in CDA research, e.g. 
(Bazzi, 2009; Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; D'Haenens & Bink, 2007; Erjavec, 
2001; Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991). Newspaper discourse has been the focus of the 
research of many studies, for example (Achugar, 2004; Bazzi, 2009; Bekalu, 2006; 
Flowerdew et al., 2002; Higgins, 2004; Pietikainen, 2003; Sezgin & Wall, 2005; Teo, 
2000; van Dijk, 1987b; 1991). CDA has also been applied to the field of education, for 
example (Kidd, 2004; Rogers, 2003; 2004). These are only examples of current 
applications of CDA to research. CDA is one of the most visible approaches in discourse 
analysis, and has been attracting more researchers and students than any other field 
which promises more research into other areas not covered previously.  
2.1.7 A Modified Version of CDA 
There are different approaches to CDA and various methods of application which 
vary according to many factors including the aim of research and the nature of data, 
among others. For the purpose of the current study, a modified version of CDA has been 
devised which includes selected aspects of the major CDA approaches outlined above 
and selected categories from various applications of CDA. This section presents the 
selected aspects of the three main approaches to CDA and the categories chosen for 
analysis.    
Fairclough's definition of CDA and its aims are quite relevant to the modified 
version of CDA, especially as regards the relationship between texts and what is 
happening socially, as well as the role of power relations in shaping discourse. CDA is 
utilised to examine the use of certain linguistic features that are ideologically relevant in 
relation to particular contextual variables, e.g. the use of specific grammatical structures 
in the reporting of acts of violence committed by different sides of the conflict in 
different newspapers. Fairclough's three-layered analysis provides a systematic 
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framework for the analysis although it is not always easy to keep this division clear cut 
in application. The study focuses on the linguistic analysis of texts and integrates 
contextual features when appropriate for the interpretation and explanation of the 
findings of the linguistic analysis. Fairclough (2003: 15) argues that ―textual analysis is 
… inevitably selective.‖ Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on three linguistic levels 
and analyses them consistently in all texts.  
There are, however, certain aspects of the model that have been modified for the 
purpose of analysis. Fairclough‘s multi-dimensional framework (1995: 2) involves the 
analysis of discourse practice, including the processes of text production, distribution 
and consumption. The analysis considers the production of news reports, especially 
institutional practices involved in news production. Although these aspects are not the 
core of the analysis, it is vital to consider them so as not to attribute every linguistic 
feature to ideology when it can be the result of certain the institutional practices of 
newspaper editing and style, or other practical issues such as the location of the reporter 
or access to news sources. Nevertheless, consumption does not play an important part in 
the analysis, as the corpus of data is quite homogeneous, i.e. it comprises only 
newspaper reports. If the corpus had been more varied, e.g. newspaper reports and TV 
news stories, a consideration of the modes of consumption would have been more 
useful.  
Fairclough‘s analyses involve tending to ―a range of properties of texts … 
regarded as potentially ideological‖ (1995: 2) which may lead to choosing certain 
features that support the claims made by the analyst while ignoring others that do not 
support them. In this study, however, a set of levels and features is selected and 
examined throughout the whole corpus. Furthermore, interpretation is a key aspect of 
Fairclough‘s model which has been criticised for being ‗critical discourse 
interpretations‘ (Widdowson 2004: 103), but this study focuses mainly on linguistic 
analysis while interpretation and explanation are based on the findings of the linguistic 
analysis. 
Wodak‘s Discourse Historical Approach is particularly relevant since the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict is deeply rooted in history and since history affects the status 
and representation of each side. Moreover, the discourse of news reports on the conflict 
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is loaded with historical references which cannot be understood adequately without 
proper consideration of the history of the conflict. Additionally, discourse reflects the 
historical phase of the conflict, for instance, during the peace process and the Oslo 
Accords, discourse was mainly about agreement, fair and just settlement, naturalisation 
etc. However, with the end of the peace process, discourse focused on mutual violence, 
therefore history of the conflict has been reviewed as a background to the analysis, 
which provides a good understanding of the origins of the conflict and the attitudes of 
different parties, especially the USA, Britain and Arab states. This background is 
considered vital for this research to achieve its aims, and it is used in the 
contextualisation of the findings of the linguistic analysis.  
Certain aspects of Wodak‘s approach are more relevant to the analysis than 
others. As stated earlier, consideration of the historical, political and socio-cultural 
contexts is very important to the interpretation and explanation of the findings of the 
linguistic analysis. Nonetheless, Wodak‘s focus on sociological and psychological 
analysis is not considered very pertinent to the analysis. Wodak‘s notion of linguistic 
strategies is also used for the analysis, yet it is applied more generally rather than 
focusing on the constructive, destructive and transformative strategies outlined by 
Wodak in her study on the discursive construction of national identity.  
Van Dijk's approach to CDA is also useful to the current study, especially his 
emphasis on ideology, as well as positive and negative group representations.  As the 
current study deals with a highly controversial and ideological conflict in which group 
representations in newspapers with various orientations are of paramount importance, 
van Dijk‘s approach is applicable; moreover, as the study concerns the relationship 
between ideology and discourse, van Dijk's definition of ideology and his ideology 
analysis are pertinent to the analysis. Another aspect of van Dijk‘s approach that is 
relevant to the study is the notion of access to linguistic and other resources, as access to 
certain linguistic sources, e.g. knowledge of foreign languages and access to other 
resources such as access to news outlets and journalists affects the ability of certain 
groups to convey their perspectives in news reports. However, van Dijk‘s cognitive 
analysis is not used in the current study. 
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In addition to the selected aspects of major CDA approaches, the modified 
version also includes selected aspects from CDA applications, e.g. van Leeuwen‘s 
analyses of social action, social actors and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1995; 
1996; 2000). Also relevant to the current study is Hodge & Kress‘s (1993) relational and 
actional models, and the distinction between transitive and non-transitive structures, and 
the ideological implications of using them. The linguistic analysis focuses on three 
discourse categories; i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation. These levels have been 
chosen because they can be invested ideologically to serve certain purposes of language 
users.  
The narrative structure of news reports is a key element that affects the 
presentation of the event reported, e.g. which elements of the story are highlighted in the 
headline, how the story is presented in terms of actions, consequences and purposes, and 
how news sources and contextual details are used in the story. Transitivity affects the 
way actions and agency are presented, e.g. if the transactive model is used, the agent is 
known to the readers, but if the non-transactive model is selected, the agent remains 
unknown. Lexicalisation affects the way members of certain groups are labelled and 
described which can lead to negative or positive evaluations. Chapter 3 includes a 
detailed discussion of each linguistic level, the ways in which it can be manipulated and 
its analysis in the current study. 
2.2 Review of Related Literature 
The discourse of the Israel/Palestinian conflict has attracted the attention of 
academics since the first Intifada, mainly because the Intifada has succeeded in drawing 
a great deal of media attention to the suffering of the Palestinians under the Israeli 
occupation. A significant and detailed study was published under the title of: ―Framing 
the Intifada: People and Media‖ by Cohen and Wolfsfeld (1993). It deals with media 
coverage of the first intifada which began in December 1987. It comprises a collection 
of studies undertaken as part of ―the Intifada Research Project‖ which began in October 
1988, when researchers at the Smart Family Foundation Communications Institute of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem launched a series of studies on the topic. The studies 
focus on communication and the Intifada; they deal with aspects of Palestinian graffiti, 
one of the major channels of communication available to Palestinian young people; 
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analysis of the personal narratives of Israeli soldiers; as well as public opinion about the 
Intifada in Israel and America. Media studies deal with how television news cover the 
first fifteen months of the Intifada in four countries: the US, the UK, (West) Germany 
and Israel. In addition, there are two studies on newspaper coverage of the Intifada, 
including a study of headlines dealing with the Intifada in Hebrew newspapers and the 
Intifada coverage in an Arab and a Jewish newspaper issued in Jerusalem, examining 
features such as texts, cartoons and letters to the editors. Two researchers from the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Nir and Roeh (1992), published a study that deals with 
Intifada coverage in the Israeli press. It compared different aspects of the Intifada 
coverage in two Israeli newspapers, including the headlines, referential strategies, etc. In 
addition, it discusses the role of news coverage in maintaining social consensus.  
The Peace Process which culminated the first Intifada has also been the object of 
some studies, notably Wolfsfled (2004) ―Media and the Path to Peace‖ which examines 
how different sides of the conflict compete over news media to promote a positive image 
of the self and thus to gain legitimacy. The book traces the dynamics of media handling 
of the peace process since its beginning until its disintegration into the Second Intifada. 
It deals with the beginning of the peace process, how Israeli media deals with peace and 
the Palestinians, how it deals with the Israel-Jordan peace process, and finally the 
collapse of Oslo and the return to violence. Wolfsfled also includes comparative data on 
the case of Northern Ireland and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. In this 
book, Wolfsfled argues that media plays an active role in the promotion of peace or 
conflict and that media is more likely to promote conflict than peace due to its focus on 
negative events with dire consequences and the desire of some journalists to construct 
sensationalist news stories.  
The second Intifada has been the focus of a very important study by the Glasgow 
University Media Group, published under the title of ―Bad News from Israel” (Philo & 
Berry, 2004). It deals with coverage of the second Intifada in British TV news reports 
and includes a comprehensive historical background, content analysis and audience 
studies. Philo and Berry conclude that the Israeli perspective dominates news reports on 
the conflict and that the lack of proper contextualisation results in showing both sides of 
the conflict as equal in power which conceals the great discrepancy in power between 
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them and which, in turn, leaves viewers ill-informed. They also discuss the practises of 
news production and conduct interviews with journalists that mention pressures to 
produce an interesting story in very brief reports, which often happens at the expense of 
explaining events. The role of powerful Jewish lobbies in the West in influencing the 
media is also discussed.  
A major study on the coverage of the second Intifada in American newspapers of 
record was initially commissioned by the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago to 
examine perceived anti-Israeli bias in American press (Zelizer, Park & Gudelunas, 
2002). The news coverage of thirty days of the first year of the Intifada in the New York 
Times, the Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune, all of which are considered 
newspapers of record in the USA was analysed. Different aspects of news coverage 
including frequency of reporting, length of reports, use of photographs and graphics, 
lexical choices, syntactic choices were investigated. The researchers noted a similarity 
between the three newspapers in the manner of reporting and revealed that all the 
newspapers are aligned with the Israeli perspective. They conclude that bias in the news 
is inescapable, and that ―no feature of American print news presentation was free of 
values and preferences.‖ The study identified a pro-Israeli slant in coverage, yet it 
warned against simplistic claims of bias and called for the development of a framework 
for the study of partisan reportage.   
Another study which was published by Grade the News Project of Stanford 
University (McManus, 2003) dealt with the journalistic practises of news coverage with 
special attention to the coverage of deaths in the second Intifada in the San Jose Mercury 
News in the period from April to September 2002. It demonstrated that Israeli deaths 
were more likely to appear in the front page headlines of the paper, unlike Palestinian 
deaths and that the paper presented 77% of Israeli deaths in front-page headlines in 
comparison with 7% of Palestinians deaths. Moreover, reports were more likely to 
emphasise Israeli suffering and to use first person narration with it. Language used to 
refer to Palestinians was also considered, and it was found that the paper uses mostly 
labels with negative connotations, e.g. ‗militants‘ and ‗gunmen‘, rather than neutral 
labels like ‗fighters.‘ Sources of bias were identified as the identification of Israeli 
victims as civilians and most Palestinian victims as combatants; the accessibility of 
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Israeli sources and Israeli restrictions on reporters who wanted to go to the Palestinian 
territories; cultural affinity between the Israelis and American journalists and editors; as 
well as the nature of news of being event driven rather than issue driven. 
A thorough and in-depth study of the journalistic practises of reporting on the 
conflict in American mainstream media has been recently published under the title of 
Pens and Swords: how the American Mainstream Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict (Dunsky, 2008). This comprehensive study by a scholar and a journalist who 
worked in the Middle East scrutinises reporting of the conflict in American mainstream 
media and presents a comprehensive and critical analysis of current practices. The book 
focuses on reportage on a number of issues, e.g. Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, 
violence in the spring of 2002; and it includes interviews with reporters from the main 
American mainstream newspapers and also relates reporting practises to American 
policies in the Middle East. Dunsky analyses news reports obtained from more than 
twelve mainstream news outlets. She points out that news reports lack essential 
contextualisation, especially in relation to the American role in the conflict or 
international law and relevant agreements. She proves that news reflects  official 
American foreign policy and that it often supports the view-point of the American 
administration. Dunsky also provides empirical evidence of pro-Israeli bias in American 
mainstream media reports on the conflict.  
A very recent study published by Samia Bazzi in 2009, under the title of Arab 
News and Conflict: a Multidisciplinary Discourse Study, deals with the representation of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab media in the period from 2001 to 2009. It 
critically examines the representation of the conflict in different Arab news outlets and 
relates these representations to prevailing ideologies in the Arab world. Arab media 
outlets examined in the study include satellite channels, news agencies and newspapers, 
e.g. Al-Manar Satellite Channel, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, Reuters Arabic and 
Associated France Press (AFP) Arabic,  Assafir and Al-Mustaqbal newspapers, which 
represent a spectrum of Arab opinion. The author outlines various approaches to media 
discourse with a focus on semiotic, ideological and critical discourse approaches. She 
explains her approach for analysing media texts which includes contextual analysis, 
including aspects related to the translation of media texts, as well as an analysis of 
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textual strategies including transitivity, mood and modality and thematic and lexical 
texture. From the textual analysis, Bazzi concludes that ―hegemony, interpellation, 
power relations, cognition and editorial control give legitimate and logical reasons for 
the final semantic, structural and pragmatic choices found in a politically motivated text‖ 
(Bazzi, 2009: 181). Another major part of the study focuses on the role of translation in 
the representation of the conflict in Arab media, and Bazzi concludes that ―the forms of 
political resistance to an alien media code can be legitimised and built into the 
translation commission itself, thus achieving the effects preferred by both the target 
elites and their target audience‖ (Bazzi, 2009: 212) 
 As shown in the previous review of related literature, the discourse of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been the focus of a number of studies in various 
disciplines. It has been investigated in areas like communications studies (Cohen & 
Wolfsfled, 1993), media studies (Philo & Berry, 2004; Wolfsfled, 2004), journalism 
(McManus, 2003; Zelizer et al., 2002), and in some recent interdisciplinary studies 
(Bazzi, 2009). Most of these studies deal with the relationship between ideology and the 
representation of the conflict, and some attempt to demonstrate that this representation is 
not free from bias, as different sides of the conflict are not represented in the same way.  
Certain aspects of these approaches have been useful to the current study, e.g. 
some labels used by Cohen and Wolfsfled (1993) are used in the lexical categorisation 
of the members of different groups. From the study of Wolfsfled (2004), the 
consideration of the role of media in the perpetuation of war or peace helped in the 
interpretation and explanation of the findings of the analysis. The studies of McManus 
(2003) and Zelizer et. al. (2003) that concentrate on the journalistic practices involved in 
the representation of both sides and attempt to demonstrate the influence of ideology on 
the representation of the conflict in US media, were very useful for the interpretation and 
the explanation of the findings of the linguistic analysis. From the study of Dunsky 
(2008), I drew on the consideration of contextual factors including US policy and the 
socio-cultural and political contexts of the conflict, and their influence on its 
representation in news media. The current thesis aims to contribute to this body of 
research from the perspective of CDA. The study focuses primarily on the discourse of 
the conflict. Journalistic practices and theories of media studies, which are the focus of 
 63 
previous research, supplement discourse analysis in the study.   
2.3 Critiques of CDA 
CDA is a relatively young approach, and its methods are continuously being 
developed. It has been implemented by scholars with different backgrounds, and 
therefore there is not a single method for conducting CDA analyses, yet there are some 
common principles in different approaches. CDA has been critiqued by many scholars; 
some criticisms dealt with its methodology while others were about its theoretical basis. 
Stubbs (1997: 102-3) describes data collection in CDA as ―often restricted to text 
fragments" and CDA methods as ‗inexplicit‘. Widdowson criticises CDA for being 
politically rather than linguistically motivated. He argues that "interpretation in support 
of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory‖ (Widdowson, 1995: 159). 
He also claims that CDA seems ‗essentially unprincipled‘; the CDA analyst is accused 
of taking from theory ―whatever concept comes usefully to hand.‖ He also critiques 
CDA for its ―disregard of inconvenient textual features,‖ and argues that CDA uses 
many concepts such as ideology and power vaguely (Widdowson, 1998: 137).  
Along the same line, Hammersley (1997) maintains that over-ambition in CDA 
"encourages the presentation of what can only be speculations as if they were well-
grounded knowledge ... and this can lead the researchers to over-interpreting their data" 
(Seidlhofer, 2003: 131). Wetherell (2001) raises concerns about the objectivity of CDA 
and what might constitute sound scientific practice, while Toolan (1997) argues that 
CDA analysts claim objectivity and at the same time take an explicit stance towards the 
problem and data they analyse. Schegloff (1997) argues that serious critical analysis of 
discourse presupposes serious formal analysis of discourse, and he also suggests that 
CDA often applies sociological categories to discourse without justification. Luke 
(2002) claims that CDA theorists pull together a range of linguistic and social theories – 
so that those that lean ‗towards comprehensive, rational grand theory‘ sit beside those 
with a ‗radical skepticism towards system and structure.‘ Kress critiques CDA for its 
focus on interpretation, and for not providing guidelines or making recommendations 
that can be used for text production. ―CL and CDA … are heavily reception/reading 
oriented, with no strongly explicit account of production, or of producers. CL or CDA 
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have not offered (productive) accounts of alternative forms of social organisation, nor of 
social subjects, other than by implication‖ (Kress, 1996: 16). 
Some of these issues have been resolved in more recent CDA studies, such as 
vagueness in the use of terminology which has been addressed in many recent studies in 
CDA, such as van Dijk‘s work on ideology (van Dijk, 1998), and Wodak‘s studies on 
national identity, power, racism and discrimination (Reisigl & Wodak, 2000; Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1989; Wodak, 1999a), among many others. These and other 
studies contribute to disambiguate these terms that are claimed to be used vaguely in 
CDA. Moreover, more recent analyses became more explicit and focused in their 
methods and more systematic in data collection. This can be evident in more recent 
studies, e.g. (Charteris-Black, 2006; Fairclough et al., 2006; Lazuka, 2006; van Dijk & 
Wodak, 2000; Wodak & Leeuwen, 2002; Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
Blommaert (2005) has argued that although CDA focuses on inequality, it has 
concentrated on the First World too much, both in terms of its object of analysis and of 
the theories which it typically draws upon. He suggests that CDA needs to focus more 
on Third World problems and to benefit more from theoreticians who deal with Third 
World issues. CDA has also been criticised for focusing on problems and inequalities; in 
response, Martin (1999) has argued for a positive discourse analysis (PDA) which 
focuses on emancipatory discourses, as an antidote to critical approaches; it is an 
approach which exemplifies a positive style of discourse analysis that focuses on hope 
and change (Bhatia, Flowerdew & Jones, 2008).  
In this study, I have been conscious of the critiques of CDA, and I tried to 
address them in my analysis. To address criticisms of the method of data collection in 
CDA which is often restricted to text fragments, full texts of news reports are analysed 
in the current study. Critiques of CDA as being unprincipled, vague and as disregarding 
inconvenient textual features have also been addressed in my study, as the research 
focuses on a number of linguistic levels and selected features at each level which are 
analysed consistently and systematically throughout the corpus of news reports. 
Moreover, the analysis focuses more on linguistic analysis, whereas interpretation and 
explanation are subsequent to the linguistic analysis and are based on it. Regarding 
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criticisms of CDA as being reading/reception oriented, my research takes into 
consideration the production of news, as the process of news production and its impact 
on news discourse and content are explored; furthermore, the concluding chapter 
presents some recommendations for newspapers regarding the presentation of events of 
the conflict. 
Despite the critiques of CDA, which have been addressed as much as possible in 
the current study, it still presents a very useful theoretical approach for the current study. 
CDA is a multidisciplinary approach that provides systematic links between discourse 
and the social world, moreover it is problem-oriented with a focus on issues such as 
inequality, access/lack of access to linguistic and other resources. This thesis deals with 
the representation of a crucial political issue that affects the lives of millions of people in 
the Middle East and in the world at large. The discursive representation of the conflict in 
news media has a significant impact on the perception of the conflict and attitudes 
towards those involved in it and actions they undertake. Therefore, an approach that 
links the discursive to the social is deemed most appropriate for the current study; 
moreover, the links between discourse and historical, political and socio-cultural 
contexts are extremely important for the interpretation and explanation of the discursive 
phenomenon under investigation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very sensitive and 
critical issue with far reaching impacts in the world today. To achieve an adequate 
understanding of its discursive representation, a multi-disciplinary approach like CDA is 
needed. 
 This chapter presents a theoretical background to the analysis with a focus on 
CDA as an analytical framework. It presents background to CDA, its main approaches, 
applications and critiques. It also presents the modified version of CDA applied in the 
current study, which includes selected aspects of major approaches to CDA and of its 
applications and which focuses on selected linguistic features at the levels of narrative, 
transitivity and lexis. The following chapter presents a more detailed explanation of the 
method of undertaking the study, by focusing on the linguistic levels chosen for analysis 
and how they can be invested ideologically, along with an explanation of the method of 
applying CDA in the current study. 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter presents the method of undertaking the critical analysis of the 
discourse of news reports on violent events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the 
selected newspapers.  
3.1 Introduction  
The aim of this section is to introduce the method used for data analysis; to 
present discourse categories chosen for analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity, and lexis; and 
to illustrate their potential to be ideologically invested. The analysis follows the three 
stages or moments of CDA outlined by Fairclough; more specifically, description, 
interpretation and explanation (Fairclough, 1992b; 1995a; 1995b; 2001). Description 
involves describing relevant linguistic features and strategies present at the levels chosen 
for analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexis. The description of narrative follows Bell 
(1998), van Dijk (1991), Toolan (2001) and White (1997) to examine the way news 
stories about events of the conflict are constructed. It also involves studying contextual 
details and use of news sources.  
The description of transitivity is based on Halliday‘s Systemic Functional 
Linguistics (Halliday, 1994), and Hodge and Kress‘ (1993) relational and actional 
models. It also benefits from the framework outlined by van Leeuwen  to analyse the 
representation of social agents, social actions and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 
1995; 1996; 2000). Discursive processes, including nominalisation and passivisation are 
also examined. The description of lexis involves examining referential and predicational 
strategies used with each side of the conflict, as well as their role in the categorisation of 
each side and their positive and negative presentation. 
The levels of analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation have been 
chosen for their potential to be ideologically invested by different newspapers. In view 
of the many voices that appear in news reports which include quotations that represent 
opinions of experts, eye-witnesses, officials and ordinary people from different sides; 
these quotations are examined in the analysis of narrative, while the analysis of lexis and 
transitivity concentrates mainly on the parts of reports that are produced by newspapers‘ 
editorial staff and correspondents to construct the news story. The findings of the 
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linguistic analysis are interpreted with reference to their role in the positive and negative 
presentation of different sides of the conflict and explained with reference to wider 
historical and political contexts.  
Central to the current study is the concept of discursive strategies which can be 
defined as ―linguistic means used to achieve goals in discourse‖ (Mehan, 1997). The 
meaning and consequences of discourse strategies depend on the sociocultural context in 
which they are used. The study examines a number of discursive strategies at the 
relevant linguistic levels that play a role in the ideological positive or negative 
representations of different sides of the conflict. Another important concept is that of 
selection since ―the choice of any linguistic option necessarily implies rejection of other 
options‖ (Janks, 2005). The selection of particular lexical, transitivity and narrative 
structures to the exclusion of others can have ideological implications. The following 
sections explain how data is analysed at each level, i.e. which linguistic features and 
strategies are examined at the levels of narrative, transitivity and lexis, and why.  
3.2 Narrative 
Rudrum (2006) argues that narrative is very difficult to define due to its varied 
uses, nevertheless a variety of definitions have been offered by many theorists. Genette 
(1980) defines narrative as ―the oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an 
event or a series of events‖ and ―the representation of an event or a sequence of events‖  
(Genette, 1982, quoted by Rudrum, 2005). Prince (1982) defines narrative as ―the 
representation of at least two real or fictive events or situations in a time sequence, 
neither of which presupposes or entails the other‖ (Prince, 1982, quoted by Andrews, 
1989). Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) define narrative as ―discourse with a clear 
sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience.‖ 
Elliott (2005) argues that temporality and causality are among the key features of 
narrative. Typically, events in a narrative are arranged in a plot that relates events to 
each other and involves a change in the situation whereby an initial situation is disrupted 
by certain events, and this is when causality emerges as an important aspect of narrative, 
for it contributes to the coherence of the narrative structure. Hesse argues that ―readers‘ 
perception of causal sequence is crucial ... To say this ‗happened‘ as a result of ‗that‘ is 
 68 
to supply a relationship between the two, to make a judgment‖ (Hesse, 1989). Chatman 
(1980) argues that without explicit causal links, readers tend to attribute causality to the 
sequence of events, so that events that occur first are seen as causes of following ones. 
Attempts to describe narrative structure date back to Aristotle who analyses the 
narrative text as containing three chronologically-ordered stages: beginning, middle and 
end. A relationship of causality holds between these stages, so that each stage leads to 
the following, and it is at the same time the result of the previous. Vladimir Propp tried 
to analyse narrative structure, in his Morphology of the Folktale (1958 [1928]). He 
identified a set of thirty-one recurrent functions or motifs and seven personae which 
provide the building blocks of Russian folktales. In their study of personal oral 
narratives, Labov and Waletzky (1967) identify six elements of personal oral narratives: 
abstract (introducing the story); orientation (time, location, participants and 
circumstances); complication (disrupting event); evaluation (significance); resolution 
(solution to the disruption); and coda (relating the story to the present). A minimum 
narrative should contain at least complicating action and evaluation, otherwise, it would 
be considered empty or pointless. Socially, evaluation is the most important element of 
narrative as it shows how the narrator wants the story to be interpreted and helps avoid 
the ‗so what?‘ response from the audience.  It can be presented explicitly or implicitly, 
or it can be conveyed indirectly in the way the story is told.  
Narrative is considered a very important component of news reports which aim 
to recount events that take place in reality. News reports, or hard news stories, have a 
distinctive structure which differentiates them from other forms of narrative because the 
narrative structure is news stories does not relate events temporally, but rather they have 
a distinctive structure that is socially and politically motivated, i.e. narrative is structured 
in a special way that serves certain ideological purposes. News reports or news stories 
have a distinctive generic structure which distinguishes them from other genres and 
which enables them to serve a complicated and demanding task. News reports need to 
reconcile two basic and contradictory functions: to entertain and to inform; in other 
words, they have to be attractive and entertaining with an element of drama attached to 
them and at the same time they have to be factual and objective in their presentation of 
events (van Leeuwen, 1987). This contradiction has led to controversies regarding the 
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narrative or non-narrative status of news reports and whether to consider them a form of 
narrative or of reporting.  There seems to be, however, a general agreement that news 
reports are a special genre of narrative. 
In addition to informing and entertaining, news has other important functions in 
society. Tuchman (1978) holds that ―news aims to tell us what we want to know, need to 
know, and should know‖. News reports do not only present information, they also 
provide their audiences with a framework for understanding it. Teo (2000) states that 
―news reporting … often comes packaged with the interpretation as well.‖ Thus, news 
not only disseminates information, it also contributes to shaping people‘s knowledge, 
especially as regards topics about which people are ignorant. Moreover, news plays a 
major role in representing culture, people, politics and other aspects of social life, as 
Pietikainen (2003) holds ―news representations contribute to ways in which people see 
themselves, their own identity and that of others.‖ Hall et al (1978) emphasise the role of 
news media in actively shaping public opinion, reinforcing consensual notions in society 
and setting agendas.  
The complex roles of news in society make it necessary to have a special generic 
narrative structure that enables the fulfillment of these complex ideological functions. 
Several attempts have been made to describe the generic structure of news reports, in 
various disciplines, such as journalists‘ training, linguistics, media studies, etc. 
Montgomery states that ―news as a genre is woven out of sub-genres … the structural 
composition of news discourse may be seen in terms of the chaining together of units 
each of which is realised by a different sub-genre‖. He also holds that genre describes 
more than a patterned, recurrent conﬁguration of elements. Indeed, it also encompasses 
shared understandings between producers and audiences about forms and the purposes 
they serve (2007: 26-27).  
Van Leeuwen (1987) describes the generic structure of press journalism using 
systemic functional linguistics. He identifies five stages that make up the generic 
structure of news reports: narration which is concerned with descriptions of actions, 
events and people; exposition which is concerned with explaining; procedure which is 
concerned with instructing; adhortation which is concerned with persuading and 
influencing; and description which is concerned with describing. He explains that these 
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stages are linguistically realised through the systems of transitivity, mood, theme, tense, 
reference, and conjunction and that all these stages are combined in a news report to 
achieve the social purpose of the text. Narrative attracts readers to the entertaining story; 
exposition generalises the story and explains it; adhortation provides suggestions in a 
subtle way, and so on. It is not obligatory for journalists to follow all the stages or to 
present them in any particular order.   
The structure of a news report is a very important factor in its effectiveness. 
There are aspects of structure that can be manipulated ideologically, e.g. the use of 
quotations or headlines. Van Dijk (1988; 1991) describes the superstructure or textual 
schemata of news reports, which consists of a number of conventional categories in a 
linear or hierarchical order. News reports conventionally begin with a headline and an 
optional lead which express the major topics of the texts and function as an initial 
summary. The body of the news report contains newsworthy information organised 
according to importance or prominence. The main event is the central element in the 
body, and usually the most prominent or most recent events come first in the news 
report; the episode includes the main event and its consequences. Background 
information allows better understanding of the story, and it may be of two basic types: 
context which relates the story to other current events and history which relates it to 
previous ones. Consequences are major parts of the story. A special kind of consequence 
is verbal consequences or opinions of major news actors. This category allows reporters 
to safely voice interpretations and opinions about events without having to venture 
unnecessarily subjective and possibly controversial personal evaluations. News reports 
may also contain comments. Some of these categories of the schema are obligatory, e.g. 
headline and main event, while the others are optional, e.g. comment.  
The most important feature of news reports is the use of the headlines and/or lead 
which express a very concise form of the story. They provide the most newsworthy 
information and determine the way the story is developed in the report. The choice of 
headline/lead can have a powerful ideological effect on the perception and interpretation 
of events. Van Dijk (1988) states that the headline/lead have important textual and 
cognitive functions. They are brief, printed on top, in large bold type, and often across 
several columns to summarise the most important information in the report. In terms of 
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structure, they are often incomplete sentences, a feature which may lead to vagueness or 
ambiguity and which may have an ideological function, e.g. to conceal agency for a 
certain action. Van Dijk (1991) argues that headlines are a subjective definition of the 
situation; journalists may upgrade a less important topic by expressing it in the headline, 
thereby downgrading the importance of the main topic. This influences interpretations 
made by the readers who often use information expressed in the headlines strategically 
to understand the story In addition, many readers often read no more than the headline. It 
activates relevant knowledge in the memory of the reader to construct a mental model of 
the situation. The second most prominent element in a news report is the lead which 
needs to be packed with information and news appeal and at the same time remain brief 
and clear.  
Bell (1991; 1998) outlines a framework for news story structure as consisting of 
three main parts: attribution, abstract and story. the attribution shows where the story 
comes from; the abstract consists of the headline, lead and the ‗intro‘ of the news story; 
and the story consists of one or more episodes or clusters of events which share a 
common location or set of news actors. There are three additional types of material, i.e. 
background or prior events; commentary or observations, assessments or comments on 
the action; and follow-up. Bell calls the headline a micro-story, as it typically contains 
the actors, main event and place, as well as the most newsworthy details of the story. It 
can be regarded as a directional summary of the story, i.e. it presents the focus of the 
story and its news values. The lead forms the beginning of the story; it provides new 
information that can be further developed in the body, but should not be repeated. The 
body of the news story provides details such as the time and place of the main events. 
The story itself presents the main event, and it can be supported by facts, quotations, etc.  
White (1997) explains that event stories in modern English newspapers are not 
structured temporally like most types of narrative; instead, they have a special generic 
organisation in which they rearrange or fracture chronology. Most news stories move 
back and forth quite freely on the timeline irrespective of the chronology of the events 
they describe. This characteristic can be explained in terms of institutional practices 
involved in the production of news stories, so as to allow for ‗radical editability‘ which 
may involve the deletion of several paragraphs, without affecting the coherence or 
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meaningfulness of the story. In terms of consumption, most news readers do not read all 
details of the story, but they often read the headline and scan through the body. The 
genre of news stories recognises this particular mode of consumption and adapts to it. 
White (1997) argues that news is about events which are construed as threatening to 
damage, disrupt or rearrange the social order in its material, political or normative guise. 
Within the genre of news reports, we can find two sub-types: the event story which deals 
with events that disrupt the normal social order and the issue report which deals with 
semiotic activities that attract public attention, such as debates or speeches. White also 
holds that hard news stories in English medium newspapers are not told chronologically, 
but rather they have a lead-dominated and orbitally-organised generic structure which is 
based on a number of cultural and ideological decisions made by reporters and editors 
(Toolan, 2001).  
Hard news stories are oriented around the headline and lead, which contain the 
most newsworthy details of the story, i.e. the disruptive or counter-expectation events. 
The main ideas presented in the headline/lead are developed in the body of the story 
through a series of specifications. The body of a news report is made up of successive 
segments that are not related to each other in a series. Instead they are linked to the lead 
paragraph in five broad kinds of satellite: elaboration, cause and effect, justification, 
contextualisation and appraisal-attribution; thus, the lead is the nucleus of hard news 
stories. Elaboration describes or exemplifies information provided in the headline/lead; 
cause and effect describes causes and the results of events described in the headline; 
justification provides justifications of action; contextualisation places the events in a 
temporal, spatial or social context; and appraisal appraises the headline/lead through 
statements of experts or external sources. White argues that this structure of repetitive 
amplification of a previously selected lead helps to naturalise the ideology which 
informs the selection of this story and to it portray as commonsensical  (White, 1997). 
The structure of news stories is affected by the institutional practises involved in 
their production. News is the end product of a complex set of institutional practises of 
news gathering, sorting, selecting and editing. News stories typically deal with events 
that are dramatic, unexpected, with grave negative consequences or involving elite 
personalities and nations. Most newspapers derive the majority of the information in 
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their international news section from other organisations, such as major international 
news agencies. Press releases issued by news agencies are usually re-written and edited 
several times by the editorial staff, so that in the end it becomes difficult to identify who 
has produced which part of the report (Bell, 1991; Tuchman, 1978).  
News media take an active role in the selection of stories according to their news 
value and in the choice of details about them, and they construct them into news items. 
Details are chosen so as to provide identification and contextualisation for the event. 
Identification involves defining the situation which is usually ‗counter-expected‘ and 
outside the direct experience of audiences in order to make it meaningful to them, while 
contextualisation involves reference to familiar contexts and background frames of 
reference to help audiences make sense of it. This process takes into account common 
assumptions and cultural knowledge shared by the majority of audiences (Hall, 1978).  
Hall et al (1978) argue that practical pressures on news media to produce news 
regularly and to work against the clock force them to form allies with powerful 
institutions in society which are capable of securing regular access to news and 
information and of providing accredited sources who are able to make authoritative 
statements on news to give it credibility and objectivity. Therefore, interpretations of 
these sources help define the social situation, and they can be seen as ‗primary definers 
of topics‘. Media reproduce definitions offered by these sources and adopt them as 
‗interpretative frameworks‘. To ensure balance, views of other sources are also 
presented, but they serve as ‗secondary definers‘, and they must take primary 
interpretations as their starting point. ―The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to 
reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society‘s institutional order.‖ 
Scannell (1992) argues that dependence of legitimised sources of information results in a 
predominantly established view of the world, in which lay people are only entitled their 
experience, but not their views. In this way, the use of quotation becomes a gate-keeping 
device that admits only those in position of power and shuts out the opinions of the 
powerless. Thus, while the powerful are further empowered thorough quotations that 
enhance their status and visibility, the systematic silencing of the powerless further 
disempowers them. 
The analysis of narrative is considered to be a very important aspect of the 
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current study, as narrative gives structure and coherence to the news story and enables 
the reader to make sense of what goes on in the real world. Based on the various 
approaches to the analysis of news structure outlined above, it has been observed that 
narrative operates at various levels in news stories. There is the nucleus narrative which 
is represented by the main event or episode. It is connected to a wider narrative in the 
rest of the news report which is made up of different categories such as consequences, 
comments, etc; and this in turn is part of a broader narrative of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict as a whole, often through contextualisation.  
The narrative structure of news reports on events of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict is examined with a specific focus on the main event of nucleus narrative. It 
attempts to answer the question; how is the main story of the report told, especially in 
terms of events, participants, causes and consequences? Other elements of the report, 
e.g. headline and lead are examined carefully, with special attention to their relation to 
the main story and how they set the framework for understanding it. Another important 
factor that is considered is the use of sources in reports and how they help define the 
situation for the interpretation of the news story. Other elements that affect the narrative 
structure of news stories are also considered, e.g. stories are sometimes ‗de-narrativised‘ 
by means of elimination of details or engulfing them with other types of details so that in 
the end it is difficult for the reader to reconstruct the event. Sometimes stories are 
dramatised by means of using figurative language or emphasising certain incidents at the 
expense of others. The choice of certain transitivity constructions can play an important 
role in the de-narrativisation of some news stories.  
3.3 Transitivity  
Transitivity is the linguistic means of representing social reality. The choice of 
grammatical patterns used to encode experience affects the content significantly 
(Iwamoto, 1996). Transitivity is one of the main systems in Halliday‘s Systemic 
Functional Linguistics (Eggins, 1994; Halliday, 1994), which regards language as a 
social semiotic, i.e. a resource for making meaning within a particular social context. It 
focuses on the way people use language to make meanings and on the way language is 
organised to enable meanings to be made (Eggins, 1994). According to functional 
grammar, language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms 
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through which meaning is realised. Halliday (1994) holds that when constructing 
meaning, speakers of any language make choices from ‗networks of interlocking 
options‘.  
Transitivity is the grammatical system concerned with the realisation of the 
‗experiential‘ or ‗ideational‘ function of language, i.e. the representation of the material 
and mental worlds as processes, participants involved in them and circumstances 
associated with them. This kind of analysis is particularly relevant to the present study 
because it is important to examine the way events of the conflict are construed in news 
reports in terms of processes, participants involved in them and circumstances around 
them. Flowerdew (2008) notes that some of the systems and concepts within Halliday‘s 
framework, such as transitivity (categories of verbal processes and participant roles), 
modality, thematic development, and grammatical metaphor have been used in CDA 
studies. Teo (2000) argues that the functional grammar offers critical discourse analysts 
a useful tool to systematically uncover and interpret the underlying motivations, intents 
and purposes of text producers as well as the attitudes, perceptions and stereotypes that 
drive them.  
Based on Systemic Functional Linguistics, Kress and Hodge regard language as 
consisting of a related set of categories and processes and classify processes into 
actionals or processes that involve actions and relationals or processes that involve 
classifications and descriptions. Actionals are further classified into transactive and non-
transactive models, based on causality. In the transactive model, there is actor, process 
and affected entity; therefore, causal steps are clearly indicated and judgments can be 
made on reasonably secure grounds. In the non-transactive model, only one entity is 
directly involved in the process. Vagueness of the non-transactive model results in a 
version of causality that is implicit or inherent causation, and spontaneous, sometimes 
self-caused action, i.e. non-transactives obscure the nature of complex processes and 
fragment causal sequences. The basic transactive model for physical processes can be 
termed agentive, in which the subject is the prime mover in the action; however, in 
mental-process transactives, the receiver is passive and his action is a reaction. The 
relational model does not express actions or processes, but rather relationships between 
entities and qualities. It is used for classification or specifying qualities. It is the most 
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straightforward model for presenting a comment or a judgment (Hodge & Kress, 1993; 
Kress & Hodge, 1979).  
Van Leeuwen (1995) explains the ideological implications of the transactive 
model. Material processes can be transactive, i.e. involving two participants – the actor 
and the goal, or non-transactive, i.e. involving only one participant – the actor. Non-
transactive actions represent their actors as having no effect on the world. The ability to 
transact requires power. The greater the power is, the greater the range of goals that may 
be affected by the actor‘s actions. Agency is a very important concept for the 
understanding of actions, as it implies both intentionality and responsibility for the 
action concerned (Davidson, 1971).  Yamamoto (2006) argues that the use or misuse of 
agency can have political significance, e.g. by manipulating the expression of agency, 
one can manipulate the way the others would think and act. 
Hodge & Kress (1993) explain the processes of passivisation and nominalisation 
as transformations, i.e. operations that can be performed in language. They involve 
deletion, substitution, combination or reordering of elements of simple linguistic forms, 
and they serve two functions; economy and distortion. ―Transformations always involve 
suppression and/or distortion, but they are also normally reversible… Transformations 
can create the illusion of such knowledge for both hearer and speaker, masking 
contradictions or confusions, and imposing an unexamined consensus.‖ Passivisation 
can have a significant effect on the presentation of reality, as the passive transformation 
inverts the order of actor and affected; therefore, the actor is no longer directly related to 
the verb, and the link between the agent and process is weakened. The theme of the 
sentence also changes from the actor to the affected, and the actual process changes into 
a finished process, like an adjective or a state. The actor may be deleted which makes it 
difficult or even impossible to recover. Causality is no longer the main concern, but 
instead attribution or classification. Passivisation can serve three different functions: 
topicalisation, impersoanlisation and detransitivisation (Kress & Hodge, 1979). 
Kress and Hodge (1993) describe nominalisations as sentences, parts of 
sentences, descriptions of actions and the participants involved in them, turned into 
nouns and nominals, which results in the loss of the specific identities of the actors and 
the affected participants. This alters the focus of the expression and narrows the vision 
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of listeners. Nominalisation creates a world of thing-like abstract beings or objects 
which are capable of acting or being acted on. They are harder to reverse in order to 
arrive at the underlying structure, as they change the meaning from a process to a state, 
from activity to an object, from specific to general, and from concrete to abstract. The 
identity of the participants may be irrecoverable. Nominalisations are not marked for 
tense and thus are outside the indications of time and modality. They can be used as 
agents of other processes, which results in more mystification of processes and causal 
relations. Nominalisation is one of the crucial resources used in news reporting. It "de-
narrativises" a process, making it a mere background, more like an entity. 
Nominalisation assumes narrative but does not tell it. It can be exploited and abused 
because it enables the user to refer without explicit reporting; thus, it can be used 
ideologically to mitigate or transfer responsibility (Toolan, 2001). 
Agency is a very important element in transitivity. Davidson defines the concept 
of ‗agency‘ as follows: ―a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described 
under an aspect that makes it intentional‖ (1971:7). Teo (2000) maintains that 
―transitivity is a useful analytic tool that foregrounds the agency or, more accurately, the 
attribution of agency and process to various participants in the text‖. Van Dijk (1991) 
stresses the ideological investment of agency in the press; ―the way the press presents 
and represents social actors is part of the broader ideological structure of values.‖ Van 
Leeuwen (1996) attempts to draw a socio-semantic inventory of possible representation 
of social actors in English and explains that discourse includes or excludes social actors 
according to the interests and purposes of the addressers in relation to their intended 
addressees. Social actors can be excluded by being either suppressed or backgrounded. 
Suppression leaves no reference to the social actors anywhere in the text while 
backgrounding mentions the agents elsewhere in the text, but not in relation to a 
particular activity. Exclusion can be achieved by agentless passives, nominalisation, 
non-finite clauses serving as agents, deletion of beneficiaries and the coding of the 
activity in the middle voice. Such exclusions of social actors represent them as 
something that is not to be further examined or contested.  
In certain contexts, choices have to be made as to which roles are allocated to 
which participants in a particular representation and which interests are served by these 
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allocations. Participants can be represented as either active agents acting as a dynamic 
force in the activity or passive patients undergoing the activity. In systemic functional 
terms, participants are coded differently in relation to various types of processes: 
material processes have actors and goals, mental processes have ‗sensers‘ and 
phenomena, verbal processes have ‗sayers‘ and verbiage, and relational processes have 
carriers and attributes. Social actors can be referred to in generic or specific terms, i.e. as 
classes or as specific actors. Social actors can also be individualised or assimilated into 
groups. Assimilation is achieved by aggregation, i.e. quantification and treating actors as 
statistics as in opinion polls and surveys; or by collectivisation through a noun that 
denotes a group, such as ‗nation‘ or ‗community‘. Aggregation is marked by the use of 
quantifiers, e.g. 40%, or ‗a number of‘, etc., and serves to regulate practise and 
manufacture consensus, as it represents itself as merely reporting facts. Collectivisation 
serves agreement and represents social actors as a homogenous group. 
Social actors can also be represented in terms of their association with a specific 
activity. Conversely, they can be represented in terms of dissociation from a certain 
activity. Indetermination involves representing social actors as anonymous, i.e. without 
specified identities while specification involves specifying the identity of social actors. 
Nomination is typically realised by proper nouns and presents the unique identities of 
social actors. Categorisation involves referring to social actors in terms of identities and 
functions they share with others. Functionalisation involves referring to social actors in 
terms of a function or role they do. Identification involves referring to social actors in 
terms of what they permanently are by classification, relational identification and 
physical identification. Classification represents social actors in terms of major 
categories, such as age, wealth and race. Physical identification represents them in terms 
of their physical characteristics while relational identification represents them in terms 
of their personal, kinship, or work relations.  
Personalisation occurs when social actors are referred to as human beings while 
impersonalisation occurs when social actors are represented in ways that do not include 
the feature ‗human‘. Abstraction occurs when social actors are referred to by a quality 
assigned to them.  Objectivation is expressed by a place or thing social actors are 
associated with, for instance spatialisation, e.g. Australia; utterance autonomination, 
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e.g. the report; instrumentalisation, e.g. a mortar shell; or somatisation, e.g. hands. 
Impersonalisation has an important ideological function, as it backgrounds the identity 
and role of social actors and lends impersonal authority or force to an activity or quality 
of the actor. It can add positive or negative connotations to an activity or utterance of a 
social actor. It can deny responsibility for negative actions, and so it is associated with 
bureaucratic uses of language (van Leeuwen, 1996).  
Transitivity analysis is crucial for the representation of activities, participants 
involved in them and circumstances associated with them. It is the main resource for the 
representation of social activity and its consequences; therefore, transitivity analysis is a 
major component of this study. Van Leeuwen‘s analysis of social actors, social action 
and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1995; 1996; 2000) is very useful for the current 
study to discuss the way participants and their actions are represented in different 
newspapers and the ideological implications of such representations. Therefore, the 
Palestinians and the Israelis are discussed in terms of their roles as agents and affected 
participants of processes that describe acts of violence in the four different newspapers, 
and how this relates to the ideology of the newspaper that offers certain representations. 
This analysis is closely related to the analysis of narrative and lexis. 
3.4 Lexicalisation 
For the purpose of describing lexis, it is very important as a first step to define 
what is meant by the term ‗lexical item‘. It has been very difficult to define what is 
meant by the term ‗word‘; attempts to define it referred to its orthography or properties, 
but failed to provide an accurate definition. The term used in this study is ‗lexical item‘ 
which can be described as ―a hold-all term that includes, but is not limited to vocabulary 
items, fixed phrases, idioms and metaphorical extensions‖ (Carter, 1987; quoted by 
Hadley, 1997). The basic function of lexis as a linguistic resource is to enable people to 
name and describe different elements of the world in which they live. Such nominations 
and attributions reveal the way they view entities and represent them; therefore, they 
differ according to the ideologies of different groups of people. With specific reference 
to lexical choices in newspaper discourse, Pisarek (1983) explains that the analysis of 
words used in newspapers will allow us to reconstruct the image of the world presented 
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by the press and the attitudes propagated by it. 
Hodge and Kress (1993) state that classification is at the basis of language and 
thought. It orders reality, therefore, it can be regarded as an instrument of control since 
society uses it to control perceptions of reality. These perceptions are not necessarily the 
same for the whole society; indeed, different groups may have different classification 
systems. It can be argued that classification constrains thought, as it provides the 
framework for organising the world and its elements. Systems of classification are not 
fixed, as they can change gradually over a long period of time, especially with the 
change in the material, social, political or ideological environment. Culturally-
determined systems of classification are very important, as they show how the world is 
represented in the minds of language users, and they form part of their ideologies 
(Hodge & Kress, 1993).  
The analysis of lexis is very important for displaying underlying ideologies in 
discourse. Van Dijk (1991: 53) holds that ―lexicalisation … is never neutral: the choice 
of one word rather than another to express more or less the same meaning, or to denote 
the same referent may signal the opinions, emotions, or special position of a speaker‖. 
Toolan (2001) expresses the importance of lexical choices especially in the context of 
newspaper discourse; journalists have rich inventories of overlapping descriptors to 
choose from as they sort out which characterisation fits their (ideologically 
contextualised) account of things best. Ideology plays a vital role in the positive 
representation of certain groups and the negative representation of others. This can be 
done through the choice of certain lexical items to refer to individuals, groups and 
actions, as well as to attributing certain traits and characteristics to them; thus, lexical 
choices are crucial in determining how people and their actions are represented and 
perceived. With regard to studying the discourse of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, 
lexical choices can serve ideologically in the representation of different sides of the 
conflict and the legitimisation or delegitimisation of their actions, depending on the 
ideology of the newspaper.  
When examining the lexical aspect of news reports dealing with violent events of 
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, it is important to study referential and predicational 
strategies, as they play a crucial role in the positive and negative representation of 
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different groups, as well as in the legitimisation and deligitimisation of their actions. In 
their study of discriminatory discourse, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) emphasise the role of 
referential and predicational strategies in positive and negative representations and their 
ideological power. Referential or nomination strategies are used to construct and 
represent social actors, and predicational strategies are used to provide social actors with 
predications, which aim at labelling them more or less positively or negatively. They 
may be realised as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in 
the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. Sometimes it can be hard to 
distinguish predicational from referential strategies since some nominations have certain 
predications associated with them; therefore, the pure referential identification often 
involves evaluative labelling of social actors. Reisigl and Wodak list some referential 
strategies relevant to discriminatory discourse which affect the positive and negative 
representations of various groups. Nir and Roeh (1992) examined referential strategies 
used to refer to Palestinian and Israeli actors in Israeli newspapers during the time of the 
first Palestinian Uprising. They listed a number of methods that were used to refer to 
actors on different sides, including: name, age or age group, occupation or social status, 
domicile status, national affiliation, role in the events, number, and group. Reference by 
name recognised the actor as a person with a clear-cut identity. Reference by occupation 
or as a group tends to emphasise stereotypes.  
Membership categorisation is closely related to referential and predicational 
strategies. Van Leeuwen (1996) defines categorisation as ―the representation of social 
actors by functionalising, identifying or appraising them, i.e. by referring to them by 
virtue of ascribing to them identities, functions and positive or negative evaluations that 
they share with others.  Categorisation is used by people in social interaction to refer to 
entities in the world and to classify them. The selection of a certain category creates a 
bond between the thing being categorised and other members of the same category. The 
selection of categorisation devices in media can point to ideological relations predicated 
on power relations (Jalbert, 1983).  
Sacks & Ziferstein (1992) suggest that everyday knowledge about people is 
organised in membership categorisation devices which consist of membership categories 
which are, in turn, constituted by category-bound activities. ―Membership categorisation 
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has a strong pragmatic component – it orients to practical action. Much of the 
categorising consists of delimiting one‘s own moral, social and religious characteristics 
as well as those of the opponents, and in doing so accomplishing rejections, recruiting 
allies‖ (Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004). Another ideologically invested 
categorisation device is category boundedness. In category-bound activities, members of 
a category are recognised as performers of certain activities, e.g. voters elect. 
Categorising a person or a group into a particular social schema influences the 
perception of the meaning of the actions of the person or group. In other words, how we 
categorise a social group affects the way we relate to them and perceive their actions. 
Jalbert notes that ―the repeated reference to the Palestinians as ‗terrorists‘ by the media 
has created this category boundedness between the members of the category‖ (Jalbert, 
1983). 
Fowler (1991) discusses a number of lexicalisation processes including over-
lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation and under-lexicalisation, as well as their ideological 
underpinnings. Over-lexicalisation is the use of many synonyms and quasi-synonyms to 
refer to the same entity. It is used in relation to problematic issues that are hard to define 
or express; therefore, it is a formal linguistic marker of an exclusive social practise. By 
contrast, the use of a single term for an entity denotes the existence of a basic consensus 
over it. Fowler argues that powerless people are over-lexicalised, e.g. ‗female lawyer‘. 
Over-lexicalisation often has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from the 
social convention or expectations and reflects perceptions and judgements from the 
essentially biased standpoint of such cultural norms or social expectations (Teo, 2000). 
There are other relevant features that can be discussed in relation to the use of lexis in 
the reporting of violence in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict; for instance, generalisation, 
connotations, implications, presuppositions, as well as the use of certain rhetorical 
devices, such as hyperbole, ridicule, contrast, vagueness, irrelevance, metonymy, 
synecdoche, among others. The metaphorical use of language can also be examined in 
this context. All these categories can be invested ideologically in relation to the 
lexicalisation of the different sides of the conflict, and they can thus contribute to their 
positive or negative representations.  
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3.5 The Method of CDA in the Current Study 
As explained earlier, there is not a single method for undertaking CDA, but 
different studies employ different methods depending on the aims of the study, the type 
of data to be analysed, etc. In this study, newspaper reports on violence in the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict are analysed to examine the way different sides of the conflict 
are presented in newspapers that are issued in different contexts or that have different 
orientations. The previous sections have explained the three selected categories, i.e. 
narrative, syntax and lexis and their potential to be ideologically invested. In this 
section, I present the features that are examined under each category if present in the 
data. 
The analysis of the narrative structure considers different elements of news 
reports, e.g. the choice of headline and lead, the presentation of the story, as well as the 
use of sources and background information. The headline is the most prominent aspect 
of a news report; it summarises the story and highlights its most significant details. It 
also guides readers‘ interpretation of the story, e.g. when the consequences of the event 
are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as serious or grave; whereas when 
causes are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as justified. The lead of the 
story indicates the source of the story and provides an initial summary which often 
points out the direction in which the story is developed in the rest of the report. Both the 
headline and lead are analysed for their significance in the presentation of the story 
especially given that they present the interpretative frames which highlight particular 
aspects and direct readers‘ understanding of the story.  
The analysis also examines how the story is told, i.e. which details are given 
about violence committed by different sides and how they are presented. A crucial 
aspect to consider in this regard is the narrative structure of the story, as sometimes the 
story is de-narrativised and presented in a factual reporting format, while in other 
instances it is presented in a more coherent narrative structure with chronological events, 
clear agency, causality and consequences, which has a significant impact on readers‘ 
ability to reconstruct the story and to make sense of it. Another important element to 
consider in the analysis is the use of sources who often present verbal reactions or expert 
views on the story. Hall (1978) makes an important distinction between sources that act 
 84 
as primary definers of the situation whose interpretations are adopted by the newspaper 
and those who act as secondary definers providing the opposing view to balance views 
presented by the primary definers, but whose views are not endorsed by the newspaper. 
Also considered in the analysis is contextual or background information which assists 
readers to make sense of the story and which are often selected strategically by reporters 
to support the interpretative frames that accompany the story.  
The analysis of transitivity structures considers how syntactic structures are used 
to represent violent actions committed by each side, which can have important 
implications on the presentation of the action, as it affects readers‘ understanding of the 
action and responsibility for it. At the level of transitivity, the selection of actions 
undertaken by each side is examined, along with the choice of transitivity structures, 
agency structures, and affected participants. Certain choices at the level of transitivity 
are crucial for the presentation of action, e.g. the use of nominalisation, the non-
transactive model, the agentless passive and the middle voice contribute to the 
suppression of agency for certain violent actions. On the other hand, the use of the 
transactive model and agentive constructions clearly present the agent of violent actions. 
The inclusion or suppression of agents can have serious implications on the presentation 
of the actions of each side and on readers‘ interpretations.  
The presentation of the consequences of violent actions and participants affected 
by them is also important, e.g. violence can be presented as targeting people and 
affecting them or it can be presented as targeting inanimate objects or as being 
unintentional. The expression of intentionality and responsibility is affected by such 
choices. Also relevant to the analysis of transitivity is the presentation of purpose of 
violence which can have the effect of presenting the action as justified or even legitimate 
and presenting it as unjustified and illegitimate. 
The analysis of lexis focuses on the presentation of different sides of the conflict, 
i.e. which labels and semantic roles are assigned to each side, and which actions are 
undertaken by each side, and the effect of such choices, e.g. the choice of labels related 
to militancy contribute to the delegitimisation of the actions of a given group, whereas 
the choice of labels related to the military register have the opposite effect of 
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legitimising the actions of a certain group. In addition, the analysis includes the choice 
of descriptions used with each side and their role in their positive and negative 
evaluation. Other categories that are also included in the analysis are the use of 
categorisation and generalisation with members of each group, which can potentially 
underrepresent certain groups, e.g. civilians in areas of conflict. Lexical processes of re-
lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation are also examined. Re-lexicalisation can reframe 
the action to present it from a different perspective, e.g. more neutrally, while over-
lexicalisation often has the effect of presenting groups and issues as problematic and 
hard to define. Certain rhetorical devices are also considered where appropriate, e.g. 
connotations, presuppositions, vagueness, metonymy, among others. 
Finally, an attempt is made to interpret and explain the findings of the linguistic 
analysis of the above features by reference to the institutional practices involved in news 
production and by integrating elements of the historical, political, socio-cultural 
contexts. This involves a discussion of how the use of certain linguistic features by 
newspapers can contribute to the positive or negative presentation of different sides of 
the conflict and their actions; it also considers how they can contribute to certain 
strategies of discriminatory discourse, e.g. othering, exclusion, legitimisation, 
delegitimisation, naturalisation, neutralisation, mitigation, criminalisation, avoidance, 
vagueness, problematisation, dehumanisation, blaming the victim, etc. 
Thus, the critical analysis of news reports undertaken in this study follows the 
modified version of CDA discussed in chapter 2. It includes the three stages of CDA 
adopted from Fairclough (1992); namely, description, interpretation and explanation. 
The linguistic analysis focuses on selected features at three linguistic levels, i.e. 
narrative, transitivity and lexis that are believed to have the potential to be ideologically 
invested in different newspapers. The analysis draws on Wodak‘s discourse-historical 
approach by integrating features  of wider historical, political, socio-cultural contexts, 
and also draws on van Dijk‘s notion of access to linguistic, material and cultural 
resources by different groups. The following chapter presents an overview of the corpus 
of news reports selected for analysis and background information about the sources of 
these reports. 
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4 Corpus Sources and Method of Selection  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the corpus of news reports used in the 
study, to introduce it sources and sampling method, as well as to give background to the 
newspapers from which reports are obtained and the events selected for analysis.  
4.1 Description of Corpus and Method of Data Selection 
The corpus used in the analysis is made up of hard news reports on violent events 
of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict starting from the second Palestinian Uprising (Al-Aqsa 
Intifada) which started in September 2000, obtained from four newspapers. The selected 
newspapers are the New York Times from the USA, the Arab News from the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, as well as the Guardian and the Times from the UK. They are daily, 
quality mainstream papers, which are issued in English and which enjoy good status and 
wide elite readerships in their respective countries. They have been selected so as to 
make it possible to compare the way the same event is represented in Arab and Western 
newspapers, i.e. Arab News and New York Times, and also to compare the way the same 
event is represented in two newspapers with different orientations from the same 
country, i.e. the Guardian and the Times. 
Reports used for analysis are obtained from online sources, i.e. the official 
websites of the selected newspapers; more specifically, the Arab News 
(http://www.arabnews.com); the New York Times (http://www.times.com); the Guardian 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk); and the London Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/). 
Some reports are derived from electronic databases such as LexisNexis Executive 
(http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/), and Thompson Gale newspaper Databases 
(http://www.gale.com/). Data is obtained from online sources due to accessibility of 
online material and to avoid the difficulties, delay and costs incurred in using the print 
versions which are issued in three different countries.  
The online versions of newspapers have some differences from the print version. 
The multimodal nature of electronic media makes it possible for online papers to have 
hyperlinks to related stories and to other resources, e.g. background information; 
moreover, they display more graphic illustrations such as colored photographs, 
interactive maps, and audiovisual materials. In addition, the ease and speed of updating 
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news stories in real-time makes it possible to produce various versions of the same story. 
The use of interactive or multimodal features should not affect this study, as it is 
concerned mainly with the linguistic aspect of the story, i.e. the actual wording. If more 
than one version of the story is available, the latest version is chosen, as it supersedes all 
previous ones. The differences between the print and online versions of the newspapers 
should not affect the results of this research because the online version should not be 
expected to display discourses or ideologies different from those displayed in the print 
version since they are issued by the same institutions and are authored by the same 
editorial staff, although they are intended for a much wider potential readership, due to 
the universal reach of materials published online. Furthermore, obtaining all data used in 
this research form online sources achieves consistency. 
News reports selected for analysis cover six years of the second Palestinian 
Uprising. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is eventful, violent and intractable, especially 
the period of the second uprising which involves a great deal of bloodshed on both sides. 
Texts used in the analysis report on violence committed by the Israelis and the 
Palestinians against each other. With regard to the vast amount of data on the conflict 
and the practical constraints imposed by the availability of time and other resources, a 
sampling method had to be chosen to produce a corpus that is both representative of the 
huge amount of data available, and at the same time analysable with view of existing 
restrictions. The selected corpus has reports that deal with acts of violence committed by 
each side against the other. Similar acts undertaken by both sides are chosen, e.g. raids, 
killings and bombings. Reports are selected so that they cover the six-year period of the 
second Uprising, by means of a method of convenience sampling, which is a method 
convenient for the purpose of this research, and that does not involve probability 
calculations.  
Initially, two events were selected for analysis from each year of the sampling 
period; one deals mainly with Palestinian violence and the other deals mainly with 
Israeli violence. This lead to collecting forty-eight reports dealing with twelve acts of 
violence. Then, this corpus was narrowed down to twenty-four reports dealing with six 
acts of violence. Effort was made to choose reports that deal with similar acts 
undertaken by different sides, e.g. a Palestinian raid in Israel and an Israeli raid in the 
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Palestinian territories, a Palestinian bombing among Israelis and an Israeli bombing 
among Palestinians, etc. In this way, it becomes possible to compare and contrast the 
way similar actions undertaken by different sides are presented. Reports are selected 
from different years of the sample period, i.e. 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006; thus, the 
sample spans over a period of six years from 2001 to 2006 and represents the 
development of events and discourses over the period chosen for analysis. The overall 
corpus consists of twenty-four news reports on six of the events of the conflict, i.e. about 
19,500 words. The following section presents background information about the 
newspapers from which reports are obtained for analysis. 
4.2 Background to the selected newspapers  
4.2.1 The Guardian 
The Guardian is an influential daily British newspaper owned by the Guardian 
Media Group. It is a left-leaning national prestige daily (Bell, 1991), published in 
London and Manchester. It appears Monday to Saturday, and its sister newspaper the 
Observer appears on Sunday. It was founded in Manchester in 1821 by a group of non-
conformist businessmen headed by John Edward Taylor, and it was issued weekly under 
the title of the Manchester Guardian. When Stamp Duty was lifted in 1855, it became a 
daily paper. Its most famous owner and editor for 57 years, C. P. Scott, made the 
Manchester Guardian into a nationally recognised newspaper. In June 1936 ownership 
of the paper was transferred to the Scott Trust, which ensured the paper's independence, 
as financial security guaranteed its independent liberal stance. In 1959 the paper came to 
be known as the Guardian.  
Scott's friendship with Chaim Weizmann played a role in the Balfour 
Declaration, and in 1948 the Guardian was a strong supporter of the State of Israel. The 
story of the relationship between the Guardian, the Zionist movement and Israel is told 
in Daphna Baram's book "Disenchantment: the Guardian and Israel". During the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Guardian attracted a significant proportion of anti-war 
readers for being most critical of British and American military initiatives. The 
Guardian is currently highly critical of Israeli defence policies. In December 2003 
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journalist Julie Burchill left the paper for the Times, citing this as one of the reasons for 
her move.  
The Guardian enjoys a high standard in writing, quality and opinion, and it is  
highly respected worldwide. Editorial articles in the Guardian are generally in sympathy 
with the liberal to left-wing ends of the political spectrum. The paper is traditionally 
affiliated with the centrist Liberal Party. A MORI poll in 2000 showed that 80% of the 
Guardian‟s readers were Labour Party voters. In November 2005, the Guardian had a 
certified average daily circulation of 378,618 copies. It has been awarded the National 
Newspaper of the Year in 1999 and 2006 by the British Press Awards. The Guardian 
Unlimited website won the Best Newspaper category two years running in 2005 and 
2006. 
In June 1993, the Guardian bought the Observer from Lonrho thus gaining a 
serious Sunday newspaper partner with similar political views. Its international weekly 
edition is titled the Guardian Weekly. It includes sections from a number of other 
internationally significant newspapers of a somewhat left-of-centre inclination, including 
Le Monde. The Guardian is famous for its cosmopolitan view, literary and artistic 
coverage and criticism section. In 2004, it introduced an online digital version of its 
print edition. All of its news is published online with free access both to current news 
and an archive of three million stories. The Guardian has a reputation for text mangling, 
technical typesetting failures and typographical errors, although such errors are now less 
frequent than they used to be. It is also known as ―Britain‘s non-conformist conscience‖ 
due to its independent liberal stance and its editorial excellence (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica inc.).  
4.2.2  The Times 
The Times is a one of the oldest and most influential British newspapers, 
regarded as Britain's newspaper of record. It is a national daily published in London 
since 1785. The paper was founded in 1785 as the Daily Universal Register by John 
Walter who was also its first editor. In 1788 its name was changed to the Times. John 
Walter's initiative to obtain international news helped enhance the paper's reputation and 
readership. The Times used contributions from significant figures in the fields of 
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politics, science, literature and the arts to build its reputation. For much of its early life, 
the profits of the Times were very large and competition minimal. In 1817  Thomas 
Barnes was appointed general editor. He succeeded in boosting the popularity of the 
Times and increasing its influence. It was given the title ―the Thunderer‖ to reflect its 
strong independent popularity, and its influence on public opinion. It was the first 
newspaper to send special correspondents abroad and to send war correspondents to 
cover particular conflicts. 
In 1967, the Times started printing news on the front page for the first time, and 
merged with the Sunday Times to form Times Newspapers Limited, which the 
Australian publisher Rupert Murdoch headed since 1981. He provided the paper with 
up-to-date printing technology. Though the Times is traditionally a right-wing 
newspaper and a strong supporter of the Conservatives, it supported New Labour for 
elections, after Murdoch allied himself with Tony Blair. It has also come to stress 
Murdoch's "neo-conservative" views over a broader and more balanced range of 
conservative views it has traditionally put forward.  
The Times is known for its accuracy and rigorous standards, ruled by tradition 
and editorial independence.  Long considered the UK's newspaper of record, the Times is 
regarded as a serious publication with high standards of journalism. However, Robert 
Fisk, seven times British International Journalist of the Year, resigned as foreign 
correspondent in 1988 over what he saw as political censorship of his article on the 
shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 in July of that year. The latest figures from the 
national readership survey show the Times to have the highest number of readers and the 
largest numbers of readers in London of any of the "quality" papers (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica inc.).  
4.2.3 The New York Times 
The New York Times is owned by the New York Times Company, published in 
New York City by Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr. and distributed internationally. It is the 
largest metropolitan newspaper and is regarded as a newspaper of record in the US. It 
was founded in 1851 by experienced journalist and politician Henry Jarvis Raymond and 
former banker George Jones as the New-York Daily Times, and in 1857 it changed to its 
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current name. It started as a penny paper, but came to enjoy early success, as it appealed 
to a cultured, intellectual readership. In 1896, Adolph Ochs acquired it, and under his 
guidance, it achieved international scope, circulation, and reputation. The paper is 
known for its full reporting of news and its good coverage of international news. The 
New York Times gave its name to Times Square in New York 1904 after it moved to new 
headquarters.  
The New York Times is one of the most prominent American daily newspapers, 
although it trails USA Today and the Wall Street Journal in circulation. It has 
traditionally printed full transcripts of major speeches and debates. In 1971 it published 
leaked documents revealing that the U.S. government had been painting an 
unrealistically rosy picture of progress of the Vietnam War. When referring to people, 
the New York Times uses titles, (except among the sports pages, in which last names 
stand alone). Its headlines tend to be verbose, and, for major stories, come with 
subheadings giving further details, although it is moving away from this style. The New 
York Times has had a strong presence on the web since 1995.  
In Manufacturing Consent (1994), Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky analyse 
a variety of major U.S. media outlets, with an emphasis on the New York Times and 
conclude that bias exists which is neither liberal nor conservative in nature, but rather 
aligned towards the interests of corporate conglomerates, such as those that now own 
most of these media. Chomsky has explained that this bias functions in all sorts of ways:  
"...by selection of topics, by distribution of concerns, by emphasis and framing of issues, 
by filtering of information, by bounding of debate within certain limits. They determine, 
they select, they shape, they control, and they restrict – in order to serve the interests of 
dominant, elite groups in the society."  Chomsky also touches on the specific importance 
this perceived bias has in the New York Times, saying: "...history is what appears in the 
New York Times archives; the place where people will go to find out what happened is 
the New York Times. Therefore it's extremely important if history is going to be shaped 
in an appropriate way, that certain things appear, certain things not appear, certain 
questions be asked, other questions be ignored, and that issues be framed in a particular 
fashion." 
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In summer 2004, the newspaper's then public editor, Daniel Okrent, wrote a 
piece on the New York Times‟ alleged liberal bias. He concluded that the paper did have 
a liberal bias in coverage of certain social issues, gay marriage being the example he 
used. He claimed that this bias reflected the paper's cosmopolitanism, which arose 
naturally from its roots as a hometown paper of New York City. Okrent did not 
comment at length on the issue of bias in coverage of "hard news‖; however, he noted 
that the paper's coverage of the Iraq war was, among other things, insufficiently critical 
of the George W. Bush administration (Encyclopaedia Britannica inc.).  
4.2.4 The Arab News 
The Arab News started in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1975. It was founded in 
1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. It is owned by the Saudi government and 
published by the Saudi Research and Publishing Co. (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi 
Research and Marketing Group (SRMG). It is the first Saudi English-language daily 
newspaper. The Arab News has become a well respected leading paper. From its 
initiation, the paper has been serving the interests of both Saudis and a large expatriate 
community and in consequence introduced them to each other, by offering regional news 
from Europe, America, India, Pakistan, Philippines and other Middle Eastern countries 
in English for the heterogeneous mix of its readership.  
The Arab News is distributed in all Gulf States in addition to the Near East, 
North Africa, Europe and the USA. It also has an online version published from its 
offices in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The paper regards itself as offering Arab and non-Arab 
readers  news from an Arab perspective, and in-depth regional information. The Arab 
News is popular among many sections of Saudi society, including nationals and foreign 
residents. However, since it is published in English, the majority of its readership is 
made up of expatriates and highly educated nationals. 
The Arab News reflects the official Saudi perspective and offers a wide range of 
national, regional and international news. The readership profile of the paper indicates 
that 85% of the readers are non-Arabs, and only 15% are Arabs. It is serious in its 
approach and in dealing with political issues, but since it is published in English to a 
mainly foreign readership or educated Arabs, it presents news from a Saudi perspective 
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that is more conciliatory with Western views. The paper has correspondents in many 
Arab and foreign capitals, yet it obtains a great deal of foreign news from news agencies 
and depends on them to a large extend.  
The Arab News has a website (www.arabnews.com) which publishes the issues 
of the paper online on a daily basis. In addition, it also has a searchable archive with 
articles that date back to 2001. The paper states that the website gets hundreds of 
thousands of hits every day from Web surfers worldwide. After the background to the 
selected newspapers, an overview of the news stories is presented, including some 
quantified data about the selected reports. 
4.3 An Overview of News Stories 
The following table presents an overview of the news stories selected for 
analysis. It compares them in terms of length, choice of headline, by line and source, 
quoted sources and key features. It aims to present an overview of the news stories in a 
factual form. 
First Story: Published 31
st
 July 2001 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  Israeli gunships pound 
Gaza 
In Mideast, a Day of 
Resounding Violence 
Blast kills six Fatah 
men on Israel's hitlist 
Six men killed in Gaza 
explosion 
Length 554 words 822 words 650 words 211 words 
Source Nazer Majally, Arab 
News Staff, GAZA  
CLYDE HABERMAN  
JERUSALEM  
Suzanne Goldenberg in 
Jerusalem 
Ross Dunn in Jerusalem 
Quoted  - Israeli Army 
- Israeli political sources 
- Arafat‘s top aide Nabil 
Abu Rudeina 
- Fatah officials 
- The Palestinians 
- Ahmad Abdel-Rahman, 
an aide to Arafat 
- The Israelis 
- Israel 
- Mickey Levy, the city's 
police chief 
- A middle-aged woman 
- Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, 
the deputy defensce 
minister 
- Palestinian officials 
- some Palestinians 
- Israel's deputy defence 
minister, Dalia Rabin 
Pelossof 
- Hospital officials 
- The Israeli army 
- Mr Sharon 
- Palestinian leaders 
 
- Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, 
Israel's Deputy Defence 
Minister 
 
 
Key Features The report focuses on 
violence against 
Palestinians and avoids 
violence against Israelis. 
 The report mentions 
violence against both 
sides and is careful about 
blaming any side for it. 
The report mentions 
violence against both 
sides and highlights 
violence of the cell to 
which victims belong. 
The report is too short 
and is not accurate about 
the location of the 
bombing.  
Second Story: Published 1st August 2002 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  Jerusalem Bomb Kills 
Seven 
AT LEAST 7 KILLED 
AS MILITANTS 
BOMB JERUSALEM 
CAMPUS 
Bomb kills seven at 
university  
Hamas attacks mixed 
campus in revenge for 
assassination 
Hamas bomb kills 
seven students at 
Jerusalem's 
multicultural 
university 
Length 618 words 1272 words 623 words 606 words 
Source Occupied Jerusalem  By James Bennet and 
John Kifner, Jerusalem  
Suzanne Goldenberg in 
Jerusalem 
Stephen Farrell in 
Jerusalem 
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Quoted  - The sources 
- An Israeli government 
spokesman … Avi 
Pazner 
- Hamas 
- Hamas leader Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin 
- The Palestinian 
Authority 
 
 
 
- Spencer Dew, 26, a 
divinity student from the 
University of Chicago 
- Abeer Salman, 19, a 
student from the Arab 
village of Beit Safafa 
- Allistaire Goldrein, 19, 
of Liverpool, England  
- Kobi Cohen, the 
student union president 
- Israeli officials 
- Ron Krumer, a 
spokesman for the 
Hadassah Medical 
Center 
- Dror Lederman, 26, a 
student of economics  
- Sophia Aron, 19, of 
Los Angeles 
- Shlomo Avineri, a 
political science 
professor  
- The Islamist group 
Hamas 
- The Palestinian 
Authority 
- Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, 
a political leader of 
Hamas 
- Sharon Avital, 26, an 
MBA student 
- Daniel Farahan, a 20-
year-old from Indiana 
- The police 
spokeswoman Sigal 
Toledo 
- Alistair Goldrein, from 
Liverpool 
- The public security 
minister, Uzi Landau 
- Hamas 
- the spiritual leader of 
Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin 
- Yasser Arafat's 
Palestinian Authority 
- Alastair Goldrein, 20, a 
student from Merseyside 
- Yassir Arafat's 
Palestinian Authority 
Key Features The report presents the 
bombing generally and 
avoids blaming 
Palestinians for it 
initially. 
The report highlights 
Hamas responsibility for 
the bombing. It is based 
mainly on quoting Israeli 
and American sources. 
The headline is 
capitalised. 
 
The report is clear about 
Hamas responsibility for 
the bombing and its 
consequences. It quotes 
many Israeli sources. 
 
The report is very clear 
about Hamas 
responsibility for the 
bombing and its 
consequences. It does 
not quote many sources. 
Third Story: Published 15thJanuary 2004 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  Mother-of-Two 
Bomber Kills Four 
Israelis  
Gaza Mother, 22, 
Kills Four Israelis 
in Suicide 
Bombing  
Human-bomb 
mother kills four 
Israelis at Gaza 
checkpoint 
'It was my wish to 
turn my body into 
deadly shrapnel 
against the 
Zionists' 
Length 790 words 832 words 826 words  640 words 
Source Nazir Majally, Asharq 
Al-Awsat 
— Additional input from 
agencies 
GREG MYRE in EREZ, 
Gaza Strip 
Chris McGreal in Gaza Ian MacKinnon in Gaza 
Quoted  - Raanan Gissin, a 
spokesman for Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon 
- Brig. Gen. Gadi 
Shamni, the Israeli 
military commander in 
Gaza 
- Hamas spiritual leader 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 
- A Palestinian woman 
standing  
- She (the bomber) 
- Her brother-in-law 
Yusef Awad 
- Palestinian Prime 
Minister Ahmed Qorei 
- David Baker, an 
official in the office of 
Israel's prime minister, 
Ariel Sharon 
- Sheik Ahmed Yassin, 
the spiritual leader of 
Hamas 
- She (the bomber) 
- A relative 
 
- The Gaza divisional 
commander, Brigadier-
General Gadi Shamni 
- Lieutenant Ayelet 
Kadosh 
- She (the bomber) 
- The spiritual leader of 
Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin 
- He (her brother-in-law, 
Yusuf Awad) 
- A Hamas official 
- Brigadier-General Gadi 
Shamni, commander of 
the Israeli Army's Gaza 
division 
- Yossi Vaknim, an 
Israeli from the nearby 
Nisanit settlement 
- The bomber 
- Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, 
the spiritual leader of 
Hamas 
Key Features The report highlights the 
status of the bomber as a 
The report details all 
actions of the bomber 
The report presents a lot 
of background 
The headline quotes the 
bomber in a highly 
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mother and presents 
Hamas responsibility 
clearly.  
and presents Hamas 
responsibility clearly.  
information and quotes 
the bomber and Israeli 
sources extensively.  
ideological statement.  
Fourth Story: Published 22nd March 2004 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  Murder Leader of Hamas Killed 
by Missile in Israeli 
Strike 
Israel assassinates 
Hamas leader 
. Yassin killed in missile 
strike 
· Mass protests by 
Palestinians 
· Militants vow revenge 
attacks 
Hamas spiritual leader 
killed in Israeli air strike 
Length 658 words  832 words 872 words 640 words 
Source Hisham Abu Taha, 
Arab News, Gaza 
By JAMES 
BENNET 
GAZA  
George Wright and 
agencies 
FROM AP IN 
RAMALLAH  
Quoted  - Sharon 
- Salah Amudi, 30 
- Top Hamas official 
Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi 
- The Israeli military 
- The army 
- Israeli officials 
- The Israeli deputy 
defence minister, Zeev 
Boim 
- Mr. Netanyahu 
- Palestinians at the 
scene 
- One witness, Maher al-
Beek 
- Hospital officials 
- Sheik Yassin 
- Ahmed Qurei, the 
Palestinian prime 
minister 
- An Israeli defence 
spokeswoman 
-  Israeli defence forces 
- Gideon Meir, an Israeli 
foreign ministry official 
- The Israeli daily 
Ha'aretz 
- The Israeli defence 
minister, Shaul Mofaz, 
- Taxi driver Yousef 
Haddad 
- Hamas official Ismail 
Haniyeh, a close 
associate of Yassin 
- Abu Abeer, a 
spokesman for a group 
of militant Palestinian 
organisations in the 
occupied territories 
- Hamas 
- The Palestinian Prime 
Minister, Ahmed Qureia 
- Israel 
- Gideon Meir, an Israeli 
Foreign Ministry official 
- One Israeli official 
- The Palestinian leader 
Yassir Arafat 
- the Hamas leadership 
- Yassin 
- Ismail Haniyeh, a 
Hamas official and a 
close associate of Yassin 
- medics 
- the Palestinian 
Authority 
- Abdel Aziz Rantisi 
The militant groups 
Islamic Jihad and Al 
Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades 
Key Features The report focuses on 
Israeli actions and 
presents more details 
The report focuses on 
Palestinian reactions and 
quotes many sources. 
The report focuses on 
Palestinian reactions and 
highlights Israeli 
responsibility. 
The reports focuses on 
Palestinian reactions and 
quotes many sources 
Fifth Story: Published 26th June 2006 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  2 Israeli Troops Killed in 
Attack by Palestinians 
MILITANTS' RAID ON 
ISRAEL RAISES 
TENSION IN GAZA 
Israel promises revenge 
for soldier deaths  
· Hamas warned after 
two killed in pre-dawn 
raid 
· Abbas ordered to 
secure seized corporal's 
release 
Soldier kidnapped in 
deadly tunnel ambush 
Length 743 words 1563 words 1100 words 526 words 
Source Hisham Abu Taha, Gaza  
— With input from 
agencies 
Conal Urquhart in 
Tel Aviv 
 
By STEVEN 
ERLANGER, 
JERUSALEM 
Ian MacKinnon in 
Kerem Shalom and 
Stephen Farrell in 
Erez 
Quoted  - Israeli Army radio  
- Hamas spokesman 
Sami Abu Zuhri 
- Unnamed officials 
from Abbas‘ Fatah 
movement 
- Israeli officials 
- Mark Regev, a 
spokesman for the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry 
- The Israeli chief of 
staff, Lt. Gen. Dan 
- Israeli officials 
- Ehud Olmert, the 
Israeli Prime Minister 
- Mark Regev, a 
spokesman for the Israeli 
foreign ministry 
- Ehud Olmert, the 
Israeli Prime Minister 
- Brigadier-General Aviv 
Kochavi, head of the 
Gaza Division 
- Ghazi Hamad, a 
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- Abbas 
- Palestinian Cabinet 
spokesman Ghazi 
Hamad 
- The Palestinian 
presidency 
 
Halutz 
- Israel's security cabinet 
- The Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ehud Olmert 
- The Israeli government 
- Ms. Livni, the Israeli 
Foreign Minister 
- Ghazi Hamad, a 
spokesman for the 
Hamas government 
- Mr. Abbas 
- a spokesman for 
Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, 
- Hamas spokesman, 
Mushir al-Masri,  
- The spokesman for the 
Popular Resistance 
Committees, Abu 
Mujahid 
- Israeli officials 
- Amir Peretz, the 
Defence Minister 
- The Palestinian Deputy 
Prime Minister, Nasser 
Shaer 
- Aides of Mr Abbas 
- Sami Abu Zuhri, a 
Hamas spokesman 
- Ghazi Hamed, the 
government spokesman 
- Mr Abbas 
 
spokesman for the 
Hamas-led Government 
Key Features The report presents 
Palestinian actions and 
highlights Israeli 
reactions. 
The report details 
Palestinian actions & 
uses capitals in headline. 
The report highlights 
Palestinian actions and 
has extensive 
background information. 
The report highlights 
Palestinian actions, 
Israeli reactions and 
consequences. 
Sixth Story: Published 7
th
 July 2006 
 The Arab News The New York Times The Guardian  The Times 
Headline  Israeli Missiles and 
Shells Kill 21  
Fighting Surges and 
Deaths Rise as 
Israel Drives 
Deeper in Gaza  
18 die in worst 
fighting since 
withdrawal last year  
Death toll rises in 
north Gaza despite 
lull in fighting 
Length 952 1127 412 765 
Source Hisham Abu Taha, 
Arab News — 
— Additional input 
from agencies  
By STEVEN 
ERLANGER and 
GREG MYRE 
BEIT LAHIYA, 
Gaza Strip 
 
Conal Urquhart in 
Beit Lahiya 
 
By Jenny Booth and 
agencies  
 
Quoted  - Defence Minister 
Amir Peretz 
- Noam Shalit 
- Palestinian Prime 
Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh,  
- One father, fleeing 
a Beit Lahiya 
neighborhood  
 
- Israel's defence 
minister, Amir 
Peretz 
- The Israeli 
military 
- Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud 
Olmert and his 
aides 
- The Palestinian 
Interior Minister, 
Said Siam 
- The Palestinian 
Prime Minister, 
Ismail Haniya, 
- Mr. Hamad 
 
- The Israeli army 
- A spokeswoman 
for the 
- The army 
- Mohammad 
Farajalah, 24, an  
ambulance man 
 
- Lieutenant 
Colonel Yaniv 
- Israel 
- Mr Peretz 
- Lieutenant 
General Halutz 
- Ismail Haniya, the 
Palestinian Prime 
Minister, 
- His ruling Hamas 
movement  
 
Key Features The report focuses on 
Israeli violence and 
Palestinian suffering. It 
mentions UN resolution 
condemning Israeli 
actions and arrest of 
Hamas officials.  
The report mentions both 
Israeli and Palestinian 
violence. It presents 
Israeli violence as 
purposeful and as 
movements.  
The report presents 
Israeli violence generally 
and highlights the 
suffering of Palestinians 
in Gaza under the attack. 
The report focuses on the 
lull in fighting and 
mentions both Israeli and 
Palestinian violence in 
Gaza.  
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The following table compares reports from the four newspapers quantitatively, in 
terms of the percentage of the text dedicated to dealing with Israeli violence, Palestinian 
violence (not including causes and impacts) as well as Israeli quotations and Palestinian 
quotations.  
First Story: Published 31
st
 July 2001  
(Israeli Bombing) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 554  822  650  211  
Israeli violence 55 (10%) 19 (2 %) 23 (4%) 14 (6%) 
Palestinian violence 0 128 (16%) 97 (15%) 17 (7%) 
Israeli  quotations 55 (10%) 167 (20%) 107 (16%) 22 (10%) 
Palestinian quotations 172 (31%) 137 (17%) 97 (15%) 33 (16%) 
Context 43 (8%) 69 (8%) 126 (19%) 44 (21%) 
Second Story: Published 1
st
 August 2002  
(Palestinian Bombing) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 618   1272  623  606  
Israeli violence 51 (8%) 26 (2%) 63 (10%) 20 (3%) 
Palestinian violence 19 (3%) 117 (9%) 87 (14%) 120 (20%) 
Israeli  quotations 63 (10%) 571 (45%) 288 (46%) 160 (26%) 
Palestinian  
quotations 
102 (17%) 104 (8%) 138 (22%) 8 (1%) 
Context 50 (8%) 186 (15%) 112 (18%) 218 (36%) 
Third Story: Published 15
th
 January 2004 
(Palestinian Suicide Bombing) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 790  832  826 640  
Israeli violence 85 (11%) 21 (3%) 15 (2%) 0  
Palestinian violence 87 (11%) 147 (18%) 108 (13%) 167 (26%) 
Israeli  quotations 68 (9%) 36 (4%) 121 (15%) 89 (14%) 
Palestinian  
quotations 
177 (22%) 153 (18%) 194 (23%) 171 (27%) 
Context 163 (21%) 251 (30%) 232 (28%) 134 (21%) 
Fourth Story: Published 22
nd
 March 2004 
(Israeli bombing and assassination of Sheikh Yassin) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 658  832  872  640  
Israeli violence 57 (9%) 7 (1%) 24 (3%) 69 (11%) 
Palestinian violence 43 (7%)  23 (3%) 31 (5%) 
Israeli  quotations 17 (3%) 156 (19%) 193 (22%) 84 (13%) 
Palestinian  
quotations 
110 (18%) 197 (24%) 217 (25%) 371 (28%) 
Context 65 (10%) 369 (33%) 86 (10%) 171 (27%) 
Fifth Story: Published 26
th
 June 2006 
(Palestinian Raid) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 743  1563  1100  526  
Israeli violence 117 (16%) 57 (4%) 0 27 (5%) 
Palestinian violence 162 (22%) 265 (17%) 151 (14%) 99 (19%) 
Israeli  quotations  270 (17%) 154 (14%) 103 (20%) 
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Palestinian  
quotations 
203 (27%) 302 (19%) 180 (16%) 57 (11%) 
Context 30 (4%) 142 (9%) 243 (22%) 38 (7%) 
Sixth Story: Published 7
th
 July 2006 
(Israeli raid) 
 AN NYT G T 
Length 952 1127 412 765 
Israeli violence 167 (18%) 177 (10%) 80 (19%) 108 (14%) 
Palestinian violence 11 (1%) 155 (14%) 50 (12%) 28 (4%) 
Israeli   quotations 120 (13%) 97 (9%) 63 (15%) 167 (22%) 
Palestinian  
quotations 
67 (7%) 155 (14%) 66 (16%) 97 (13%) 
Context 83 (8%) 92 (8%) 51 (12%) 54 (7%) 
The reports of 31
st
 July 2001 come from the first year of Al-Aqsa Uprising. In 
2001, tension between both sides was heightened, as the Palestinians continued their 
protests which started in September 2000 under the name of Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israel 
failed to stop them despite resorting to excessive force which resulted in international 
condemnation, and despite many international summits that also failed to stop violence. 
In that year, around seven hundred and thirty-seven Palestinians and one hundred and 
sixty-four Israelis had been killed, including civilians from both sides. The reports from 
2001 deal with various incidents of Israeli and the Palestinians violence, but the focus of 
the reports is the killing of six Palestinian militants in a blast in the West Bank and the 
Israeli bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza. 
The Arab News report focuses on violence against the Palestinians and avoids 
mentioning any violence against the Israelis. Palestinian quotations represent 31% of the 
report while Israeli quotations represent 9% of the report. The New York Times presents 
violence committed by both sides; however, violence committed against the Israelis 
represents 20% of the report while violence committed by the Israelis represents 2% of 
the report. The report quotes sources on both sides, but there are more Israeli quotations 
. Palestinian  quotations represent 15% of the report and Israeli  quotations represent 
19%, and Palestinian violence represents 14% of the report in comparison with less than 
1% representing Israeli violence. The Guardian report includes incidence of violence 
committed by both sides. It includes more incidents of Palestinian violence (15%) than 
Israeli violence (4%). It also includes quotations by both sides about (15%) each. The 
Times report is the shortest, and it presents both Israeli and Palestinian violence and 
quotations by both sides. Contextual details represent 21% of the report. 
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2002 was another violent year in which there were many suicide bombings 
against the Israelis, and there were a lot of Israeli incursions and raids in the Palestinian 
territories creating hundreds of victims on both sides. The death toll reached more than 
one thousand Palestinians and more then four hundred Israelis. Both peoples were 
separated, and the Palestinian territories were sealed. The reports of 1
st
 August 2002 deal 
with a Palestinian bombing at a café at the Hebrew University which was claimed by 
Hamas and which killed seven people including foreigners.  
The Arab News report mentions Palestinian violence briefly (3%) although the 
report deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing. The report includes more Palestinian 
quotations (17%) than Israeli quotations (10%). The New York Times is dominated by 
quoting sources, especially Israeli sources (45%). Palestinian violence is prominent in 
the report since it focuses on a Palestinian bombing. The Guardian report is also 
dominated by quoting Israeli sources (46%). The Times report includes most contextual 
details (36%), and it focuses on Palestinian violence (20%) as well as quotations by 
Israeli sources (26%). 
2004 was a very violent year characterised by a great deal of bloodshed on both 
sides. Two reports have been selected from that year; one of them deals with Palestinian 
violence and the other deal with Israeli violence. The reports of the 15
th
 of January 2004 
deal with a suicide bombing at an Israeli check point in Gaza, which claimed the lives of 
four Israelis and injured seven others including four Palestinians. The most newsworthy 
detail about this bombing is that it was undertaken by a female bomber who is also a 
mother of two young children. This is highlighted in all news reports. 
Although the report deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing, the Arab News 
report presents both Palestinian and Israeli violence (11%) each. Palestinian quotations 
dominate the report (22%). The New York Times report focuses mainly on Palestinian 
violence (18%) in comparison with (3%) of Israeli violence. The report includes many 
contextual details (30%). The Guardian report also focuses on Palestinian violence 
(13%) and includes a lot of contextual details (28%). The Times report gives the most 
elaborate account of Palestinian violence (26%). Palestinian violence is prominent in all 
the reports, as they focus on a Palestinian bombing. 
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The reports of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 deal mainly with the Israeli assassination 
of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas) in Gaza by an Israeli missile strike that killed him,  seven others and 
injured fifteen others. This event is significant because of the symbolic value and 
political role of Sheikh Yassin as a symbol of resistance for all Palestinians. Yassin‘s 
assassination resulted in international condemnation of Israel. 
The Arab News report clearly presents Israeli violence (9%), and it includes 
Palestinian violence as well (7%). Palestinian quotations represent 18% of the report 
while Israeli quotations represent only 4%. The New York Times presents Israeli 
violence very briefly (1%). It includes a lot of contextual details (33%) and quotations of 
sources on both sides; (19%) Israeli sources and (24%) Palestinian sources. The 
Guardian report presents violence on both sides briefly (3%) each. It is dominated by 
quoting sources on both sides; (25%) Israeli sources and (22%) Palestinian sources. The 
Times report presents Palestinian violence clearly (11%). It presents more Palestinian 
quotations (28%) than Israeli quotations (13%). 
The reports of the 26
th
 of June 2006 deal mainly with a Palestinian raid on an 
Israeli military post that resulted in killing two Israeli soldiers, injuring three and 
capturing one, as well as the killing of two Palestinian fighters. This is a significant 
event because it was unexpected, and it led to a great deal of Israeli violence against the 
Palestinians in response including several raids and an all-out war against Gaza in 2008. 
All the reports focus on the Palestinian attack and present it as quoted from the 
Israeli military. The Arab News report focuses on Palestinian violence (22%), and it also 
presents Israeli violence (16%). Palestinian quotations represent 27% of the report. The 
New York Times focuses on Palestinian violence, and it presents a lot of quotations on 
both sides. The Guardian report is also focuses on Palestinian violence (14%). It is 
characterised by detailed background information (22%). The Times report includes a 
detailed account of Palestinian violence (19%) and briefly presents Israeli violence 
(5%).  
The reports of the 7
th
 of July 2006 deal mainly with an Israeli incursion in Gaza, 
in response to the capture of an Israeli soldier on the 26
th
 June 2006 by Palestinian 
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militants and the firing of homemade rockets from Gaza towards Israel. The incursion 
claimed the lives of around twenty Palestinians and one Israeli soldier; moreover, thirty 
Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were injured. This event is significant as it represents 
the Israeli military measures against the Palestinians in response to the kidnapping of the 
Israeli soldier.  
The topic of the four reports is the Israeli raid against Gaza. The Arab News report 
focuses on Israeli violence (18%), and it presents Palestinian violence very briefly (1%). 
The New York Times presents more Palestinian violence than Israeli violence although 
the report deals mainly with an Israeli incursion that killed 20 Palestinians. The 
Guardian report focuses on Israeli violence (19%), and it also presents Palestinian 
violence (12%). The Times report focuses on Israeli violence (14%) and briefly presents 
Palestinian violence (4%). The report also focuses on Israeli quotations (22%). 
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5 Narrative Analysis 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the narrative structures of news reports 
on violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the four selected newspapers. 
The aim is to investigate how narrative structures work to represent the same events; 
focusing on comparing and contrasting the way the same event is represented in two 
newspapers that are sited in different countries and contexts, i.e. the Arab News 
(henceforth, AN) and the New York Times (henceforth, NYT); and two newspapers that 
appear in the same country but have different orientations, i.e. the Guardian and the 
Times.  
Narrative is crucial for the news story genre which recounts real events. As 
stated earlier in chapter 3, news narrative has a distinctive structure adapted to the 
complex functions that news reports serve. The analysis of narrative structure of news 
reports in this thesis draws on the works of many scholars who studied narrative in 
general and narrative in the news in particular, and it examines different aspects of the 
structure of news reports, including choice of headline and lead; interpretative frames; 
the foci of reports; the choice and order episodes of violence and how they are 
constructed, especially as concerns the representation of violent acts of different sides, 
their causes and consequences; the use of quotations and sources on both sides; and 
contextual details used with each story.  
The analysis of the headline and head 
The first element examined is the choice of headline and lead. Van Dijk regards 
the headline as the most prominent element of a news report that has an important 
cognitive and ideological function which can influence readers‘ interpretations of the 
story and it highlights the most prominent aspect of the story and thus downplays others. 
He describes the headline as ‗a subjective definition of the situation‘ (van Dijk, 1988). 
The analysis considers both the ideas highlighted in the headline as the most relevant 
and the way language is used to express them, as well as their impacts on the 
presentation of the story, e.g. highlighting consequences, agency, etc. 
The lead is also considered in the analysis. Toolan (2001) argues that ―the 
 103 
modern English-medium hard news story is oriented around the opening sentence, which 
will include the most tellable and critical world-disturbing event.‖ White (1997) 
described the structure of the news story as ‗lead-dominated and orbitally-organised‘ 
since news stories are not presented chronologically, but rather they are developed by 
expanding the lead by different types of satellite. In this way, the lead represents the 
nucleus of the story, and along with the headline it sets its interpretative frame. For the 
crucial textual and ideological function of the lead, it is examined in the analysis with 
reference to the ideas it presents, the way language is used to present them, and its role 
in directing interpretations of the story. 
The analysis of the main story 
The analysis also considers the main story or episode of the report, which is 
examined by focusing on how it presents the event, which details are included or 
excluded, as well as which elements are highlighted and which are downgraded. The 
analysis benefits to some extent from the work of Labov and Waletzky (1967) on the 
analysis of the structure of narrative. Although they examined the structure of oral 
narrative, the elements of narrative provide a useful approach to examining the way the 
main story is presented in the news report. Labov and Waletzky identified six elements 
of the narrative structure, with two elements required for a minimum narrative. The 
analysis considers which elements of narrative are present in stories of violence about 
each side. A relevant point here is Toolan‘s discussion of the narrativisation or de-
narrativisation of news stories which are presented as factual reporting rather than as 
narrativisation of events (Toolan, 2001). To study the way the story is presented, 
elements of narrative included in the main story, e.g. characterisation, complication, 
details, etc. are examined in stories about violence committed by each side. Another 
aspect which is considered here is the way agency, causes and consequences are 
presented in stories about violence committed by each side.  
The analysis of the sources’ statements and contextual details 
The analysis of narrative structure also examines the use of sources from both 
sides. They provide verbal reactions and expert views about the reported events. Hall 
(1978) distinguishes between sources that are used as primary definers who ―promote 
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the dominant definitions of events,‖ and secondary definers of the situation who present 
―counter-definitions of the situation‖. Definitions offered by the primary definers are 
often those endorsed by the newspaper, while counter definers ―have no access to the 
defining process‖ (Hall, 1978: 64). The analysis of the use of news sources in reports 
draws on Hall‘s classifications of sources into primary and secondary definers of the 
situation by examining in which capacity each newspaper uses sources on both sides. 
The use of contextual details is another aspect of the analysis. Contextual details and 
background information are considered in terms of which details are selected about each 
side and the role they play in the presentation of the story and the actions of each side.  
The following section investigates the use of narrative structure in NYT to 
represent Israeli and Palestinian violence by examining the following features: 
headlines; leads; interpretative frames; the narrative structure of the main episode, i.e. 
characterisation, complication and resolution; the use of sources and quotations; and the 
selection of contextual details.  
5.1 Narrative Analysis of the New York Times Reports  
NYT uses narrative structures differently to represent violence committed by the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. The following section presents an analysis of reports that 
deal mainly with Israeli violence. 
5.1.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence 
 31
st
 July 2001 22
nd
 April 2004 7
th
 July 2006 
Headline  In Mideast, a Day of 
Resounding Violence 
Leader of Hamas Killed by 
Missile in Israeli Strike 
Fighting Surges and Deaths 
Rise as Israel Drives Deeper 
in Gaza  
Lead The state of Israeli-
Palestinian relations is 
looking more and more like 
a police blotter. That was 
conspicuously so today as 
bombs, mortars, missiles 
and knives left casualties on 
both sides across the length 
of the land. 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the 
spiritual leader and founder 
of the militant Palestinian 
group Hamas, was killed 
early Monday by an Israeli 
missile that struck him as he 
left a mosque in Gaza City, 
his family and Hamas 
officials said. They said at 
least two bodyguards had 
been killed with him. 
A member of Hamas was 
reported killed in an 
airstrike Friday, less than 24 
hours after Israeli troops and 
Palestinian militants had 
waged their most intense 
battles since Israel re-
entered the Gaza Strip last 
week to secure the release of 
a captured soldier and stop 
rocket fire into Israel. 
In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, NYT headlines present events 
generally without attributing clear responsibility to Israel; moreover, there is sometimes 
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an effort to naturalise these events, conceal crucial agency and downplay consequences. 
The first headline (In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence) is too general and vague. 
It highlights violence in the Middle East, yet it is a nominal phrase with no action or 
agents involved. Readers cannot know from the headline who caused this violence and 
who suffered it.  
The second headline (Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike) 
summarises the assassination story. It uses passivisation with inanimate agent to mitigate 
Israeli responsibility. Passivisation highlights the outcome of the action and presents it 
as completed action more like a state and at the same time downplays agency and 
responsibility for it. Israeli involvement is expressed, however, loosely through the use 
of the circumstantial, which fails to establish a confirmed causal relationship between 
the strike and the killing.  
The third headline (Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in 
Gaza) is also too general and vague. The use of the nominalisations ‗fighting‟ and 
‗deaths‟ and the middle voice verbs ‗rise‟ and ‗surge‟ which are semantically associated 
with natural occurrences naturalises the reported events and their consequences and 
mitigates responsibility for them. The circumstantial presupposes that Israel has already 
driven deep in Gaza, so readers accept this as an unquestionable proposition; it also fails 
to establish a clear causal relationship between fighting and deaths on the one hand and 
Israeli movements on the other hand. Considering the interpretative frames that these 
headlines set, NYT headlines present Israeli violence generally and vaguely without 
blaming Israel clearly for it which mitigates Israeli responsibility and downplays the 
impact of Israeli violence on Palestinians.  
In line with the headlines, the lead paragraphs of NYT also attempt to conceal or 
mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence or represent violence as a mutual action 
undertaken by both sides, e.g. the lead paragraph of the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 
that deals with an Israeli bombing of the police headquarters in Gaza and the killing of 
six Palestinian activists in a blast. It presents a simile where the Israeli-Palestinian 
relations are compared to ‗a police blotter‟, which emphasises that many incidents of 
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violence have taken place between both sides. This is further elaborated by mentioning 
several incidents of violence (bombs, mortars, missiles and knives left casualties on both 
sides). The metonymical substitution of human agents by weapons avoids blaming 
violence on any side and maintains vagueness as the headline. 
The second report deals with the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in an 
Israeli air strike. The lead uses passivisation and an inanimate agent to mitigate Israeli 
responsibility. Yassin is described as (spiritual leader and founder of the militant 
Palestinian group Hamas), which delegitimises him by association with a militant 
group. Consequences of the attack are presented as the killing of two bodyguards 
although seven others were killed in the attack. The story is presented as quoted from 
Yassin‘s family and Hamas officials to give it credibility; however, it is very unlikely 
that Yassin‘s family and Hamas officials would call him leader of a militant group, try to 
mitigate Israeli responsibility or underestimate the number of victims.  
The third report deals mainly with an Israeli raid on Gaza. The lead highlights the 
killing of a member of Hamas in an airstrike using an agentless passive. Fighting 
between both sides is presented as mutual. The contrast between ‗Israeli troops‟ and 
‗Palestinian militants‟ legitimises Israeli actions. The expression ‗since Israel re-entered 
Gaza‟ contextualises for the event and naturalises the Israeli incursion in Gaza, as if 
Israel has the right to enter and re-enter Gaza freely. It also presupposes previous entries. 
It does not recognise that the Israeli presence in Gaza is considered a military occupation 
of the Palestinian territories. The purpose of the Israeli incursion is presented as ‗to 
secure the release of a captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel‘ which 
legitimises the Israeli actions by presenting them as purposeful and legitimate.  
The selection of details to include in each report and the presentation and 
organisation of these events are very important. In reports that deal mainly with Israeli 
violence, NYT reports deal with violence committed by both the Palestinians and the 
Israelis against each other, which serves to justify Israeli violence and to show it as 
mutual or as a response to Palestinian violence; moreover, NYT presents Israeli violence 
briefly, not in a coherent narrative, using structures that can de-narrativise stories, e.g. 
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the use of non-human agents or middle verbs associated with spontaneous actions. 
Another important feature is that reports highlight the purpose of Israeli violence and 
downplay the consequences of such actions.  
The report of the 31
st
 of July 2001, which deals mainly with an Israeli attack 
against Gaza and the killing of six Palestinians, mentions a lot of violence against the 
Israelis e.g. the injury of members of border police, a nine-year old girl and a Jewish 
man, in addition to other ‗false alarms‘. NYT represents both sides as victims of 
violence and also as undertaking violence against each other; however, it focuses on 
violence against the Israelis and presents it in detail with vivid descriptions and 
sometimes exaggerates Palestinian threats and dramatises them.  
Narrative structure is used differently with Israeli and Palestinian violence 
reported in the report. The main episode of the Israeli bombing of the Palestinian police 
headquarters is summarised in one sentence (seven Palestinian police officers were 
wounded when Israeli helicopters fired at a building in the police headquarters 
compound); it foregrounds the consequences of the action using an agentless passive and 
presents the act of bombing in a circumstantial with a non-human agent and an 
inanimate target. The story is de-narrativised; there are no human agents involved or 
complication and resolution. The story is presented as a finished action, and the 
circumstantial fails to establish Israeli responsibility and intentionality. The episode of 
the killing of six Palestinian activists is dominated by speculations about how the men 
were killed, and the newspaper adopts the Israeli perspective on their death as a ‗work 
accident‘.  
The report also includes several acts of violence against the Israelis including the 
shooting of members of the borders police, the injury of a nine-year old girl and the 
stabbing of a Jewish man in Old Jerusalem. Responsibility for these incidents is not clear 
in the report, yet it can be understood from the context that Palestinians are to be 
blamed; moreover, these acts of violence are presented in clearer and more coherent 
narrative structures than Israeli violence, e.g. (Palestinians showered stones on Jews 
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praying at the Western Wall in the Old City, an action that touched off skirmishes with 
Israeli police officers at the Aksa Mosque compound).  
The report also mentions several non-violent incidents that take place in 
Jerusalem. They have no news-value as they do not involve any counter-expected or 
aberrant events, e.g. the bursting of a can and a bus  tyre. It is unusual to find such 
stories in an international news report. The aim is to underscore the tense situation in 
Israel and the psychological impacts of such incidents. This serves to exaggerate the 
threats of Palestinian violence against the Israelis. Moreover, the arrangement of 
episodes in the NYT report supports the Israeli perspective, e.g. Israeli claims that they 
attacked a mortar factory in the police headquarters is followed by an episode of the 
injury of a nine-year old girl as a result of a mortar round; and the injury of Palestinian 
policemen as a result of an Israeli aerial attack is preceded by a story of the injury of 
members of the Israeli border police in a shooting. In this way, Israeli fears are 
represented as valid and Israel‘s violent actions as justified.  
The report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 deals with the assassination of Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin, NYT presents the story very briefly through Israeli army statements. It 
focuses on the Palestinian reactions to the killing and the Israeli justifications for 
undertaking it; moreover, it presents a lot of background information related to Hamas, 
Sheikh Yassin and Israeli views of both. The report foregrounds angry Palestinian 
reactions to the killing, rather than the killing itself which is presented briefly through 
the statements of the Israeli army which are contested by Palestinians, i.e. (the army said 
it had targeted a car carrying Sheik Yassin). At the time of the attack Yassin was in his 
wheelchair which was smashed in the attack, yet the army refers to it euphemistically as 
‗a car‘, and NYT adopts the same expression although it is inaccurate. 
The consequences of the attack are presented as (Israeli weapons punctured the 
pavement), which indicates the force of the explosion, but which also presents Israeli 
violence as targeting and affecting inanimate objects. NYT describes Sheikh Yassin as 
‗quadriplegic‟ which is a technical term that does not invoke the sympathy gained by the 
more common term ‗disabled‘ which is avoided completely by NYT although Yassin 
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was in fact paralyzed and was unable to move his hands or legs. The report is vague 
about the number of victims. It mentions two bodyguards only although seven people 
were killed and fifteen were injured.  The most prominent consequences of the 
assassination in NYT report are  angry Palestinian reactions, demonstrations and vows 
of revenge.  
In terms of the narrative structure of the main episode of the report, there are no 
human characters involved in the main story. The main and only character is Sheikh 
Yassin who was killed by an Israeli missile. The story is summarised in one sentence 
that uses passivisation with an inanimate agent (was killed … by an Israeli missile). This 
choice contributes to the de-narrativisation of the story which is presented as a finished 
process, and the focus of the report is on the Palestinian reactions to the killing.  
The report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 deals with an Israeli raid against Gaza. The 
NYT report presents the story in details, yet it does not present it coherently. It 
concentrates on mutual violence between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants and 
gives details of the movements and activities of the Israeli forces in Gaza during the 
incursion, their purpose and impacts, in addition to the activities of Palestinian militants 
and their consequences. Israeli violence is mainly represented as movement of forces; 
furthermore, most of the episodes of Israeli violence are de-narrativised by means of 
representing them as abstract nominals e.g. ‗death‟, or as spontaneous actions that do not 
require agency e.g. ‗fighting erupted.‘ Besides, the agents of violent acts are often either 
deleted or replaced by inanimate agents e.g. ‗an Israeli airstrike killed ....‘ Therefore, it 
becomes harder to reconstruct the story. Israeli violence is represented as justified and 
purposeful, even when it is directed against children, e.g. (Israeli soldiers fired near 
groups of children in what appeared to be an effort to get them to scatter). Episodes of 
Israeli violence are not presented chronologically or coherently; instead, they are 
separated by details of Palestinian violence, justifications, contextual details, etc. This is 
a common feature in news narrative which does not have to be told chronologically.  
The report also includes episodes of Palestinian violence which are presented 
with details, specific actions and clear agents, e.g. ‗Palestinians were seen planting 
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explosives in manholes, ‗one masked fighter rode away on a bicycle after laying such a 
charge‟. The Palestinians are represented as doing most of the fighting and using 
weapons. Their actions are represented as targeting Israelis with clear agency; 
furthermore, Palestinian violence is never represented as justified although it can be seen 
as resisting the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian territories or protecting their people 
against the atrocities of a military operation in their towns. Details of Israeli violence 
occupy almost the same length as Palestinian violence although Israeli violence resulted 
in twenty-folds the number of victims, not to mention other forms of suffering and 
damage. The only Israeli victim is mentioned twice, and the agent is criminalised and 
represented as a ‗sniper‟.  
In conclusion, NYT presents Israeli violence against the Palestinians in certain 
ways that mitigate responsibility for it and downplay its consequences. Moreover, it de-
narrativises the stories of violence and fragments them by presenting them with no 
coherence or chronological order. Israeli violence is always presented as justified and 
purposeful, and it is often presented as a reaction to Palestinian violence. In most of the 
cases, the Israelis and the Palestinians are presented as being involved in mutual 
violence against each other.   
Another element to consider is the use of sources and quotations. In the three 
reports, NYT uses Israeli sources as primary definers of the situation and presents 
Palestinians‘ quotations against those of the Israelis. In the first report, the paper‘s 
comments cast doubts on Palestinian statements as unconvincing (despite a lack of 
conclusive evidence), untrustworthy (on closer inspection, neither version held water, 
prompting still further speculation), contradictory (no, others said…). These comments 
by NYT discredit Palestinian sources and their statements. At the same time, Israeli 
statements are evaluated positively, e.g. (Israel's explanation was simpler). Besides, 
Israeli sources are institutionalised, and they are identified by name and institutional 
capacity, e.g. (Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister), unlike Palestinian 
sources that remain unnamed. As a result, Israeli arguments are presented as more 
convincing and trustworthy than the Palestinians‘ statements in NYT.  
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When reporting the killing of Sheikh Yassin, the story is presented as quoted 
from unnamed Palestinian sources. Some consequences are also quoted from 
Palestinians such as an eye-witness who says that he could not recognise the sheikh‘s 
body and hospital officials who say that his body was smashed in the attack. NYT 
quotes two Hamas members promising revenge for Yassin‘s death, and the Palestinian 
Prime Minister condemning the assassination and describing it as a ―crazy and very 
dangerous act‖. Yassin is also quoted by NYT in his response to Israeli threats of 
assassination saying: "we do not fear death threats. We are seekers of martyrdom." NYT 
quotes many more Israelis, e.g. it quotes details of the attack from Israeli military and its 
accusations to Yassin of being connected to terrorism. NYT also quotes an Israeli 
minister threatening to eliminate Yassin. The report also includes Netanyahu‘s 
comments on Sharon‘s plans to withdraw from Gaza.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, NYT quotes officials on both sides. Israeli 
sources include the Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Their statements 
explain the purpose of the Israeli incursion in Gaza. Palestinian personalities quoted 
include the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister. Quotations of the Palestinians are 
general and somewhat vague, e.g. "called on all Palestinian security and military 
services to participate in the moral, national and religious duty to defend our people”. 
This statement mentions Palestinian military services that do not exist, as the 
Palestinians have no army or military services; moreover, it is not clear from the 
statement what the moral, national and religious duty to defend our people entails or 
how to defend them. In sum, NYT always uses Israeli sources as definers of the 
situation. It adopts their definitions and statements and presents them positively as 
institutional and trustworthy.  On the other hand, Palestinian quotations are often vague 
and too general. They are sometimes challenged and undermined by the newspaper. 
Palestinian sources are sometimes presented as unnamed and void of institutional 
capacity. Sometimes Palestinian sources are used to justify Israeli violence, e.g. when 
militants are quoted threatening violence against Israel. 
In terms of contextual details, NYT often chooses contextual and background 
details that justify Israeli violence, e.g. the report of July 2001 focuses on the mutual 
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violence between both sides, yet it presents violence as initiated by Palestinians with no 
provocation (Palestinians showered stones on Jews praying). It also refers to the 
declared ceasefire that degenerated into ceaseless fire and to previous denials of 
assassinations by Israel. In the report of March 2004, NYT provides information about 
Hamas which delegitimises the group and justifies the assassination of its leader, e.g. 
that it is officially committed to the destruction of Israel and that it runs low-cost schools 
and clinics to broaden its ideological reach. The Israeli views of Hamas as the most 
organised militant group are also presented. The report mentions the establishment of 
Hams in 1987 and the imprisonment of Yassin in Israel for three years and his release 
after plunged assassinations in Amman. It also includes information about two suicide 
bombings claimed by Hamas and another group, and an Israeli raid on Gaza, as well as 
the unilateral withdrawal plan of Sharon. Contextual details in the report show an old 
and deep animosity between Israel and Hamas, and present Hamas as committed to the 
destruction of Israel and as undertaking suicide bombings against it. These contextual 
details present Yassin and Hamas in a negative light.  
To contextualise the report of July 2006, NYT refers to Israel‘s entrance into 
Gaza the week before, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a year earlier, the start of the 
Palestinian uprising, the capture of Cpl. Shalit, and rocket fire at Israel. All Palestinian 
actions used for contextualisation are negative to justify the Israeli incursion while the 
Israeli actions are both positive and negative. However, negative Israeli actions are 
neutralised by their presentation in less negative terms, e.g.  as ‗re-entering‘ Gaza, rather 
than occupying it. To conclude, the choice of contextual details in NYT often justifies 
Israeli violence against the Palestinians. 
5.1.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence 
 1
st
 August 2002 15
th
 January 2004 26
th
 June 2006 
Headline  AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS 
MILITANTS BOMB 
JERUSALEM CAMPUS 
Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four 
Israelis in Suicide Bombing 
MILITANTS' RAID ON 
ISRAEL RAISES 
TENSION IN GAZA 
Lead A powerful bomb hidden in 
a bag and left on a table by 
Palestinian militants tore 
apart a bustling cafeteria 
during lunch at Hebrew 
University here today, 
killing seven people, 
A young Palestinian mother, 
feigning a limp and 
requesting medical help, 
blew herself up Wednesday 
at the entrance to a security 
inspection center for 
Palestinian workers, killing 
In an ominous development, 
Israel threatened strong 
military action on Sunday 
after eight Palestinian 
militants in Gaza, including 
members of the governing 
faction Hamas, emerged 
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including at least three 
Americans, and wounding 
more than 80. 
four Israeli security 
personnel and wounding 
seven people, the Israeli 
military said. 
from a secret tunnel dug 300 
yards into Israel, killed two 
soldiers, wounded three and 
kidnapped another.  
In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, NYT headlines present 
Palestinian responsibility clearly and highlight the consequences of violence. The 
headline of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 foregrounds the consequences of the 
attack, i.e. the killing of at least seven. It clearly presents militants‘ responsibility for the 
killing using the transactive model; moreover, the use of capitalisation makes the 
headline even more prominent. The headline of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 
highlights the identity of the bomber and her actions. It identifies the bomber in terms of 
family relations, age and origin, as it is unexpected for a young mother to undertake such 
action as a suicide bombing. Consequences of the attack are clear in the headline using 
the transactive model.  
The headline of the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 underlines the involvement of 
Palestinian militants in the raid and underlines its political consequences as raising 
tension in Gaza. It uses activation and the present tense which present the event as vivid 
and relevant. Capitalisation is also used to make the headline more prominent. NYT 
headlines about Palestinian violence show responsibility and causal relationships clearly; 
therefore, readers can confidently make judgements about Palestinian actions; moreover, 
presenting the consequences of such actions clearly in the headlines proves their 
seriousness and impacts on Israelis. Two of the three headlines dealing with Palestinian 
violence in NYT use capitalisation. 
The lead of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 foregrounds the strength of the 
bomb and the agency of Palestinian militants, as well as the consequences of the 
bombing. It uses the transactive model to represent the actions and active participles to 
represent the consequences. This contributes to presenting the action clearly and vividly. 
It clearly presents agency and responsibility, as well as details of the bombing and its 
consequences. The lead of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 provides more 
information about the actions of the bomber (feigning a limp and requesting medical 
help), as well as location of the bombing and its consequences. All details are quoted 
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from the Israeli military. The lead emphasises the negative actions and the deception of 
the bomber, and it clearly presents the consequences of the bombing.  
The lead of the report of the 26
th
 June 2006 describes the event as (an ominous 
development) which arouses readers‘ interests and highlights its significance. It presents 
a summary of the event and its consequences, as it begins with Israeli threats of strong 
military reaction which are not addressed to any particular side.  It presents details of the 
number of militants, their affiliations, the use of a secret tunnel and the consequences of 
the raid, i.e. killing, wounding and kidnapping Israeli soldiers. It also presents Israel as 
involved in one verbal action (threatened), while Palestinian militants are involved in 
four material actions (emerged, killed, wounded and kidnapped). The transactive model 
clearly presents the Palestinians as active agents responsible for violence and its impacts. 
The use of the lead in NYT reports that deal with Palestinian violence highlights 
Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis and the consequences of this 
violence.  
The story of the bombing presented in the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 is 
presented in a clear, coherent and chronological narrative. All the basic elements of 
narrative are present in the story, therefore, it is possible for readers to reconstruct the 
story and understand it. The story includes orientation, characterisation, complication 
and consequences (A powerful bomb hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian 
militants tore apart a bustling cafeteria during lunch at Hebrew University here today, 
killing seven people, including at least three Americans, and wounding more than 80). 
There is no resolution to the story; the report presents an open narrative. The report is 
dominated by eye-witness statements from the location of the bombing which highlight 
the consequences of the attack, especially the killing of Israelis and foreigners. The story 
of the bombing is presented clearly, coherently and chronologically, with a vivid 
description of the scene of the attack (through a bedlam of screams and crashing glass, 
students fled in horror from the cafeteria, in the Frank Sinatra Student Center, some 
trailing blood onto the concrete courtyard).  
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Responsibility for the bombing is clear through quoting Hamas‘ statement 
claiming responsibility for the bombing. The report also refers to Israeli violence against 
the Palestinians, i.e. the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader by bombing his home as 
the cause of the attack (Israel's killing last week of a top Hamas leader. Fourteen others, 
including nine children, died in that attack, in which Israel bombed a house in Gaza 
City) and state that nine children were killed in the attack. NYT also mentions the Israeli 
offensive against the Palestinian territories. It is presented as a justified and purposeful 
response to Palestinian attacks (After back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more 
than a month ago, Israel began a ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress 
Palestinian violence). Although the report presents Israeli violence, the focus is the 
Palestinian bombing of the university café.  
The story of the suicide bombing is also prominent in the report of the 15
th 
of 
January 2004. Just like the first report, the narrative structure of the story has all the 
basic elements of a narrative, i.e. orientation (Wednesday at the entrance to a security 
inspection center for Palestinian workers), characterisation (a young Palestinian mother 
and soldiers), and complication (when the alarm sounded, the soldiers told her to wait 
while they called an army woman to search her, the military said. Seconds later, Ms. 
Reyashi detonated her bomb, estimated at about 10 pounds and packed with ball 
bearings and screws to make it more lethal). The consequences of the bombing are clear 
in the report; they include both killing and injury of victims, as well as physical damage 
to the building. The actions of the bomber are presented in a vivid, coherent and 
chronological structure. Details include the bomber‘s claim that she had metal implants 
to be able to escape a military check and carry out the bombing. NYT uses language in a 
way that negatively evaluates the actions of the bomber, e.g. (deceived) and (lethal). The 
bomber‘s actions are not given any justification, yet she is quoted in a video recording 
saying that she had always wanted to be the first woman martyr, and NYT quotes 
militant groups saying that the bombing is in revenge for Israel‘s killing of Palestinians.  
The consequences of the attack are prominent in the report. They include the 
killing of four Israelis and injury of seven others including four Palestinians; damage to 
the building is also mentioned. NYT also highlights the economic and political 
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consequences of the attack and blames Palestinian violence for ruining the Palestinian 
economy and for the stalemate of peace negotiations; thus, while the causes of the attack 
are presented briefly and mainly in terms of bomber‘s personal wishes, its consequences 
are prominent in the report and are told in terms of deaths and injuries, physical damage 
to buildings as well as economic and political impacts. The Israeli response is presented 
in terms of closing the crossing to Palestinian workers.  
The story of the Palestinian raid in the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 is 
presented in detail and is described vividly and chronologically, giving the exact details 
of fighters‘ actions and their consequences in a coherent story with clear actors, actions 
and affected participants. It has the basic elements of narrative including, orientation 
(near the spot where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet, about 5:15 a.m.,), characterization 
(the eight Palestinian fighters), and complication (emerged from the tunnel and split into 
small teams. One blew up an armored personnel carrier, which was empty, and another 
threw grenades into an Israeli Merkava tank, killing First Lt. Hanan Barak, 20, from 
Arad, and Sgt. Pavel Slutzker, 20, from Dimona. Antitank missiles were also fired 
toward the vehicles from Gaza). NYT presents the story twice in the reports; it is 
introduced briefly at the beginning of the report and explicated in more details later. The 
narrative structure includes all basic elements of narrative and highlights the 
consequences of the attack. The story is quoted from the Israeli military. The report 
includes many details, e.g. preparations for the attack and the tunnel, and it identifies 
Israeli victims by name, rank, age and place of origin. The causes of the attack are 
presented through quoting Palestinian officials and militants. The causes of the attack 
fall short of legitimising or even justifying it, as they do not refer to any moral values, as 
they are presented in terms of revenge.  
The consequences of the attack are prominent, especially the deaths, injuries and 
kidnap of Israeli soldiers. They include actual, potential and political consequences, e.g. 
the killing, injury and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the deaths of Palestinian fighters, 
and the closure of crossings (actual); the Israeli warnings or threats of response 
(potential); as well as the embarrassment of Mr Abbas and failure of inter-Palestinian 
talks (political). The report presents the Israeli response mainly in terms of planned 
rather than actual military action. However, the report mentions Israeli tanks moving a 
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short distance into Gaza without explaining their activities or their outcomes. The 
purpose of the movement is present clearly (to search and to investigate the tunnel.) In 
conclusion, the details of the activities of Palestinian militants are presented in a 
coherent chronological narrative with agents, actions and consequences. Israeli reactions 
are presented as potential which leaves the narrative structure open. Readers do not 
know what the resolution of the narrative is, but expect more of the story to unfold later.  
NYT consistently quotes sources on both sides, however Israeli sources are often 
used more than Palestinian sources, and they are always used as the primary definers of 
the situation. Quotations are very prominent in the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 
which quotes American, Israeli and Palestinian sources, e.g. it quotes President Bush 
condemning the attack and other Americans commenting on the number and identities of 
the American victims of the attack. The Israeli side is quoted extensively, as the report is 
dominated by quoting eye-witnesses and victims of the attack. They act as the primary 
definers of the situation, alongside the Israeli military from which the story is quoted. 
The victims are of different nationalities, and they describe events of the attack and their 
reaction to it.  
There is a vivid description of the victims, including their physical appearance 
and psychological state, which emphasises the severity of the attack and its 
consequences. These quotations delegitimise the attack and present it as unjustified and 
criminal, e.g. “I know there are justifications -- bad justifications … It's killing college 
students. That's no political solution for anything. It's killing college kids”, "I saw dead 
people. I saw people with no heads. There was a guy, I gave him mouth to mouth, but he 
was dead.”, “I saw blood and shoes and I.V.'s on the ground‖, etc. Quotations from 
hospital officials contribute to the same presentation, e.g. ―victims suffered "penetrating 
injuries, with lots of metal elements, such as bolts and screws and nails, all over their 
bodies”.  
The report quotes Hamas claiming responsibility for the attack. The cause of the 
attack is presented through Hamas statement (it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that 
killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children.) Quoting the 
causes from Hamas, which is regarded as a militant and even a terrorist organisation by 
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the West, makes it less credible and convincing. Israeli officials are quoted rejecting 
Hamas‘ justifications for the attack and claiming that it is a “continuous effort by the 
Palestinians to kill as many Israelis as possible in order to sabotage the peace process”. 
These statements serve to gain sympathy for the victims and criminalise the Palestinian 
attack. 
 The report on the bombing of the 15
th
 of January 2004 quotes sources from both 
sides. The story of the bombing is quoted from Israeli military sources, and they are the 
main definers of situation. It quotes an official in the Israeli Prime Minister‘s office 
saying that Palestinian terrorists strike Israel and destroy their own economy. The 
Palestinians are also quoted by the paper, e.g. they both quote the bomber talking about 
her actions in a video message. NYT presents a longer quotations, and quotes her saying 
"it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to 
knock on the doors of heaven with the skulls of Zionists," and also saying that her wish to 
be a martyr is stronger than her love for her children, which shows strong hatred for 
Israelis and very strong ideological attitudes against them. The paper also quotes Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin who comments on the use of a female bomber for the first time by 
Hamas. NYT comments on his statement that he cites purely tactical reasons. Relatives 
of the bomber are also quoted expressing shock and disbelief.  
The report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 quotes members of both sides, e.g. Hamas 
government officials denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to 
treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive. It also quotes president Abbas‘ 
condemnation of the attack. A Palestinian militant is quoted stating that the attack came 
to avenge the assassination of a militant group leader by Israel. NYT presents the cause 
of the attack through quoting a Palestinian official from Fatah who states that it was 
ordered by Hamas leadership abroad, and a Palestinian official from Hamas describing 
the attack as a natural response to Israeli crimes against the Palestinians. NYT presents 
this statement along with the Israeli interpretation as evidence of Hamas welcoming the 
attack, rather than being an explanation of its causes. This undermines the validity of the 
statement and presents it as evidence to discredit Hamas rather than a justification.  
From the Israeli side, the paper quotes details of the attack from Israeli army 
 119 
sources. Many Israeli officials are quoted, e.g. the Israeli Prime Minister holding the 
Palestinian Authority responsible for the attack ―with all that implies‖, the Israeli 
Foreign Minister calling members of the international community to urge Abbas to 
remain in Gaza until the situation is resolved, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry 
casting doubts on the legitimacy of Hamas and the effectiveness of the Palestinian 
Authority. Not only does NYT quote Israeli officials, it endorses their views. For 
instance, it first presents the Israeli interpretation of Hamas‘ statement twice that the 
attack is a natural response to Israeli crimes against the Palestinians. The first time it is 
presented with the Israeli interpretations of Hamas‘ statement as welcoming the raid 
“But Israeli officials noted that Hamas, if not officially claiming responsibility for the 
raid, seemed to welcome it”, and the second time, the paper presents a similar statement 
by Hamas with its interpretation as welcoming the attack “But another Hamas 
spokesman…welcomed the attack.‖ Although the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives are 
present in the report, NYT endorses the Israeli perspective and uses Israeli sources as 
primary definers of the situation while casting doubts on the legitimacy of the Hamas 
government and stressing Hamas involvement in the attack.  
In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, contextual details in NYT present 
information about previous Palestinian attacks that killed twenty-six Israelis and the 
Israeli response to them. There is information about the mixed student body and workers 
at the Hebrew University. NYT comments on Hamas by saying that ―Hamas leaders 
consider all of Israel to be occupied territory, not just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
which Israel occupied in 1967”, and quotes an Israeli professor who confirms the same 
statement. Contextual details presented in NYT show the Palestinian attack as a 
continuation of previous attacks and also present this as part of the ideology of Hamas. 
 The contextualising details in the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 present 
details about the bomber‘s family background and her children. The paper mentions 
details about the crossing and the Palestinian workers who use it daily. It also mentions 
the story of a previous suicide bombing and its consequences and the Israeli occupation 
of Gaza and the West Bank since 1967. The bomber‘s background is relevant because it 
is unexpected, and details  relating to previous bombings and to the crossing where the 
bombing took place emphasise the impacts of the bombing and present it as a 
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continuation of Palestinian attacks against Israelis.  
 Considering contextualisation in the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, NYT refers 
to Palestinian talks between Hamas leaders and Abbas at the time of the attack. It tells 
the story of the last Israeli soldier who was captured by the Palestinians in 1994 and 
refers to Palestinian rocket attacks against Israel and the Israeli response which resulted 
in the death of Palestinian civilians and the end of the truce with Hamas. It refers to the 
killing of Palestinian civilians, however it is presented in terms of an unintentional error 
(some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilian). It also 
mentions a wanted militant group leader who became a commander in Hamas. Although 
the NYT contextual details are relevant to the event, there is essential context that is 
absent from the report, especially in relation to the Israeli control over all aspects of 
Palestinians‘ lives and the role of military posts, like the one attacked, in the 
enforcement of this control. The lack of this context leads to regarding Palestinians‘ 
actions in terms of violence and militancy rather than in terms of resistance.  
 In conclusion, there are very obvious differences between the way Israeli and 
Palestinian violent acts are presented in NYT. Firstly, headlines dealing with Israeli 
violence are too general and vague with no clear agency while headlines dealing with 
Palestinian violence present Palestinian agency of violence and its consequences clearly. 
Capitalisation is sometimes used in headlines dealing with Palestinian violence but not 
with Israeli violence. The lead paragraphs are similar to the headlines but present more 
details. Secondly, the narrative structure of stories of Israeli violence often de-narrativise 
them, so that the story is presented as unconnected events that are separated by other 
details, and the basic elements of narrative are often missing from reports. Stories 
dealing with Palestinian violence, on the other hand, have all the basic elements of 
narrative structure including orientation, characterisation, and complication; however, 
the resolution is often missing and a form of open narrative is presented. Palestinian 
violence is presented in NYT in coherent and chronological narrative with clear 
causality and consequences. Moreover, Israeli violence is often presented as justified 
and purposeful unlike Palestinian violence which is rarely given justification. Causes of 
Palestinian violence are often quoted from Palestinian militants who are illegitimate and 
untrustworthy.  
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 Thirdly, NYT uses Israeli sources and their quotations are the primary definers of 
the situation. They are often identified by name and institutional capacity, unlike 
Palestinian sources that are often presented without identification or institutional 
efficacy. Stories of violence are often quoted from Israeli military sources. NYT often 
casts doubt on Palestinian statements and endorses Israeli statements. Contextual details 
chosen often refer back to previous Palestinian violence which serves to show 
Palestinian violence as continuous and which also serves to justify Israeli violence. 
5.2 Narrative Analysis of the Arab News Reports  
5.2.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence 
 
 31
st
 July 2001 22
nd
 March 2004 7
th
 July 2006 
Headline  Israeli gunships pound Gaza Murder Israeli Missiles and Shells 
Kill 21  
Lead Violence in the Middle East 
threatened to spiral out of 
control yesterday after six 
Palestinians were killed in a 
West Bank blast and Israeli 
combat helicopters pounded 
Palestinian police 
headquarters in Gaza City. 
Israel assassinated Hamas 
leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 
yesterday, provoking global 
condemnation and cries of 
revenge from Palestinian 
resistance 
Israeli tanks moved deeper 
into Gaza Strip and its forces 
killed at least 21 Palestinians 
yesterday in the bloodiest 
day since the Jewish state 
invaded Gaza on June 28 
over a soldier‘s capture. 
During yesterday‘s 
operation, one Israeli soldier 
was also killed and five were 
injured 
The headlines of reports dealing mainly with Israeli violence in AN present Israeli 
responsibility clearly and sometimes criminalises Israeli actions. The headline of the 
report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 highlights the Israeli raid against Gaza and represents 
Israel as actively involved in violence against the Palestinians. Agency and 
responsibility are represented clearly through the use of the transactive model. The 
headline foregrounds Israeli weapons used in the attack. There is an exaggeration in the 
headline, for the Israeli attack is represented as targeting Gaza as a whole not the 
Palestinian police headquarters only. The headline of the report of the 22
nd
 of March 
2004 criminalises the Israeli action by labelling it ‗murder‟. It is a nominalisation that is 
brief and vague, as it does not include agents or time frame for the action. This may be a 
way of attracting readers to read more to know more details about the crime.  
The headline of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 foregrounds the Israeli weapons 
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used against the Palestinians and clearly presents the impacts of using them as killing 
twenty-one Palestinians. The transactive model clearly establishes causal relationship 
between the Israeli weapons and the Palestinian deaths. In sum, in reports that deal 
mainly with Israeli violence, AN focuses on Israeli responsibility for violence against 
the Palestinians and criminalises it. The interpretative frameworks set in these headlines 
point to Israeli involvement and responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. 
Israel is presented as the perpetrator of violence and the Palestinians are presented as the 
victims.  
The lead paragraph presents the core of the story and indicates how it will be 
developed in the rest of the report. In line with the headlines, the lead paragraphs of AN 
present Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians clearly. The lead 
paragraph of the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 emphasises the threats of spiraling 
violence and represents them as the result of the killing of six Palestinians and the Israeli 
raid against the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza. It highlights Israeli violence 
against the Palestinians and indirectly blames Israel for the escalation. The lead 
paragraph of the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 summarises the story using the 
transactive model which clearly establishes causal relationships and Israeli 
responsibility. The choice of the verb ‗Assassinated‟ denotes that the Israeli action is 
politically motivated, intentional and criminal. The consequences of the attack are 
presented using the active participle in terms of international condemnations and cries of 
revenge from Palestinian resistance. The word ‗resistance‟ acknowledges the 
Palestinians‘ right to resist Israeli occupation.  
The lead of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 summarises and foregrounds the 
Israeli advancement in Gaza and the killing of twenty-one Palestinians.  It uses 
activation with the Israeli movement and the transactive model with the killing, and it 
contextualises  the events by reference to the beginning of the Israeli incursion and 
delegitimises it as ‗since the Jewish state invaded Gaza‟. The use of the transactive 
model underpins Israeli agency and responsibility. Israel is labeled ‗the Jewish state‟ 
which foregrounds its ideology. The cause of the Israeli operation is presented as ‗over a 
soldier‟s capture‟ which implies that this is a pretext. Israeli victims are presented in an 
agentless passive construction. The lead paragraphs in AN are used to summarise the 
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main story in the reports, and they emphasise Israeli responsibility for violence against 
the Palestinians who, in turn, are represented as victims.  
In AN reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, the main episode highlights 
Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. At the same time, they 
downplay Palestinian violence and its impacts on the Israelis. Reports that deal mainly 
with Israeli violence contain very little or no Palestinian violence at all. In the report of 
the 31
st
 of July 2001, Israeli violence and its consequences are prominent, especially the 
injury of four Palestinian policemen in an Israeli aerial attack. The impacts of the attack 
are prominent in the report both in terms of the injury of policemen and damage to the 
building. The cause of the attack is presented through quoting the Israeli army. The 
report also mentions the killing of six Palestinians in the West Bank, yet it does not 
blame Israel directly for it. Israeli responsibility is expressed indirectly through quoting 
Palestinians blaming Israeli tank shells for it.  
The report also mentions the provocative actions of Jewish ultra-nationalists that 
resulted in clashes and the injury of eighteen Palestinians, however it does not mention 
any incidents of Palestinian violence against the Israelis. It represents the clashes as 
being provoked by Jewish ultra-nationalists who held a symbolic ceremony to lay the 
cornerstone for a Jewish Temple in Haram Al-Sharif (the latest escalation in violence 
came after a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists held a brief but symbolic ceremony 
Sunday near the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem‟s Old City to mark the laying of a 
cornerstone for a new temple on the site). 
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, the report provides a detailed description 
of the Israeli operation and its consequences, as well as the scene of the attack. It focuses 
on international condemnations of the assassination. The story of the killing is prominent 
in AN, and it is foregrounded in the report. Israeli responsibility is clearly indicated and 
the involvement of the Israeli Prime Minister is emphasised. The story is presented with 
vivid narrative description of an eye witness who was present at the time of the attack. It 
includes the explosion of three missiles one after the other, and the consequences of the 
attack (Yassin's head was cut in two by the blast and part of his brain had fallen out). It 
also mentions his wheelchair that lay broken in a pool of blood and the efforts of the 
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witness and the nurse to collect body parts of the Sheikh to take them to hospital. The 
report also refers to the number of victims as seven killed and fifteen injured including 
two of Yassin‘s sons. Other consequences are mentioned in the report, e.g. 
demonstrations in the streets of Gaza and the killing of four Palestinians including an 
eleven-year-old at the hands of the Israeli forces. AN presents the story of the 
assassination of Sheikh Yassin clearly with a vivid description of the Israeli actions and 
their consequences.  
The report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 presents the Israeli incursion by describing 
Israeli actions and by quoting Palestinian civilians in Gaza. It foregrounds the UN 
Human Rights Committee condemnation of (rights violations by Israel) and the 
demands to (a halt to Israel‟s “extensive military operations” against Palestinians). The 
story of the incursion is presented in one coherent section. It includes vivid description 
of the actions of the Israeli attacks against the Palestinians using the transactive model, 
e.g. (Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians with missile strikes…). Causes of the Israeli 
operation are given as a response to capturing an Israeli soldier and firing two upgraded 
rockets at Israel, and the consequences of the attack are very prominent in the report. In 
addition, the suffering of Palestinian civilians is presented through the story of a 
Palestinian family fleeing their home due to the Israeli offensive. This shows some 
aspects of the humanitarian situation of Palestinian civilians under the Israeli attack.  
Considering the use of sources and quotations, AN uses Palestinian sources as the 
primary definers of the situation, and it adopts their perspective. The report of the 31
st
 of 
July 2001 is dominated by quoting Palestinian sources, e.g. Arafat‟s aid and the 
Palestinian Authority. They comment on incidents of violence, blame Israel for them 
and promise revenge. AN quotes Palestinians four times compared with two Israeli 
quotations. Palestinian sources comment on events while Israeli quotations are presented 
against those of the Palestinians. Moreover, Palestinian sources are identified by name 
and institutional capacity, e.g. (Arafat‟s top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina), unlike the two 
Israeli quotations which are attributed to the Israeli army and unnamed political sources. 
In the reports of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, AN quotes two Palestinians; an eye-witness 
and a top Hamas official. The eye-witness describes a horrible scene of the attack and 
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the Israeli missile strikes, and Abdel Aziza Al-Rantissi pays tribute to Yassin and vows 
retaliation for his death. The report also quotes Sharon announcing the assassination of 
Yassin.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, AN quotes both Israeli the Palestinian official 
and unofficial sources. The official Palestinian perspective is represented by quoting the 
Palestinian Prime Minister who describes the assault as a ‗collective punishment‘ and 
demands ‗international intervention‟ which underlines Palestinians‘ vulnerability. The 
unofficial Palestinian reaction comes from a Palestinian who had to flee his home with 
his family in fear of the dangers of the Israeli operation. The Israeli official viewpoint is 
represented by the statement of the Israeli Defence Minister who threatens to operate in 
Gaza in any way that the Israelis like and who shows both confidence and caution in 
dealing with the situation. The unofficial reaction comes from the father of the captured 
soldier who blames the Israeli government for not negotiating for the release of his son. 
Although AN often quotes both sides, Palestinian sources are used more than Israeli 
sources and the newspaper takes them as primary definers of the situation.   
In terms of contextual details, in the report of 31
st
 of July 2001 AN refers to 
violence in the preceding weekend and presents it as provoked by Jewish ultra-
nationalists. It also refers to the number of casualties on both sides since the beginning 
of the US-sponsored ceasefire, i.e. forty-four Palestinians and seventeen Israelis. 
Disagreement between both sides about the formation of a truce monitoring force is also 
mentioned, as Palestinians insist on an international force while Israel demands an 
American-only force. In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, AN hardly provides any 
contextualisation for the story. It refers to the international condemnation of the attack 
with specific reference to the UK, France and the EU. Most contextualising details in the 
report of the 7
th
 of July 2006  relate to Israeli violence, e.g. the invasion of Gaza, killing 
sixteen Palestinians in 2004, holding 9,000 Palestinians prisoners, withdrawing from 
Gaza in 2005 after thirty-eight years of occupation. The report also mentions Palestinian 
rockets fired at Israel and the capture of the Israeli soldier. 
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5.2.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In AN, the headlines of reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence try, 
where possible, to mitigate Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis. 
The headline of the 1
st
 of August 2002 is vague and does not refer to any side in 
particular, so readers do not know on which side is the victim or the perpetrator. This is 
the result of the metonymical substitution of the agent with ‗Jerusalem bomb‟ and the 
presentation of victims as a numeral ‗seven‟. The headline of the 15th of January 2004 
foregrounds the family status of the bomber – a mother of two – as being the most 
counter-expected detail; it also highlights the consequences of her actions using the 
transactive model. The headline of the 26
th
 of June 2006 foregrounds the killing of two 
Israelis in an attack by Palestinians. It uses passivisation to represent the event with the 
effect of presenting it as a finished process, i.e. more like a state. The circumstantial „in 
attack by Palestinians‟, loosely relates the Palestinian attack to the killing of the two 
Israelis. In sum, AN headlines of reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence try, 
where possible, to mitigate responsibility. 
In line with the headlines, the lead of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 
conceals agency and presents the actions with few detail, however it presents its 
consequences clearly. The lead of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 presents details 
about the bombing and summarises the story; it presents details about the location of the 
bombing and the identities of the victims, as well as contextual details about Hamas that 
has never before dispatched a woman suicide bomber.  
The lead of the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 describes the Palestinian operation 
as an ‗attack‟, and presents its consequences as the death of two Israeli soldiers and the 
 1
st
 August 2002 15
th
 January 2004 26
th
 June 2006 
Headline  Jerusalem bomb kills seven Mother-of-Two Bomber 
Kills Four Israelis  
2 Israeli Troops Killed in 
Attack by Palestinians 
Lead A bomb ripped through a 
busy university cafeteria in 
Jerusalem yesterday, killing 
seven people, five of them 
foreigners. Some 70 people 
were injured. At least one of 
the dead was an American 
woman, while another 
victim was a Frenchman 
A Palestinian mother of two 
blew herself up yesterday at 
the Erez Crossing at the 
Israel-Gaza border, killing 
three Israeli soldiers and a 
private security guard and 
signaling a new tactic by 
Hamas, who had never 
before dispatched a woman 
suicide bomber. 
A daring pre-dawn 
Palestinian attack on an 
Israeli Army post bordering 
the southern Gaza Strip 
yesterday left two Israeli 
soldiers and two 
Palestinians dead and one 
Israeli soldier was abducted, 
the Israeli Army and 
Palestinian officials said. 
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abduction of one, in addition to the death of two Palestinians. It naturalises these 
consequences by the use of the expression ‗left dead‘ which obfuscates agency and 
responsibility. The lead mentions the Israelis and the Palestinians who died together as 
victims of the attack. The capture of the Israeli soldier is described as ‗abduction‟ in an 
agentless passive construction, and the location is described as on the border-line 
between Israel and the Palestinian territories rather than inside Israel.  
As for the main episode of the reports that deal with Palestinian violence, AN 
tends to highlight the causes of Palestinian violence and to present it as justified. 
However, it often presents details of Palestinian violence as quoted from Israeli sources. 
The report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 deals with both Israeli and Palestinian violence. The 
story of the bombing at the Café is presented briefly in one sentence only without clear 
agency (a bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria in Jerusalem yesterday). The 
scene of the attack and its impacts are described (the blast sent people fleeing in panic. 
Victims staggered out of the cafeteria). Responsibility for the bombing is clear through 
quoting Hamas‘ statement claiming responsibility for the bombing; moreover, the cause 
of the attack is also presented through a Hamas statement (it was in retaliation for the 
Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children.) 
The consequences of the Palestinian bombing are prominent in the report (killing seven 
people, five of them foreigners). 
The report refers to Israeli violence against the Palestinians, e.g. the assassination 
of a Hamas leader by bombing his home as the cause of the attack which is presented as 
(the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian 
children). The report also refers to the Israeli policy of deporting relatives of those 
involved in suicide attacks. The paper presents both sides as being involved in violence 
against each other. Although the focus of the report is on the Palestinian bombing of the 
university café, Israeli violence is presented in more detail and occupies longer sections 
of the report.  
The story of the suicide bombing is also prominent in the report of the 15
th 
of 
January 2004. The story is quoted from Israeli army sources, and the narrative structure 
of the story has all the basic elements of a narrative, i.e. orientation (at the Erez Crossing 
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yesterday morning), characterization (a woman identified as Reem Raiyshi, soldiers and 
Palestinians), and complication (she was taken for a security search to a special room, 
where she set off the bomb). The story does not have a resolution though, therefore it 
presents an open narrative. The actions of the bomber are presented in a vivid, coherent 
and chronological narrative. The consequences of the bombing are clear in the report; 
they include the killing of four Israelis and injury of seven others including four 
Palestinians, as well as damage to the building. The bomber‘s actions are not given any 
justification, yet she is quoted in a video recording saying that she had always wanted to 
be the first woman martyr. Although the report deals mainly with Palestinian violence, 
Israeli violence is also prominent. The report refers to the death of a British man who 
was shot by Israeli troops. This story is presented in details with background information 
about the victim, his shooting and charges against the Israeli soldier who shot him.  
The story of the Palestinian raid in the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 is 
presented in detail and is described vividly and chronologically, giving the exact details 
of fighters‘ actions and their consequences in a coherent story with clear actors, actions 
and affected participants. The story is quoted from the Israeli military, and the narrative 
structure includes all basic elements of narrative, e.g. orientation (pre-dawn Palestinian 
attack on an Israeli Army post bordering the southern Gaza Strip yesterday), 
characterization (fighters from within the Gaza Strip, an eight-man attack team and 
soldiers) and complication (the attacking force split into three teams. One tried — and 
failed — to attack an armored personnel carrier in the area, one charged the post, firing 
at the soldiers, and one attacked a tank with grenades killing the two soldiers and 
wounding two others). The consequences of the attack are prominent in the report, 
especially the deaths, injuries and kidnap of Israeli soldiers. The causes of the attack are 
presented through quoting Palestinian officials and militants. The causes of the attack 
fall short of legitimising or even justifying it, as they do not refer to any moral values; 
instead, they are presented in general terms as a response to Israeli crimes and as being 
ordered by Hamas leadership abroad.  
 The AN report foregrounds the Israeli incursion in Gaza in response to the 
Palestinian attack. It is presented as being undertaken by the Israeli army and as 
involving movements of troops and tanks in Gaza. It is presented vividly through 
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quoting a Palestinian civilian who witnessed the attack. The report also mentions the 
Israeli closure of the crossing in response to the attack. There is also mention of 
potential Israeli military response through quoting an Israeli army source.  
AN generally quotes more Palestinian than Israeli sources, and it uses them as 
primary definers of the situation. In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2001, AN quotes 
Palestinian sources four times, including Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas is 
quoted claiming responsibility for the attack and stating that it came in response to the 
killing of one of its leaders and nine children.  AN also quotes Sheikh Yassin confirming 
Hamas statement by saying ―when Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and 
children and kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect‖. The Palestinian 
Authority condemns the attack and blames the Israeli Prime Minister for it. The Israeli 
side is quoted twice in the same report. An Israeli source is quoted commenting on the 
deportation of a Palestinian from the West Bank. An Israeli spokesman is also quoted 
accusing Arafat of provoking violence to avoid reforming his administration. 
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, AN quotes more Palestinian sources 
than Israelis. The story of the bombing is quoted from the Israeli military spokeswoman. 
Two other Israeli sources are used; one commenting on the closure of the crossing and 
the other on the potential Israeli response to the bombing. The three Israeli sources are 
identified by name and institutional capacity. Palestinian sources are used extensively in 
the report, including the bomber, Hamas sources, ordinary people and Palestinian 
officials. Sheikh Yassin is quoted commenting on the use of a woman as suicide 
bomber. He tries to justify it and calls it ‗resistance‘. The bomber is quoted saying the 
she wanted to be the first woman martyr. Ordinary Palestinians are also quoted; an eye 
witness describes the scene of the attack, and a relative of the bomber condemns her 
actions. The Palestinian Prime Minister is quoted saying that escalation is the result of 
Israel‘s attacks and restrictions on the Palestinians.  
 The story of the Palestinian raid on the 26
th
 of June 2006 is quoted from Israeli 
military sources. The Israeli army radio is also quoted commenting on the condition of 
the abducted soldier. Palestinian sources are used extensively, including Hamas and the 
Palestinian Authority sources. A Hamas spokesman is quoted saying that the assault is 
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(a natural attack on the Israeli occupation crimes.) The Hamas government is quoted 
denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier 
well and keep him alive. A Palestinian official from Fatah states that the attack was 
ordered by Hamas leadership abroad. President Abbas is quoted condemning the attack 
and calling on the international community to intervene to prevent Israel from (taking 
advantage of the arrack by carrying out a large scale offensive against the Gaza Strip.) 
A Palestinian farmer who is an eye-witness of the Israeli military incursion in Gaza in 
response to the Palestinian attack is also quoted in the report.  
Contextual details help explain the events. AN does not usually refer to previous 
Palestinian violence much. In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, AN contextualises for 
the story of the bombing at the Hebrew University café by referring to talks between 
Sheikh Yassin and Jesse Jackson that were cancelled because of the attack. It also refers 
to a Palestinian who was deported from the Palestinian territories by Israel for being a 
relative of a man who was involved in a Palestinian bombing of an Israeli bus. In the 
report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, on the suicide bombing, AN presents details about the 
bomber‘s family background and her children; it also describes her appearance in the 
video recording she left. AN also mentions information about the crossing and 
Palestinian workers using it, as well as  the industrial area where they work which 
includes businesses with joint Israeli and Palestinian ownership. Moreover, AN tells the 
story of a British man who was killed after being shot by an Israeli soldier months 
earlier. Contextual details presented in AN do not focus on previous Palestinian 
violence. They are mainly concerned with the immediate context of the events and lack 
historical background that can help readers make sense of the situation. 
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5.3 Narrative Analysis of the Guardian’s Reports  
5.3.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence 
In this section, various elements of the narrative structure of the Guardian‟s 
reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence are examined beginning by headlines. In 
reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, the Guardian tends to express Israeli 
responsibility for violence more clearly when responsibility has been confirmed or when 
it cannot be denied, e.g. the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 which deals mainly with 
the assassination of Sheikh Ahamed Yassin, (Israel assassinates Hamas leader) This 
headline presents a summary of the story using the transactive model with clear agency 
and causal relationship. The choice of the verb ‗assassinates‟ confirms the intentionality 
and political motivations of the killing. There are three sub-headlines that present further 
details of the story and some consequences (Yassin killed in missile strike - Mass 
protests by Palestinians - Militants vow revenge attacks).  
When Israeli responsibility is not confirmed, the Guardian tends to be very 
careful about expressing it in the headlines, e.g. the headline of the report of the 31
st
 of 
July 2001 (Six Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist), which summarises the main 
episode of the report. Although it uses the transactive model, the use of the inanimate 
agent ‗blast‘ completely conceals agency and responsibility. The victims are labelled 
‗Fatah men on Israel's hitlist‘ which presents them as activists targeted by Israel; this 
delegitimises them but it may also indirectly hint at Israel‘s involvement. The headline 
of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 (18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year) 
is vague. It naturalises the killing as a result of the incursion by the verb ‗die‟ which is 
 31
st
 July 2001 22
nd
 March 2004 7
th
 July 2006 
Headline  Blast kills six Fatah men on 
Israel's hitlist  
Israel assassinates Hamas 
leader 
 
Yassin killed in missile strike 
Mass protests by Palestinians 
Militants vow revenge attacks 
18 die in worst fighting since 
withdrawal last year  
 
Lead A powerful explosion killed 
six Palestinian activists in 
the West Bank, and Israeli 
helicopter gunships rocketed 
the Palestinian police 
headquarters in Gaza City 
yesterday, punctuating a day 
of sharply escalating 
tensions. 
Palestinian militants today 
warned of swift and bloody 
retaliation against Israel after 
it "opened the gates of hell" 
by assassinating Ahmed 
Yassin, the founder and 
spiritual leader of militant 
group  Hamas. 
At least 17 Palestinians and 
one Israeli soldier were 
killed yesterday in the most 
serious violence since Israel 
withdrew its forces from the 
Gaza Strip last year.  
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associated with natural death; moreover, it aggregates victims on both sides together 
using the figure ‗18‟. This conceals the fact that seventeen of these victims are 
Palestinians, and only one is Israeli. In terms of setting the interpretative frames, the 
Guardian‟s headlines attribute responsibility to Israel directly if its involvement in 
violence has been confirmed. This makes it easier for readers to reconstruct the story and 
to understand the events.  
Considering the lead paragraphs of reports dealing mainly with Israeli violence, 
they tend to follow the same strategies used in the headlines in terms of expressing 
responsibility or mitigating it; however, they provide more details than the headline. In 
the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001, the Guardian‟s lead mentions both the killing of six 
Palestinians in a powerful explosion and the shelling of the Palestinian police 
headquarters by Israeli gunships. Both incidents are expressed using inanimate agents. 
Consequences are presented generally as „punctuating a day of sharply escalating 
tensions‟.  
 The lead of the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 highlights one of the 
consequences of the assassination, i.e. threats of violence by Palestinian militants. It 
quotes Palestinian militants commenting on Israeli actions as ―opened the gates of hell‖. 
The use of scare quotations distances the paper from the statement. The lead also 
describes Israeli action as killing and presents agency and responsibility clearly. The 
lead of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 explains that at least seventeen victims are 
Palestinians and one is Israeli. The quantifier ‗at least‘ implies the possibility of the 
existence of more Palestinian victims. Victims are mentioned together in an agentless 
passive construction. The circumstantial ‗in the most serious violence‟ is ambiguous, and 
it presupposes previous serious violence. Contextualisation is achieved by reference to 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The Guardian‟s lead represents violence vaguely without 
blaming any side for it.  To sum up, the lead paragraphs are usually similar to the 
headlines, especially in terms of expressing agency and responsibility or concealing 
them. 
The main story in the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 presents several violent 
incidents between both sides. Israel is represented as firing rockets at the Palestinian 
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police headquarters. The cause of the action is presented close to the description of the 
action through an Israeli army quotation (it had attacked a mortar factory). The impacts 
of the attack are presented as (sending out great clouds of white smoke, and injuring at 
least three people). The report also includes incidents of violence against the Israelis 
although most of it is not directly blamed on Palestinians, e.g. (a small blast from a 
booby-trapped beer can … the stabbing of an Orthodox Jewish man). The consequences 
of both actions are presented generally as (underlined the tense security situation.) The 
report also includes failed attempts of Palestinian violence against Israelis, i.e. a car 
bomb attack. The report refers to a lot of Palestinian violence in the background 
information, although there is not any actual Palestinian violence on the day of 
reporting.  
The killing of six Palestinians is covered in detail. The Guardian presents 
Palestinian accusations against Israel for the killing through quoting officials and Fatah 
leaders. The Israeli denial and explanation of the deaths as a work accident are also 
present and are supported by witnesses‘ statements. The report criminalises the victims 
by representing them as being on Israel‘s most-wanted list and as belonging to a 
shadowy militant cell that carries out gang style killings and attacks inside Israel. 
Although the details of the victims‘ militancy are not confirmed and are presented as 
uncertain, the newspaper seems to adopt them, and there is no sympathy expressed 
towards them. The report gives a vivid description of the scene of the killing with details 
that support the Israeli claims, e.g. that the blast came from the inside which dismisses 
the possibility of an aerial shelling. The structure of the report is more of reporting than 
of narrative; it includes many incidents that are presented briefly without the proper 
elements of a narrative structure. 
The story of the assassination in the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 is presented 
briefly, yet its consequences are clearly presented as the killing of seven other people 
and the injury of seventeen. The story is presented in one passive sentence with no 
human agency (Yassin was killed in a missile strike by Israeli helicopters). There is not a 
clear narrative structure for the story. An eye-witness is quoted describing the scene of 
the attack with the twisted wheel chair that Yassin used and dead people near him. The 
cause of the attack is also clearly presented in terms of Israeli blame for Yassin for 
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(orchestrating a wave of suicide bombings). The report focuses on the reactions of the 
Palestinians to the assassination, e.g. Palestinian militants firing ten rockets towards 
settlements in Gaza, thousands of people participating in the funeral procession and the 
angry calls for revenge against Israel. The report also mentions clashes between 
Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli forces in which Israelis killed four Palestinians 
including a thirteen-year-old boy when firings at crowds.  
The main story of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 deals with fighting between 
Israeli forces and Palestinian militants during the Israeli incursion in Gaza. It is 
presented through the reporter‘s description and through quoting both sides. Israeli 
violence is not presented in a coherent story, as details are separated by quotations, 
description of militants‘ actions, etc. Israeli actions in Gaza are described in terms of 
movement (pushed to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya) or as targeting inanimate objects 
(Israeli tanks and bulldozers were destroying orchards and crops) or militants (it killed 
10 militants). One Palestinian civilian victim is mentioned in some detail; nevertheless, 
his death is not blamed on any side (gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew in 
the back). The purpose of Israeli violence is prominent in the report as (to prevent rocket 
fire at Israel and put pressure on the captors of Corporal Gilad Shalit). Incidents of 
Israeli violence are justified (Israel increased its offensive after three Qassam home-
made rockets hit central Ashkelon). Their consequences are presented in terms of the 
death of at least seventeen Palestinians and one Israeli soldier. The Palestinians who get 
killed are described as militants or as being killed after firing a rocket towards Israel. 
The only civilian victim mentioned is the farmer, yet his death is attributed to fighting 
and to the delay in the ambulance reaching him.  
The report also includes Palestinian violence, as militants are described as 
attacking Israeli forces (Palestinian gunmen began to attack them), placing roadside 
bombs and carrying different types of weapons. Details of the actions of Palestinian 
militants are presented vividly with many details, e.g. (three Hamas gunmen, followed 
by three from Fatah, moved along the road. One Hamas man carried an anti-tank 
weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs). Palestinian violence is not given any 
justification. To sum up, the Guardian presents Israeli violence without a clear narrative 
construction, but rather as incidents reported briefly. Palestinian violence is also very 
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prominent in all reports that deal with Israeli violence, so that Israeli violence is often 
presented as a reaction to Palestinian violence or it is presented as mutual between both 
sides; moreover, Israeli violence is often presented as justified, and its causes are often 
prominent in the reports.  
Considering the use of the sources, the Guardian takes Israeli sources as the 
primary definers of the situation while Palestinian sources are used as secondary 
definers. The report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 quotes many Israeli and Palestinian officials 
and presents their statements against each other, e.g. the Palestinian accusations of 
Israeli involvement in the killing and the Israeli denial. The paper quotes Israel's Deputy 
Defence Minister who blames the victims for their own death (attackers who are trying 
to activate explosive devices ... recently they have been making many mistakes ... and 
they pay with their lives for it), and supports her statement via witnesses‘ statements 
which at the same time discredit the Palestinian version (witnesses said there were no 
signs of shell fragments in the debris). The Israeli Prime Minister is also quoted saying 
―that there is no negotiation under fire,‖ Which presupposes that the Israelis are under 
Palestinian fire.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, the Guardian quotes sources on both 
sides. Palestinian leaders of militant groups are quoted promising revenge  on both Israel 
and the US for the assassination. The Palestinian Prime Minister is quoted describing the 
assassination as one of ‗the biggest crimes‟ committed by Israel and Arafat describing 
the assassination as a ‗barbaric act‘. In addition, the Guardian also quotes a Palestinian 
eye-witness who describes the scene of the attack. Israeli sources are quoted justifying 
the attack by blaming Yassin for suicide bombings and for killing Israelis. An Israeli 
Foreign Ministry Official is also quoted stating that Yassin is ―responsible for sending 
children and women to explode themselves.‖ The Israeli Defence Minister is also quoted 
pledging that ―the battle against Hamas will continue.‖ The Guardian also mentions 
Arab condemnation with specific reference to Kuwait, and foreign condemnation with 
reference to Britain.  
In the reports of the 7
th
 of July 2006, the Guardian uses sources extensively. 
Most of the reported information is quoted from sources, thus the paper avoids giving its 
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views on the reported events. The Israeli army is quoted twice, giving justification for 
the incursion and some details about Israeli actions. Israeli sources are considered 
primary definers of the situation, as they are quoted first, and their statements are very 
prominent in the report. The Palestinian sources are ordinary people who do not have 
institutional capacity to enhance their credibility although they are eye-witnesses and 
victims of fighting. The Palestinians quoted in the report are an ambulance man who 
cannot reach injured people due to the fighting and a relative of the first Palestinian 
victim who was killed due to the fighting. The Hamas government is not mentioned at 
all in the report, and no Palestinian official is quoted; consequently, the Palestinians 
official point of view is absent. In sum, the Guardian consistently quotes both Israeli 
and Palestinian sources;, however, Israeli sources are always used as primary definers of 
the situation. Their quotations are often adopted and supported by the newspaper. Israeli 
sources are often identified by name and/or institutional capacity which make their 
statements more effective and convincing. Their statements usually justify Israeli 
violence or deny responsibility for it. Palestinians‘ statements are often presented against 
those of the Israelis‘, and they are often not adopted or supported by the newspaper. 
Palestinian officials are often quoted condemning violence against the Israelis, and 
militants always vow revenge against them. The Guardian tends to quote ordinary 
people who are usually eye-witnesses or victims of violence.  
In terms of contextualisation, the Guardian often presents a lot of background 
information and contextualising details.  In the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001, it presents 
detailed information about the Palestinian armed group to which the victims are believed 
to belong, and its activities, including attacks against Israel and the Palestinians. These 
details criminalise the victims, present them as dangerous militants, and also justify their 
inclusion on Israel‘s hit-list. Furthermore, they eliminate sympathy for them and make 
Israeli claims that they were bomb makers seem more plausible. There is also reference 
to the Palestinian uprising and international efforts to end violence. Background 
information is long and detailed although information about the six Palestinians is 
unconfirmed. A lot of Palestinian violence is presented as background information.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, contextual details focus on Sheikh 
Yassin, e.g. a previous assassination attempt by Israel, and his imprisonment in Israel for 
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the formation of Hamas and then his release following the request of King Hussain of 
Jordan after a failed Israeli assassination attempt in Amman. The paper also mentions 
that Yassin is (the most prominent Palestinian leader to be killed in more than three 
years of Israeli-Palestinian fighting). Condemnation from Arab and foreign states is also 
mentioned in the report.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, the Guardian contextualises  the Israeli 
incursion by reference to two closely-related Israeli actions, i.e. withdrawal from Gaza 
and the evacuation of the Israeli settlements there; this serves to present Israel positively. 
It presents Palestinian actions, i.e. the capture of the Israeli soldier and the firing of 
rockets from Gaza at Israel. The choice of certain events to use as background 
information or as contextualising details affects the way the story is perceived and 
interpreted by readers. Therefore, when positive Israeli actions are mentioned as 
background information, they help justify Israeli violence and to present Israel in a more 
favourable light generally. Moreover, the choice of negative contextual and background 
details with Palestinians presents them negatively and justifies violence against them. 
5.3.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, responsibility for violence 
is usually expressed clearly in the headlines, and the consequences of violence are also 
prominent. The headline of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 (Bomb kills seven at 
university - Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination) underscores the 
bombing and its consequences. In addition, it also highlights Hamas‘ responsibility for 
 1
st
 August 2002 15
th
 January 2004 26
th
 June 2006 
Headline  Bomb kills seven at 
university  
Hamas attacks mixed campus 
in revenge for assassination 
 
Human-bomb mother kills 
four Israelis at Gaza 
checkpoint 
Israel promises revenge for 
soldier deaths  
- Hamas warned after two 
killed in pre-dawn raid 
- Abbas ordered to secure 
seized corporal's release 
Lead The bombers of Hamas 
struck at the heart of student 
life yesterday, killing at 
least seven people and 
injuring more than 70 in a 
lunchtime attack on a 
crowded university cafeteria 
A 22-year-old Palestinian 
mother of two small 
children, pretending to be 
disabled, killed four Israelis 
at a Gaza border crossing 
yesterday after duping 
soldiers into allowing her a 
personal security check 
rather than going through a 
metal detector. 
Israel has warned Hamas 
that it will pay a "deadly 
price" for a daring raid on 
Israeli positions yesterday in 
which militants killed two 
soldiers and kidnapped a 
third.  
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the bombing and presents its cause. The headline of the report of the 15
th
 of January 
2004 (Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint) provides a summary 
of the story and foregrounds the identity of the bomber as a human-bomb mother. The 
bomber is metonymically substituted by ‗bomb‟ which dehumanises and 
instrumentalises her. The consequences of the bombing are clear in the headline through 
the use of the transactive model.  
The headline of the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 (Israel promises revenge for 
soldier deaths - Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid - Abbas ordered to 
secure seized corporal's release) focuses on Israeli reactions to the Palestinian raid, 
especially threats of revenge and warnings to Hamas and Abbas. The headline also 
summarises the consequences of the raid, i.e. killing two Israeli soldiers and seizing 
another. In general, headlines of reports dealing mainly with Palestinian violence 
highlight the consequences of the violence and present Palestinian responsibility clearly. 
In terms of setting the interpretative frames, the Guardian‟s headlines are very clear 
about Palestinian violence, responsibility for it and its consequences; therefore, readers 
can get a clear idea from the headline of what the Palestinians have done and how it had 
affected the Israelis. 
The lead paragraphs of reports dealing with Palestinian violence in the Guardian 
tend to summarise the story and present responsibility for violence clearly. The lead of 
the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 summarises the main story (the bombers of Hamas 
struck at the heart of student life) and its consequences (killing at least seven people and 
injuring more than 70). It uses activation with human agency to establish clear agency 
and responsibility. The lead uses metaphoric language (at the heart of student life) to 
highlight the significance of the event. The story is presented clearly and coherently in 
the lead paragraph.  
The lead the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 summarises the main story and its 
consequences. It foregrounds the identity of the bomber, being the most unexpected 
detail (a 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two small children). It gives a lot of details 
about the bomber‘s deception and pretence to carry out the attack (pretending to be 
disabled … after duping soldiers into allowing her a personal security check rather than 
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going through a metal detector).  The lead uses the transactive model with human 
agency to establish clear agency and responsibility (killed four Israelis).  
The lead of the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 foregrounds Israeli warnings to 
Hamas; they are presented as ‗deadly price‟, and the use of the scare quotations shows 
how the paper distances itself from the statement. The transactive model clearly 
establishes militants‘ responsibility for the raid and its consequences, and the verbs 
‗killed‟ and ‗kidnapped‟ involve the criminalisation of the Palestinian action and 
victimisation of Israeli soldiers. The lead refers to Israeli reactions to the Palestinian raid 
in terms of verbal reactions as ‗promises revenge‘ and ‗warns‟. The lead paragraphs of 
the Guardian‟s reports highlight Palestinian violence and its consequences. They 
summarise the events in clear coherent narratives with human agency and obvious 
causality and responsibility.  
Stories of Palestinian violence are usually presented in coherent and 
chronological narrative structures. In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, the story of the 
bombing is told in detail. The report begins by describing the scene of the attack and 
presents it as being caused by a powerful bomb. The consequences of the attack 
dominate the report both through reporter‘s description and eye-witness accounts. Clear 
agency structures with human agents establish responsibility clearly, and the 
consequences are the focus of the report. The paper attributes responsibility for the 
attack to Hamas, and both present the cause of the attack through Hamas‘ statement as 
seeking retaliation for the killing of one of its commanders and fourteen others. The 
report also refers to Israeli violence, i.e. the killing of a Hamas commander and others 
which is the cause of the attack according to Hamas, which is represented as (Israel's 
decision to drop a one-tonne bomb in Gaza City, killing a commander it had targeted for 
assassination and 14 other Palestinians). The killing of fifteen Palestinians is reified and 
presented as a nominal ‗decision‟.  
The story of the bombing in the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 is presented 
coherently and chronologically, with many details quoted from Israeli sources, such as 
the bomber faking disability to reach her target, detonating explosives and causing harm 
and damage. The report identifies the bomber by name, age and family status, and it 
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describes her actions vividly. It also comments on her intentions and emphasises that she 
deceived Israeli soldiers by pretending to be disabled. The story is presented 
chronologically, coherently and in many details, including all actions of the bomber 
starting with queuing at the check point until she detonates her bomb giving details of all 
her actions and statements.   
The story of the Palestinian raid on the Israeli army post on the 26
th
 of June 2006 
is presented in detail. The Guardian gives details of the number of militants, their 
affiliations, their actions, as well as the impacts of these actions. Details of the actions of 
Palestinian militants are quoted from Israeli army sources, and they are described 
vividly, giving details in a coherent chronological manner with clear actors, actions and 
affected participants. The Guardian presents the causes of the attack through quoting 
Palestinian militants saying that it was in response to (Israeli assassinations and attacks 
on civilians in recent weeks). Moreover, the paper states that (kidnapping an Israeli 
soldier has been a key aim of Palestinian militants for years. They believe it is the only 
way to force Israel to release Palestinian prisoners.) The causes of the attack are mainly 
presented in terms of revenge and blackmail which fail to legitimise or justify it; 
moreover, causes are mainly presented through statements of Palestinian militants who 
are regarded as illegitimate, which invalidates these justifications.  
The consequences of the attack are elaborated in the report. The deaths, injuries 
and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers are prominent. The Guardian mentions options 
available to Israel such as a full scale invasion of Gaza or targeting Hamas leaders, as 
well as Israeli threats and preparations to respond to the Palestinian attack; however, it 
does not mention the Israeli incursion that has already started in Gaza, yet it discusses 
the political implications of the attack as eroding confidence in the Hamas government.  
 The Guardian quotes both Israeli and Palestinian sources; however, Israeli 
sources are always used as primary definers. The report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 is 
dominated by the statements of three eye-witnesses, i.e. British, Israeli and American 
students. They describe the consequences of the attack, their reactions to it and their 
views of it. The report also quotes the police spokeswoman describing the planting of 
the bomb. The Palestinian side is also quoted both directly and indirectly. The Hamas 
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spiritual leader is quoted commenting on the attack as an expected response to the Israeli 
killing of fifteen people; an unnamed official is quoting saying that it is the first of many 
attacks. The Palestinian Authority is quoted condemning the attack and blaming the 
Israeli Prime Minister for violence.  
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, the Guardian quotes sources on both 
sides, most prominently the bomber who is quoted from the video recording she left 
saying ("it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the 
Zionists”). She is also quoted saying that her love for martyrdom is more than her love 
for her kids. Both statements are very controversial and hard to understand, especially 
for Western readers. They show how ideological her motives are and how much she 
hates Israel. This hatred is represented as irrational, and there is nothing that she says to 
justify it other than her wish to become a martyr. The paper also quotes Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin warning that resistance will continue and more female bombers will follow. 
Other Hamas officials comment on the use of women as suicide bombers.  
Details of the bombing are quoted from Israeli sources which are used as primary 
definers of the situation. An army general deplores the bomber‘s use of a faked medical 
condition. The Guardian also quotes an official in the Israeli Prime Minister‘s office 
who accuses the Palestinians of always trying to kill Israelis and blames the bombing for 
the closure of the crossing which will make thousands of Palestinians go hungry.  
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Guardian quotes members of both 
sides. From the Palestinian side, it quotes Hamas' officials denying involvement in the 
attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive and 
President Abbas condemning the attack. It also quotes a Palestinian minister, a Hamas 
government spokesman and Abbas asking the captors to free the soldier. Abbas is also 
quoted stating that the attack violated national consensus and contradicted recent 
negotiations between the Palestinians. From the Israeli side, the Guardian quotes the 
Israeli Defence Minister threatening Palestinian militants of paying a (deadly price), the 
Israeli Prime Minister holding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority responsible for the 
raid, and a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry calling on Abbas to stay in Gaza 
to resolve the situation. 
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 In terms of contextual details, the Guardian often presents a great deal of 
background information.  In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, it stresses the mixed 
nature of the campus with Arabs and Israelis together in harmony. It mentions previous 
Palestinian bombings, and it states that this is the second bombing in one day. It also 
refers to an article in the university newspaper which envisaged a similar attack four 
months earlier. The Guardian refers to Sharon‘s decision to expel relatives of 
Palestinian militants for the first time since Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank in 
1967. Although the paper refers to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, it 
is backgrounded and presented as undisputed fact.  
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, the Guardian states that it was the first 
time that Hamas sent a female suicide bomber and provides some information about her 
identity, family and children. It also mentions Palestinian workers who will lose their 
livelihood due to the closure of the crossing after the attack. It states that there have not 
been many suicide bombings in the last few months before the attack and describes two 
of the latest bombings and their consequences.  
 In reports of the Palestinian raid on the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Guardian 
contextualises the event by mentioning the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a year earlier, 
meetings between Hamas leaders and Abbas, and provides detailed and thorough 
background information about Israeli hostages held by Palestinians in the past. The 
background information tells stories of Israeli soldiers or remains of soldiers that 
Palestinians held to trade with hundreds of Palestinians prisoners in Israel. It presents the 
Arabs in a very negative way while Israel is represented as honourably pledging to bring 
its citizens home at any cost. The Arabs are represented as blackmailing Israel; this 
presents an explanation for the abduction of the Israeli soldier and gains sympathy for 
him and for Israel.  
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5.4 Narrative Analysis of the Times Reports  
5.4.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence 
When dealing with Israeli violence, the Times‟ headlines tend to conceal Israeli 
responsibility, for example, the headline of the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 is vague 
and inaccurate. It does not explain any circumstances of the death of the men, who they 
are or even whether they were Palestinians or Israelis. Moreover, the killing took place 
in the West Bank not in Gaza! It is very unusual to find such inaccurate reporting in a 
respectable newspaper like the Times, especially in the headline. The headline of the 
report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 summarises the story, however, the use of an agentless 
passive conceals agency and responsibility although the circumstantial loosely indicates 
causality. The headline of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2007 naturalises death using the 
nominal ‗death toll‟ and the middle voice verb ‗rise‟. The information structure in the 
headline presents the rise in the death toll as given information which is less likely to be 
questioned by the readers, while new information relates to the lull in fighting which 
presents the rise of the death toll as counter-expected. Thus, the Times‟ headlines tend to 
mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence against Palestinians and naturalise or conceal 
it. In terms of setting interpretative frames, the Guardian‟s and the Times‟ headlines are 
very careful about attributing responsibility when dealing with Israeli violence. They 
tend to present it as a natural occurrence or use structures that mitigate responsibility for 
it and undermine its consequences.  
The Times‟ lead paragraphs tend to use the same strategies used in the headlines 
although they may provide more details. The lead of the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 
highlights the killing of six Palestinians which is expressed as a spontaneous action died, 
 31
st
 July 2001 22
nd
 March 2004 7
th
 July 2006 
Headline  Six men killed in Gaza 
explosion 
Hamas spiritual leader killed 
in Israeli air strike 
Death toll rises in north Gaza 
despite lull in fighting 
 
Lead SIX Palestinian activists 
died in an explosion on the 
West Bank yesterday. Later, 
missiles from Israeli 
helicopters damaged the 
Palestinian police 
headquarters in the Gaza 
Strip, although no serious 
injuries were reported. 
Tens of thousands of 
mourners jammed the streets 
of Gaza City today for the 
funeral procession of the 
Hamas founder Ahmed 
Yassin and seven others 
killed in an Israeli air strike 
at daybreak 
The death toll rose again in 
northern Gaza today as 
Israeli forces and militants 
continued 
desultory exchanges of fire 
after the bloodiest day of 
clashes in the strip since 
Israel withdrew last summer 
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and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza which is expressed using 
an inanimate agent. The lead presents the consequences of the attack as (damaged the 
Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza although no serious injuries were 
reported).The lead of the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 focuses on the funeral of 
Sheikh Yassin, especially the participation of  (tens of thousands of mourners 
jammed the streets of Gaza City today for the funeral). It summarises the story using an 
agentless passive which conceals agency (the Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and seven 
others killed in an Israeli air strike). The use of the circumstantial loosely indicates 
Israeli involvement.  
The lead of the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 begins with the vague statement 
‗death toll rose again‟. The use of ‗again‟ makes this rise presupposed, so readers do not 
question it. Fighting between the Israeli forces and the Palestinian militants is 
represented as ongoing and mutual. The contrast between ‗forces‟ and ‗militants‟ serves 
to legitimise the actions of the Israelis and delegitimise the Palestinians. Nominalisations 
such as ‗exchanges‟ and ‗clashes‟ suppress agency. Events are contextualised by 
reference to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The lead of the Times naturalises the 
deaths and mitigates responsibility for it; moreover, they present fighting as a mutual 
action between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In conclusion, the leads of the Times‟ 
reports that deal with Israeli violence are general and sometimes vague about 
responsibility for violence and its consequences. 
Details of Israeli violence are often told briefly without a coherent narrative 
structure in the Times‟ reports; moreover, violence is always presented as mutual. The 
report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 describes the Israeli attack very briefly, trivialising the 
consequences as (no serious injuries). It does not mention incidents of violence against 
the Israelis although it refers to potential Palestinian violence (a new wave of Palestinian 
bombing attacks). This statement presupposes previous wave(s) of bombings. In the 
report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, the story of the assassination is presented very briefly, 
yet its consequences are clearly presented as the killing of seven other people and the 
injury of seventeen. The cause of the attack is clearly presented (Israel said it held 
Yassin responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people). The report focuses on 
Palestinians‘ reactions to the assassination, including firing ten rockets towards 
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settlements in Gaza with no reports of injuries and the participation of thousands of 
people in the funeral procession and the angry calls for revenge on Israel. The report 
also mentions clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli forces in which 
Israelis killed four Palestinians including a thirteen-year-old boy when firing at crowds.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, the Times‟ report foregrounds the purpose of 
the Israeli incursion in Gaza. Violence is mainly represented as a mutual action between 
the Israeli army and Palestinian militants (ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes 
with masked Palestinian gunmen), or as targeting militants (Israeli aircraft targeted 
Palestinian militants with missile strikes). The reported twenty-four Palestinian victims 
who lost their lives in the incursion are aggregated, and there are not many details about 
them. The focus of the report is the latest Israeli movements out of Palestinian towns and 
the anticipated end of the operation, which serves to present Israel positively by 
concentrating on its positive rather than negative actions. The Times‟ correspondent in 
Gaza provides an eye-witness account of the actions there. He emphasizes that the 
Israeli operation is coming to an end e.g. ‗tanks have pulled back slightly now and there 
is a lull.‘ Palestinian victims are euphemistically and indirectly indicated to; ‗there will 
probably be a lot of funerals later‘. The correspondent‘s account focuses on the limited 
scope of Israeli actions and the foreseen end of the Israeli operation. The purpose of 
Israeli violence is prominent in the report (in an attempt to win freedom for a captured 
soldier and put Israel out of the militants‟ increasingly longer rocket range). Palestinian 
violence is presented without any explanation or justification, yet its impacts are very 
prominent in the report; for example, even though the reported rocket attacks did not 
cause any physical damage, their psychological and political impacts are presented (the 
latest rocket attacks have caused concern for Israeli army chiefs and panic among 
civilians).  
The Times usually quotes sources on both sides, however it takes Israeli sources 
as the primary definers of the situation while Palestinian statements are presented as 
secondary definers. In the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001, the Times‟ report quotes 
Israel's Deputy Defence Minister and supports her claims through a factual statement 
(there were, however, no Israeli helicopters in the area at the time of the blast) and the 
description of the explosion which indicates that it came from within. The Times‟ report 
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does not quote any Palestinian sources directly, and Palestinian statements are presented 
against those of the Israelis. They deny that the six victims were militants and accuse 
Israel of the killing. The paper also quotes an Israeli official denying the Palestinian 
accusations. In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, the paper quotes sources on both 
sides. It quotes Palestinian officials and leaders of militant groups promising revenge for 
the assassination on both Israel and the US. It also quotes Arafat condemning the attack 
and describing it as a ‗cowardly crime‘ and Palestinian medics commenting on the injury 
of one of the victims of clashes between Israeli forces and demonstrators. Furthermore, 
it quotes Israeli sources that justify the attack in terms of Israel blaming Yassin for 
suicide bombings and for killing Israelis, e.g. it quotes an Israeli Foreign Ministry 
Official who says that Yassin is ―responsible for sending children and women to explode 
themselves.‖ The Times also mentions British and French condemnations and the US 
calling for calm.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, the Times presents the verbal reactions of 
Israeli and Palestinian officials, however the Israeli side is quoted much more 
extensively. Israeli army officials are quoted three times stating that the Israeli forces are 
winding up their mission in Gaza and that the Israel is not intending to reoccupy Gaza. 
There are also justifications for the deaths of Palestinian civilians by blaming it on 
militants who use them as human shields and justifications for the Israeli incursion as a 
way of retaliation for harm done to Israeli citizens. The Israeli officials quoted are 
identified by name and institutional capacity which enhances their status and presents 
them as credible sources. The Palestinian Prime Minister is briefly quoted describing the 
Israeli operation as a ‗crime against humanity‟. He is also reported calling for 
international intervention to stop the Israeli offensive. The report focuses on Israeli 
quotations which are about four times longer than Palestinian quotations; furthermore, 
they are more focused, and the Israeli point of view is represented very clearly.  
In terms of contextual details, the Times does not present extensive contextual 
details like other newspapers. In the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001, the only contextual 
details relate to the visit of the archbishop of Canterbury to the Middle East and his calls 
to the Christians to remain in the Holy Land. In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, 
contextual details focus on Sheikh Yassin, e.g. a previous assassination attempt by Israel 
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in September, and to his imprisonment in Israel for the formation of Hamas and then his 
release following the request of King Hussain of Jordan after a failed Israeli 
assassination attempt in Amman. It also mentions Israel‘s targeting of other Hamas 
leaders like Rantissi in June. In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, it contextualises the 
story by reference to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and by referring to Palestinians‘ 
firing rockets at Israel and capturing an Israeli soldier. The Israeli actions used for 
contextualisation are positive while Palestinians‘ actions are negative.  
5.4.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, responsibility for violence 
is usually expressed clearly in the headlines of the Times, and the consequences of 
violence are also prominent. The headline of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 
summarises the story with clear agency and emphasizes the consequences. It uses the 
transactive model which establishes clear causal relationships and responsibility, and 
places the action in the present time frame to present it as vivid and relevant to the 
present. The headline of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 is sensational; as it 
includes a condemnable statement of the bomber “It was my wish to turn my body into 
deadly shrapnel against the Zionists”. It serves to attract readers‘ attention and to 
highlight the violent and ideological nature of the incident. The sub- headline summaries 
the story (Suicide-bomb mother fakes disability to kill four.) It highlights the identity of 
the bomber as a mother and her actions (fakes disability to kill) which points out her 
deception and presents her in a very negative light. The circumstantial (as Hamas 
 1
st
 August 2002 15
th
 January 2004 26
th
 June 2006 
Headline  Hamas bomb kills seven 
students at Jerusalem's 
multicultural university 
'It was my wish to turn my 
body into deadly shrapnel 
against the Zionists' 
Suicide-bomb mother fakes 
disability to kill four as 
Hamas launches fresh front 
Soldier kidnapped in deadly 
tunnel ambush 
 
Lead Blood and shredded ivy 
cling to columns inside the 
cafeteria that was until 
yesterday one of the few 
symbols of cross-
community life in Israel. 
A PALESTINIAN mother 
of two faked a disability 
yesterday to trick her way 
past Israeli guards before 
detonating a vest packed 
with explosives, killing four 
security staff and wounding 
seven people at a 
checkpoint. 
Israeli troops were hunting 
last night for a soldier who 
is thought to have been 
kidnapped after a 
Palestinian ambush on a 
military post near the Gaza 
border that left two other 
soldiers dead. 
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launches fresh front) puts the event in a larger political perspective and implies that this 
event is part of an ongoing war between Hamas and Israel. Hamas is represented as the 
initiator of violence. The headline of the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 foregrounds the 
kidnapping of a soldier and describes the attack as ‗deadly tunnel ambush‟ which 
includes clear negative evaluation.  
 The lead of the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 does not provide a summary of 
the story, as expected, but describes the scene of the attack. It dramatises the 
consequences and highlights not only its actual impacts but its symbolic impacts also. 
The lead of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 summarises the story and highlights 
the identity of the bomber as a mother and her actions (a PALESTINIAN mother of two 
faked a disability yesterday to trick her way past Israeli guards) which points out her 
deception and presents her in a very negative light. Capitalisation is used with the 
nationality of the bomber to highlight it. There are a lot of details relating to the actions 
of the bomber, and the consequences are prominent in the lead. The lead of the report of 
the 26
th
 of June 2006 begins with Israel hunting for the kidnapped soldier and underpins 
the killing of two other soldiers. The Palestinians‘ attack is nominalised as an ‗ambush‟. 
The Times‟ lead is brief and presents information a very condensed way. The paper does 
not present details as established facts, but presents them as  hitherto uncertain (who is 
thought to have been kidnapped.) 
The Times‟ generally presents Palestinian violence clearly in coherent and 
chronological narrative structure. The report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 tells the story in a 
coherent narrative and informal style. It foregrounds the consequences and presents the 
bombing as the cause. The story is told twice; at the beginning of the report and towards 
the end. The report is dominated by the consequences of the bombing, both through the 
reporter‘s description and eye-witness accounts. Agency structures establish human 
responsibility clearly, and the consequences are the focus of the report. The paper 
attributes responsibility for the attack to Hamas, and presents the cause of the attack 
through Hamas‘ statement as seeking retaliation for the killing of one of its commanders 
and fourteen others.  The report also refers to Israeli violence, i.e. the killing of a Hamas 
commander and others which is the cause of the attack according to Hamas. The Times 
presents it as (the death of 15 Palestinians including its military commander, Salah 
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Shehadeh, in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza last week). Israeli responsibility is mitigated, as 
the fate of the Palestinian victims is presented as ‗death‟ which is a nominal, and which 
is a spontaneous event that does not require agency. Israeli involvement is represented 
through a circumstantial that loosely relates the consequences to the action.  
The story of the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 is presented coherently and 
chronologically. Many details are quoted from Israeli sources, such as the bomber‘s 
faking disability to reach her target, detonating explosives and causing harm and 
damage. The report identifies the bomber by name and describes her actions vividly. It 
also comments on her intentions and emphasizes that she deceived Israeli soldiers by 
pretending to be disabled. The story is presented chronologically, coherently and in great 
detail, including all actions of the bomber starting with queuing at the check point until 
she detonates her bomb giving details of all her actions and statements.   
The story of the 26
th
 of June 2006 gives details of the number of militants, their 
affiliations, their actions, as well as the impacts of these actions. Details of the actions of 
Palestinian militants are quoted from Israeli army sources, and they are described 
vividly, giving details in a coherent chronological manner with clear actors, actions and 
affected participants. The Times presents the causes through the statements of militants 
that it was in retaliation for Israel's assassination of a militant leader and civilian deaths. 
The cause of the attack is mainly presented in terms of revenge which fails to legitimise 
or justify them; moreover, causes are mainly presented through statements of Palestinian 
militants who are regarded as illegitimate, which invalidates these justifications. In 
addition, the causes are not presented close to the actions, so it is difficult to read it as 
purpose or justification. The consequences of the attack are elaborated in the paper. The 
deaths, injuries and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers are prominent in the report. The Times 
discusses the impact of the raid on the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. It mentions 
Israeli threats and preparations to respond to the Palestinian attack. The Times mentions 
military actions in Gaza as an attack designed to destroy the tunnel and search for the 
missing soldier, which presents it as justified and purposeful.  
The Times quotes sources on both sides, but it uses the Israeli sources as primary 
definers. The report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at the Hebrew 
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University quotes a British student at the Hebrew University who describes his reactions 
to the attack and its consequences. It does not quote any Palestinians directly, but states 
that the Palestinian Authority condemned the attack. The report of the 15
th
 of January 
2004 quotes sources on both sides, most prominently the bomber whose quotations 
appears in the headline. It presents excerpts from the video recording left by the bomber, 
particularly "it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the 
Zionists‖. It also quotes her saying that her love for martyrdom is more than her love for 
her kids. Both statements are very controversial, and they show how ideological her 
motives are and how much she hates Israel. This hatred is represented as irrational, and 
there is nothing that she says to justify it other than her wish to become a martyr. The 
paper also quotes Sheikh Ahmed Yassin warning that resistance will continue and more 
female bombers will follow. Other Hamas officials comment on the use of women as 
suicide bombers. The report quotes details of the bombing from Israeli sources which 
are used as primary definers of the situation. They also quote an army general who 
deplores the bomber‘s use of a faked medical condition. An Israeli settler who is also an 
eye-witness is quoted describing the horrible scene of the attack and blaming it on 
Sharon for proposing to withdraw from settlements in Gaza. 
 In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Times quotes members of both sides. It 
quotes a Hamas officials denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to 
treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive, as well as President Abbas condemning 
the attack. It also quotes a Hamas spokesman and mentions contacts between the 
Palestinian Authority with the Egyptians and other parties to resolve the issue. It quotes 
the Israeli Foreign Minister urging Abbas to remain in Gaza until the situation is 
resolved and holding the Palestinian Authority responsible for the attack. It also quotes 
the Israeli Prime Minister and Israeli army sources commenting on the attack. The 
details of the attack are quoted from the Israeli army, and Israeli sources are used as 
primary definers of the situation.  
 Contextual details in the Times emphasize violence between both sides. In the 
report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, contextual details stress the mixed nature of the campus 
with Arabs and Israelis together in harmony. They include a previous Palestinian 
bombing in Jerusalem in April. It also refers to an article in the university newspaper 
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which envisaged a similar attack four months earlier. In the report of the 15
th
 of January 
2004, the paper mentions that it was the first time for Hamas to send a female suicide 
bomber and provides information about her identity, family and children. It also 
mentions Palestinian workers who will lose their livelihood with the closure of the 
crossing after the attack. In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Times tell the story of 
the last Israeli soldier who was captured by Palestinians in 1994.  
The above discussion of specific aspects of the narrative structure of the news 
reports demonstrates that different reporters tell the same story from different 
perspectives. This is exemplified by the choices they make of details to include or to 
exclude; to foreground or to background; and also from the choice of certain events to 
use as background information or as contextualizing details, etc. In the following 
sections, transitivity structures used to represent the actions of each side and the events 
reported in each newspaper are examined. The analysis focuses on actions undertaken by 
each side and how they are represented using various constructions that reveal or 
conceal certain aspects of the action, e.g. its agents or affected participants; and the 
impact of such choices on the presentation of each side of the conflict. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the previous analysis has shown that there are differences between 
the way narrative structure is used to represent Israeli and Palestinian violence in each 
newspaper. In this section, the use of narrative to represent violence is compared in NYT 
and AN as examples of Arab and Western (American) newspapers, and between the 
Guardian and the Times as examples of newspapers that are issued in the same country 
but have different orientations.  
 There are obvious differences between the use of narrative to represent violence 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in NYT and AN. Headlines are the most prominent 
aspects of news reports. They summarise the stories and highlight the most important 
details of the story. Headlines and leads are used strategically to serve ideological 
purposes and to convey the views of each newspaper, e.g. by highlighting certain aspects 
of the story and downplaying others or by concealing agency for certain actions. 
Considering the use of headlines and leads by AN and NYT, when a story deals mainly 
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with Israeli violence, NYT uses general headlines that do not directly indicate Israeli 
responsibility for violence against the Palestinians, e.g. (In Middle-east, a Day of 
Resounding Violence) [NYT, 31 July 2001]. On the other hand, the same story is 
presented in AN with a headline that clearly shows Israeli responsibility for violence 
against the Palestinians, e.g. (Israeli gunships pound Gaza) [AN, 31 July 2001].  
By contrast, AN tries to present Palestinian responsibility for violence generally 
and vaguely in the headline and lead, e.g. (Jerusalem bomb kills seven) [AN, 1 August 
2002], while NYT presents the same story and other stories on Palestinian violence with 
clear agency and responsibility, e.g.  (AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB 
JERUSALEM CAMPUS) [NYT, 1 August 2002] (capitalisation in original). In two of 
the three reports dealing with Palestinian violence, NYT uses capitalisation in the 
headline which makes it more prominent. Both papers present responsibility and agency 
clearly when they are newsworthy, i.e. when they are the most unexpected details of the 
story. For example, when a young mother-of-two  carries out a suicide bombing, both 
papers present agency and responsibility clearly in the headlines since it is the most 
unexpected detail in the story, e.g. (Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis) [AN, 15 
January 2004], and (Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing) [NYT, 15 
January 2004].  
The lead paragraphs serve to provide an initial summary of the story and indicate 
how it will develop in the rest of the report. They should provide more information than 
the headlines. However, lead paragraphs are usually used in ways similar to the 
headlines, i.e. when the headlines are vague or general, the same vagueness is 
maintained in the lead, e.g. the reports of 31 July 2001 in the NYT and of 1 August 2002 
in AN have headlines and lead paragraphs that are vague, and they do not tell who is 
responsible for violence. A very large proportion of readers read no more than the 
headline and lead, and in this way they remain uninformed about crucial aspects of the 
story such as who undertakes the violence. 
 News narrative has a distinctive structure that differs from other narrative forms 
in that it does not always develop chronologically, but it has a special structure which 
White (1997) describes as ‗lead dominated and orbitally organised‘ and argues that this 
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structure helps ―naturalise and portray as commonsensical the ideology which informs 
the selection of this story‖. The narrative structure of news reports is very important for 
the proper understanding of the events; therefore, it is often manipulated ideologically 
by different newspapers. There is a tendency in NYT to de-narrativise stories about 
Israeli violence, and at the same time to present stories of Palestinian violence in a clear, 
coherent and chronological narrative. De-narrativisation of reports about Israeli violence 
is done in many ways, e.g. the story is fragmented, incomplete, and incoherent, i.e. 
separated by other information, e.g. details of Palestinian violence, quotations, 
justifications of violence, etc. The effect of these strategies is that readers often find it 
difficult to reconstruct the story and understand exactly what goes on and how events 
develop and relate to each other. Moreover, when reporting on Israeli violence, NYT tell 
stories of mutual violence, even if the report deals mainly with Israeli violence.  
 On the other hand, NYT tells stories of Palestinian violence in a clear, vivid, 
chronological and coherent narrative with the basic elements of a minimum narrative, 
i.e. orientation, characterisation and complication. Agency, causality and impacts are 
often presented clearly, and the consequences of Palestinian violence are always 
prominent in the reports. Palestinian violence is represented as open narrative. Readers 
can easily reconstruct stories of Palestinian violence presented. In NYT, the 
representation of Israeli and Palestinian violence shows striking contrast, between the 
ways stories of Israeli and Palestinian violence are told, as Palestinian violence is 
consistently told in a coherent chronological narrative, as evident in all the stories 
analysed in this study. AN reports try to present Israeli violence in a clear coherent 
narrative structure – when enough information is available. Although AN endeavours to 
present Palestinian violence generally or vaguely in headlines and leads, it often presents 
it clearly in the body of the report. In some cases, AN avoids mentioning Palestinian 
violence altogether, e.g. in the representation of the Israeli raid against Gaza  on 7
th
 July 
2006, and the AN report does not include any details of the movements and actions of 
Palestinian militants which are prominent in the reports of other newspapers.  
NYT presents the causes of Israeli violence clearly and strategically, as they are 
often presented earlier in the reports and positioned close to close to description of 
violent actions. Israeli violence is often justified by reference to statements of Israeli 
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officials. There is an effort to legitimise Israeli violence by presenting the justifications 
or causes of Israeli violence in relation to moral values, e.g. (to secure the release of a 
captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. Causes of Israeli 
violence are often presented in AN as well, mainly through statements of Israeli 
officials, however they are not presented prominently. In NYT, Palestinian violence 
hardly receives any justification. When causes are presented, they are presented through 
statements of militants or other dubious sources mainly in terms of revenge; moreover, 
they are not mentioned close to the description of violent actions. AN presents the 
causes of Palestinian violence, yet it does not attempt to legitimise it; moreover, it 
presents most causes in terms of revenge.  
The consequences of Israeli and Palestinian violence are often prominent in both 
papers. In fact, they are often the most important and most visible part. Both papers 
often present consequences accurately and prominently because they have great news 
value. However, NYT presents the consequences of Israeli violence in certain ways that 
contribute to legitimising them, e.g. by presenting victims as militants; by presenting 
violence as targeting inanimate objects; by presenting consequences as unintended or 
occurring due to an error; or by using transitivity constructions that naturalise 
consequences, e.g. middle voice or constructions that conceal agency. NYT almost 
completely avoids the effects of Israeli violence on Palestinian civilians, e.g. the Israeli 
raid against Gaza is mentioned while avoiding its consequences on civilians who live 
there. Palestinian violence, on the other hand, is presented with very clear consequences 
with obvious agency and responsibility. When Palestinian violence does not affect 
victims or lead to any physical damage, NYT highlights its psychological effects on 
Israeli civilians, e.g. causing panic, concerns, rattling nerves, etc. The psychological, 
humanitarian, physical effects of Israeli violence on Palestinian civilians are almost 
always absent from NYT reports. The only things that are mentioned accurately are the 
numbers of those killed and injured, often in terms of statistics or numbers. 
The analysis of narrative structures in AN and NYT also reveals that there are 
certain patterns that dominate reports in both papers when using sources. Teo (2000) 
demonstrates that quotation patterns can act as a ―powerful ideological tool to 
manipulate readers‘ perception and interpretation of people and events in news reports‖. 
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Both newspapers try to ensure balance and objectivity by presenting the views of both 
sides. However, the choice of the ‗primary definers‘ and the ‗secondary definers‘ differs 
from one newspaper to another, especially that primary definers set the limits of the 
situation, and ‗secondary definers‘ are forced to insert themselves into the definitions of 
the primary definers. AN typically takes Palestinian sources as the primary definers of 
the situation and adopts their interpretations as interpretative frameworks for 
understanding the situation. They are often named and are given institutional capacities. 
Israeli views are usually presented against those of the Palestinians.  
NYT takes Israeli sources as the main definers of the situation and Palestinian 
sources as secondary definers. Palestinian sources are often presented as anonymous, 
especially if they are from outside the Palestinian Authority; this results in depriving 
them of status and efficacy. NYT also uses sources from Palestinian militant groups 
whose statements are often vowing revenge, threatening and violent; thus, they 
contribute to delegitimising Palestinian violence, and they are not treated as trustworthy. 
NYT also attempts to discredit Palestinian sources as exemplified in the analysis of the 
report of 31 July 2001 where Palestinian statements are presented as baseless, 
contradictory, unconvincing and uninformed.  
The choice of primary definers has an ideological aspect to it. Yet, there are 
other practical and institutional factors that can have important implications on such 
decisions, e.g. the availability and credibility of sources. Newspapers prefer credible 
sources with institutional status, as the statements of these informed sources give 
credibility and validity to the report itself; therefore, Israeli media contacts with their 
effective communication apparatus are more accessible to Western newspapers and 
news outlets and their statements feature constantly on Western newspapers, unlike 
Palestinian sources that are often inadequate and inaccessible. In addition, Israel does 
not allow Israeli or foreign journalists into the Palestinian territories since the beginning 
of the Intifada, which results in difficulty in reaching Palestinian sources. In sum, the 
analysis reveals that elements of narrative are used differently by NYT and AN to 
represent violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and these differences are 
linked to the ideologies of the newspapers, as they contribute to negative or positive 
presentations.  
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There are some differences between the representation of violence between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians in the Times and the Guardian, but there are a lot of 
similarities as well. The Guardian‟s reports are often longer and contain more details 
and background information than the Times‘. In terms of narrative structure, the 
Guardian‟s headlines are often clearer than the Times‘ when reporting on confirmed 
Israeli violence, e.g. when reporting on the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin, the Guardian‟s headline (Israel assassinates Hamas leader), and the Times 
headline (Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike) [22 March 2004]. On the 
other hand, when reporting Palestinian violence, both papers often express Palestinian 
responsibility clearly, however, the Times can be more dramatic in its presentation of 
Palestinian violence, e.g. (Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint), 
[the Guardian, 15 January 2004], ('It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel 
against the Zionists' [the Times, 15 January 2004]. When describing Israeli violence, the 
stories are told in more or less similar ways, e.g. the causes of Israeli violence are 
prominent in the reports of both newspapers and stories are told mostly in similar ways; 
however, the impacts of Israeli violence are often presented more clearly in the 
Guardian.  
When reporting Palestinian violence, both papers present it in detail and in 
similar ways, especially that they both quote its details from Israeli sources in most 
instances. Its causes are often present in terms of revenge, and its consequences are 
prominent in the reports of both papers. The main difference is that the Guardian reports 
are often more detailed and present the actions of both sides and their consequences 
more clearly than the Times which tends to avoid describing Israeli violence where 
possible, e.g. in the very short reports of 31 July 200 two incidents of Israeli violence are 
described in two clauses only, and their consequences are downplayed; moreover, in the 
reports of 7 July 2001, the report focuses on the temporary calm after the violence at the 
expense of describing Israeli violence and its impacts on Palestinians. The paper also 
focuses on Palestinian reactions to Israeli violence and highlights them rather than 
Israeli violence which triggered them, as is the case in the reports of 22 March 2004. On 
the other hand, the Times presents Palestinian violence, not only clearly but also in 
dramatised ways, e.g. the presentation of the suicide bombing on 15 January 2004 and 
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the Palestinian raid on 26 June 2006. The consequences of Palestinian violence are very 
prominent in reports, and causes are often toned down.  
Both papers take Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situations and 
present Palestinian statements in relation to those of Israeli sources; however, in five out 
of six reports the Guardian uses more Palestinian quotations. As for contextualisation 
and background information, the Guardian provides much more detailed background 
information than the Times. This was clearly the case in the reports on the kidnapping of 
an Israeli soldier by Palestinian militants on 26 June 2006, where background 
information about previous kidnapping incidents of Israeli soldiers represents more than 
20% of the length of the report. The Guardian and the Times show more similarities in 
the way they present violence undertaken by both sides of the conflict.  
In conclusion, different newspapers manipulate narrative structure to serve 
ideological purposes when presenting events of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Such 
manipulation includes highlighting or downplaying certain aspects of the story, e.g. 
crucial agency, in the headlines and lead paragraphs, manipulating the narrative structure 
of news stories, or the use of quotations and contextual details. Obvious differences can 
be observed between Arab and Western newspapers.  
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6 Transitivity Analysis 
This chapter deals with the way transitivity structures are used to represent 
violence undertaken by the Israelis and the Palestinians in the four selected newspapers. 
The analysis examines which actions are undertaken by each side; how they are 
construed; and how agency, causality and responsibility for violence are represented.  
6.1 Transitivity Analysis of the New York Times Reports  
6.1.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence 
 
In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, NYT represents violence as a 
mutual action; moreover, it often uses transitivity constructions that mitigate Israeli 
responsibility for violence and undermine its consequences. The report of the 31
st
 of July 
2001, which deals mainly with the killing of six Palestinians and the bombing of the 
Palestinian police headquarters, contains many details of violent actions undertaken by 
both sides. Israel is represented as involved in one violent action only, i.e. firing at the 
police headquarters, and this violence is mainly represented using non-agentive passive 
constructions, e.g. (seven Palestinian police officers were wounded when Israeli 
helicopters fired at a building). Israeli involvement is indicated through the 
circumstantial, and the firing is presented as undertaken by and directed towards 
inanimate objects, i.e. „helicopters and building.‟ Israeli responsibility cannot be denied 
because only Israel can use gunships against the Palestinians. The killing of six 
Palestinians is not blamed on Israel, and it is presented using a non-agentive passive 
construction especially that Israel denies responsibility for the killing (six Palestinians… 
were blown apart in an explosion); agency and responsibility are completely obfuscated.  
In the same report, Palestinians are represented as involved in violence against the 
Israelis using the transactive model (Palestinians showered stones on Jews praying). 
There are other incidents of violence against the Israelis presented in a non-agentive 
passive, e.g. (a Jewish man was stabbed and critically wounded) or middle voice, e.g. (a 
small bomb exploded). These actions are not blamed on any side, and responsibility for 
them is not clear. Nominalisations are used to represent mutual violence, e.g. violence, 
attacks, etc. There are other incidents that are non-violent, but are represented as 
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affecting the Israelis, e.g. (there was a report of another bomb in the Sheik Jarrah 
section of eastern Jerusalem. It turned out to be a can … word came of a bus bombing 
across town.) These are mainly presented through existentials and nominalisations.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 that deals with the Israeli assassination of 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, NYT presents Israeli violence briefly. It is presented mainly 
using agentless passives, as in the headline (Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli 
Strike), or in the body of the report (at least two bodyguards had been killed with him, 
14 other people were wounded, etc.) Activated clauses that are used to represent Israeli 
violence are used with inanimate agents, e.g. (the Israeli weapons punctured the 
pavement). Most of the actions of Israel are represented in terms of speech acts, e.g. (the 
Israeli military confirmed the killing, the army said it had targeted a car, etc.) 
Nominalisations are also used with Israeli violence, e.g. (strike, targeted killing, raid, 
assassination). It is clear from all the above that NYT uses transitivity constructions that 
mitigate Israeli responsibility for the killing although Israeli involvement is obvious 
from the context; moreover, it is confirmed through army statements. Palestinian actions 
are presented in detail, using activation and clearer agency structure, e.g. (Palestinians 
began burning tires in the streets, demonstrators chanted for revenge, etc.) Palestinian 
officials are presented as agents of speech acts, e.g. (Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime 
minister, condemned the attack). The report also refers to other Palestinian violent acts 
in the background information, e.g. (two Palestinian suicide bombers from a Gaza 
refugee camp blew themselves up).  
 In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 that deals mainly with an Israeli raid against 
Gaza, NYT represents both sides as involved in many actions both separately and 
mutually. Fighting and deaths are represented as either spontaneous as in the headline 
and the lead, e.g. (fighting surges and deaths rise). ‗Fighting‟ and ‗deaths‟ are 
nominalisations, which have the effect of concealing agency. Both nominalisations are 
used as subjects of other clauses; this adds to the complexity of the statement. Death 
conveys natural occurrences, as opposed to killing. ‗Surges‟ and ‗rise‟ are middle voice 
verbs associated with spontaneous events. This completely mitigates agency and 
conceals responsibility. This pattern is repeated later in the report, e.g. (heavy fighting 
erupted; the death toll had risen; fighting quickly escalated, etc.). Furthermore, certain 
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actions are presented as mutual, e.g. (Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged 
their most intense battles.) This also mitigates responsibility for whoever started the 
action which is represented as mutual.  
 NYT represents the Israeli side as involved in many violent actions using a 
variety of structures, e.g. the non-transactive model is used repeatedly to represent the 
actions of the Israeli forces in terms of movements, e.g. (moved, re-entered, started 
edging, etc). Agentless passives are used with actions that involve killing Palestinians, 
e.g. (at least two bodyguards had been killed with him, 14 other people were wounded, 
etc.) The transactive model is used mainly with inanimate agents and goals, so as to 
avoid directly blaming Israelis for such actions, e.g. (the Israeli weapons punctured the 
pavement). Nominalisations are also used, with the effect of changing the action into a 
thing or state to mitigate responsibility for them, e.g. (killing, assassination, strike). 
NYT represents Israeli actions as purposeful and justified (to secure the release of a 
captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel). Most of the killing is represented with 
affected participants such as (militants, gunmen, armed men, Hamas members or 
Islamic Jihad members), which justifies the killing, as it targets dangerous militants.  
  Transitivity structures used to represent Palestinian violence in the same report 
are used differently from those used to represent Israeli violence. The report does not 
present any purpose or justification for Palestinian actions. Palestinian violent actions 
are represented in details, using active structures indicating clear causal relationships, 
e.g. (Palestinians were seen planting explosives in manholes, One masked fighter rode 
away on a bicycle after laying such a charge; gunmen from various Palestinian factions 
fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets at the Israeli troops; etc.) The great majority 
of Palestinian violent acts in the report are activated, and most of them are in the 
transactive model with agents and affected participants clear in the clauses. When 
passivisation and nominalisations are used with Palestinian violence, nominalisations 
are linked to the Palestinians and most passive constructions are agentive, e.g. (Cpl. 
Gilad Shalit, a tank gunner, was captured just inside Israel by militants, one Israeli 
soldier was reported killed by a sniper, etc.) Palestinians‘ responsibility for undertaking 
violent acts against Israelis is clear in the NYT report, unlike the Israelis whose 
responsibility for violence against the Palestinians is mitigated by means of agent 
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deletion or substitution, among other strategies. Although Israeli violence resulted in 
twenty times more deaths and injuries among the Palestinians, transitivity structures in 
the report mitigate Israeli violence for these killings and injuries. 
6.1.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence 
   Transitivity structures used to represent Palestinian violence in NYT are used 
differently from those used to represent Israeli violence. Palestinian violence is often 
presented without any purpose or justification. Palestinian violent actions are 
represented in details, and they appear together in vivid descriptions using active 
structures with agents, actions and affected participants; thus, causal relationships and 
responsibility are clearly indicated.  
 In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 that deals mainly with a Palestinian 
bombing at the Hebrew University, NYT headline (at least 7 killed as militants bomb 
Jerusalem campus) foregrounds the outcome of the attack and presents agency of 
militants clearly using the transactive model with human agents. The story of the 
bombing is told; NYT presents the agency and responsibility of Palestinian militants 
through an agentive passive in a subordinate clause (hidden in a bag and left on a table 
by Palestinian militants). The consequences of the attack are presented in the lead using 
the active participle (killing seven people…). More consequences are clear through the 
statements of eye-witnesses and victims quoted by NYT. Responsibility for the attack is 
presented through the verbal process (claimed responsibility), with Hamas as the agent. 
The causes of the attack are quoted from Hamas in terms of retaliation for the Israeli 
assassination of a Hamas leader.  
There is also Israeli violence mentioned in the report, i.e. the killing of a Hamas 
leader a week before the bombing. NYT presents it as (Israel's killing last week of a top 
Hamas leader. Fourteen others, including nine children, died in that attack, in which 
Israel bombed a house in Gaza City). NYT uses a nominalisation (Israel's killing), and it 
presents the consequences of the attack using the middle voice (died) which presents 
them as spontaneous. NYT also refers to an Israeli offensive in the West Bank (after 
back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more than a month ago, Israel began a 
ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress Palestinian violence). The Israeli 
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offensive is represented as a reaction to Palestinian violence, and it is presented as 
purposeful and justified. The deportation of relatives of militants is also presented as a 
potential action. In sum, NYT clearly presents Palestinian militants as responsible 
agents, and the consequences of the attack are the focus of the NYT report, and they are 
presented mainly through descriptions and through the accounts of eye-witnesses mostly 
in a conversational style.  
The report the 15
th
 of January 2004 deals mainly with a suicide bombing that 
claimed the lives of four and injured seven others. Transitivity structures present the 
story with clear agency and causal relationships, especially that the bomber left a video 
recording in which she admits responsibility for the bombing. The story is quoted from 
Israeli sources, and it is presented with clear transitivity and agency structures using the 
transactive model, e.g. (Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis, Ms. Reyashi detonated her 
bomb, The blast tore apart the simple structure, etc.) Palestinian violence is very 
prominent in the report, and it is presented mainly using activation to describe the 
actions of the bomber and other Palestinian violence as well, e.g. (a young Palestinian 
mother … blew herself up, Ms. Reyashi detonated her bomb, the blast tore apart the 
simple structure, Palestinians have carried out more than 100 suicide bombings, etc.)  
The consequences of the bombing are prominent in the report, and they are 
presented through the use of passivisation and the active participle, e.g. (killing four 
Israeli security personnel and wounding seven people, Two soldiers, a border policeman 
and a civilian security guard were killed and seven people were wounded.) There is no 
justification given for the attack, yet the bomber explains her motives in terms of her 
personal wish to become a martyr in a video message. Responsibility for the bombing is 
expressed through the use of verbal processes (Hamas, the Islamic movement, and the 
Aksa Martyrs Brigades … took joint responsibility for the attack). Relationals are used 
to comment on the bombing, e.g. (such attacks have been extremely rare in the fenced-in 
Gaza Strip). Israel is represented as reacting to Palestinian violence by closing the 
crossing to Palestinian workers (Israel responded by immediately shutting down the 
industrial zone). The paper uses activation, particularly the transactive model, to present 
the actions of the Palestinian militant with clear agency, consequences and causal 
relationships. Israel is not presented as undertaking many actions, but as reacting to 
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Palestinian violence. 
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 which deals mainly with a Palestinian raid 
against an Israeli military post, NYT concentrates on Palestinian actions, their 
consequences as well as Israeli reactions to them. Activation is the dominant mode of 
representing Palestinian actions, e.g. (emerged, killed, kidnapped, escaped, fired, 
attacked, etc.) Inanimate agents are used twice; once in the headline to summarise the 
story, which means that human agency and responsibility for violence are clear in the 
great majority of instances of Palestinian violence. Moreover, Israeli people and objects 
are represented as the affected participants of these actions. Passive constructions are 
used three times with Palestinian violent actions, including wounding, firing missiles, 
and kidnapping. There is also an instance of using the agentive passive to represent 
contextual background information of kidnapping an Israeli soldier in 1994 by Hamas. 
Relationals are used to provide additional information and descriptions, and to make 
comments on the raid.  
The Israelis are predominantly represented as affected participants of Palestinian 
actions, and they are not presented as actively involved in violence against the 
Palestinians. The Israeli side is mainly presented as undertaking a number of mental and 
verbal processes including (decided, want, denied, urged, talked, etc.) These processes 
emphasise Israel‘s reaction and present it as less violent and more rational and sensible. 
The Israeli military actions that started in Gaza in response to the attack are mainly 
presented in terms of movements of forces rather than actual military activities. 
Moreover, the purpose of these movements is presented clearly. Passivisation is used 
with one Israeli action to represent the killing of two Palestinian militants who took part 
in the attack. In sum, NYT represents the Palestinians as being involved in many more 
violent actions than the Israelis. Israeli actions, including the incursion in Gaza, are 
represented in neutral terms as movements, mental processes and speech acts unlike 
Palestinian actions which are represented as violent acts, e.g. (killed, kidnapped, etc.) 
Moreover, agency and affected participants are clear with Palestinian actions, thus 
causal relationships and responsibility are obvious. 
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6.2 Transitivity Analysis of the Arab News Reports  
6.2.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence 
 
When reporting Israeli violence, AN tends to use transitivity structures that 
present agency and responsibility clearly. It also tends to highlight the consequences of 
such violence and to present them prominently in reports. In the report of the 31
st
 of July 
2001, the AN report focuses on Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Israeli actions 
are represented using the transactive model which clearly indicates causal relationships 
and responsibility, e.g. (Israeli gunships pound Gaza). The consequences of the action 
are prominent in the report, e.g. (the blast smashed walls and blew out windows). The 
report also mentions the killing of six Palestinians in a non-agentive passive 
construction. Although transitivity does clearly indicate Israeli responsibility, it is 
indirectly blamed on Israel through quoting Palestinian sources. Jewish ultra-nationalists 
are represented as provocateurs and initiators of violence. Their action and its 
consequences are also represented in the transactive model (the Jewish action sparked 
clashes which left at least 18 Palestinians injured).  
The Palestinians are not represented as involved in any violence against the 
Israelis. Instead, they are largely represented as affected by Israeli violence, e.g. (at least 
four Palestinian policemen were injured). The report includes mutual violent actions 
that are represented using nominalisations, e.g. unrest, clashes, escalation of violence, 
etc. In sum, AN represents Israeli violence using clear transitivity and agency structures 
that firmly establish Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. There is 
no mention of any Palestinian violence, yet escalation and clashes are expressed using 
nominalisations as a mutual action.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, AN concentrates on the killing of Sheikh 
Yassin and presents Israeli actions against Sheikh Yassin in details using activation, e.g. 
(Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Sharon personally ordered 
and monitored the helicopter attack, etc.) The use of activation and particularly the 
transactive model clearly establishes causal relations and confirms Israeli responsibility 
for the killing. The main story of the AN report is told within a wider context of other 
Israeli violent acts that took place before and after the bombing, e.g. (Israel tried to kill 
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Sheik Yassin, Israeli forces killed four Palestinians, etc.) There are some 
nominalisations as well, e.g. (murder, assassination, etc.) They semantically criminalise 
the Israeli actions, and present them in a condensed way, e.g. in the headline. AN 
presents three violent Palestinian reactions to the assassination using activation, e.g. (the 
occupied territories erupted in anger, an Arab stabbed and wounded three passengers 
on an Israeli bus and an ax-wielding Palestinian wounded three people). Although 
Palestinian violent reactions are present in the report, they are presented as reactions.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, AN presents many violent actions 
undertaken by the Israelis, including killing, invading, targeting, fighting; they are 
mostly presented as affecting the Palestinians e.g. (its forces killed at least 21 
Palestinians, Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians.) The report includes a lot of violent 
actions undertaken by Israelis which are presented using a variety of structures. 
Activation, particularly the transactive model, is the most common mode for reporting 
on Israeli violence. The headline and lead employ the transactive model to highlight 
Israeli responsibility for violence and its consequences, e.g. (Israeli Missiles and Shells 
Kill 21, the Jewish state invaded Gaza, etc.) Nominalisations are used with some Israeli 
actions; although nominalisations have the potential to conceal agency and causal 
relationships, AN makes these relations explicit by using attributions and prepositional 
phrases, e.g. (Israel‟s extensive military operation, violations by Israel).  
The purpose of the Israeli actions is presented in a prepositional phrase ‗over a 
soldier‘s capture‘, which presents it as a pretext rather than a justification. The impacts 
of the Israeli actions are prominent in the report, e.g. (nine Palestinians were killed, at 
least 24 wounded in an Israeli bombardment, etc.) The purpose of Palestinian violence 
is not present in the report at all. Its impacts are also downplayed, with the effect of 
presenting the Palestinians as unable to affect the Israelis. The AN report also includes 
violent actions undertaken by Palestinians, especially in the background. Transitivity 
structures used in the report contribute to the presentation of the Palestinians as unable 
to act. The Israelis are represented as doing most of the violence, while the Palestinians 
are mainly represented as affected participants. Even when the Palestinians are 
represented as undertaking violent acts against the Israelis, such acts are presented as 
futile, or unable to affect the Israelis, e.g. (Hamas activists fired two upgraded rockets ... 
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No one was hurt). In sum, transitivity structures used in AN represent the Israelis as 
responsible for many violent actions against the Palestinians who are represented as 
victims. 
6.2.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence 
AN tries to mitigate Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis 
where possible; however, this is not possible in most of the cases due to the effective 
Israeli media that communicate information about Palestinian violence widely and 
quickly.  In the report of 1
st
 of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at an Israeli 
university, the main event is represented vaguely in the headline (Jerusalem bomb kills 
seven) using the transactive model with an inanimate agent ‗Jerusalem bomb‟ and a 
numeral ‗seven‟ as the affected participant, which completely conceals the identities of 
both the perpetrator and the victims. AN keeps the identity of the agent concealed in the 
lead as well (a bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria). Although AN uses the 
transactive model to present Palestinian violence, human agency is not presented at all 
along with it; instead, the agent is presented as bomb, explosion, etc.  
 The consequences of the attack are presented in the leads of both papers using 
the active participle (killing seven people…). The cause of the bombing is presented 
clearly in the report as the killing of Hamas leader by Israel a week before the bombing. 
AN represents it as (it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, 
Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children), AN presents the Israeli raid using the 
transactive model (killed its military leader). Responsibility is presented through a 
verbal process (responsibility for the lunchtime blast at Hebrew University at Mount 
Scopus was claimed by Hamas). 
The report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 deals mainly with a suicide bombing at a 
Gaza checkpoint. Transitivity structures present the story with clear agency and causal 
relationships, especially since the story is quoted from Israeli military sources.  
Activation is used to represent the events, e.g. in the headline, lead and body of the 
report (Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis, a Palestinian mother of two blew 
herself up, etc.). The consequences are prominent in the report, and they are mainly 
presented through active participles, e.g. (killing three Israeli soldiers, signaling a new 
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tactic by Hamas). Responsibility is expressed using a verbal process (the bombing was 
jointly claimed by Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs‟ Brigades). The Israeli side is 
represented as undertaking many violent actions as reactions to the attack: (it will 
temporarily close the crossing to Palestinians) as background information (a British 
man shot in the head by Israeli troops in Gaza Strip last April); and as a potential 
response (Israel would hit back). 
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, AN describes the actions of Palestinian 
militant during the attack as well as Israeli responses to it. The AN report presents 
details of the Palestinian attack using active clauses to describe the movements and 
actions of fighters who undertook the operation, e.g. (fired, smuggled, charged, and 
attacked). The inanimate agent ‗the attack‟ is used in the lead to summarise the story. 
Active participles are used to present the consequences, e.g. killing, wounding, etc. The 
Palestinians are also presented as involved in a number of speech acts which convey 
different actions and reactions to the attack, e.g. (condemned, appealed, urged, 
announced, etc.) The main construction for presenting consequences of the attack is 
passivisation, e.g. (was abducted, were wounded, etc.)  
AN uses activation to present Israeli military and non-military responses to the 
attack, e.g. the movements and actions of the Israeli forces in Gaza, e.g. (sent tanks and 
troops, moved, opened gunfire, and closed the crossings). Activation is also used with 
speech act verbs that present verbal reactions of Israeli officials, e.g. (phoned, urged, 
etc.) Passivisation is used one time only with Israeli actions in relation to closing the 
Rafah terminal. It is also used to present contextual information about the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967. In conclusion, the AN report focuses on the 
Palestinian attack and its consequences, as well as reactions to it. However, the Israeli 
military response is also prominent in the report which presents both sides as involved in 
violence against each other. Activation is the most prominent structure for presenting the 
actions of both sides, and agency is clear in the report, even the instances of agent 
deletion or substitution can be recovered from the context.  
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6.3 Transitivity Analysis of the Guardian’s Reports  
6.3.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence 
The Guardian reports represent Israeli violence with clear agency and 
responsibility when Israeli responsibility has been confirmed. In general, the Guardian 
represents violence as mutual between both sides. The Guardian‟s report of the 31st of 
July 2001 includes many violent incidents, mainly the killing of six Palestinians and the 
bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters. Responsibility for the killing is 
completely obfuscated through the use of abstract nominalisations as agents, i.e. 
explosion and blast, and the non-agentive passive (were killed). This is appropriate as 
Israel denied responsibility, and agents remain unknown. When Israeli responsibility for 
violence is confirmed, it is clearly represented in the report (Israeli helicopter gunships 
rocketed the Palestinian police headquarters). Although Israeli responsibility is clearly 
presented, there is a metonymical substitution of real agents by non-human agents 
(Israeli helicopter gunships). The purpose of the bombing is presented in close 
proximity to the action through a statement of the Israeli army which presents the attack 
as justified. The consequences are also presented through active participles (sending out 
great clouds of white smoke and injuring at least three). 
The Palestinian side is represented as involved in a number of violent actions 
mostly in background information; some violence is against other Palestinians, (e.g. the 
gangland-style killing of the chief of Palestinian television), and other incidents are 
against Israel, (e.g. attacking targets inside the Jewish state). There is also potential 
Palestinian violence that has not materialised which is expressed through 
nominalisations, e.g. bombing attempts. There are some violent actions against Israelis; 
they are expressed through nominalisations and are not blamed on Palestinians, e.g. the 
stabbing of a Jewish man. The Guardian‟s report deals mainly with violence against the 
Palestinians that left six dead and at least three injured, yet the report presents more 
Palestinian than Israeli violence through the presentation of background information and 
potential violence. There is no cause or purpose presented for Palestinian violence. 
Agency for Palestinian violence is clearly presented through activation, e.g. claimed the 
gangland-style killing. Even with potential violence which is expressed through 
nominalisation, agency is presented through a prepositional phrase, e.g. a car bomb 
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attack … by militants. 
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 which deals with the assassination of 
Sheikh Yassin, the Guardian uses transitivity structures that present Israeli agency and 
responsibility clearly in the headline, e.g.  (Israel assassinates Hamas leader); and in the 
body of the report, e.g. (Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds). The choice of the 
transactive model with clear agency makes causal relationships and Israeli responsibility 
obvious. The consequences of the killing are represented using the active participle and 
the non-agentive passive, e.g. (killing Yassin and seven others), and (seventeen people 
were wounded). Most of the actions of Israeli officials are represented as mental or 
verbal processes, e.g. (the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, oversaw the operation, 
Shaul Mofaz, defiantly pledged.) The cause of Israeli action is clearly presented using  
quotations from Israeli sources. Nominalisations are also used to represent some Israeli 
actions, e.g. (assassination, strike, etc.)  
 The Palestinians are represented as involved in violence some of which is 
directed towards the Israelis. Palestinians‘ angry reactions to the killing are expressed in 
terms of threatening revenge, pouring into the streets, etc. These acts are associated with 
the threatening behaviour of an angry mob, e.g. (militants vow revenge attacks, tens of 
thousands of mourners poured on to the streets, angry crowds called for revenge against 
Israel and the US). The transactive model is used to represent the firing of  ten rockets 
towards Israel (Palestinian militants fired 10 home-made rockets toward an Israeli 
settlement in Gaza). The Guardian presents the harsh Israeli response to Palestinian 
demonstrations as spontaneous clashes between both sides, and the death of the victims 
is presented in an agentless passive construction (violent clashes between demonstrators 
and Israeli security forces broke out, and four Palestinians - including a 13-year-old 
boy and a journalist - were reported to have been killed when Israeli soldiers fired on 
the crowds). 
Although the reports of July 2006 deal primarily with an Israeli incursion in 
Gaza, violence is represented as committed by both sides against each other. The 
Guardian represents some violent actions as mutually undertaken  or as affecting both 
sides; these are represented vaguely while avoiding placing responsibility for them on 
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any side. Constructions used in them include middle voice verbs (18 die), agentless 
passives (at least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were killed), inanimate agents 
(gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew) and existentials (there was shooting). 
In these constructions, it is not possible to determine which side undertook the action. 
The purpose of the Israeli incursion and the subsequent violence is prominent in the 
beginning of the report; (to prevent rocket at Israel and put pressure on the captors of 
Corporal Gilad Shalit).  
Agents of Israeli violent actions are institutionalised, e.g. (it „the army‟ killed 10 
militants) and (Israel increased its offensive). This legitimises the actions and conceals 
the crucial agency for them. Agents are sometimes metonymically substituted by 
inanimate agents, including actors and affected participants, e.g. (Israeli tanks and 
bulldozers were destroying orchards). Moreover, Israeli violence is presented as 
targeting or affecting either militants or inanimate objects, so that violence is either 
directed towards legitimate targets or inanimate objects. This downplays the impacts of 
such violence and justifies it. Additionally, civilian victims are mentioned in relational 
or middle voice constructions that do not require agency or responsibility. In conclusion, 
transitivity constructions mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence in a number of ways: 
mostly agent deletion or substitution, or representing the action as mutual or 
spontaneous.  
6.3.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence 
The Guardian represents Palestinian violence with clear agency, transitivity 
structures and highlights its consequences.  In the report of the 1
st
 August 2002, which 
deals mainly with a bombing of a café at the Hebrew University, transitivity structures 
present the bombing, its consequences and Palestinian responsibility for it clearly. 
Palestinian violence is activated in the headline, lead and body of both papers. The 
headline (Bomb kills seven at university - Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for 
assassination) uses the transactive model with material processes which represents 
causal relationships and responsibility clearly. The lead uses activation and human 
agents for the same effect. The consequences of the attack are presented using the active 
participle (killing at least seven people and injuring more than 70). The body of the 
report focuses on the consequences of the attack, which are presented in a variety of 
 171 
constructions, e.g. agentless passives (the forecourt of the Frank Sinatra international 
students' centre was splattered with blood …). Some consequences are presented 
through the statements of eye-witnesses which are mostly in short sentences and 
conversational style. 
In the reports of the 15
th
 of January 2004, transitivity structures present the 
actions of the bomber clearly and vividly with no mitigation. The transactive model is 
used mainly to represent her actions with clear agents, actions and consequences. The 
bomber is represented as involved in many actions, e.g. (killed four Israelis, detonated 
her 2kg bomb, etc.) Her actions are presented in detail, especially with regards to 
deceiving Israeli soldier and faking disability; moreover, the consequences of the attack 
are presented clearly using activation, e.g. (killed four Israelis, the blast tore open the 
corrugated iron, etc.) The Israeli side is represented as involved in very few actions, 
chiefly verbal reactions to the bombing, as well as other reactions, e.g. closing the 
crossing, and the demolition of the family house of the bomber.  
The report of the 26
th
 of July 2006 provides a clear and coherent description of 
the actions of militants during the raid. The Palestinian militants are represented as 
involved in actions that target Israeli people and objects and affect them, such as 
(attacked, fired, etc.) In addition, Palestinian officials and militants are involved in a 
number of speech acts such as (called on, said, etc.) On the other hand, most of the 
actions of the Israeli side are represented as speech acts and planned response. The 
report focuses on Palestinian violence and reactions to it. Activation, and particularly the 
transactive model, is used extensively with Palestinian violence and its consequences, 
e.g. (killed, kidnapped, attacked, etc.) Human agency is prominent in the majority of 
these actions, and the Israeli people and objects are represented as affected participants; 
this expresses causal relationships and firmly establishes Palestinian responsibility. 
Reactions to the attack and its consequences are also activated, e.g. (condemned, said, 
declared, etc.)  
Israel is largely represented as reacting using  mental and verbal processes. 
Activation is used to represent such reactions, e.g. (promised revenge, ordered, 
threatened, etc.) Nominalisations are used to predict or introduce potential Israeli 
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reactions, e.g. (assassination, attack, invasion, threat, etc.) The report does not mention 
the Israeli military action in Gaza which started shortly after the attack. In conclusion, 
choices of transitivity constructions in the Guardian contribute to presenting 
Palestinians‘ actions vividly and clearly, and violence is presented as targeting the Israeli 
side. On the other hand, the Israelis are presented as involved in mental processes and 
speech acts as reactions.  
6.4 Transitivity Analysis of the Times’ Reports  
6.4.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence 
The Times tends to use transitivity structures that mitigate Israeli responsibility 
for violence and that represent violence as spontaneous or as mutual action. The report 
of the 31
st
 July 2001 which deals with the killing of 6 Palestinian activists and the 
bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters is very short, and it includes very few 
actions. It includes one Israeli act of violence against the Palestinians, i.e. (missiles from 
Israeli helicopters damaged the Palestinian police headquarters), which uses the 
transactive model with non-human agents, and Israeli involvement is expressed through 
an adjectival. Consequences of the attack are mitigated and presented as (no serious 
injuries). Although there is no real Palestinian violence, potential violence is represented 
through a nominalisation, i.e. (Palestinian bombing attacks against Israel). The killing 
of six Palestinians is naturalised through the use of the middle voice (died), and an 
agentless passive (six men killed); therefore, responsibility for it is completely mitigated. 
Both papers use transitivity structures that conceal agency for most of the actions 
reported, as responsibility for many of the actions is not clear.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 that deals with the assassination of 
Sheikh Yassin, the Times‟ report tries to mitigate Israeli responsibility, e.g. in the 
headline (Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike) through the use of an 
agentless passive that obfuscates agency and mitigates responsibility, although it is 
loosely indicated by the use of the circumstantial. In the body of the report, the Times 
uses both activation and passivisation to represent Israeli violence; however, the two 
instances of using activation are in the non-transactive model, e.g. (two Israeli helicopter 
gunships hovered).  
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 The paper clearly presents Palestinians‘ angry reactions to the killing which are 
associated with the threatening behaviour of an angry mob, e.g. (tens of thousands of 
mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City, others clamoured for revenge, Hamas 
promised a harsh response.) The harsh Israeli  response to angry demonstrations by the 
Palestinians is represented, however the Times mentions one victim only, i.e. the boy, 
and represents his death in agentive passive (a 13-year-old Palestinian boy was killed by 
Israeli troops during a mass demonstration in the southern Gaza Strip town of Khan 
Yunis).  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, transitivity structures used in the Times to 
represent violent events in Gaza conceal responsibility for about one third of the 
reported actions which are represented using structures that completely mitigate 
responsibility. These actions are represented as spontaneous actions using the middle 
voice, e.g. (death toll rose), (fighting that broke out); as nominalisations, e.g. (fighting, 
clashes, exchanges); and using existential structures, e.g. (there had been exchanges of 
fire), (there is fighting). Moreover, a number of actions are presented as mutual, e.g. 
(Israeli forces and militants continued desultory exchanges of fire). The Israeli side is 
represented as undertaking a number of violent activities. More than one third of these 
actions are nominalised, i.e. they are represented as abstract nouns, rather than actions, 
e.g. (assault, airstrike, fire, etc.) Most of the remaining actions have inanimate agents 
that substitute human agents, e.g. (Israel renewed its assault, aircraft fired at four armed 
Palestinians, etc.) The purpose of Israeli actions is presented clearly, e.g. (to win 
freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants‟ increasingly longer 
rocket range, etc.) 
   Although the Palestinians are represented as involved in fewer actions, their 
actions are not given any purpose or justification. Palestinian agency and responsibility 
for violence against Israelis is clear through the use of activation, e.g. (Palestinian 
militants used as cover to fire 14 missiles towards); and the agentive passivise is used 
with Palestinian violence, e.g. (Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured … by militants). The 
impacts of Palestinian violence are represented clearly and in detail even when they do 
not have any physical effect, e.g. (the latest rocket attacks have caused concern for 
Israeli army chiefs and panic among civilians). It is clear from the above analysis that 
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the actions of the Palestinians and the Israelis are presented differently. The Times 
represents most of the actions as mutually responsible and presents the Israeli actions  as 
justified while Palestinian actions are denied any justification. The activities of Israeli 
forces against the Palestinians often have concealed agency and mitigated responsibility.  
6.4.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence 
Palestinian violence is represented clearly in the Times, with clear actions, agents and 
affected participants. In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, the bombing at a café at the 
Hebrew University and its consequences are the focus. Transitivity structures present the 
bombing, its consequences and Palestinian responsibility for it clearly through the use of 
activation, and particularly the transactive model. The Times‟ headline (Hamas bomb 
kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university) uses the transactive model to 
establish clear causal relationships and responsibility. The lead presents some of the 
consequences of the bombing through description, i.e. destruction caused by the attack. 
The body of the report tells the story of the bombing and underlines its consequences, 
e.g. (Seven … lay dead and more than 80 injured after a Hamas bomber struck). 
Palestinian violence is expressed using activation with human agents which establishes 
clear causality and responsibility. The same story is repeated later in the report (a bomb 
left in a bag on a table inside the crowded cafeteria exploded near the till, shredding 
bodies). The consequences of the attack are presented through active participles, 
descriptions and eye-witness accounts.  
In the report of the15
th
 of January 2004, transitivity structures present the actions 
of the bomber clearly. Actions are presented along with clear agents and consequences, 
e.g. (the woman detonated a larger device than usual, shrapnel peppered the walls and 
left a scene of charred devastation inside the cabin, etc.) The bomber is represented as 
involved in many actions,  such as faking a disability and detonating a large device. Her 
actions are presented in detail, especially  with regards to deceiving an Israeli soldier and 
faking disability. The consequences of the bombing are presented mainly using active 
participles, e.g. (killing four security staff and wounding seven people), and some 
consequences are passivised, e.g. (its corrugated aluminium roof was peeled back, Seven 
people were injured, etc.) The report focuses on Palestinian violence only, and it does 
not mention any Israeli violence even in background information, etc. The Israeli 
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reaction is presented in terms of closing the crossing, and it is nominalised.  
The report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 provides a clear and coherent description of 
the actions of militants who are represented as involved in actions that target Israeli 
people and objects and affect them. The actions of Palestinian militants are presented 
coherently, e.g. (Palestinians, including Hamas members, launched a pre-dawn raid on 
Kerem Shalom beside southern Gaza, emerging from a tunnel to hurl bombs and 
grenades at the base, etc.) In addition, Palestinian officials and militants are involved in 
a number of speech acts such as (called on, said, etc.) On the other hand, most of the 
actions of the Israeli side are represented as speech acts and planned response. The 
Times mentions actual military actions in Gaza briefly with its purpose foregrounded.  
The Times also focuses on Palestinian actions and their consequences. 
Activation, particularly the transactive model, is used as the main construction to 
represent Palestinian violence, e.g. (launched a raid, attacked, launched rockets, etc.) 
Passivised constructions are used when representing certain Palestinian actions, e.g. 
(kidnapping, abducting, snatching, and claiming responsibility). Nominalisation is also 
used with Palestinian actions, e.g. (ambush, raid, attack, assault, operation, etc.) 
Activation is used to represent some Israeli actions, especially with speech acts and the 
incursion in Gaza in response to the attack, including (hunting for the soldier, mounting 
an assault and firing into open fields.) Israeli violence is not represented as affecting 
Palestinians; it is presented in the non-transactive model as movements, e.g. (crossed 
into Gaza, moved a short distance into Gaza) or as targeting inanimate objects, e.g. 
(fired into open space.). Moreover, the purpose of the Israeli action is foregrounded, e.g. 
(to hunt for the kidnapped soldier, to search and investigate the tunnel and to destroy 
the tunnel.) In sum, the report focuses on violence undertaken by the Palestinians, 
responsibility for violence and its consequences which are clear with Palestinian actions, 
unlike Israeli actions which are either verbal or non-transitive. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this section, the use of transitivity structures to represent Israeli and 
Palestinian violence is compared in the four selected newspapers. In line with the use of 
narrative structures, NYT uses transitivity structures that contribute to the de-
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narrativisation of stories of Israeli violence and that mitigate responsibility for violent 
actions and downplay their effects on Palestinians. In most of the reports, Israeli 
violence is expressed using constructions that suppress or background agency and also 
obfuscate causality and responsibility for violence, e.g. using middle voice verbs 
associated with spontaneous actions without involvement of agents (Fighting Surges and 
Deaths Rise) [NYT , 7 July 2006]; nominalisations that present actions like entities void 
of time and process or change (fighting, deaths, etc.); and passivisation which presents 
the action as a finished process, i.e. more like a state than a process (a member of Hamas 
was reported killed, the militant was killed, about 30 Palestinians were wounded, nearly 
20 Palestinians have been killed) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. In addition, the substitution of 
human agents with inanimate agents is used, so as to hide crucial agency and 
responsibility, e.g. (Israeli tanks fired shells at houses, Three separate airstrikes 
accounted for the deaths of six Palestinians, Israeli tank fire killed two militants, etc.) 
[NYT, 7 July 2006].  
More than one feature can be used together to make agency and responsibility 
almost impossible to recover, e.g. the use of nominalisations with middle voice verbs, 
e.g. (Deaths Rise) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. It is also common to represent violence as a 
mutual act in which both the Israelis and Palestinians are involved e.g. (Israeli troops 
and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. On 
the other hand, NYT in most of the cases presents Palestinian agency and responsibility 
for violence very clearly without trying to conceal or mitigate it, e.g. (gunmen from 
various Palestinian factions fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets at the Israeli 
troops, Palestinians fired eight rockets from Gaza at Israel on Thursday, Palestinians 
were seen planting explosives in manholes, Palestinian fighters had been preparing 
earthen barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting, etc.) [7 July 2006]. 
Palestinian violence is also presented without any justification or purpose, and its 
consequences are often prominent and sometimes they are exaggerated. 
On the other hand, AN shows Israeli responsibility for violence against the 
Palestinians clearly and tries to conceal agency when representing Palestinian violence, 
especially in headlines and lead paragraphs. It focuses on the consequences of Israeli 
violence, and its causes are usually presented as well. In sum, transitivity structures are 
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used ideologically by both papers, as NYT, in most of the instances, tries to use 
constructions that conceal agency for Israeli violence against the Palestinians and to 
foreground its causes and background its impacts, especially on civilians, while agency 
for Palestinian violence is often presented clearly with prominent consequences. On the 
other hand, AN shows Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians clearly 
and foregrounds its consequences. 
 Considering the use of transitivity constructions in the Guardian and the Times, 
both papers use a variety of constructions to represent the actions of both sides. 
However, the main difference between both papers is that the Guardian often uses 
constructions that present Israeli responsibility for violence against Palestinians more 
clearly than the Times, especially when Israeli responsibility for violence is confirmed or 
cannot be denied. As explained in the example about the assassination of Sheikh Yassin; 
(Israel assassinates Hamas leader) [the Guardian, 22 March 2004] and (Hamas 
spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike) [the Times, 22 March 2004].  
 Both newspapers present Palestinian violence very clearly with obvious agency, 
causality and responsibility. There is hardly any attempt to conceal agency or 
responsibility, or even to downplay its consequences. The transactive model is the 
preferred structure to represent Palestinian violence. When it comes to the representation 
of Israeli violence, both papers represent it along with Palestinian violence in the same 
report. Reports often include a lot of violent actions which are undertaken by both sides 
against each other; some of which are presented as mutual. The most notable difference 
between both papers in the presentation of Israeli violence is that the Times uses 
structures of transitivity to conceal Israeli agency and responsibility for violence against 
the Palestinians by using actions with inanimate agents in mostly non-transactive 
constructions, e.g. (two Israeli helicopter gunships hovered in the sky), (troops opened 
fire from a watchtower), etc. [the Times, 22 March 2004]. On the other hand, the 
Guardian tends to use transitivity structures to represent Israeli responsibility more 
clearly, e.g. (Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds), (Israel assassinates Hamas leader), 
etc. [the Guardian, 22 March 2004].  
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7 Lexical Analysis 
Lexis is a very important resource available for journalists. It has the vital role of 
labelling and describing people and their actions; thus, it affects the positive and 
negative representation of people and their actions. The choice of a certain label to the 
exclusion of others often carries values that are conveyed to the readers or other 
recipients of discourse. In this section, the use of lexis to refer to different sides of the 
conflict and their actions in the selected newspapers is examined.  
7.1 Lexical Analysis of the New York Times Reports  
7.1.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence 
In the report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 which deals mainly with the killing of six 
Palestinian activists in the West Bank and the bombing of the Palestinian police 
headquarters in Gaza, the dominant image of the Israelis  is that of victims, even if this 
violence is merely false alarms. NYT represents the Israelis both collectively and 
individually, and both as ordinary people and as officials. Labels used with them include 
reference to national identity (Israelis), age (9-year-old girl), religion (a Jewish man), 
and occupation (police officers) as well as being identified by name and institutional 
capacity (Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister). There is also metonymical 
substitution of Israelis by (Israeli helicopters), and as such they are represented as 
involved in the action of firing at a Palestinian building. Israeli institutions mentioned in 
the report include Israel, army and army radio. NYT presents the Israelis as victims of 
some violent incidents like stabbing, and also of other insignificant ones like tyre or can 
bursting. The inclusion of certain incidents of no newsworthiness in the NYT report and 
their dramatisation demonstrate a great deal of sympathy towards the Israelis. For 
example, in relation to the incident of a can bursting, this sympathy is expressed 
explicitly in the report (no one was hurt. But nerves were rattled, and the mere rumor of 
yet another attack jangled them further). 
In the same report, NYT represents the Palestinians by reference to their national 
identity (Palestinians), occupation (police), and militant activity (bomb makers). The 
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only person mentioned by name is (Yasir Arafat).The Palestinian institutions mentioned 
in the report include the Palestinian Authority and a militant group the Aksa Brigades, 
the armed branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction. Arafat is mentioned in relation to both 
institutions which presents him as controversial or even dubious. The Palestinians are 
represented as involved in some violent actions against the Israelis, e.g. (showered 
stones at Jews praying). NYT avoids mentioning Palestinian civilians and ordinary 
people who are completely absent from the report, and the only Palestinian who is 
identified by name is Mr. Arafat. The killing of six Palestinians is presented mainly by 
focusing on the conflicting views about the circumstances of their death; NYT casts 
doubts on all views that blame Israel for the killing, and at the same time it positively 
presents Israeli views, which blame the victims for their own deaths. NYT does not 
express any sympathy for the six Palestinians who were killed, instead, it presents them 
as bomb makers, as members of a militant group and as wanted terrorists which 
delegitimises them.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004 which deals with the assassination of 
Sheikh Yassin, lexicalisation is a crucial resource in the presentation of this event. The 
use of lexis to refer to Sheikh Yassin and Hamas and to describe them makes all the 
difference in the presentation and the interpretation of the events. NYT refers to Yassin 
as (the spiritual leader and founder of the militant Palestinian group Hamas, the most 
significant Palestinian militant, etc.) This delegitimises him for being associated with 
militancy. The paper also presents Yassin as a controversial character (Sheik Yassin, a 
symbol to Palestinians of resistance to Israel and to Israelis of Palestinian terrorism); 
moreover, it does not use the word ‗disabled‘ to refer to him, instead it uses the technical 
term ‗quadriplegic‘ to refer to his medical condition. This term does not have the same 
effect and does not invoke any sympathy like the common label ‗disabled‘.  
NYT presents ordinary Palestinians in terms of their sheer numbers as an angry 
mob involved in violence and calling for revenge, e.g. (thousands of Palestinians, more 
than a thousand people, demonstrators, etc.) Ordinary Palestinians are also presented as 
witnesses and victims, e.g. (one witness, Maher al-Beek, at least two bodyguards, etc.) 
The third image of Palestinians is that of officials, e.g. (Ismail Haniya, a political leader 
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of Hamas,) and (Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister). The last image of 
Palestinians is that of militants, and they are presented as members of Hamas and as 
involved in violence and threats against Israel. This image is very prominent in NYT. 
On the other hand, Israel is institutionalised, and its main image is official and military 
through the representations of Israeli officials and military institutions, e.g. (Israeli 
officials, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, soldiers, etc.) Weapons are also prominent, e.g. 
(an Israeli missile and the Israeli weapons), especially as agents of violence. In sum, the 
most prominent image of Palestinians in the report is that of militants while the most 
prominent image of Israelis is official and military. 
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006 which deals with an Israeli incursion in Gaza, 
the Palestinians are predominantly represented as militants, through the choice of certain 
labels and descriptions, e.g. (militant, gunman, fighter, masked, etc.) They are also 
mentioned in conjunction with organisations such as ‗Hamas‟ and ‗Islamic Jihad‘ which 
are considered by Israel and the West as terrorist, e.g. (militants from Islamic Jihad, 
Hamas militant, etc.) This delegitimises them and presents them as criminals and 
terrorists since they belong to terrorist organisations. Palestinian militants are mainly 
represented as involved in violent actions that target the Israelis e.g. (preparing earthen 
barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting, using light weapons, fired 
automatic rifles and antitank rockets, etc.) These actions are presented with no 
justification, which makes them seem irrational and condemnable. In addition, 
Palestinian militancy is also emphasised and confirmed by mentioning ‗weapons‟ that 
the Palestinians possess and use, e.g. (light weapons like Kalashnikovs, M-16's and 
antitank grenades, rockets, explosives, light weapons, etc.)  Furthermore, the home-
made rockets that are fired from Gaza towards Israel are mentioned as a justification for 
the Israeli incursion and as a threat. The emphasis on weapons that the Palestinians have 
and use against the Israelis contributes to the delegitimisation of the Palestinians and to 
their representation as a threat to the state of Israel and the security of its citizens. 
Palestinians are criminalised by choice of words like ‗sniper‟ which implies deliberate 
criminal actions. 
Palestinian victims of the Israeli incursion are downplayed in the NYT report, 
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and responsibility for their deaths is mitigated. The reported Israeli incursion left twenty 
Palestinians dead and thirty others injured, however, the fate of Palestinian victims is 
naturalised as ‗death‘ which obfuscates human agency. The verb ‗kill‟ is used in passive 
constructions and/or with inanimate agents. Besides, most of the Palestinian victims are 
represented as ‗militants‟ or „gunmen‟, not as civilians. This justifies the Israeli actions 
against them, as they are represented as posing a menace to Israel. Victims are also 
aggregated and treated like numbers or statistics, which has the effect of dehumanising 
them and downplaying the effect of their deaths. Dehumanisation of the Palestinian 
people is most obvious in the sentence that describes the way Israeli soldiers use 
firearms near Palestinian children in order to get them to scatter. Although children are 
most vulnerable and worthy of protection, and there are important social values 
associated with their protection, Israeli soldiers use firearms to scatter them, and NYT 
naturalises this and justifies it in the report (Israeli soldiers fired near groups of children 
in what appeared to be an effort to get them to scatter). Although the report deals mainly 
with Israeli violence which resulted in the death of twenty Palestinians, the Palestinians 
are represented as violent militants who appear mainly as perpetrators of violence. The 
report does not offer any justification or cause for Palestinian actions. NYT does not 
mention the tens of thousands of civilians who live in Palestinian towns e.g. Beit Lahiya 
where most of the fighting takes place, has more than 40,000 civilians.  
            The most prominent image of the Israeli side is the military image. This 
presentation helps institutionalise and legitimise Israeli actions in Gaza. Various Israeli 
institutions are mentioned in the report including: (Israel, the Israeli military, the armed 
forces, etc.) Institutionalisation of the Israeli side contributes to the positive presentation 
of Israel as a country of institutions, a representation that is consistent with Western 
values of a democratic state. In addition, it contributes to the mitigation of Israeli 
responsibility for violence by attributing it to institutions which impersonalises and 
legitimises it, since institutionalisation represents actions as formal, impersonal and 
legitimate. This is used in relation to controversial actions undertaken by the Israelis, as 
well as controversial statements and decisions, e.g. (Israel drives deeper in Gaza, Israel 
says it will not negotiate for the release of the soldier.)  
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Israeli violence is naturalised by the choice of verbs associated with natural 
occurrence, e.g. ‗surge‟ and ‗rise‟ are associated with natural phenomena such as 
‗sunrise‘ and ‗wave surge‘. The reader is less likely to ask about those responsible for 
the increase of fighting and deaths. The same applies to the choice of the nominal 
‗deaths‟ which is preferred to ‗killing‘ although it is less accurate in this context. Israeli 
violence is also neutralised by presenting it in less negative terms, for instance in terms 
of movement, e.g. (drives deeper, entered, re-entered, ventured, and moved.) The 
presentation of the Israeli incursion as movement downplays it and reduces its impacts.  
Responsibility for Israeli violence is mitigated by the metonymical substitution 
of human agents with inanimate agents such as weapons, e.g. (Israeli tanks fired shells; 
an Israeli airstrike killed two militants, etc.) Thus, crucial agency is concealed, and 
violence is represented as undertaken by inanimate agents that cannot be held 
accountable. Mitigation is also achieved by means of vagueness and generalisations, e.g. 
‗it was one of the bloodiest days in Gaza‟, or by presenting the actions as mutual, e.g. 
„Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles‟. The 
Israeli victim is very prominent in the report although the Israeli incursion left twenty 
Palestinians dead and thirty injured. The one Israeli soldier who was killed is mentioned 
twice in the report, although it is against good journalistic practice to repeat any 
information in the text. Bell (1991) states that: ―repetition is a mortal sin in news 
writing‖. In both occasions, the agent of the killing is labelled ‗sniper‘. Whereas the 
killing of Palestinians is naturalised and responsibility for it is mitigated, the killing of 
the Israeli soldier is criminalised. In conclusion, NYT presents the Israelis and the 
Palestinians in different categories, yet both sides are represented as mutually involved 
in violence against each other. While Palestinian violence is criminalised, Israeli 
violence is naturalised, justified and mitigated.  
7.1.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence 
The representation of Palestinian violence in NYT is quite different from the 
representation of Israeli violence. In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 which deals 
with a bombing at the Hebrew University. The bombing resulted in the death of seven 
and the injury of many others. NYT expresses a great deal of sympathy towards the 
 183 
victims and uses lexis in a personal way with the Israeli side. Many eye-witnesses and 
victims who are interviewed are named, and there is information about their age, origin 
and institutional capacity e.g. (Spencer Dew, 26, a divinity student from the University of 
Chicago, Kobi Cohen, the student union president, etc.). NYT uses a variety of 
expressions, e.g. (seven people, students, their peers, civilians, victims). These 
expressions underpin their vulnerability and present more details about them which 
gains sympathy for them. NYT also names other sources and presents their professional 
capacities, so as to be more credible, e.g. (Gideon Meir, a senior Foreign Ministry 
official, Ron Krumer, a spokesman for the Hadassah Medical Center, etc.). The paper 
also mentions civilian institutions, e.g. (the Hebrew University, the American Friends of 
the Hebrew University, etc.) It uses adjectives and adverbs, e.g. (stunned, frantically, 
worried, shirt spotted crimson and his khaki pants torn, etc.) They highlight the severity 
of the attack and its consequences. Eye-witness accounts and statements are full of 
ideologically loaded expressions that negatively evaluate the bombing and highlight its 
consequences, e.g. carnage, anarchy, killing, disgusting, etc. In sum, the two prominent 
images of Israelis in the report are the civilian victims and the informed officials. There 
is a great deal of sympathy expressed towards them.  
The main image of representing the Palestinians in the report is the militant, e.g. 
(Palestinian militants, suicide bomber, etc.) The other image which is less prominent is 
that of ordinary people, and they are presented in terms of co-existing peacefully with 
Israelis in the university before the bombing, e.g. (Arab students and Arab workers). 
Palestinian officials mentioned belong to Hamas, e.g. (a top Hamas leader and Dr. 
Mahmoud al-Zahar, the political leader of Hamas). The spokesman of Hamas confirms 
Hamas‘ responsibility and warns of more attacks against Israel. NYT mentions 
Palestinian militants who were involved in attacks against Israel. With regard to 
Palestinian institutions, both papers refer to the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. NYT 
describes Hamas as (Islamist), as opposed to Islamic, which implies that it has an 
extremist ideology.  
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004 which deals with a suicide bombing, 
NYT represents the Palestinians in three main categories: as militants, officials and 
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ordinary people. The most prominent category is the militants, as the report deals 
mostosly with a suicide bombing. This is clear in expressions like (bomber, suicide 
bomber, Hamas activist, etc.) The report highlights the contrast between the identity of 
the bomber as a mother and as a bomber in expressions like (mother-of-two bomber), 
being the most newsworthy aspect of the story. NYT identifies the bomber by name and 
national identity, and it emphasises her young age and her being a mother, e.g. (Gaza 
Mother, 22, Reem al-Reyashi, 22, etc.) She is represented as involved in actions like 
(killed, blew herself up, etc.) NYT presents the story with many details, so the bomber is 
represented as involved in many actions, e.g. (deceiving, feigning a limp, etc.) It also 
mentions Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas and the militant 
organisations involved in the attack, namely Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. 
Another image of Palestinians is the image of ordinary Palestinians who are represented 
mainly as workers who need to pass the crossing to go to their work inside Israel, e.g. 
(Palestinian workers, roughly 4,000 Palestinian workers, etc.)  The loss of their 
livelihood is blamed on the bombing. Other ordinary Palestinians are presented in both 
papers as relatives of the bomber, e.g. (a son aged 3, her husband, a relative, etc.). The 
last image of Palestinians presented in the report is that of officials, e.g. (the Palestinian 
Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei, Palestinian leaders, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat). 
They are involved in speech acts, e.g. declining to condemn the bombing and 
commenting on it. Relevant to the same image is Palestinian institutions, e.g. (Fatah 
movement and the Palestinian leadership.) The Israeli side appears in two main images, 
as victims and as officials. The NYT report represents one of the victims of the bombing 
as civilian which underpins his vulnerability (a civilian security guard).  Other victims 
are presented as (four security personnel.) The official image is clear in the 
representation of officials who comment on the bombing. They are identified by name 
and institutional capacity, e.g. (David Baker, an official in the office of Israel's prime 
minister). 
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006 which deals with a Palestinian raid on an 
Israeli army post, the Palestinians are  presented as militants and as officials. The 
militant image is presented with words like (militants, guerrillas, fighters, etc.), and they 
serve as agents of actions like (killed, kidnapped, attacked, fired, etc.) They are 
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negatively evaluated using descriptions like (armed, etc.) The official image can be 
noted in expressions like (President Abbas, the spokesman for the government, Hamas 
Prime Minister, etc.) They mainly serve as agents of speech acts such as (condemn, 
appeal, announce, etc.) Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned in the report, 
including the three militant groups involved in the attack including Hamas; moreover, 
there are legitimate institutions such as (the Palestinian Authority.) NYT singles out the 
Palestinian government as ‗Hamas-government‟. This can be noted in expressions like 
(the Hamas prime minster, Hamas ministers, the Hamas-led government, Hamas 
officials.) This over-lexicalisation serves to present the government pejoratively, as it 
foregrounds affiliation to Hamas to its actual roles as the Palestinian government; thus, 
the government and its officials are not presented as legitimate mainstream 
representatives of the Palestinian people but are seen as belonging to Hamas. This 
creates a sense of otherness and undermines the fact that they were freely elected by the 
Palestinian people in democratic elections in January 2006. Moreover, the involvement 
of certain elements of Hamas in the attack is foregrounded in the report, so the link 
between Hamas and the government officials presents them negatively.  
The Israeli side is represented in two main capacities: military and official. The 
military image is prominent in expressions like (soldiers, corporal, military, army, etc.) 
In this capacity, the Israelis serve mainly as victims of Palestinian violence, i.e. (being 
killed, abducted, attacked, etc.) The official image is presented through expressions like 
(the Israeli Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.) They are 
presented as involved in a number of speech acts including (phoned, urged, etc.) 
Institutions mentioned in the reports include (the Israeli army, the government Security 
Cabinet, etc.) Objects associated with the Israeli side include arms and weapons, e.g. 
(tanks, armed personnel carrier, Israeli military post, etc.) that were attacked by 
Palestinian militants during the raid. Moreover, the paper mentions Israeli weapons that 
were used in a military incursion in Gaza in response to the Palestinian attack. NYT 
describes their actions as movements without referring to their impacts on the 
Palestinians, e.g. (crossed into Gaza, moved a short distance into Gaza.) These actions 
are presented as targeting inanimate objects, e.g. (fired into open space.) Moreover, the 
purpose of these actions is foregrounded, i.e. (to hunt for the kidnapped soldier, to 
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search and investigate the tunnel and to destroy the tunnel.)   
7.2 Lexical Analysis of the Arab News Reports  
7.2.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence 
In this section, lexical items used to represent the members and actions of the 
Israeli side are analysed. In the report of 31
st
 July 2001, AN uses lexis differently with 
members of each side and their actions. The Israelis are referred to collectively only 
without reference to any individuals. They are represented in terms of occupation 
(police) and institutional capacity (political sources). There is one more category, i.e. (a 
tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists) which is expressed in negative terms as a group 
with an extremist ideology. Israeli institutions include Israel and the army. Moreover, 
there are instances of metonymical substitution of the Israelis by their weapons which 
are used against the Palestinians, e.g. (Israeli gunships, combat helicopters, etc.) Israel is 
represented as involved in many actions against the Palestinians, e.g. pounding Gaza, 
firing five missiles, provoking clashes, etc.  
 The Palestinians are referred to both collectively and individually, and labels 
that refer to them indicate national identity (Palestinians), political activity (protesters), 
occupation (police), institutional capacity (Fatah officials), and also names and positions 
(Arafat‟s top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina). AN describes Arafat as (president) which results 
in representing the Palestinians positively as a free nation with a president. Palestinians 
are mainly represented as victims of violence; moreover, they are not represented as 
involved in many actions which emphasises their helplessness and vulnerability, and 
which expresses sympathy with them. Palestinian institutions mentioned in the report 
include Fatah Movement and the Palestinian Authority.  
             AN refers only to legitimate and civilian Palestinian institutions and highlights 
Israeli gunships and helicopter gunships used in the attack against the Palestinians. It 
also represents them as victims of the provocation of a tiny group of Jewish ultra-
nationalists. In this way, it depicts them as extremists undertaking provocative symbolic 
actions of laying the cornerstone of a Jewish temple in holy Palestinian places. 
Moreover, AN avoids mentioning Israeli civilians and ordinary people who are 
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completely absent from the report. 
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, Israel is institutionalised, and its main 
image is official and military. This is clear in expressions like (Israeli security sources, 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, deputies from his Likud party, etc.) Israeli institutions 
support the same image, including (the Israeli armed forces, etc.) Israelis also appear as 
civilians in expressions like (three passengers in an Israeli bus, etc.) On the other hand, 
AN presents Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Hamas in neutral or positive terms, e.g. it refers 
to Yassin as (Hamas leader and the 67-year-old symbol of Palestinian resistance and 
patriarch). Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report; AN presents them as 
victims of Israeli violence who were killed and injured in the attack, e.g. (at least seven 
other people, two of Yassin's sons, the 15 wounded, etc.) They are also represented in 
terms of their reactions to the assassination, e.g. (wailing Gazans, an ax-wielding 
Palestinian, etc), and one person is presented as an eye-witness. AN refers to one Hamas 
official who comments on the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Yassin, i.e. (Top Hamas 
official Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi).  
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, AN represents the Palestinians in three 
main categories: as civilians, officials and fighters. In terms of their semantic roles, the 
Palestinians are mainly presented as victims of Israeli violence, e.g. (its forces killed at 
least 21 Palestinians, Palestinian officials and civilians arrested during the offensive, 
targeted Palestinians with missile strikes, etc.) The report emphasises civilians in Gaza, 
e.g. (civilians, residents, etc.) Related to the same image is the presentation of the 
Palestinians in terms of their age groups and family relations, e.g. (babies, children, 
father, and wife.) Moreover, adjectives used with them underpin their vulnerability and 
suffering, e.g. (terrified, occupied, arrested, scurrying, etc.)  
In the official image, the Palestinians are institutionalised; this enhances their 
image and credibility, e.g. (Palestinian officials, government, ministers and MPs, 
mayors, etc.) Palestinian officials are represented as being under Israeli threats, which 
emphasises the vulnerability and subjugation of the Palestinians and the domination of 
the Israelis, e.g. (sixty-four members of Hamas, including a third of the Cabinet and 26 
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MPs, were arrested, Hamas-led government has been directly targeted in the offensive). 
Many Palestinian officials are identified by name and institutional capacity, which 
stresses their status as individuals and as holders of important positions in legitimate 
institutions, e.g. (Finance Minister Omar Abdelrazeq, Planning Minister Samir Abou 
Eisheh, etc). Palestinians who confront the Israeli forces are called ‗fighters‟, a label 
which is more neutral than ‗militants‟. It endows them with some legitimacy which is 
denied by the word ‗militants‘ with its negative connotations. This can be exemplified 
by the use of ‗fighters‘ in collocations like ‗fire fighters‘. The same applies to the use of 
the word ‗activists‘ in relation to Palestinians who are affiliated to Hamas.  
The predominant image of Israel in the same report is military. The majority of 
lexical items used to refer to Israeli individuals, institutions, actions and objects are 
derived from the military register, e.g. (soldier, leaders, Minister of Defense, army, army 
radio, incursion, offensive, airstrikes, attack, occupation, aircrafts, apache helicopters, 
sappers, flares, etc.) Similarly, Israeli actions are mainly represented using verbs like 
(killed, invaded, targeted, etc.) and nominals like (military operation, violation, 
offensive, missile strikes, etc.) They contribute to the representation of the Israeli side as 
a strong military force using weapons and arms against the Palestinian people, which in 
turn points out the great discrepancy in power between both sides. The invasion and 
occupation of Palestinian territories is prominent in expressions like: (the Jewish state 
invaded Gaza, the occupied Palestinian territories, 38 years of occupation, and the 
occupied West Bank). ‗The Jewish state‟ is a highly ideological label of Israel which 
foregrounds the ideological differences between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The 
only Israeli non-military individual mentioned is the father of the captured soldier. Israel 
and its actions are described and evaluated in the AN report much more than the 
Palestinians and their actions. This shows that the paper has certain attitudes towards 
Israel and expresses them explicitly. It also expresses sympathy for the Palestinians 
representing them largely as victims of the Israelis. 
7.2.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 which deals mainly with a Palestinian 
bombing, AN uses lexis with the Israeli side in an impersonal way and only two people 
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are named, both officials, i.e. Prime Minister Sharon and the government spokesman. 
Israeli victims are mainly represented using a numeral (seven, seventy people), and the 
word (victims) is used with them only once. Some Israelis are mentioned vaguely 
without identification but in terms of their contribution to the report, e.g. (political 
sources and sources.) Institutions mentioned in the report include (Israel, Israeli 
security cabinet, etc.) Israelis are represented in an impersonal way, even the victims are 
presented as numbers or statistics. Israel is also represented as undertaking violence 
against Palestinians in terms of the deportation of relatives of militants.  
AN uses lexis to refer to the Palestinians in a more personal way, as it refers to 
more Palestinian personalities, e.g. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. AN refers to a Palestinian who 
is to be deported from the West Bank for being a relative of a militant. AN uses few 
adjectives with the Israeli side, but AN refers to the Cabinet and Security Cabinet only. 
AN refers to Palestinian civilians, e.g. one to be deported.  
In the report of the15
th
 of January 2004, the Palestinians are presented in three 
main categories: as militants, officials and ordinary people. The most prominent 
category is the militants, as the report deals mainly with a suicide bombing. This is clear 
in expressions like (bomber, suicide bomber, Hamas activist, etc.) The report highlights 
the contrast between the identity of the bomber as a mother and as a bomber in 
expressions like (mother-of-two bomber and woman suicide bomber), as it is the most 
counter expect and newsworthy aspect of the story. Another image of Palestinians is that 
of ordinary people. They are represented  as workers who need to pass the crossing to go 
to work inside Israel, e.g. (Palestinian workers, thousands of workers, etc.) Other 
ordinary Palestinians are presented in both papers as relatives of the bomber, e.g. (a son 
aged 3, her husband, a relative, etc.) The report also refers to shared businesses between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians in the industrial zone (Israeli, Palestinian and jointly 
owned factories). The last image of Palestinians presented in the reports is that of 
officials, e.g. (the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei, Palestinian leaders, the 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat). They are involved in speech acts, e.g. declining to 
condemn the bombing and commenting on it. Relevant to the same image is Palestinian 
institutions, e.g. (Fatah movement and the Palestinian leadership.) 
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            The Israelis are also represented in two main roles and images in the report; i.e. 
officials and military. The official image is clear in the representation of officials who 
comment on the bombing. They are identified by name and institutional capacity in both 
papers, e.g. (Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister.) The military image is 
also prominent in both reports in expressions like (two soldiers, senior Israeli military 
officials, Israeli soldiers, etc.) Israeli institutions mentioned in the report include (Israel, 
and Israeli TV). 
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Palestinians are mainly presented as 
militants and as officials. The militant image is presented in words like (fighters, attack 
team, etc.) AN avoids using negative terms like militants and militia, and uses more 
neutral terms like fighters and activists. They serve as agents of actions like (fired, 
smuggled, tried, charged, attacked, etc.) AN quotes details of the attack from the Israeli 
military. The official image can be noted in expressions like (President Abbas, the 
spokesman for the government, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, etc.) They mainly serve 
as agents of speech acts such as (condemn, appeal, announce, etc.) Several Palestinian 
institutions are mentioned in the report, including the three militant groups involved in 
the attack; moreover, there are legitimate institutions such as (the Palestinian Authority.) 
Objects associated with the Palestinians include weapons used in the attack, e.g. (anti-
tank rockets, and grenades.) 
The Israeli side is represented in two main capacities: military and official. The 
military image is prominent in expressions like (troops, soldiers, military, army, etc.) In 
this capacity, the Israelis serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. 
(being killed, abducted, attacked, etc.) The official image is presented through 
expressions like (the Israeli Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.) 
They are presented as involved in a number of speech acts including (phoned, urged, 
etc.) Institutions mentioned in the report include (the Israeli army, the government 
Security Cabinet, etc.) Objects associated with the Israeli side include arms and 
weapons, e.g. (tanks, armed personnel carrier, Israeli military post, etc.) that were 
attacked by Palestinian militants during the raid. Moreover, the paper mentions some 
Israeli weapons that were used in a military incursion in Gaza in response to the 
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Palestinian attack.  
AN has another image of the Palestinians, i.e. as civilians. This image is 
presented through quoting a Palestinian eye-witness (Ryad Jargoun, a farmer) who 
presents information about an Israeli incursion that started in Rafah shortly after the 
attack. This image is not very prominent in the report which deals mainly with the 
Palestinian attack. In accordance with this image, the Israeli side is presented as actively 
involved in a number of actions against the Palestinians, e.g. (Israeli tanks moved, 
Israeli helicopters opened heavy indiscriminate gunfire).  
7.3 Lexical Analysis of the Guardian Reports  
7.3.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence 
The report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 deals with the bombing of the Palestinian 
police headquarters in Gaza and the killing of six Palestinians in the West Bank. The 
Israelis are represented mainly as officials, e.g. (intelligence officials, Dalia Rabin-
Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister, etc.) Some officials are identified by name 
and institutional capacity, e.g. (Israel's prime minister and Ariel Sharon.) There is also 
mention of ordinary Israelis and violence against them, e.g. an orthodox Jewish man. 
Israeli institutions are also included in the report, e.g. (Israel, the Jewish state and 
military.) ‗The Jewish state‟ is highly ideological, and it is used to emphasise that the 
Palestinian armed group attacked targets inside the Jewish state, not in the Palestinian 
territories. Institutionalisation of the Israeli side is emphasised by reference to certain 
procedures and official documents, e.g. (cabinet meeting, foreign ministry research 
paper, Israel‟s hit-list, Israel's most-wanted list, etc.)  
In the same report, the Palestinians are represented in a number of categories, 
most importantly as militants. This is clear in expressions like (activists, militants, bomb 
makers, etc.) The six Palestinians who were killed are not represented as innocent 
victims; instead, they are represented as activists who belong to a shadowy armed cell 
that is involved in a number of criminal activities, e.g. (gangland style killing, attacking 
targets inside the Jewish state, etc.) Objects mentioned in relation to them are unpleasant 
and resented, e.g. (a junkyard of rusting cars, some bloodied playing cards, etc.) Such 
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images are repulsive and alarming and are consistent with other representations such as 
‗gangland way of living‘ which further criminalise the victims. Palestinians are 
generally evaluated negatively through adjectives like (shadowy, gangland-style, etc.) In 
this way, the victims are delegitimised, criminalised and negatively evaluated. 
Palestinians are also represented as an angry mob (2,000 angry mourners) which is a 
threatening and alarming image. The report also refers to a number of Palestinian 
institutions mainly armed groups and they are evaluated negatively, e.g. (a shadowy cell, 
al-Aksa group, etc.) They are represented in relation to very negative actions, e.g. 
killing. In conclusion, the Guardian represents the Israelis and the Palestinians in 
different images. The Palestinians are  represented as militants involved in negative 
actions and are killed in mysterious circumstances. The Israelis are represented as 
military involved in some military actions against the Palestinians and also as victims of 
violence.  
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, Israel is institutionalised and is 
represented as a military force; this is clear in expressions like (Israeli soldiers, military 
officials, etc). Israeli officials are identified both by name and institutional capacity, e.g. 
(Gideon Meir, an Israeli foreign ministry official, Israeli defence minister Shaul Mofaz, 
etc.). Israeli institutions support the same image, including (the Israeli security forces, 
Israeli defence forces, Israeli security cabinet, etc). Objects associated with the Israeli 
side include weapons used in the assassination, e.g. (missile, Israeli helicopters, etc). 
Israeli officials are represented as justifying the attack and commenting on it. The 
Guardian represents Israeli responsibility for the killing clearly and calls it 
‗assassination‟ which highlights the political nature of the killing 
The Palestinians are presented in two main roles, as militants and as ordinary 
people. The most prominent character in the report is Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who is 
identified by name, age (the 67-year-old) and by his role as the (the founder and 
spiritual leader of militant group Hamas). Yassin is mentioned in association with 
Hamas and militancy. The Guardian describes him as (the most prominent Palestinian 
leader killed by Israel). The paper avoids describing Yassin as ‗disabled‘. The main 
image of the Palestinians is that of militants, and this is clear in expressions like (masked 
militants, masked gunmen, etc.) They are involved in negative actions like firing into the 
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air, firing rockets towards Israel, threatening revenge, etc. The report focuses on militant 
groups, e.g. (militant group Hamas, the militant groups Islamic Jihad, etc). However, 
the Palestinian Authority is mentioned in relation to condemnation of the attack.  
 Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report. The Guardian presents them 
as victims of Israeli violence who were killed and injured in the attack, e.g. (Seven other 
people, another 17), and victims who were killed in demonstrations, e.g. (a 13-year-old 
boy and a journalist), and as an eyewitness, i.e. (Taxi driver Yousef Haddad). Ordinary 
Palestinians are  represented as mourners of Sheikh Yassin, and they are presented as an 
angry mob involved in violence, e.g. (angry crowds, tens of thousands of mourners, etc.) 
Palestinian officials, e.g. (the Palestinian prime minister, Ahmed Qureia and the 
Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat) are  presented as involved in speech acts condemning 
the attack. The leaders of militant groups, e.g. (Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, Abdel 
Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader, etc.) are represented as threatening and vowing 
revenge on Israel.  
In the report of the 7
th
 of July 2006, the dominant image of the Israelis is 
military. This is clear in the choice of words from the military register like (soldier, 
army, corporal, forces, etc). Actions of the Israeli army are represented as (incursion, 
offensive, attack, etc.), and objects associated with it include (navy gunboats, helicopter 
gunships, tanks, etc). Militarisation is a form of institutionalisation, so it serves to 
present Israelis in positive terms. Nevertheless, it also represents the Israelis in a 
negative light for operating militarily in the Palestinian territories. 
 The Palestinians are presented in two main categories: as civilians and militants. 
The paper recognises the existence of Palestinian civilians in Gaza at the time of the 
Israeli incursion and identifies them by name, age and occupation, e.g. (Mohammad 
Farajalah, 24, an ambulanceman, a farmer, Mohammad Atari, 2). They are represented 
as eye-witnesses from the scene of violence, and also as those who suffer from it. 
However, it does not blame their suffering on the Israeli side; instead, they are 
represented as victims of fighting. Moreover, aggregation is used to represent the 
number of Palestinian victims, e.g.  (at least 17 Palestinians and civilian deaths.) 
Palestinian militants are presented in several roles, as targets of Israeli violence, as the 
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captors of the Israeli soldier, and as undertaking militant activities against the Israeli 
forces including firing rockets into Israel. Details of actions of Palestinian militants 
against the Israeli forces are very clear in the report, e.g. (One Hamas man carried an 
anti-tank weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs at the roadside). This 
representation serves to delegitimise them and to justify Israeli violence against them. 
The report avoids mentioning the controversial Palestinian government formed 
predominantly by Hamas which makes the Palestinians‘ official point of view missing 
from the report. 
7.3.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at the Hebrew 
University, the Guardian represents the Palestinians mainly as militants, e.g. (the 
bombers of Hamas, commander, militants, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin). Even the Palestinians who suffer deportation by Israel are presented in terms of 
their relationship to militants (a relative of a Palestinian militant, the families of wanted 
Palestinian men, etc.) The report also mentions two Palestinian institutions Hamas and 
Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority which is over-lexicalised by its attribution to 
Arafat. This presents the PA pejoratively; not as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, but in terms of its association with Arafat, who was at that time 
blamed by Israel and the USA for inciting violence among the Palestinians.   
In the same report, the most prominent image of Israelis is that of civilian 
victims. They are  presented as (students, wounded, seven people, Israeli citizens, more 
than 70, etc.) This emphasises their vulnerability and criminalises the attack against 
them. The Guardian presents another prominent image of the Israelis, i.e. as officials 
(the police spokeswoman Sigal Toledo, the prime minister, Ariel Sharon, etc). Israeli 
officials comment on both the bombing and the deportation of Palestinians related to 
militants. There are two Israeli institutions, i.e. the Hebrew University where the 
bombing takes place, and the police that comment on the bombing. The use of lexis 
underlines Palestinian militancy and involvement in violence against the Israelis, as well 
as the vulnerability of the Israeli side that suffers Palestinian violence.  
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, the Guardian presents the Palestinians 
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in two main categories: as militants and as ordinary people. The militant image is clear 
in expressions like (a suicide bomber, Hamas activist, human-bomb, etc.) It appears in 
relation to the identity of the bomber as a woman and a mother of two, and this is 
emphasised in both reports, and it is clear in expressions like (human-bomb mother, 
female suicide bomber, etc). This is the most prominent image of the report, as it deals 
with a suicide bombing; moreover, the paper mentions Sheikh Yassin, the leader of 
Hamas, and Hamas officials and activists who comment on sending a female bomber 
and warn that more would follow. They are  involved in verbal actions. The only 
institutions mentioned are militant organisations, e.g. (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al-
Aqsa Martyrs brigade). Ordinary Palestinians are represented by workers who queued at 
the crossing at the time of the bombing. Palestinian officials are absent from the report. 
 The Israelis are represented in two main categories, military and ordinary people. 
The military image is represented through a number of expressions, e.g. (soldiers, the 
Gaza divisional commander, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, etc). The military is 
mainly represented as involved in speech acts. There is one more action represented 
which is closing the crossing. The civilian image is also present in the expression (a 
civilian security worker). In conclusion, the Guardian presents the Israelis  in the 
military category as victims and the Palestinians as militants involved in violence. The 
bombing is emphasised and criminalised, and it is not given any justification.  
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Guardian represents the Palestinians as 
militants and as officials. The militant image is clear in words like (militants, gunmen, 
captors, etc.) which serve as agents of actions like (killed, kidnapped, attacked, fired, 
etc.) These actions agree with the stereotypical image of Palestinians as militants and as 
terrorists. The purpose of these actions is not prominent in the reports, though it is 
present as a form of ‗revenge‟. The second prominent image of Palestinians is the 
official, e.g. (Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas 
Prime Minister, etc). They serve as agents in a number of actions, mainly speech acts 
such as (call on, say, etc.)  
Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned, including the three militant groups 
involved in the attack: Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Islamic 
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Army; moreover, the Palestinian Authority and the government are also present. Objects 
associated with the Palestinian side include weapons used in the attack against Israel, 
e.g. (anti-tank weapons, grenades, etc). The Guardian uses over-lexicalisation in 
relation to the Palestinian government by attributing it to Hamas even though it came 
into office through free and democratic elections in January of the same year; this is 
clear in expressions like (the Hamas-led Government, the Hamas prime minister, Hamas 
ministers, etc). These expressions have a pejorative effect, as they single out the 
government as attributing to Hamas rather than being a representative of all Palestinians.  
The Israeli side is represented in two main images; military and official. The 
military image is prominent in expressions like (soldiers, military, army, corporal, etc.) 
which serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. being (killed, abducted, 
attacked, etc). The official image is presented through the presentation of (Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.), who are involved in speech acts 
such as (phoned, urged, promised, threatened, etc). Israeli institutions include (the 
Israeli army, the government Security Cabinet, etc). Objects associated with Israelis 
include weapons and other objects that were attacked by Palestinian militants during the 
raid, e.g. (tanks, Armed Personnel Carrier, Israeli military post, fence, etc.).  
The Guardian identifies the Israeli victims by name and age. Israeli reactions 
towards Palestinian actions are rationalised and institutionalised, and they are presented 
as response, or as options or possibilities being investigated by the Israeli cabinet; 
moreover, most Israeli actions are represented using mental and verbal processes. The 
Israeli incursion in Gaza is absent from the report.  
7.4 Lexical Analysis of the Times Reports  
7.4.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence 
The report of the 31
st
 of July 2001 is very brief, and it represents both sides in 
few roles. The Palestinians are presented as members of Fatah and as activists who are 
killed in mysterious circumstances; they are described as being on Israel's list of 
suspected terrorists which delegitimises them. The Palestinians are also presented as 
officials who are involved in verbal actions, e.g. denied and accused. The report includes 
a Palestinian institution, i.e. Fatah, yet its members are described as being on Israel's list 
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of suspected terrorists. The Israeli side is represented in two main roles; as officials and 
as military. Israeli officials are presented by name and institutional position, e.g. Dalia 
Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister, unlike the Palestinians who are not 
named at all. Real agents of violence are metonymically substituted by weapons missiles 
from Israeli helicopters. The Israelis are not very prominent in the report, except as 
involved in verbal actions. The most prominent image of the Palestinians is the image of 
militants and activists, while the most prominent images of the Israelis are the official 
and military images.   
In the report of the 22
nd
 of March 2004, the Times presents the Israelis as 
institutionalised and they are  represented as a military force; this is clear in expressions 
like (security officials, Israeli troops, etc). Officials are identified both by name and 
institutional capacity, e.g. (Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a former army general, Gideon 
Meir, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, etc). Israeli institutions support the same 
image. Israeli officials are represented as justifying the attack and commenting on it.  
The most prominent character in both reports is Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who is 
identified by name, age (the 67-year-old) and by his role as the (Hamas spiritual leader, 
Hamas leader). Yassin is mentioned in association with Hamas and militancy. The 
Times describes him as (the most prominent Palestinian leader killed by Israel). The 
Times states that he (used a wheelchair), yet it does not explicitly refer to him as 
‗disabled‘. The main image of the Palestinians is that of militants, and this is clear in 
expressions like (Palestinian militants, masked gunmen, etc). They are involved in 
negative actions like firing rockets towards Israel, threatening revenge, etc. The reports 
focus on militant groups, e.g. (militant group Hamas, the militant groups Islamic Jihad, 
etc.) However, the Palestinian Authority is mentioned in relation to condemnation of the 
attack.  
 Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report, e.g. other victims of the 
attack and the thirteen-year-old who was killed in demonstrations. Ordinary Palestinians 
are also represented as mourners of Sheikh Yassin, and they are presented as an angry 
mob, e.g. (mourners, tens of thousands of Palestinians, etc.) The report also mentions 
Palestinian officials, e.g. (the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat) who are presented as 
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involved in speech acts condemning the attack, as well as leaders of militant groups, e.g. 
(Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader, etc.) 
who are represented as threatening and vowing revenge on Israel.  
The Times report on the 7
th
 of July 2006 institutionalises Israel by militarisation 
and by reference to state departments and officials. The dominant image of the Israelis is 
that of a military force, e.g. people (Israeli forces, Israeli soldier, troops, Lieutenant 
Colonel Yaniv, a battalion commander, Israeli army chiefs, etc.); objects (aircraft, tanks, 
etc.); actions (airstrikes, tank fire, operation, invaded, mission, incursions, etc.); and 
institutions (the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), the Israeli army, army radio, etc). This 
contributes to the presentation of Israeli actions from a positive perspective. 
Another image of the Israelis is that of ‗victims‘, as they are represented as 
vulnerable victims of Palestinian violence, e.g. (a captured soldier, civilians, etc). 
Vulnerability of Israel and the Israelis is prominent as a justification of the Israeli 
incursion: (in an attempt to win freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the 
militants‟ increasingly longer rocket range.)  
7.4.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence 
In the report of the 1
st
 of August 2002, the Times uses lexis to emphasise the 
involvement of Palestinian militants in violence against the Israelis who are presented as 
victims. The Times‟ report also presents the Palestinians as militants, but also stresses 
the existence of Palestinian workers and students at the Hebrew University alongside 
Israelis in expressions like (2,000 Palestinian students and numerous Arab staff). The 
report mentions two Palestinian institutions Hamas and Yasser Arafat's Palestinian 
Authority which is over-lexicalised by its attribution to Arafat. This presents it 
pejoratively; not as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but in terms 
of its association with Arafat. The most prominent image of Israelis is that of civilian 
victims. They are presented as (students, people, etc). This emphasises their 
vulnerability and criminalises the attack against them. The paper focuses on one Israeli 
institution, i.e. the Hebrew University where the bombing takes place. In conclusion, 
lexis underlines Palestinian militancy and involvement in violence against the Israelis, as 
well as the vulnerability of the Israeli side that suffers Palestinian violence. The most 
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prominent image of Israelis in this report is that of victims, especially  since the report 
deals with a powerful bombing at the Hebrew University that resulted in deaths and 
injuries on the Israeli side.  
In the report of the 15
th
 of January 2004, the paper presents the Palestinians in 
two main categories: as militants and as ordinary people. The militant image is clear in 
expressions like (a suicide bomber, Hamas activist, suicide-bomb, etc). It appears in 
relation to the identity of the bomber as a woman and a mother-of-two, and this is 
emphasised in the report, and it is clear in expressions like (human-bomb mother.) This 
is the most prominent image of the report, as it deals with a suicide bombing; moreover, 
the paper mentions Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and Hamas officials 
and activists who comment on sending a woman bomber and warn that more would 
follow. They are involved in verbal actions. The only institution mentioned in the report 
is Hamas (Hamas, the militant Islamic group). Ordinary Palestinians are represented by 
workers who queued at the crossing at the time of the bombing (as many as 20,000, 
thousands of Palestinian workers, etc). The report also mentions the children of the 
bomber and their ages, but it does not mention any Palestinian officials. 
 The Israelis are represented in two main categories: as military and ordinary 
people. The military image is represented through a number of expressions, e.g. 
(soldiers, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, the Gaza divisional commander, etc.). The 
military is represented as involved in speech acts. There is one more action represented 
which is the closing of the crossing. The most prominent Israeli institution mentioned in 
the report is the Israeli military or army. The civilian image is not clear in the report. 
Israelis are presented as victims of killing and injury at the hands of the bomber.  
In the report of the 26
th
 of June 2006, the Times represents the Palestinians as 
militants and as officials. The militant image is clear in words and actions of militants 
who raided the Israeli army post. The second prominent image of Palestinians is the 
official, e.g. (Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas-led government.) They serve as 
agents of speech acts. Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned, including the three 
militant groups involved in the attack: (Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and 
the Islamic Army). Moreover, the Palestinian Authority and the government are also 
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present. Objects associated with the Palestinian side include weapons used in the attack 
against Israel, e.g. (bombs, grenades, etc). The report uses over-lexicalisation with the 
Palestinian government by attributing it to Hamas, in expressions like (the Hamas-led 
Government.) 
The Israeli side is represented in two main images; military and official. The 
military image is prominent in expressions like (soldiers, military, army, corporal, etc.) 
which serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. being (killed, abducted, 
attacked, etc). The official image is presented through the presentation of (Ehud Olmert, 
the Israeli Prime Minister, etc.), who are involved in speech acts. Israeli institutions 
include (the Israeli government, the Security Cabinet, etc). Objects associated with the 
Israelis include weapons and other objects that were attacked by Palestinian militants 
during the raid, e.g. (tanks, Armed Personnel Carrier, etc). Israeli reactions towards 
Palestinian actions are rationalised and institutionalised, and they are presented as 
response, or as options or possibilities. The Israeli incursion in Gaza is minimally 
present in the Times.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Lexicalisation is another important resource that is used ideologically in news 
reports. In NYT, the Palestinians are presented as militants. This is understandable in 
news reports that deal with Palestinian violence undertaken by Palestinian militants; 
however, the same image is also prominent in reports dealing with Israeli violence. 
Thus, Palestinian civilians are under-represented in NYT, while militants are very 
prominent. This may lead to overgeneralisation of militancy to all Palestinians. In 
addition, Palestinian militants are often over-lexicalised by the use of many expressions 
to refer to them, e.g. militants, gunmen, militia men, guerrillas, fighters, sniper, masked 
gunmen, Hamas militants, etc. They are described in intimidating images as wearing 
masks, holding weapons, etc. They are also represented as involved in negative militant 
actions, e.g. using weapons, shooting, digging manholes or tunnels, firing missiles and 
rockets, attacking, etc. Even in speech acts they are represented as undertaking violent 
actions, e.g. vow revenge, threaten, etc. There is no sympathy for them, even when they 
are killed, and their killing is represented as self-explanatory without the need for 
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justification, as if they were legitimate targets for Israeli violence.  
The actions of Palestinian militants are always presented negatively with no 
explanation or justification; moreover, they are often exaggerated. Their actions are 
always delegitimised and presented as falling outside the moral, normative and socio-
political order. In addition, the lack of the crucial context of the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories further delegitimises their actions and eliminates any possible 
justification for them. Also relevant to this category is the representation of Palestinian 
militant organisations, e.g. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc. They are very prominent in all 
reports, and labels used with them always emphasise militancy, e.g. (militant groups, 
militant Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad, the militant Palestinian group Hamas, 
another militant group, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, etc). They are represented as 
claiming responsibility for militant attacks, vowing revenge in response to Israeli 
attacks, etc. When militants are quoted, their statements are often translated into 
unidiomatic English which further downplays them and their statements.  
The other prominent image of Palestinians is that of suicide bombers who are 
involved in acts of indiscriminate killing that are illegitimate and illegal. News reports 
often present this violence as if it starts with no underlying causes except hatred and 
revenge. Violence is prominent and delegitimised, but the causes behind this violence 
are never explored. Newspapers never question what may drive young Palestinians to 
blow themselves up among Israelis to kill them; thus, their actions are always presented 
as irrational,  inexplicable and unjustified, and their statements are always presented in 
terms of hatred. the socio-political context (that is never presented adequately), the 
despair as well as the lack of hope and opportunity among Palestinians and the daily 
humiliation at the hands of Israeli forces are never told in news reports. Therefore, the 
real causes of suicide bombings never appear in reports. The way newspapers deal with 
this particular issue can be said to be very superficial. They never probe nor do they 
encourage readers to probe what might cause these acts, and whether there could be 
peaceful and rational ways to deal with it like any other problem.  
This became more intense after the events of the 11
th
 of September when 
America itself became the victim of suicide bombings. The discourse of US (the US and 
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its allies) versus THEM (terrorists and their allies) dominated the discourse of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The way America chose to deal with the problem by 
eliminating terror was also adopted in Israel. Restrictions on the Palestinians and 
violence against them became the accepted and unquestioned procedure. Israel launched 
its own war on Palestinian terror, and just like the American war, it did not discriminate 
between civilians and militants! This war was very hard to challenge just like the 
American war on terrorism. Moreover, it was overshadowed by the war led by the USA. 
In sum, after 9/11, Palestinian militants became terrorists and fought in the Israeli war 
on terror. No dialogue or peaceful solution could be proposed or foreseen. It may be 
worth mentioning that almost all Palestinian militant groups and organisations are on the 
American list of foreign terrorist organisations (see: 
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups.cfm). 
The third prominent image of Palestinians is the official image. The Palestinian 
Authority is often presented in NYT as inefficient, especially since it was blamed not 
only for failing to stop the uprising but also for intensifying it. Arafat, in particular, has 
been the subject of a great deal of criticism, accusations, humiliation, confinement and 
threats form Israel. At the beginning of the Intifada, NYT referred to him generally as 
(the Palestinian Authority chairman) [2001]; however, in time it started to refer to him 
as (the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat) [2004], which undermines his institutional role, 
especially  since he was confined and humiliated by Israel. NYT represented the Israeli 
measures against Arafat without much criticism. The Palestinian Authority is often over-
lexicalised, problematised, and presented as ineffective and corrupt. It is often presented 
in terms of its relationship to militant organisations, e.g. (the Aksa Brigades, the armed 
branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction) [NYT, 31 July 2001]. Palestinian officials are 
often left anonymous and deprived of institutional status, which denies them credibility 
and efficacy. Official statements condemn Palestinian violence against the Israelis and 
Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Other statements are often too general and lack 
accuracy.  
Ordinary Palestinians do not get much representation in NYT. In the sample 
analysed, NYT refers to Palestinian civilians once only as victims of Israeli attack; 
however, it is mentioned as an error (the Israeli military has stepped up its actions, but 
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some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilians in 
recent weeks). Palestinian civilians appear as an angry mob rioting or expressing their 
anger in response to Israeli violence, e.g. (demonstrators chanted, thousands of people 
took to the streets, thousands of Palestinians, more than a thousand people, etc). These 
expressions relate to the negative threatening image of an angry mob, and they stress the 
sheer numbers of Palestinians which could exaggerate their potential threat. Palestinian 
civilians are also mentioned when they are quoted as eye-witnesses, e.g. (Palestinians at 
the scene, one witness, Maher al-Beek, etc). Palestinians civilians are often referred to 
using neutral categories, e.g. family relations or age group, e.g. (youths, a relative, etc). 
NYT represents Israel in terms of its institutional image. There are certain 
organisations presented prominently, e.g. (the Israeli military, the Israeli government 
and the Israeli army). These representations contribute to the legitimisation of Israeli 
actions, even the most controversial and most violent ones, due to the power of 
institutional discourse. Moreover, Israeli actions are often described in ―neutral formal 
terms or in positive legitimating terms‖. The institutionalisation of Israel has the effect 
of legitimating its actions, and at the same time delegitimising others‘, e.g. the 
Palestinian perspective; ―institutional discourse is authoritative, thereby delegitimating 
alternative discourses‖ (Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). NYT endeavours to present Israel and 
its actions in positive or at least neutral terms. Actions of the Israeli army are sometimes 
re-lexicalised in an attempt to redefine them in more favourable or at least less 
condemnable terms; e.g. when mentioning the Israeli raid on Gaza in the reports of 7
th
 
July 2006, NYT refers to the Israeli action, which is considered a military occupation of 
the Palestinian territories as movements or entering, using expressions like ‗moved 
deeper, entered, re-entered, started edging, etc‘. These expressions represent the actions 
of Israeli forces neutrally and avoid the political implications of these movements. As 
discussed earlier, Israeli civilians are often represented very prominently in NYT 
reports, especially those dealing with Palestinian violence. They appear as victims of 
Palestinian violence, and their suffering is prominent even if it is fear or panic. They are 
often interviewed as well to describe how they feel which gains a lot of sympathy for 
them. 
The difference in status between Israel and the Palestinians and the subsequent 
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institutionalisation of Israel result in the legitimation of Israeli actions against 
Palestinians. Legitimation discourse, as discussed by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) 
contributes to the overall positive representation of the Israeli side and the subsequent 
negative presentation of the Palestinian side. Moreover, the institutionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of discourse about Israel and its actions promotes the representation of 
these practices as routine, anonymous, normalised and well-established procedures, 
which further legitimates Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Institutionalisation 
also has a euphemistic effect that contributes to the conceptualisation of violent Israeli 
actions as appropriate, logical and rational. In addition, the emphasis of the negative 
actions of the Palestinians is used as a justification of actions taken against them in 
newspapers.  
 Just as in NYT, the most prominent image of Palestinians in the Guardian and 
the Times is the militant. Palestinian militants are referred to using a number of labels 
including (militants, gunmen, militia, fighters, bombers, activists, etc). Their actions are 
described in terms of militancy and are negatively evaluated in both papers. On the other 
hand, Israel is predominantly institutionalised and militarised which serves to legitimise 
Israeli actions and at the same time to delegitimise Palestinians‘ actions. Israelis, both 
civilians and officials, are often named, while Palestinians are presented anonymously in 
most of the instances. When Israelis are victims of Palestinian violence, both papers 
emphasise their vulnerability and express a great deal of sympathy for them; however, 
when Palestinians fall victim of Israeli violence, reports often still mention their militant 
image and they also emphasise their angry mob image and present them in threatening 
angry images that do not gain them any sympathy, e.g. (angry crowds, demonstrators, 
the crowds, tens of thousands of mourners) [the Guardian, 22 March 2004]; (tens of 
thousands of mourners, tens of thousands of Palestinians) [the Times, 22 March 2004]. 
The Guardian sometimes also presents Palestinians as civilians and as victims of 
violence; however, they only blame their death or injury on Israelis when Israel admits 
responsibility for their fate, but when responsibility is not confirmed, they are often 
represented as victims of violence without blaming Israel for it, e.g. in the reports on the 
Israeli raid on Gaza 7 July 2006. It has also been noted that sometimes the Guardian 
recognises Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and refers to them as ‗the 
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occupied territories.‘ 
 Lexis is used in AN differently because it tends to label the Palestinians in more 
neutral terms than Western newspapers. For example, AN never uses the label ‗militant‟ 
with Palestinians, instead it uses the words ‗fighter‟ or ‗activist‟ which are more neutral 
in connotation than ‗militant‟. Moreover, AN recognises Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian territories and uses expressions like ‗Occupied Jerusalem,‘ etc. However, AN 
does not try to justify or legitimise Palestinian violence.  AN underpins the vulnerability 
of Palestinians and represents the Palestinians as victims with no ability to affect the 
Israelis. AN emphasises the civilian status of Palestinians and refers to them using 
family relations and other relevant labels used with ordinary people. It also highlights 
legitimate Palestinian institutions like the Palestinian Authority and government. 
Palestinian militancy is not prominent in many reports, especially those that deal with 
Israeli violence. AN reports highlight Israeli military activities against the Palestinians 
and represent the discrepancy in power between both sides clearly, e.g. the Israeli side is 
always represented in terms of a military power used against the Palestinians. AN often 
avoids mentioning Israeli civilians and ordinary people who are completely absent from 
most reports. 
 It should be emphasised that not all the differences between the reports are 
ideological, but some of them are the outcome of the historical and political context of 
the conflict. There is a big difference between both sides of the conflict in terms of 
power and status. Israel is a state and a full member of the United Nations which gives it 
the status of a state with institutions like state departments and a military. On the other 
hand, the Palestinians do not have a state, and therefore lack the status and institutional 
capacity that come with it. Journalists have the option to refer to Israel as a state, but this 
is not the same for the Palestinians, as there is no state yet called ‗Palestine‘. For this 
reason, fighting or military activities undertaken by the Palestinians are often 
characterised as militancy since there is no military for the Palestinians. However, news 
reports often ignore  any mention of the Israeli occupation and control of the Palestinian 
territories which can have the effect of depicting Palestinian fighting as resistance to an 
illegal occupation and thus justify it. 
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8 Conclusion 
This thesis presents a study in CDA that examines a corpus of news reports that deal 
with violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the second uprising. The 
study aims at comparing the way members of each side and their actions are represented 
in newspapers that are sited in Arab and Western countries and also in newspapers that 
have different attitudes but appear in the same country. The study also aims to examine 
the role of ideology in representing the conflict. The analysis has focused on three 
linguistic features: narrative, transitivity and lexis. 
 In order to achieve these aims several steps have been taken. As background to 
the study, the history of the conflict and the history of the relationship between the 
Arabs and the West, as well as the perceptions of both sides in the West and in the Arab 
world have been reviewed. Theoretically, major approaches to CDA have also been 
reviewed with the aim of identifying the best approach to undertake the study. However, 
no single approach was deemed appropriate; therefore a modified version of CDA that 
includes selected aspects of different approaches has been devised. Methodologically, 
three linguistic levels have been selected for the analysis, and they have been 
theoretically researched to achieve a better understanding of how they work and how 
they can be ideologically invested in news discourse. Based on the above theoretical 
research, a method for the analysis of news reports that focuses on certain features and 
strategies to examine at each linguistic level has been developed.  
CDA has proven to be a very useful tool for the analysis, and the three linguistic 
levels chosen for analysis have shown evidence of the ideological use of language to 
represent both sides of the conflict and their actions. Although CDA has proven to be a 
useful tool for the study, certain aspects of different approaches have been more 
appropriate for the analysis than others; for narrative analysis, the approaches of Toolan 
(2001), van Dijk (1987b, 1988 & 1991), and White (1997), as well as Hall et al (1978) 
for transitivity analysis, the approaches of Fairclough (2003), Hodge and Kress (1993), 
and van Leeuwen (1995, 1996 & 2000) have proven most fruitful; and for lexical 
analysis, I drew on the approaches of Flowerdew (2002), Wodak (1999) and Reisigl & 
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Wodak (2001).  
 The application of this method to the selected news reports has proven useful for 
the analysis of lexicalisation and transitivity; however, the analysis of narrative proved 
to be a more demanding task, as the narrative structure of news reports has the potential 
to mask ideological views with an appearance of neutrality and impartiality, and it was 
not an easy task to prove the ideological workings on discourse at the level of narrative. 
Therefore, further research into the areas of cultural and media studies especially the 
theories of Stuart Hall in the study of the use of sources as primary and secondary 
definers of the situation in news discourse was also included in the analysis.  
 Ideology and bias in the news are not easy to identify, especially with the factual 
nature of news reporting and the apparently balanced representation of different views, 
however it was evident through the study of the positive and negative presentation of 
different sides of the conflict and their actions, as well as the use of agency and causality 
to represent responsibility for violence undertaken by both sides, and the way narrative 
structure and news sources are used in news discourse.  
The analysis revealed that, in most of the instances, different newspapers use 
discourse ideologically to represent events of the conflict. There are similarities and 
differences between news reports about the same events, and there are many factors, 
some of which are ideological while others are not, that affect the degrees of similarities 
or differences. Many similarities have been noted between the four newspapers. Firstly, 
all reports represent the conflict in terms of two warring nations, while ignoring the 
asymmetry of power between both sides; consequently, readers may have the false 
impressions that both sides are more or less of equal power. This can result in an 
inaccurate and superficial understanding of the conflict. Bennett (1996) maintains that 
―the absence of attention to power further encourages the audiences to abandon political 
analysis.‖  
Secondly, all reports lack proper contextualisation which results in reports that 
are not very meaningful to an uninformed readership. Events of the conflict are 
essentially represented in terms of incidents of violence and counter violence, and all 
reports focus on here and now without presenting any of the underlying issues that affect 
 208 
the conflict. Incidents of violence are often contextualised by reference to previous 
incidents without proper explanation of the wider context of the conflict; in this regard 
Dunsky calls for the reconsideration of these practises and argues that:  
―it is time for a new approach to reporting that, over time and across media, investigates 
and illuminates the organic essence of the conflict as a much needed complement to the 
easily obtained snapshots of the daily drama unfolding between the Israelis and 
Palestinians in the field‖ (Dunsky, 2008: 368). 
Thirdly, all newspapers endeavour to present an accurate description of the 
outcomes of violence between both sides, i.e. they all try to represent the exact numbers 
of victims on both sides and the material damage as well. This is largely due to the 
values of journalism that focus on accuracy of presenting facts. Fourthly, the historical 
and political contexts of the conflict impose certain constraints on the way language is 
used by all newspapers. This is most obvious in the difference in status between Israel, 
as a recognised state and a full member of the UN, and the Palestinians who are thus far 
stateless. Israel is always institutionalised; this endows it with legitimacy of which the 
Palestinians are deprived. This is most notable in the representation of violence or 
confrontations between both sides. Israel is a state with a military; therefore, aggression 
against the Palestinians is institutionalised and presented as military action. On the other 
hand, since the Palestinians lack the same institutions, aggressions they undertake 
against the Israelis cannot be presented as military action; instead it is represented as 
militancy.  
Finally, Palestinian violence is always represented as illegitimate and unjustified. 
Its causes are mainly presented in terms of revenge or retaliation, and it is never 
legitimised like Israeli violence. This can be explained in terms of a moral ‗closure‘ in 
relation to Palestinian violence. Davis and Walton (1983b) argue that in news reporting 
on some subjects, like political violence, are approached from an assumed moral 
consensus. The moral imperative to condemn (violence or terrorism) leads to routine 
practises of moral ‗closure‘ at the level of language. Moreover, condemning acts of 
violence legitimises other forms of violence (e.g. state violence in response to rioting) 
which is somehow placed in a different category (Davis & Walton, 1983a). In the case 
of reporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is a case of moral consensus that leads 
a moral closure and thus to the condemnation and delegitimisation of Palestinian 
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violence. There is no room for justification of Palestinian violence, or even an attempt to 
present it as legitimate resistance. AN often avoids Palestinian militancy if it is not the 
main news story.  
There are many differences between Arab and Western newspapers in the 
representation of violence between both sides. Generally, AN highlights Israeli violence 
and international condemnations to this violence more than other newspapers, e.g. it is 
the only newspaper to mention the condemnations of the UN Human Rights Committee 
to the Israeli raid against Gaza in July 2006 and to detail the Israeli violence against 
members of the Palestinian government which are completely absent from all other 
newspapers. At the level of narrative, all the newspapers present Palestinian violence in 
a clear coherent narrative structure although the structure of hard news stories does not 
relate events temporally. Details of Palestinian violence are often quoted from Israeli 
military sources in all newspapers which can explain the similarity. However, the three 
Western newspapers tend to present Israeli violence less clearly and less coherently; 
they often de-narrativise it by different strategies that are discussed in detail in the 
analysis of narrative. AN, on the other hand, tries to present Israeli violence as clearly 
and coherently as possible, depending on the available information. Another major 
difference between Arab and Western newspapers has to do with the use of news 
sources who often decide the interpretative frame for understanding events. Western 
newspapers take Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situations while AN takes 
Palestinian sources as the primary definers.  
In terms of transitivity structures, all newspapers present agency, causality and 
responsibility clearly when representing Palestinian violence. AN tends as much as 
possible to mitigate responsibility for Palestinian violence in the headline, but it is often 
made clear later in the report. Using transitivity to report Israeli violence is more 
complicated. NYT and the Times often use transitivity constructions that mitigate Israeli 
responsibility for violence, such as the agent deletion by means of nominalisations or 
agentless passives, or its substitution by inanimate objects like the weapons used for 
killing, etc. On the other hand, the Guardian tends to present Israeli responsibility more 
clearly, especially if Israeli responsibility has been confirmed. It does not often try to 
mitigate or conceal responsibility except when Israeli responsibility is not confirmed. 
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AN consistently presents Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians very 
clearly. Israel is always presented as initiating and undertaking violence against the 
Palestinians who are in turn represented as its victims.  
At the level of lexicalisation, both sides of the conflict are represented in a 
limited number of roles that have a great deal of overlap between different newspapers. 
The Israeli side is largely institutionalised, and its members are presented as military 
personnel and as officials. The civilian image of the Israelis is prominent in the reports 
of NYT, the Guardian and the Times, however, this image is hardly present in AN. In 
terms of presenting the Palestinians, the most prominent images for them in NYT, the 
Guardian and the Times are the militant and the official. These images are clear in most 
of the reports analysed. AN presents the official image as the most prominent image, but 
militants are often presented using more neutral terms like ‗fighters‘ and ‗activists‘. 
Moreover, AN highlights the civilian status of the Palestinians and presents it clearly in 
most of the reports, however, it is almost absent from NYT and Times reports. 
Palestinian civilians are clearly presented in some of the Guardian reports as well. Lexis 
is used ideologically by different newspapers for positively or negatively evaluating the 
members of certain groups and for legitimising or delegitimising their actions. 
Some of the differences between reports in different newspapers are based on 
ideological considerations while others result from practical necessities or institutional 
practises relevant to news production. For instance, during the second uprising Israel 
barred all international journalists from entering the Palestinian territories for security 
concerns; therefore, they were mainly based in Jerusalem or accompanying the Israeli 
army in its raids. On the other hand, AN reporters were based in the Palestinian 
territories. So, reporters in different locations did not have access to the same sources or 
information. Fowler (1991) holds that news discourse is constructed according to the 
stylistic and ideological conventions of the newspapers, which differ from one 
institution to another and affect the way the same story is presented in different 
newspapers.  
Tuchman (1978) notes that news, as a social institution, is an ally of legitimate 
institutions, such as governments and politicians. News organisations endeavour to 
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maintain effective relationships with powerful institutions and to serve the interests of 
the news organisation itself. They often try to frame stories within the interpretations 
offered by powerful institutions and within accepted common assumptions shared by the 
majority of their audiences. Therefore, most information about the conflict comes from 
the Israeli side that can also communicate its interpretations, as Israel has a superior and 
efficient communications apparatus and a recognised state with legitimate institutions. 
The Palestinian side, on the other hand, with its limited resources, ineffective institutions 
and its lack of efficacy is not a reliable ally of media outlets and is unable to 
communicate its views effectively.  
The history of the relationship between the Arabs and the West in addition to 
developments in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict have resulted in certain 
orientalist stereotypical images of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular 
in the West; ―the Palestinians and their organisations and the Arabs more generally, have 
been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and uncompromising refusal 
to come to terms with the existence of Israel or to accept the norms of decent behavior‖ 
(Herman & Chomsky, 1994). On the contrary, positive stereotypes of Israel prevailed in 
Western media based on the suffering of Jews in Europe during the Holocaust and the 
success of the Zionist movement in establishing a national home for prosecuted Jews, as 
well as cultural proximity and mutual interests between Israel and the West. As Ghareeb 
(1977) emphasises in relation to American media ―Zionism has been made to appear as a 
force for progress and liberation in a backward Arab world. The Arabs were thought of 
in terms of pyramids, camels, dancing girls, and perhaps, oil.‖ In addition, the 
undeniable role of invoking memories of the Holocaust and Western fears from charges 
of anti-Semitism have had a strong influence on media representations of Israel.  
―The Holocaust has proven to be an indispensable ideological weapon. Through its 
deployment, one of the world‘s most formidable military powers, with a horrendous 
human rights record, has cast itself as a ‗victim‘ state, and the most successful ethnic 
group in the United States has likewise acquired a victim state‖ (Finkelstein, 2000). 
The critical examination of the representation of the conflict in Western and 
Arab newspapers, as well as in newspapers with different orientations reveals that news 
reporting of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not provide an objective, 
unbiased account of events as claimed by different newspapers. With reference to the 
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representation of the second Intifada, the result of such practises in reporting is the 
reduction of a very complex conflict to a mere military confrontation between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, to the detriment of millions of Palestinian civilians in Gaza 
and the West Bank who remain under-represented, to a large extent, in news media, as 
well as to Israeli civilians who are also under-represented, as the military image of Israel 
dominates the reporting. The legitimation and mitigation of Israeli violence against the 
Palestinians will only result in its persistence, while reporting it clearly and bravely may 
lead to encouraging Western governments to pressurise Israel to change its policies 
towards the Palestinians and hopefully lead to peace between both sides.  
It is worth noting that there have been notable changes of attitudes both in the 
media and public views towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These changes have 
been the result of many factors including the recent history of the conflict, especially the 
establishment of the Israeli security barrier in the West Bank, the Israeli war against 
Gaza in 2008 with the aim of stopping Hamas rockets against Israel and the Israeli 
blockade on the movement of people and goods to and from the Palestinian territories. 
The disproportionate use of power and the siege of Gaza have alerted the public and the 
media to the situation of the Palestinians. Media in different parts of the world were very 
critical to Israel during the war against Gaza, and certain practises of the Israeli forces, 
especially the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and the alleged use of 
internationally forbidden weapons have particularly been prominent in media reports. 
Moreover, as Israel barred international news crews from entering Gaza, many news 
outlets were forced to source news and footage from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya 
channels which contributed to filtering some views that are sympathetic to the 
Palestinians to Western audiences. The unprecedented media criticisms of Israeli 
practises during the war and the increased awareness of the humanitarian aspect of the 
conflict usher significant changes in attitudes towards the conflict and its reporting.  
This study represents a contribution to a small but growing body of research 
about the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It presents an application of a 
modified version of CDA to an interesting corpus that deals with a timely and vital issue 
for peace in the Middle East and in the world at large. It shows that representations of 
the conflict are ideological and that they reflect and naturalise the asymmetries of power 
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between both sides of the conflict. It also shows that news reporting of the conflict is not 
as objective and free from bias and value judgments as it should ideally be. It is hoped 
that this may encourage newspapers to reconsider their representations of the conflict, so 
as to provide better contextualisation of events, balance the views of both sides and use 
linguistic structures in ways that do not mitigate responsibility for violence in order to 
represent events clearly and allow the readers to have a better understanding of events in 
context. The analysis shows that the members and actions of different sides are 
represented differently and that some of the differences are ideologically motivated. 
These representations can result in swaying the public opinion and giving the public a 
superficial and uncritical view of the conflict and its events. Both sides of the conflict 
are represented in a limited and fixed set of roles that are related to stereotypes of each 
side. This is true of media representations of the conflict in Arab and Western 
newspapers. 
I started this research because I noted the great discrepancy between the 
representation of the events of the conflict in Arab and Western media. Sometimes, it 
seemed to me as if they were describing different events and different groups when they 
really described the same events. In the course of my study, I came to scrutinise the 
representations of the conflict in different newspapers and also to re-evaluate my own 
ideas and position towards the conflict and its events. I grew up in an Arab country, and 
I learned history from an Arab point of view, but in the course of my study it became 
apparent that this is only one point of view and that there are other views of the conflict 
that can be quite different and also more influential and more widely accepted. I realised 
also that discourses of the conflict in Arab and Western cultures are so different that they 
do not enable mutual communication and the creation of a common ground for peace. I 
have concluded that media representations contribute to confirming prevailing 
conceptions of the conflict and its sides in each culture, and thus maintain the status quo. 
What I have achieved in my study at a personal level was a transformation of my views 
about the conflict, as I came to realise that the conflict is too complex to be undrestood 
from one point of view only. Peace between both sides requires a great deal of change of 
views, discourse and attitudes of and towards both sides of the conflict. I have also 
realised that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical not only for peace in the Middle 
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East, but also for world peace and for better relationships between the West and the 
Arab world.  
This study demonstrated certain aspects of the ideological workings of discourse 
in the representation of the conflict in newspapers issued in English in the Arab world 
and in the West; I plan to concentrate in my future research on the critical analysis of 
newspapers that are issued in Arabic. There is a need for studies that deal with the 
ideological representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab media and their role 
in the promotion of peace or conflict. Similarly, there is a need for more studies that 
examine its representations in Hebrew media. More studies that scrutinise the discourse 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are needed in order to be able to challenge the current 
conventions of representing the conflict and to change the discursive practises that 
promote violence and that maintain and naturalise the asymmetry of power between both 
sides, so as to replace them with practises that promote justice, peace and reconciliation 
between both sides. It is hoped that these academic studies can contribute to the 
enlightenment of peoples in both cultures and the achievement of peace for both the 
Palestinian and the Israeli peoples. 
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Appendices: Articles used for analysis 
Appendix 1 - The Reports of 31st July 2001  
 
The Arab News  
Israeli gunships pound Gaza  
By Nazer Majally, Arab News Staff — 
GAZA CITY, 31 July — Violence in the Middle East threatened to spiral out of control yesterday 
after six Palestinians were killed in a West Bank blast and Israeli combat helicopters pounded 
Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City. 
The upsurge in tensions came after a weekend of rioting in Jerusalem, where Israeli police and 
Palestinian protesters fought running battles on the Al-Haram Al-Sharif complex, one of the 
holiest sites in the Jewish and Islamic faiths. The unrest has left a US-sponsored cease-fire in 
tatters, with the death toll since it was declared June 13 rising to 61 — 44 Palestinians and 17 
Israelis. 
At least four Palestinian policemen were injured when Israeli helicopter gunships fired five 
missiles at the walled compound which Israeli Army said was being used to make arms and 
mortar shells. The blast smashed walls and blew out windows of the compound, known as 
“Arafat City,” after the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, who was in Tunisia to push for an 
Arab conference to tackle the 10 months of violence. 
“This is another Israeli crime,” Arafat’s top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina told AFP. “It will only escalate 
the situation. We ask the international community, namely the United States, to move swiftly to 
stop the Israeli aggression and its war against the Palestinians and to provide international 
protection.” 
The death toll rose sharply in the early hours yesterday morning when an explosion in a car junk 
yard in the West Bank village of Farah killed six Palestinian men, at least three of them 
militiamen from Arafat’s Fatah movement. Fatah officials vowed to exact “rapid and painful 
revenge.” “Our response will be more painful than can be imagined and it will be quicker than the 
(Israeli) occupation expects,” it said. 
The Palestinians said the men were killed by Israeli tank shells fired from a Jewish settlement 
northeast of Nablus. Around 10,000 Palestinians, shouting “revenge, revenge” and waving flags, 
swarmed into Farah from the neighboring towns of Nablus and Jenin for the funerals, which 
passed off without incident despite flaring tempers. 
The latest escalation in violence came after a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists held a brief 
but symbolic ceremony Sunday near the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem’s Old City to mark the 
laying of a cornerstone for a new temple on the site. The Jewish action sparked clashes which 
left at least 18 Palestinians injured and caused fury in the Arab world. 
The Palestinian Authority rejected earlier an idea to have a US-only monitoring force oversee a 
cease-fire and insisted on a fully international team. Ahmad Abdel-Rahman, an aide to Arafat, 
said the PA would welcome US participation “within the observation force” but would not 
compromise on having people from other countries included. “We need Americans and others, 
not only Americans. It is very clear, Americans alone are not enough,” he told Reuters. Israeli 
political sources said last week Israel could agree to the deployment of as many as 10 US 
Central Intelligence Agency officers to monitor a cease-fire hammered out by the agency’s 
director, George Tenet, in June. Israel has refused any international presence other than a US 
one in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, maintaining it would serve as a shield to Palestinian 
attacks on Israelis.  
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The New York Times  
 
In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence  
 
By CLYDE HABERMAN  
JERUSALEM, July 30  
 
The state of Israeli-Palestinian relations is looking more and more like a police blotter. That was 
conspicuously so today as bombs, mortars, missiles and knives left casualties on both sides 
across the length of the land. 
In the northern part of the West Bank, six Palestinians allied with Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian 
Authority chairman, were blown apart in an explosion at a roadside tin shack between Nablus 
and Jenin.  
 
Despite a lack of conclusive evidence as to what caused the blast, Palestinian officials accused 
Israel of carrying out an assassination, part of an army pattern of targeted killings. The charge 
was firmly denied by the Israelis, who called the explosion "a work accident" -- the euphemism 
here for Palestinians' inadvertently blowing themselves up while preparing bombs for terrorist 
operations.  
 
The West Bank incident, which occurred before dawn, set the tone for a long day of violence. It 
reflected the deepening mistrust and anger between the two sides, which find themselves mired 
in a warlike situation that is not really a war: a declared cease-fire that has degenerated into 
ceaseless fire, resisting international appeals for calm. 
 
The attacks came today in a steady tattoo. 
 
In northern Israel, three members of Israel's border police were wounded in a drive-by shooting 
while they were on patrol near a kibbutz not far from the West Bank border. In Gaza City, seven 
Palestinian police officers were wounded when Israeli helicopters fired at a building in the police 
headquarters compound. Israel said the building was a mortar-producing factory. Palestinian 
officials said the helicopters had hit a weapons storeroom. 
 
At Kfar Darom, a Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, a 9-year-old girl was hit by shrapnel from 
a mortar round that landed near her. In Jerusalem, a Jewish man was stabbed and critically 
wounded as he was walking out of the Muslim quarter of the Old City. 
 
Even before then, Jerusalem was on edge a day after Palestinians showered stones on Jews 
praying at the Western Wall in the Old City, an action that touched off skirmishes with Israeli 
police officers at the Aksa Mosque compound. 
 
Uneasiness hung in the air. The United States consulate general in Jerusalem issued a notice 
reaffirming that its employees would be wise to keep away from crowded areas and stay off 
public buses. The Jerusalem police added their own security alert for Israelis. 
 
"There are concentrated efforts to drag Jerusalem into the circle of violence," cautioned Mickey 
Levy, the city's police chief. Some government workers downtown said they were told this 
morning to stay in their offices and off the streets. 
 
In mid-afternoon, a small bomb exploded in a basement supermarket on heavily traveled King 
George Street, in the heart of town. No one was hurt. But nerves were rattled, and the mere 
rumor of yet another attack jangled them further. 
 
Soon after the supermarket explosion, there was a report of another bomb in the Sheik Jarrah 
section of eastern Jerusalem. It turned out to be a can that had been left in a car, where it burst 
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from intense heat. A couple of hours later, word came of a bus bombing across town, in an area 
called Givat Shaul. It was another false alarm. A tire on the bus had burst. 
 
Some in Jerusalem found it all increasingly hard to take. "We're strong," a middle-aged woman 
said as she walked by police cordons set up along King George Street. "But emotionally this is 
difficult." 
 
In the West Bank explosion, the six who died were described as men of consequence in the 
Aksa Brigades, the armed branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction. Palestinian officials said three 
had been on an Israeli wanted list. That struck the officials as quite a coincidence. This had to be 
an assassination, they insisted. 
 
But no one could say how it was supposedly carried out. 
 
At first, some Palestinians said helicopters had fired missiles at the shack, in a village called Al 
Fara. No, others said, Israeli tanks shelled the place. On closer inspection, neither version held 
water, prompting still further speculation in Al Fara that Palestinians collaborating with Israel had 
somehow arranged for explosives to go off inside the shack. 
 
Israel's explanation was simpler: there were no assassins. 
 
"It was a work accident," said Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister. Bomb makers, 
Ms. Rabin-Pelosoff said on the army's radio station, "have recently been making many mistakes, 
and they pay for it with their lives." 
 
"It is not the first time the Palestinians have claimed we killed a squad," she said. 
 
It was also not the first time that Israel denied responsibility for the sudden deaths of 
Palestinians allied with Mr. Arafat. There have been at least three known "work accidents" in the 
last 10 days or so. 
 
Even if that is indeed what they were, these incidents have added to the tensions, producing 
Palestinian promises of reprisals that in turn lead to Israeli warnings of swift counterattacks. 
 
The Guardian  
 
Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist  
Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem 
Tuesday July 31, 2001 
 
A powerful explosion killed six Palestinian activists in the West Bank, and Israeli helicopter 
gunships rocketed the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City yesterday, punctuating a 
day of sharply escalating tensions.  
The six Palestinians - who were on Israel's most-wanted list - were killed soon after midnight 
when an explosion ripped through a shack in a junkyard north of the West Bank town of Nablus.  
Palestinian leaders immediately accused the Israeli army of firing tank shells on the shack, and 
said that the men were targeted as part of Israel's policy of assassinating Palestinian militants.  
In Nablus, Fatah leaders said they believed the men were killed by a bomb planted by one of the 
Israeli collaborators who have infiltrated Palestinian political and security organisations.  
However, Israel's deputy defence minister, Dalia Rabin Pelossof, said the men were killed in a 
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"work accident" - the local euphemism employed when bombmakers blow themselves up. 
Witnesses said there were no signs of shell fragments in the debris.  
"Attackers who are trying to activate explosive devices ... recently they have been making many 
mistakes ... and they pay with their lives for it," she told Army Radio.  
The explosion blew the roof off the shack in a yard of rusting cars near the Fara refugee camp, 
hurling body parts 30 yards from the table where the men had apparently been sitting. Several 
bloodied playing cards were recovered from the wreckage. All six victims were activists in 
Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement; three of them had served in the Palestinian security forces.  
Some of the victims were believed to belong to a shadowy cell within Fatah, the Revolutionary 
Martyrs of al-Aqsa Saints. The group, which emerged in the early months of the latest uprising, 
has broken with the main organisation by attacking targets inside the borders of the Jewish 
state.  
Within the West Bank and Gaza, it has also been deployed to punish suspected collaborators, or 
those suspected of corruption. The al-Aqsa group claimed the gangland-style killing of the chief 
of Palestinian television in a Gaza City seaside restaurant last January. Palestinian officials said 
the six men had taken to sleeping in the shack because they feared an attack on their homes as 
Israel steps up its policy of attacking Palestinian militants accused of planning raids inside Israel.  
Israel, meanwhile, was on heightened alert yesterday for a car bomb attack intelligence officials 
believe was in the process of being staged by militants based in Nablus. In recent days, Israeli 
security forces have thwarted a spate of bombing attempts inside Israel. Several have 
concentrated on the Jerusalem area.  
A small blast from a booby-trapped beer can at a supermarket in central Jerusalem yesterday 
underlined the tense security situation, as did the stabbing of an Orthodox Jewish man at the 
gates of the old city of Jerusalem. Hospital officials said he was in serious condition.  
As 2,000 angry mourners took the six men to their graves in the West Bank yesterday afternoon, 
Israeli helicopters fired at least three missiles on Gaza City's main police compound, sending out 
great clouds of white smoke, and injuring at least three people. The Israeli army said that it had 
attacked a mortar factory.  
The sharp upswing in violence comes during a momentary lull in international diplomatic efforts 
to find a peaceful resolution to the 10-month Palestinian uprising.  
At yesterday's cabinet meeting, Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, set aside a foreign ministry 
research paper proposing Israel carry out long-delayed transfers of land to the Palestinians set 
out in the Oslo peace accords.  
"Every morning we must learn this sentence by heart: there is no negotiation under fire," Mr 
Sharon said.  
 
The Times  
 
Six men killed in Gaza explosion 
 
Ross Dunn in Jerusalem 
 
SIX Palestinian activists died in an explosion on the West Bank yesterday. Later, missiles from 
Israeli helicopters damaged the Palestinian police headquarters in the Gaza Strip, although no 
serious injuries were reported.  
 
The two incidents have heightened fears of a new wave of Palestinian bombing attacks against 
Israel. 
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Palestinian officials denied claims that the six men who died in the explosion in the West Bank 
town of Jenin were preparing explosives and accused Israel of murdering them with tank shells. 
There were, however, no Israeli helicopters in the area at the time of the blast, which blew the 
roof off a shack, indicating that the explosion had come from within. Some were identified as 
members of Fatah, the Palestinian security establishment, and were said to be on Israel's list of 
suspected terrorists. 
 
Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister, said: "Attackers who are trying to 
activate explosive devices...recently they have been making many mistakes." 
 
The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr George Carey, on a four-day pastoral visit to the Middle East, 
appealed to Christians to remain in the Holy Land. "Stay put, make your mark, but share your 
message with the rest of us around the world," he said. 
 
 
Appendix 2 - The Reports of 1st August 2002 
 
The Arab News  
 
Jerusalem Bomb Kills Seven 
OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, 1 August — A bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria in 
Jerusalem yesterday, killing seven people, five of them foreigners. Some 70 people were 
injured. At least one of the dead was an American woman, while another victim was a 
Frenchman. 
Responsibility for the lunchtime blast at Hebrew University at Mount Scopus was claimed by 
Hamas which said in a statement that it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military 
leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children. 
Many of those in the cafe at the Frank Sinatra International Students’ Center were foreigners on 
summer courses. There were some Palestinians, too. Witnesses said the bomb appeared to 
have been stashed in a plastic sack. It exploded shortly before 2 p.m. and gutted the eatery. The 
blast sent people fleeing in panic. Victims staggered out of the cafeteria, located in an Israeli 
enclave of Arab East Jerusalem. 
Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin said: “When Israel bombs a civilian building full of women 
and children and kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect.” 
US civil rights leader Jesse Jackson canceled talks in Gaza with Sheikh Yassin. “We canceled 
that meeting to show respect for the victims and their families,” Jackson said after turning around 
at the Israel-Gaza border. “We feel no useful purpose would be served to meet under the current 
conditions,” he said. Jackson is currently on a peace mission to the occupied territories at the 
head of an inter-faith delegation. 
The Palestinian Authority of Yasser Arafat condemned the attack. So did US President George 
W. Bush. Bush vowed the bombing would not undermine his “vision of peace” for the Middle 
East. 
“There are clearly killers who hate the thought of peace and therefore are willing to take their 
hatred to all kinds of places, including a university,” he told reporters after a Cabinet meeting at 
the White House. 
“This country condemns that kind of killing, and we send our deepest sympathy to the students 
 228 
and their families,” Bush said. “I also want to make it clear to the killers they won’t stop us from 
rallying the world to fight their kind of terror, nor will they stop us from having a vision of peace.” 
Before the blast, Israel’s Security Cabinet decided to expel to the Gaza Strip a relative of a West 
Bank resident who had attacked Israelis, political sources said after the meeting. The man will 
have 12 hours to appeal the decision, the sources said. 
The online edition of the Israeli daily Haaretz said the man in question was a relative of a 
Palestinian who ambushed a bus near the Jewish settlement of Emmanuel on July 17, killing 
nine people. 
The decision emerged as the Security Cabinet met to consider new ways of tackling bombings a 
day after a teenager blew himself up in Jerusalem, injuring seven Israelis. If the expulsion goes 
ahead, it will be the first time the controversial measure, which has been criticized at home and 
abroad, has been used by Israel since the start of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, in 
September 2000. 
An Israeli government spokesman accused Arafat of “encouraging” the rash of attacks to avoid 
carrying out reforms in his own administration. “This is an attempt by the Palestinian Authority to 
try to avoid making the necessary reforms. It is Yasser Arafat who directly encourages this,” Avi 
Pazner said. 
The Palestinian Authority retorted, “The leadership considers Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
as being responsible for this cycle of terror. This cycle of terror is a result of policies that are 
adopted by Sharon’s government.” 
 
The New York Times  
 
AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB JERUSALEM CAMPUS  
 
By JAMES BENNET and JOHN KIFNER 
 
JERUSALEM, July 31  
 
A powerful bomb hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian militants tore apart a bustling 
cafeteria during lunch at Hebrew University here today, killing seven people, including at least 
three Americans, and wounding more than 80. 
 
Through a bedlam of screams and crashing glass, students fled in horror from the cafeteria, in 
the Frank Sinatra Student Center, some trailing blood onto the concrete courtyard of Nancy 
Reagan Plaza.  
 
Because of the campus' diverse student body -- it is one of the few enclaves here where Israeli 
Jews and Israeli Arabs still mix -- students said they had felt safe, even as new violence 
threatened the city this week. Arab students were among the wounded, hospital officials said, as 
were foreign students. 
 
In Washington, the State Department reported the deaths of the three Americans, two women 
and one man. One victim, Janis Ruth Coulter of New York City, was identified tonight by the 
American Friends of Hebrew University.  
 
The State Department declined to identify the American victims further as consular officials 
worked to notify relatives. 
 
An administration official said there might be more Americans among the dead. He gave no 
further details, except to say that the identification process was continuing. The Israeli consul in 
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Boston, Hillel Newman, told The Boston Globe last night that four Americans had been killed in 
the attack. 
 
Philip Reeker, a department spokesman, called the attack "absolutely tragic and outrageous." 
 
President Bush condemned the bombing and said it was perpetrated by "killers who hate the 
thought of peace and therefore are willing to take their hatred to all kinds of places, including a 
university."  
 
The bombing at the campus, on Mount Scopus, was the second in two days in Jerusalem. The 
Islamist group Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing, saying that it acted in retaliation for 
Israel's killing last week of a top Hamas leader. Fourteen others, including nine children, died in 
that attack, in which Israel bombed a house in Gaza City.  
 
Spencer Dew, 26, a divinity student from the University of Chicago studying here for the 
summer, was eating on the patio when he heard the blast, then smelled gunpowder. Lacerated 
by flying glass, he joined the fleeing crowd, then returned for a notebook, which had also been 
pierced by glass.  
 
"I know there are justifications -- bad justifications," he said of the political violence, his shirt 
spotted crimson and his khaki pants torn as he left a hospital here. "It's killing college students. 
That's no political solution for anything. It's killing college kids."  
 
As emergency workers cleared the site, Abeer Salman, 19, a student from the Arab village of 
Beit Safafa, sat on the plaza steps, stunned. 
 
"I was across the plaza," she said. "My friend wanted to get something to drink. After two 
minutes we heard a blast, and we can't find her." 
 
The campus is fenced, and guards check the bags of those who enter. But some students 
complained that the security was porous. An investigation by a campus paper in January warned 
that a cafeteria would be an appealing, accessible target.  
 
"The security tries to do their best," said Kobi Cohen, the student union president."But there are 
a lot of holes in the fence. A lot of guards don't check the bags well." 
 
Mr. Cohen, who helped evacuate the wounded, said, "We always believed that because there 
are Arab students here and Arab workers, nobody will try to hurt us here."  
 
The attack was unusual in that it appeared not to be the work of a suicide bomber. Police 
officials said initial investigation suggested that the bomb was hidden in a bag.  
 
Israeli officials said the attack fit a Palestinian strategy of killing civilians. "This is a continuous 
effort by the Palestinians to kill as many Israelis as possible in order to sabotage the peace 
process," said Gideon Meir, a senior Foreign Ministry official. "It has nothing to do with what 
happened in Gaza City a week ago." 
 
The Palestinian Authority, led by Yasir Arafat, issued a statement saying that it "absolutely 
condemns the attack against Hebrew University" but adding that it blamed Israel's prime 
minister, Ariel Sharon, for provoking violence. 
 
After back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more than a month ago, Israel began a 
ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress Palestinian violence.  
 
But Palestinian militants vowed retaliation after the bombing last week. After five people were 
injured in the suicide bombing here on Tuesday, Mr. Sharon met senior security advisers before 
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today's attack to discuss ways of coping with suicide bombers, and the group endorsed the idea 
of deporting members of the killers' families. Tonight, Israeli military officials convened to 
consider possible retaliation.  
 
Ron Krumer, a spokesman for the Hadassah Medical Center, where some of the wounded were 
taken, said the victims suffered "penetrating injuries, with lots of metal elements, such as bolts 
and screws and nails, all over their bodies." 
 
The bomb sprayed blood across the ceiling tiles, tore apart wooden chairs and scattered the 
antique radios decorating the cafeteria. A large jar of pickled radishes sat unbroken on one 
counter, as an officer a few feet away used large tweezers to pick evidence out of a pool of 
blood.  
 
Students jotted down lists of friends and frantically dialed their cellphones, checking off the 
names of those who responded. Others called home to say they were all right.  
 
"I got delayed; I'm the luckiest man in the world," Allistaire Goldrein, 19, of Liverpool, England, 
told his worried father, calling from England. Mr. Goldrein said he ate in the cafeteria every day 
and was delayed today by another student. 
 
"I was coming around the corner and suddenly there was this huge explosion," he said. "I can't 
describe it -- huge. The very foundation of the stone structure was shaken." 
 
Mr. Goldrein said he raced inside. "It was carnage in there," he said. "Carnage, anarchy. It was 
disgusting. I saw dead people. I saw people with no heads. There was a guy, I gave him mouth 
to mouth, but he was dead." 
 
Just outside the campus this afternoon, the police detained scores of Arab men, including some 
who appeared to be students, keeping them standing in the sun for several hours as they 
searched for suspects. 
 
Representatives of an anti-Palestinian faction arrived at the blast site and unfurled a banner 
declaring, "It's them or us" and "Expel the Arab enemy." Dror Lederman, 26, a student of 
economics and accounting, angrily accosted one man. "Get out of here," he said. "You come 
every time. You come to dance on the blood." 
 
Students watched in shock as emergency workers carried their peers away on orange 
stretchers, through an area where graduation ceremonies are held. "I was standing in the Forum 
and watching them bring people on stretchers, and I saw blood and shoes and I.V.'s on the 
ground," said Sophia Aron, 19, of Los Angeles, a student from the University of California, Davis, 
who is studying here for a year. "Right in the Forum. It freaks me out. But I'm not leaving." 
 
Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a political leader of Hamas, blamed Israel for the attack. "Such 
operations will continue until the elimination of the occupation," he said. Hamas leaders consider 
all of Israel to be occupied territory, not just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which Israel 
occupied in 1967. 
 
Shlomo Avineri, a political science professor at the university, said: "This is beyond the pale, to 
attack a university, and it shows what the war is about. It's not about the settlements. It's not 
about occupation. It's about the very existence of a Jewish population in this country." 
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Bomb kills seven at university  
Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination 
Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem 
Thursday August 1, 2002 
 
The bombers of Hamas struck at the heart of student life yesterday, killing at least seven people 
and injuring more than 70 in a lunchtime attack on a crowded university cafeteria.  
In the maelstrom of the intifada, the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University had remained 
a rare preserve of co-existence between Arab and Jew, and attracted scores of foreign 
exchange students during the summer months.  
Yesterday, the forecourt of the Frank Sinatra international students' centre was splattered with 
blood, food, smashed trays and shards from huge plate glass windows blown out by a powerful 
bomb apparently left inside.  
Hamas said the bombing was the first act of retaliation for Israel's decision to drop a one-tonne 
bomb in Gaza City, killing a commander it had targeted for assassination and 14 other 
Palestinians.  
Sharon Avital, 26, an MBA student, had just put down her tray at a table by the windows when 
an explosion rocked the heavy concrete pavilion.  
"First of all there was silence, and then the screaming started," she said, after being treated for 
minor head cuts. "There were screams, people lying on the floor, blood, and darkness. I felt a 
blow to the back of my head, and then I looked down and my hands were covered in blood."  
One of the dead was an American exchange student, officials at Jerusalem hospitals said, and 
foreign students - an American, an Italian, and three from South Korea - were among the 
wounded. At least 10 Arab students were also injured.  
Most of the wounded were aged 18-30, and were hit by shrapnel or metal rods when the ceiling 
collapsed.  
Students ripped up their T-shirts for tourniquets and carried the wounded to ambulances. The 
corpses were laid out under black plastic sheeting against the nearby law faculty building.  
"I saw a girl my age covered up with a blanket because she was dead," said Daniel Farahan, a 
20-year-old from Indiana with long dreadlocks under his kippa [skullcap]. "You see it on TV all 
the time, but this was nothing like TV."  
The bombing marked a departure from Hamas's usual methods - primarily suicide bombings.  
"The bomb was in a bag which had been planted on a table in the centre of the restaurant," said 
the police spokeswoman Sigal Toledo.  
Within minutes of the attack, police began rounding up young Palestinian men in Arab areas 
near the campus, forcing them to stand spread-eagled against walls.  
Until now, educational institutions were seen as off-limits to attackers - particularly Hebrew 
University, where a high proportion of students are Arabs, Palestinians and Israeli citizens from 
the Arab towns of the Galilee.  
"How do you justify walking into a university and blowing up children who are studying?" asked 
Alistair Goldrein, from Liverpool, who has been studying at the university for a month. "These 
were students. A lot of people are heavy leftwingers who want to get out of the territories right 
away."  
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In an implicit claim of responsibility, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, said 
the attack was the natural consequence of events in Gaza.  
"When Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and children, and kills 15 people, this is the 
response they should expect," he told the television cameras. "Today's Israeli government 
should bear responsibility." A Hamas official said it would be the first of many attacks. It was the 
second bombing in Jerusalem in 24 hours.  
Although Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority was swift to say it "absolutely condemns the 
attack", it also laid the blame at the feet of the prime minister, Ariel Sharon, for continuing 
Israel's policy "of destruction, killing and collective punishment".  
Just hours before the attack, Mr Sharon's security cabinet ordered the first expulsion of a relative 
of a Palestinian militant since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.  
Although Israel's plans to deport the families of wanted Palestinian men have been condemned 
abroad, the public security minister, Uzi Landau, told Israel Radio yesterday that it was "enough 
for a relative of a relative of a suicide bomber to set up a mourning tent or visit a mourning tent 
for him" in order to be selected for exile.  
It said the first candidate for deportation - a relative of one of the militants ambushed a bus of 
Jewish settlers two weeks ago - would be given a chance to appeal. However, he was expected 
to be deported yesterday.  
 
The Times  
 
Hamas bomb kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university 
 
Stephen Farrell in Jerusalem 
 
Blood and shredded ivy cling to columns inside the cafeteria that was until yesterday one of the 
few symbols of cross-community life in Israel. 
 
Amid the bustle of the kosher restaurant no one noticed the bag beneath a Meeting Place sign 
where Jewish, Arab, American, British and other foreign students have studied together for 
years. 
 
Yesterday seven of these students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, including one 
American, lay dead and more than 80 injured after a Hamas bomber struck while they chatted 
over coffee and bagels beside the Frank Sinatra International Student Centre.  
 
Alastair Goldrein, 20, a student from Merseyside, said: "Glass was flying everywhere. Tables 
were flying everywhere. Things were flying out of the window. It went quiet for a few moments 
and then there was wailing. 
 
"It was anarchy. I joined with a few others and tried to take bodies out. The wounds were just 
appallingly awful. It was beyond anything that you could ever imagine. There were holes in 
people's bodies. 
 
"I was stuffing scraps of paper from exercise books into people's wounds, there was so much 
screaming and desperation on people's faces," he said. "There were Israelis there, Arabs and 
kids from all over the world. In this cafe, Arabs and Jews ate their lunch in harmony, in peace, 
without any of the divides you hear about so much elsewhere in the world. 
 
"This is a very mixed university, a very cosmopolitan university. I carried out one girl obviously of 
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Arab extraction and she was very badly wounded."On one shattered window hung a notice 
warning that no milk products were allowed, in line with Jewish dietary rules. In another corner, 
next to a pile of bloodstained napkins lay a durbaka, an Arab drum. 
 
Everyone thought that the university's Mount Scopus campus was one of the safest places in a 
dangerous country, its modernist angular limestone buildings hidden from Jerusalem and 
outlying Palestinian villages by a screen of fir trees and conifers providing a sense of security. 
 
True, guards checked bags at the campus gates and, true, the student university newspaper 
printed a warning last April, visualising, with uncanny accuracy, a terrorist attack in which 
Palestinians kill seven people and injure dozens. 
 
But as shaken students sitting on blood-spattered park benches testified yesterday, there were 
no armed guards on the campus itself because everyone assumed that the presence of 2,000 
Palestinian students and numerous Arab staff among the 16,000 on campus guaranteed 
immunity from attack. 
 
This delusion was shattered shortly before 2pm when, police believe, a bomb left in a bag on a 
table inside the crowded cafeteria exploded near the till, shredding bodies, ripping the fake 
1950s bakelite wirelesses off the walls and blowing a South Korean student through a window. 
 
For Mr Goldrein it was his second such encounter, after being just yards from a blast in a central 
Jerusalem shopping precinct last December. 
 
Responsibility for the attack was taken by Hamas, the Islamic group seeking revenge for the 
death of 15 Palestinians including its military commander, Salah Shehadeh, in an Israeli airstrike 
in Gaza last week. 
 
Yassir Arafat's Palestinian Authority condemned the strike. President Bush said that he would 
continue to seek peace in the Middle East. "There are clearly killers who hate the thought of 
peace and, therefore, are willing to take their hatred to all kinds of places, including a university," 
he said. 
 
 
Appendix 3 - The Reports of 15th January 2004  
 
The Arab News  
Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis 
OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, 15 January 2004 — A Palestinian mother of two blew herself up yesterday at 
the Erez Crossing at the Israel-Gaza border, killing three Israeli soldiers and a private security guard and 
signaling a new tactic by Hamas, who had never before dispatched a woman suicide bomber.  
Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin said the use of a woman bomber was unique for the group, 
but holy war ―is an obligation of all Muslims, men and women.‖  
Israel said it will temporarily close the crossing to Palestinians, preventing thousands of workers from 
traveling to a nearby Israeli-Palestinian industrial zone that is one of the last vestiges of cooperation 
between the two peoples after more than three years of violence in which thousands have been killed.  
The army said four of the seven wounded in the attack were Palestinians. 
The bombing came as efforts to restart peace negotiations remained stalled, with Israel‘s leaders 
threatening to impose a new boundary between Israel and the Palestinians if no progress is made soon.  
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Meanwhile, a British man shot in the head by Israeli troops in Gaza Strip last April died Tuesday after 
nine months in a comatose state, his family said yesterday. Tom Hurndall, a member of the International 
Solidarity Movement, was trying to help children out of the path of a tank in the Rafah refugee camp when 
he was shot.  
An Israeli soldier was charged Monday in the incident. A military official said on condition of anonymity 
that the indictment could be upgraded to manslaughter.  
At the Erez Crossing yesterday morning, a woman identified as Reem Raiyshi, 22, told soldiers checking 
Palestinians that she would set off a metal detector because she had an implant to repair a broken leg. She 
was taken for a security search to a special room, where she set off the bomb, said Maj. Sharon Feingold, a 
military spokeswoman.  
―I heard soldiers screaming, the blast was very strong,‖ said a Palestinian woman standing outside the 
room who identified herself only as Amena. She said another Palestinian woman in the room ran out, 
bleeding from her legs.  
After the explosion, a temporary structure made of corrugated metal had a large hole in the roof, and 
destroyed desks and computers were scattered nearby.  
The bombing was jointly claimed by Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, linked to Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat‘s Fatah movement. However, Raiyshi was described as a Hamas activist.  
―This is an indication that resistance will continue,‖ Yassin said.  
The tactic of using a woman appeared aimed at piercing Israeli security, which mainly focuses on men as 
possible suicide bombers. Other militant groups have used women in the past but Hamas had not done so.  
In a video made before the bombing, Raiyshi wears the traditional hijab covering for women, holds an 
assault rifle and stands before two green Hamas flags.  
―I always wanted to be the first woman to carry out a martyr attack, where parts of my body can fly all 
over. That is the only wish I can ask God for,‖ she said with a smile.  
Raiyshi had two children: a girl, Doha, 18 months, and a boy, Obedia, 3. Her brother-in-law Yusef Awad 
expressed disbelief that she had abandoned her children. ―We were not expecting that from her. We would 
not have thought it possible,‖ he said.  
Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei declined to condemn the attack, saying that continued Israeli 
attacks and restrictions on the Palestinians are leading ―to more escalation on both sides.‖  
There have been several previous attacks at the Erez Crossing. In response to yesterday‘s attack, Israeli 
officials said they would close the Erez Crossing to Palestinians for several days. Roughly 6,000 
Palestinians have to enter Erez to get to jobs at an industrial zone filled with Israeli, Palestinian and jointly 
owned factories.  
―We are not going to close it (permanently) but no one can blame us for making more stringent checks,‖ 
said Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.  
Brig. Gen. Gadi Shamni, the Israeli military commander in Gaza, indicated that Israel would hit back. ―I 
imagine that we will know how to respond at the time, place and method of our choosing,‖ he told Israel 
TV.  
The industrial zone straddling the Israel-Gaza border provides crucial jobs to residents of the 
impoverished coastal plain, where 60 percent of working-age people are unemployed.  
A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the attack on Erez appeared aimed at pushing 
Israel to close the border, depriving thousands of Palestinians of work and making life in Gaza even more 
miserable — which raises the popularity of militant groups.  
— Additional input from agencies 
 
The New York Times 
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January 15, 2004 
Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing  
BYLINE: By GREG MYRE 
 
A young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew herself up 
Wednesday at the entrance to a security inspection center for Palestinian workers, killing four 
Israeli security personnel and wounding seven people, the Israeli military said. 
 
The bomber, Reem al-Reyashi, 22, said in video released after her attack that "it was always my 
wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on the doors of 
heaven with the skulls of Zionists." Ms. Reyashi left behind a son aged 3, and a year-old 
daughter.  
 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said this was the first time his group had 
dispatched a woman to be a suicide bomber. Some militant Palestinian factions have been 
reluctant to do so, and some Islamic groups have questioned whether it is permitted under 
Islamic law.  
 
But when Sheik Yassin was asked why Hamas had decided to send a woman, he cited purely 
tactical concerns. "It could be that a man would not be able to reach the target, and that's why 
they had to use a woman," he said. 
 
Ms. Reyashi's attack, in an industrial zone at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip, was the first 
Palestinian suicide bombing to kill Israelis since a Dec. 25 blast at a bus stop outside Tel Aviv, 
which also left four dead. Middle East violence has been down recently, but the blast ratcheted 
up tensions and dealt another blow to peace efforts that have been stalled for months. 
 
Israel responded by immediately shutting down the industrial zone and sending home the 
roughly 4,000 Palestinian workers employed in its factories. 
 
"Palestinian terrorists are not only committed to striking Israelis at every opportunity, they are 
also bent on destroying their own economy," said David Baker, an official in the office of Israel's 
prime minister, Ariel Sharon. 
 
Palestinians have carried out more than 100 suicide bombings during the past three years of 
violence. But such attacks have been extremely rare in the fenced-in Gaza Strip, where 
Palestinian contact with Israelis is largely limited to security checks at places such as Erez. 
 
Ms. Reyashi was able to carry out her bombing by momentarily deceiving the soldiers with her 
claim that she needed medical treatment inside Israel, the military said. 
 
She joined the line where the Palestinians go through a security check each morning as they 
enter the industrial zone. 
 
As she approached the building's entrance, which has a metal detector at the doorway, she was 
limping, the Israeli military and Palestinian witnesses said. She told soldiers she had a recent leg 
operation, and a metal pin had been implanted that the detector would register. 
 
 236 
She was allowed to pass, and when the alarm sounded, the soldiers told her to wait while they 
called an army woman to search her, the military said. Seconds later, Ms. Reyashi detonated 
her bomb, estimated at about 10 pounds and packed with ball bearings and screws to make it 
more lethal, the military said. 
 
The blast tore apart the simple structure, sending part of the roof skyward and leaving behind 
dangling strips of metal. The floor was sticky with blood and littered with body parts, and 
bloodstains speckled the walls. 
 
Two soldiers, a border policeman and a civilian security guard were killed and seven people 
were wounded, including both Israeli security personnel and Palestinians heading to work. 
 
Ms. Reyashi, who came from a middle-class family in Gaza City, appeared in her video wearing 
combat fatigues, with an automatic rifle in her hands and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher on 
the desk in front of her. 
 
"God gave me the ability to be a mother of two children who I love so," she said. "But my wish to 
meet God in paradise is greater, so I decided to be a martyr for the sake of my people. I am 
convinced God will help and take care of my children." 
 
After the bombing, her husband was seen crying outside the family home. A relative said he had 
no knowledge of his wife's plans, Reuters reported. 
 
Hamas, the Islamic movement, and the Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a faction loyal to the Palestinian 
leader Yasir Arafat, took joint responsibility for the attack, saying it was revenge for Israel's killing 
of Palestinians. 
 
Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian leadership usually condemn suicide bombings inside Israel, but 
issued no such statement after Wednesday's blast. 
 
The Palestinian leaders rarely criticize attacks against Israeli soldiers or settlers in the West 
Bank or Gaza, land Israel has occupied since the 1967 war. 
 
Hamas had not carried out a suicide attack for the past four months, and senior Israeli military 
officials said last month that they believed Hamas had temporarily suspended them. 
 
But Sheik Yassin said Wednesday that "there is no truce, operations will continue." 
 
Wednesday's bombing raised the prospect of a step-up in battles between Hamas and the 
Israeli military. 
 
Last summer, Israel's military struck at four senior Hamas leaders, including Sheik Yassin, while 
the Islamic faction carried out several suicide bombings. 
 
 
The Guardian  
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January 15, 2004 
Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint 
BYLINE: Chris McGreal in Gaza 
 
A 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two small children, pretending to be disabled, killed four 
Israelis at a Gaza border crossing yesterday after duping soldiers into allowing her a personal 
security check rather than going through a metal detector. 
 
The Islamic resistance movement Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade said the attack by 
Reem Riyashi, from Gaza City, was a joint operation in revenge for weeks of Israeli incursions 
into West Bank cities that have left about 25 Palestinians dead. 
 
It was the first time Hamas had used a woman as a human bomb. 
 
She left a videotaped message in which she was pictured in combat fatigues, holding an 
automatic rifle and with a rocket-propelled grenade in front of her. She said she had dreamed 
since she was 13 of turning "my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists".  
 
"I always wanted to be the first woman to carry out a martyrdom operation, where parts of my 
body can fly all over," she said. "God has given me two children. I love them (with) a kind of love 
that only God knows, but my love to meet God is stronger still." 
 
Mrs Riyashi detonated her 2kg bomb inside a building used to check thousands of Palestinians 
who cross each day from Gaza to work in a neighbouring industrial zone. The Israeli army said 
that when she reached the metal detector, the suicide bomber pretended to be crippled and said 
she had metal plates in her leg which would sound the alarm. She asked to be checked with a 
body search. 
 
She was taken to an area where a group of soldiers and policemen was checking bags and was 
told to wait for a woman to come and search her in a cubicle. She then detonated the explosive. 
 
The blast tore open the corrugated iron roof and sent shards of metal and glass ripping through 
the room. Soldiers used putty knives and pieces of plastic skirting board to scrape strips of flesh 
from the floor and walls. 
 
All the dead were Israelis: two soldiers, a policeman and a civilian security worker. Seven other 
Israelis and about four Palestinians were injured. 
 
The Gaza divisional commander, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, described the attack as a 
cynical abuse of his soldiers' attempts to treat women with dignity. 
 
"We're doing our best to be humanitarian, to consider the problems associated with searching 
women. She said she had a medical problem, that's why the soldiers let her in, to check her in 
private because she is a woman," he said. "That's a very cruel, cynical use of the humanitarian 
considerations of our soldiers." 
 
The attack came after months of relative quiet by the Palestinians which has seen few suicide 
bombings. An attack on Christmas Day by Islamic Jihad killed four Israelis. Last week, a teenage 
suicide bomber killed himself, but no one else. Prior to those attacks, there had been no 
 238 
bombings since October. 
 
However, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, yesterday warned that other 
women would follow Mrs Riyashi's example. 
 
Her family swiftly set up the traditional memorial tent near her home in Gaza City. Her relatives 
offered neither praise for her attack nor an explanation of why a mother with children just three 
years and 18 months old should choose to become a suicide bomber. 
 
Her family is wealthy, whereas most bombers come from poorer backgrounds. She is the eighth 
female suicide bomber, but only one other had children. 
 
At Mrs Riyashi's house, her brother-in-law, Yusuf Awad, was dismantling the main gate and 
moving out furniture in preparation for the arrival of an Israeli army demolition team, which 
usually blows up the homes of suicide bombers. 
 
"I denounce her attack," he said. "I support peace. We don't accept women doing such things. 
She has two children. It is not right." 
 
A Hamas official at a memorial service in the local mosque, who called himself Abu Jihad, said 
there would be more such women bombers. 
 
"We should expect that more female martyr warriors will do this. It is allowed in Islam because 
Hamas saw that it is no longer easy to send a male warrior to attack them (the Israelis). This 
year will see a large number of women joining in the attacks," he said. 
 
The Israeli military responded by immediately closing the Gaza crossings to Palestinians for 
several days. 
 
"They're always trying to kill, even if they hurt themselves," said Lieutenant Ayelet Kadosh. 
 
"What will happen is that while we are investigating the crossing will be closed and thousands of 
Palestinians will go hungry because they cannot go to work." 
 
About 4,000 Palestinians work in factories in the sealed industrial zone connected to Gaza, 
many of them providing for extended families in Gaza where there is 70% unemployment. 
 
A further 14,000 Palestinians cross from Gaza to Israel each day. The military swiftly ordered 
Palestinians out of the factories and, under heavy guard, sent them home. 
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January 15, 2004, Thursday 
BYLINE: Ian MacKinnon 
'It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists' 
Suicide-bomb mother fakes disability to kill four as Hamas launches fresh front, writes 
Ian MacKinnon in Gaza. 
 
A PALESTINIAN mother of two faked a disability yesterday to trick her way past Israeli guards 
before detonating a vest packed with explosives, killing four security staff and wounding seven 
people at a checkpoint. 
 
The suicide bomber was named as Reem al-Rayashee, 22, the mother of a girl aged 18 months 
and a boy, 3. 
 
Hamas, the militant Islamic group, said that it was the first time that it had deployed a woman in 
such an attack and marked a new tactic in its battle against Israel.  
 
In a videotape explaining her actions, the bomber was seen seated between two Hamas flags, 
clutching an assault rifle. "It was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against 
the Zionists and knock on the doors of Heaven with the skulls of Zionists," she said. "I always 
wanted to be the first (Hamas) woman to carry out a martyrdom operation where parts of my 
body can fly all over." 
 
She said, smiling at times, that she had the dreams since she was 13. "God gave me two 
children and I loved them so much. Only God knew how much I loved them." She asked that her 
children should study in religious schools. 
 
In Gaza City, mourners gathered in pouring rain at a mosque to remember Mrs al-Rayashee, the 
wife of a lifeguard who patrolled Gaza's beaches a short distance from the home of her wealthy 
extended family. 
 
One family member at her home condemned the attack, but shed no light on her motive. 
Thousands of Palestinian workers who were using the Erez crossing, where the blast occurred, 
were held there for hours in the rain before being taken back to Gaza. As many as 20,000 are 
likely to lose their livelihood for days or weeks if, as expected, the crossing remains shut. 
 
Mrs al-Rayashee had passed along hundreds of metres of heavily guarded razor wire to enter 
the security cabin at about 9.30am, shortly after the main wave of workers had crossed into 
Israel or an adjacent industrial zone. 
 
She said that she wanted to apply for a new security pass, either to enter Israel for work or 
medical treatment. She passed through a metal detector and, when it sounded an alert, told 
soldiers that she had metal pins in her legs. 
 
Israeli soldiers in the cabin, equipped with airport-style baggage screening equipment, told her to 
stop while they summoned a female soldier to conduct a search in the privacy of a room at the 
rear. As they waited, the woman detonated a larger device than usual, the Israeli Army said. 
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"She was faking a medical condition," Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, commander of the Israeli 
Army's Gaza division, said. "The soldiers were waiting to take care of her. That's a cruel and 
cynical exploitation of our humanitarian treatment of her." 
 
Two soldiers, a policeman and a civilian security guard died. Shrapnel peppered the walls and 
left a scene of charred devastation inside the cabin. Its corrugated aluminium roof was peeled 
back. Seven people were injured, four of them Palestinians waiting to be screened. 
 
Yossi Vaknim, an Israeli from the nearby Nisanit settlement, was one of the first at the scene. 
"When I got there it was almost impossible to look at," he said. "It was awful." He blamed Ariel 
Sharon, the Prime Minister, for talking of withdrawing from Israeli settlements to forge peace. 
 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said that the death of Mrs al-Rayashee 
represented a new departure for the organisation. Holy war was "an obligation of all Muslims, 
men and women", he said. "This is an indication that resistance will continue." It was the first 
Hamas suicide bomb in many months. 
 
A local Hamas activist gave warning of an upsurge in violence, which he said was in response to 
continuing Israeli attacks. 
 
 
Appendix 4 - The Reports of 22nd March 2004  
 
The Arab News 
 
Murder  
Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News  
 
GAZA, 23 March 2004 - Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin yesterday, provoking 
global condemnation and cries of revenge from Palestinian resistance. 
Israeli security sources said Prime Minister Ariel Sharon personally ordered and monitored the helicopter 
attack on the 67-year-old symbol of Palestinian resistance, whose wheelchair lay smashed in a pool of 
blood after three missiles exploded outside the Gaza mosque he had left minutes earlier after the Fajr 
prayer. 
"The state of Israel this morning hit the leader of the Palestinian assassins and terrorists," Sharon said in a 
brief address to deputies from his Likud party as he congratulated his armed forces on the operation. 
At least seven other people died in the missile strike and two of Yassin's sons were among the 15 
wounded. 
Salah Amudi, 30, said he and a first-a id nurse had picked up Yassin's remains from the ground and took 
them to Al-Shifa Hospital in plastic bags.  
"I was also at the mosque praying. Upon leaving, I heard a first missile, then a second and third," he said, 
still shaken. "It was ugly, we didn't know what to do. We thought they (the Israeli Army) would strike 
again." 
Yassin's head was cut in two by the blast and part of his brain had fallen out. 
 241 
The occupied territories erupted in anger following the announcement of Yassin's death, with groups of 
Palestinians spontaneously taking to the streets to call for swift reprisals. Israeli forces killed four 
Palestinians, including an 11-year-old. 
The United States strongly denied any involvement in the assassination but said the Jewish state had the 
right to defend itself against the "terrorist" group. 
Speaking on morning television interviews, White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said 
the United States did not have advance warning of the assassination.  
"It is very important that everyone step back now and try to be calm in the region," Rice told NBC's 
"Today" show. 
But Rice made it clear on whose side Washington is. "Let's remember that Hamas is a terrorist 
organization and that Sheikh Yassin himself has been heavily involved in terrorism," she said. 
At noon, a sea of wailing Gazans took part in the funeral procession for a man seen by many as a 
patriarch, in the largest march the strip had seen since the start of the Palestinian uprising. The procession 
left the hospital and went to Yassin's modest Gaza house before attending a service at a mosque and 
finally burying him in the city's "martyrs' cemetery". 
Top Hamas official Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi said: "Yassin was a man in a nation, and a nation in a man. 
And the retaliation of this nation will be of the size of this man. You will see deeds not words." 
A website published a statement purporting to come from an Al -Qaeda-linked group vowing revenge on 
the United States and its allies over Yassin's murder. "We tell Palestinians that Sheikh Yassin's blood was 
not spilt in vain and call on all legions of Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades to avenge him by attacking the 
tyrant of the age, America, and its allies," said the statement by the group carried by the Al-Ansar forum 
website. 
Hours after Yassin's murder, an Arab stabbed and wounded three passengers on an Israeli bus in Jaffa 
before fleeing, a police spokeswoman said. Earlier, an ax-wielding Palestinian wounded three people 
outside an army base near Tel Aviv. 
In northern Israel, Lebanon's Hezbollah attacked Israeli posts in a disputed border area, drawing air raids. 
There were no immediate reports of casualties. 
The European Union criticized the "extra-judicial killing" but also recalled past EU condemnations of 
bombings. 
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said Israel had the right to defend itself against terrori sm. "But it is 
not entitled to go for this kind of unlawful killing and we therefore condemn it," he said. 
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana condemned the killing as "very, very bad news" for the Middle East 
peace process. 
 
The New York TImes 
 
Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike 
March 22, 2004 
By JAMES BENNET 
GAZA, March 22 - Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of the militant 
Palestinian group Hamas, was killed early Monday by an Israeli missile that struck him as he left 
a mosque in Gaza City, his family and Hamas officials said. They said at least two bodyguards 
had been killed with him. 
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Sheik Yassin, a symbol to Palestinians of resistance to Israel and to Israelis of Palestinian 
terrorism, was by far the most significant Palestinian militant killed by Israel in more than three 
years of conflict. 
Black smoke curled over Gaza City as Palestinians began burning tires in the streets and 
demonstrators chanted for revenge. Mosque loudspeakers blared a message across Gaza of 
mourning for Sheik Yassin in the name of Hamas and another militant group, Al Aksa Martyrs 
Brigades. 
Thousands of Palestinians took part in a funeral procession for the Sheik and others killed in the 
attack.  
The Israeli military confirmed the killing, saying in a statement that the sheik was "responsible for 
numerous murderous terror attacks, resulting in the deaths of many civilians, both Israeli and 
foreign." 
The army said it had targeted a car carrying Sheik Yassin, but Palestinians at the scene said 
that the Sheik was not in car when he was hit. 
The Israeli weapons punctured the pavement of the street where Sheik Yassin, a quadriplegic, 
was being escorted home. Blood spattered the walls of surrounding buildings. "I could not 
recognize the sheik, only his wheelchair," said one witness, Maher al-Beek. 
In interviews with American television stations this morning, the White House's national security 
adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said that the United States did not have advance warning of the 
assassination, and urged calm in the region. 
In refugee camps like Rafa and Khan Yunis, strongholds of Palestinian militancy, thousands of 
people took to the streets. Ismail Haniya, a political leader of Hamas, addressed more than a 
thousand people who gathered outside the autopsy center at Shiffa Hospital in Gaza City. 
"You don't have to cry," he said. "You have to be steadfast, and you have to be ready for 
revenge, because the sheik has implanted the soul and the spirit of martyrdom and courage in 
your souls." 
He said that "the blood of Sheik Yassin will run in the veins of all Palestinians," and predicted 
that his death would give "more momentum for the liberation of Palestinians from the criminals, 
the Jews." 
Hospital officials said the sheik's body had been smashed in the attack. 
Like other political leaders of Hamas, Sheik Yassin denied involvement in planning specific 
attacks, but Israeli officials said he was directly connected to terrorism. 
Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister, condemned the attack. "This is a crazy and very 
dangerous act," he said, according to Reuters. "It opens the door wide to chaos. Yassin is 
known for his moderation, and he was controlling Hamas, and therefore this is a dangerous, 
cowardly act." 
The Israeli Army said it had closed off the Gaza Strip, which is bracketed against the 
Mediterranean by an Israeli fence, and shut checkpoints that effectively divide it into three 
sections. 
Israel has again stepped up its pressure on militants in Gaza since two Palestinian suicide 
bombers from a Gaza refugee camp blew themselves up last Sunday at the Israeli port of 
Ashdod, killing 10 Israelis. That attack was jointly claimed by Hamas and Al Aksa Martyrs 
Brigades. 
The country has also appeared eager to show that a plan announced by Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon to withdraw Israeli settlers and soldiers from Gaza did not amount to a victory for 
Palestinian militants, as some of them had claimed. 
Israel tried to kill Sheik Yassin on Sept. 6, dropping a 550-pound bomb on a Gaza apartment 
building where he was holding a meeting. The sheik escaped with a slight shrapnel wound to his 
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right hand, and 14 other people were wounded. That strike came as Israel declared "all-out war" 
on the group after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem in August. 
 On Jan. 16, the Israeli deputy defense minister, Zeev Boim, said Sheik Yassin was "marked for 
death" by Israel. "He should hide himself deep underground where he won't know the difference 
between day and night," Mr. Boim said at the time. "And we will find him in the tunnels, and we 
will eliminate him." 
Sheik Yassin responded: "We do not fear death threats. We are seekers of martyrdom."  
Hamas is officially committed to Israel's destruction, not just a withdrawal from the occupied 
territories. The word means `zeal` in Arabic, and that is an acronym for Islamic Resistance 
Movement. 
The group runs a network of low-cost clinics and schools that have broadened its ideological 
reach while helping to give its popularity a boost among Palestinians. Israeli  security officials 
regard it as the most organized and disciplined of the militant groups. 
Sheik Yassin helped found Hamas in 1987. He later spent eight years in an Israeli prison, before 
being freed in 1997 as a gesture to King Hussein of Jordan after a bungled assassination 
attempt on a Hamas leader in Amman, the capital. 
The targeted killing followed an Israeli raid on Sunday into the southern Gaza Strip that left four 
Hamas militants and one Palestinian woman dead. Israel said it had been seeking to arrest one 
of the Hamas men who died in the operation. 
Also on Sunday, Prime Minister Sharon gained qualified backing from his top right-wing rival, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, for Mr. Sharon's plan for a Gaza withdrawal. Mr. Netanyahu said he might 
back the plan if Mr. Sharon achieved an "appropriate return," including support for retraining 
some blocks of settlements in the West Bank, from the United States. 
He also said Israel must remain free to act militarily in Gaza after any withdrawal. 
 
The Guardian 
 
Israel assassinates Hamas leader 
· Yassin killed in missile strike 
· Mass protests by Palestinians 
· Militants vow revenge attacks 
George Wright and agencies 
Monday March 22 2004 
 
Palestinian militants today warned of swift and bloody retaliation against Israel after it "opened 
the gates of hell" by assassinating Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of militant 
group  Hamas. 
Yassin was killed in a missile strike by Israeli helicopters as he left a mosque in Gaza city at 
dawn. Seven other people, including the 67-year-old's bodyguards, were killed. Another 17 - 
including two of Yassin’s sons - were injured in the attack, according to initial reports. 
Witnesses described a horrific scene, with a large area of the pavement where the missiles 
landed covered in blood and strips of clothing. Yassin, who used a wheelchair, was said to have 
been directly hit by the first missile, and his body was severely disfigured. 
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Taxi driver Yousef Haddad, who was in a nearby shop at the time of the attack, and was one of 
the first on the scene, told the Associated Press: "His wheelchair was twisted. Two or three 
people were lying next to him on the ground. One was legless." 
Israel blamed Yassin - the most prominent Palestinian leader to be killed in more than three 
years of Israeli-Palestinian fighting - for orchestrating a wave of suicide bombings. An Israeli 
defence spokeswoman said that his assassination was a "life-saving mission". 
Hamas and other militant groups warned of an immediate explosion in violence in the Middle 
East as tens of thousands of mourners poured on to the streets of Gaza for Yassin's funeral 
procession. 
His body, wrapped in a green Hamas flag, was carried along the route in an open coffin, 
accompanied by an honorary Hamas guard. 
In scenes repeated in towns across the occupied territories, angry crowds called for revenge 
against Israel and the US, and masked militants fired automatic rounds into the air. 
Violent clashes between demonstrators and Israeli security forces broke out, and four 
Palestinians - including a 13-year-old boy and a journalist - were reported to have been killed 
when Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds. 
"Words cannot describe the emotion of anger and hate inside our hearts," Hamas official Ismail 
Haniyeh, a close associate of Yassin, said. 
Abu Abeer, a spokesman for a group of militant Palestinian organisations in the occupied 
territories, told pan-Arab satellite channel al-Arabiya there would be "swift and serious" 
repercussions. 
"They have opened the gates of hell," he warned. "For us, everything is now permissible after 
this assassination." 
For the first time, Hamas threatened revenge on the US as well as Israel, saying that US 
backing of Israel had made Yassin's assassination possible. 
"All the Muslims of the world will be honoured to join in on the retaliation for this crime," Hamas 
said in a statement. 
Yassin, who escaped an Israeli assassination attempt last September, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment by Israel in 1989 for founding Hamas and inciting Palestinians to attack Israelis. 
He was released in 1997 as a goodwill gesture to Jordan's King Hussein after a failed Israeli 
attempt to assassinate another Hamas leader in Amman. 
Israeli defence forces issued a statement confirming that Yassin had been killed in the strike, 
and saying that he was directly responsible for "dozens of terrorist attacks and the deaths of 
Israelis, foreigners and security personnel". 
Gideon Meir, an Israeli foreign ministry official, said Yassin had been "the one who is sending 
children and women to explode themselves" in suicide attacks against Israel. 
According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, the Israeli security cabinet took the decision to 
assassinate him following a double suicide bombing at the Ashdod port earlier this month in 
which 10 people were killed. 
The Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, oversaw the operation, receiving constant updates from 
military officials at his Negev ranch, the paper reported. 
Political leaders across the Arab world and beyond lined up to condemn Israel's action, while the 
US appealed for calm on both sides. 
The Palestinian prime minister, Ahmed Qureia, said: "This is one of the biggest crimes that the 
Israeli government has committed." The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, described the 
assassination as a "barbaric crime". His aides expressed fears that he might be next on the 
Israeli's list of assassination targets. 
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The British home secretary, Jack Straw, said that Yassin's killing was "unjustifiable" and "unlikely 
to achieve its objectives." 
In Kuwait - one of the US's closest allies in the Arab world - the prime minister, Sheik Sabah al-
Ahmed al-Sabah, warned: "Violence will increase now, because violence always breeds 
violence." 
Despite the international outcry, the Israeli defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, defiantly pledged that 
"the battle against Hamas will continue", suggesting more air strikes and raids against the group. 
Meanwhile, Israeli security forces were placed on high alert following the attack. Israel closed its 
borders on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring all Palestinians from entering. 
Israel's military commander, Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, met senior officers in Tel Aviv to 
discuss the possible fallout, and more forces were ordered to the Gaza Strip. 
In a first response, Palestinian militants fired 10 home-made rockets toward an Israeli settlement 
in Gaza. There were no immediate reports of injuries. 
 
The Times  
March 22, 2004  
 
Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike 
 
FROM AP IN RAMALLAH 
Tens of thousands of mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City today for the funeral procession of the 
Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and seven others killed in an Israeli air strike at daybreak. 
The death of the 67-year-old spiritual leader has prompted threats of unprecedented revenge by Palestinian 
militants against Israel and the United States. 
The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, condemned the killing of Yassin as ―unacceptable". The French 
foreign ministry also said that the assassination broke international law.  
The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat earlier denounced the killing of the Hamas leader and declared a 
three-day mourning period saying that the Israelis had crossed "all red lines". 
Twenty-one Palestinian police officers formed an honour guard as the coffin holding Yassin‘s body was 
carried out of Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Mourners jostled, trying to touch the coffin, which was draped 
in a green Hamas flag. Others clamoured for revenge. Women ululated and threw flowers into the air. Two 
Israeli helicopter gunships hovered in the sky, which was darkened by the thick black smoke of burning 
tyres.  
Yassin, who has been in a wheelchair since an accident in his youth, is the most prominent Palestinian 
leader to be killed by Israel. Despite Israeli threats against him, Yassin had never changed his routine. 
Every morning, attended pre-dawn prayers at the local mosque in the Sabra neighbourhood of Gaza City. 
Today he did the same, being wheeled to the house of prayer by bodyguards. As he emerged at around 
5.30 am (0330 GMT), three Israeli missiles hit killing Yassin and seven others, including several 
bodyguards. Seventeen people were wounded.  
Announcing Yassin's death over mosque loudspeakers, the Hamas leadership said, "Sharon has opened the 
gates of hell. and nothing will stop us from cutting off his head." At Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, where 
Yassin's body was taken, masked gunmen shot in the air. Some aired recordings of Yassin, saying, "We 
chose this road, and will end with martyrdom or victory."  
In a spontaneous outpouring of rage and grief, tens of thousands of Palestinians poured into the streets of 
Gaza City after hearing of Yassin's death.  "Words cannot describe the emotion of anger and hate inside 
our hearts," said Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas official and a close associate of Yassin. 
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A 13-year-old Palestinian boy was killed by Israeli troops during a mass demonstration in the southern 
Gaza Strip town of Khan Yuni.  Medics said he was fatally hit in the head when troops opened fire from a 
watchtower in the nearby Jewish settlement of Ganei Tal. 
Israel said it held Yassin responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a 
former army general, was updated throughout the operation, security officials said. 
The Yassin assassination is seen as an enormous gamble by Mr Sharon, who is trying to score a decisive 
victory against Hamas ahead of a possible Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, but risks triggering a dramatic 
escalation in bloodshed that could turn the popular mood in Israel against him. 
Gideon Meir, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, said Israel held Yassin directly responsible for the 
scores of suicide attacks Hamas unleashed since 2000. "He is the one who is sending children and women 
to explode themselves," Mr Meir said. 
Flags at Yasser Arafat's headquarters in the West Bank town of Ramallah were lowered to half-staff today, 
and the Palestinian Cabinet was to hold an emergency session later Monday. 
"President Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, with national and Islamic factions, condemn the crime of 
assassinating the hero Sheik Ahmed Yassin and the other brothers killed after praying in the mosque," the 
Palestinian Authority said in a statement. "This cowardly crime will do nothing but increase the national 
unity among the Palestinians to confront the Israeli conspiracy, which has crossed all red lines. 
"Arafat and the Palestinian leadership ask the Palestinian people for more unity and to continue with 
steadfastness, emphasising that there will be no stability without the removal of the occupation," the 
statement continued. Arafat declared the mourning period in the Palestinian territories and for the millions 
of Palestinians living abroad.  
Fearing revenge attacks, Israel has clamped a closure on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring all 
Palestinian from entering Israel. The army chief, Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, met with army 
commanders in Tel Aviv to discuss the possible fallout, and more forces were ordered to the Gaza Strip. 
Hamas promised a harsh response. "Yassin is a man in a nation, and a nation in a man. And the retaliation 
of this nation will be of the size of this man," said Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader in Gaza 
who himself escaped an Israeli assassination attempt last June. 
For the first time, Hamas also threatened the United States, saying America‘s backing of Israel made the 
assassination possible. "All the Muslims of the world will be honoured to join in on the retaliation for this 
crime," Hamas said in a statement. The United States has urged both sides too show restraint.  
The militant groups Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, sometimes at odds with Hamas, also 
promised revenge. "This crime has affected every Palestinian, and the retaliation for it will be from every 
Palestinian," said Abu Qusay, an Al Aqsa leader in Gaza. An Al Aqsa statement said retaliation "will be in 
the coming hours, God willing." 
In a first response, Palestinian militants fired ten home-made rockets toward an Israeli settlement in Gaza. 
There were no immediate reports of injuries. 
Israel had previously tried to kill Yassin in September when a warplane dropped a bomb on a 
building where he and other Hamas leaders were meeting, but Yassin escaped with just a small 
wound to his hand. One Israeli official recently said Yassin, a Hamas founder, was "marked for 
death." 
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Appendix 5 – the Reports of 26th June 2006  
 
The Arab News 
 
2 Israeli Troops Killed in Attack by Palestinians 
GAZA CITY, 26 June 2006 — A daring pre-dawn Palestinian attack on an Israeli Army post bordering 
the southern Gaza Strip yesterday left two Israeli soldiers and two Palestinians dead and one Israeli soldier 
was abducted, the Israeli Army and Palestinian officials said. 
The Israeli Army sent tanks and troops into the Gaza Strip in response. Military officials were quoted as 
saying the incursion was part of a search for the abducted soldier. 
At least three other Israeli soldiers were wounded in the attack, which began when fighters from within the 
Gaza Strip fired an anti-tank rocket at the army outpost near the Kerem Shalom crossing. Israeli military 
officials said simultaneously an eight-man attack team smuggled into the military outpost through a tunnel 
dug under the Gaza border. 
The attacking force split into three teams. One tried — and failed — to attack an armored personnel 
carrier in the area, one charged the post, firing at the soldiers, and one attacked a tank with grenades 
killing the two soldiers and wounding two others. 
The attack was claimed by three Palestinian groups — Hamas, Al-Naser Brigades, the armed wing of the 
Popular Resistance Committees, and a new group named the Islamic Army. Sources close to the groups 
said that two fighters identified as Hamed El-Rantisi from Al-Naser Brigades and Mohammad Ferwan 
from the Islamic Army were killed in the attack. Six other fighters were back safely to their base.   
Ryad Jargoun, a farmer living near Kerem Shalom crossing, told Arab News that the Israeli tanks moved 
about 500 meters into eastern Rafah areas at 10 a.m. local time. In addition, three Israeli helicopters 
opened heavy indiscriminate gunfire at Al-Shohda village which is close to the Shalom crossing, he 
added. ―No one can move in the area, it‘s more than a curfew,‖ he said. Directly after the attack, the Israeli 
Army closed Kerem Shalom crossing that the European observers use to travel to reach the Rafah crossing 
in a sign that the terminal will also be closed. 
Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said the assault was ―a natural attack on the Israeli occupation 
crimes.‖ The abducted soldier was reportedly in stable condition, after having suffered blows to the chest 
and abdomen, Israeli Army radio reported. In wake of the attack, Israel closed down all border crossings 
and terminals with the Gaza Strip until further notice. 
Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert was to convene the government‘s security Cabinet and assess Israel‘s 
response to the attack. 
The attack is a major embarrassment to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has been trying to get 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to end their daily rocket attacks on Israel. Abbas has also been trying to get 
Hamas to agree to a platform, drafted by Palestinians in Israeli jails, which among its provisions calls on 
Palestinians to limit attacks only in territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Middle East War. 
Unnamed officials from Abbas‘ Fatah movement were quoted in the Jerusalem Post daily yesterday 
morning as saying the attack on the Israeli post was engineered by Hamas leader in exile Khaled Mashaal 
in order to thwart any possible agreement on the document. 
Meanwhile Abbas condemned yesterday‘s attack in a written statement to the press, saying they 
―contradict with the attitudes we heard over the past two days, and it is in breach of the understandings 
that were voiced by leaders of factions we met.‖  
Abbas called on the Palestinians who abducted the Israeli soldier and those who kept the remains of the 
other soldiers, to bring them back, warning that if they keep the soldier, Israel would harshly retaliate. 
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Palestinian Cabinet spokesman Ghazi Hamad urged the fighters holding the Israeli soldier to ―keep him 
alive and treat him well.‖ Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni reportedly phoned members of the 
international community urging them to press Abbas to remain in Gaza until the situation is resolved. 
Abbas arrived in Gaza on Friday and held a series of meetings with Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and 
representatives of factions in preparations for declaring the outcomes of inter-Palestinian talks. 
The Palestinian presidency also announced it would order a quick and comprehensive investigation into 
the parties that participated in the attack, including the new group, which some Palestinians fear is related 
to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
Meanwhile, Abbas appealed to the international community to intervene to prevent Israel ―taking 
advantage of the attack by carrying out a large-scale offensive against Gaza Strip.‖  
— With input from agencies 
 
the New York Times  
 
June 26, 2006 Monday  
MILITANTS' RAID ON ISRAEL RAISES TENSION IN GAZA 
By STEVEN ERLANGER, JERUSALEM, June 25  
In an ominous development, Israel threatened strong military action on Sunday after eight 
Palestinian militants in Gaza, including members of the governing faction Hamas, emerged from 
a secret tunnel dug 300 yards into Israel, killed two soldiers, wounded three and kidnapped 
another.  
Two of the Palestinians were killed but the rest escaped into Gaza with the captive Israeli 
soldier, Cpl. Gilad Shalit, 19, who is believed to have been wounded. He was the first Israeli 
soldier kidnapped in more than a decade. 
Israeli tanks moved a short distance into Gaza on Sunday, the first tank raid since Israel 
withdrew from the territory last summer.  
Israeli officials talked of a harsh response to the raid on an Israeli Army outpost near the Kerem 
Shalom kibbutz, close to the Egyptian border. The raid was weeks in the planning, and the 
military wing of Hamas took partial responsibility, as did militant groups like the Popular 
Resistance Committees and a new formation called the Army of Islam. 
But Israel and the Hamas leadership were looking for ways to defuse the tense situation. Israel 
asked Egypt, which has influence in Gaza, for help in freeing the soldier. The Israeli foreign 
minister, Tzipi Livni, called Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to seek support. 
Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas government in Gaza, urged the soldier's captors ''to 
protect his life and treat him well,'' and urged Israel ''not to escalate the situation.''  
But others who said they spoke for Hamas were more militant.  
There was a sense that, with some elements of Hamas participating in a deadly armed attack in 
Israel, the tunnel raid could portend a grimmer phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
particularly if further harm came to the kidnapped soldier.  
Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, said simply, ''This is a crisis.'' 
The Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, said, ''The Palestinians are responsible for the fate 
of the kidnapped soldier, and we will do everything in our power to retrieve him.'' 
Israel's security cabinet met Sunday night and authorized the military to plan a response to the 
raid, but decided to postpone any military action to see if Corporal Shalit was released, said an 
Israeli official. Some response is expected no matter what happens, but the officials do not want 
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to damage the chances of his safe return to Israel. 
The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, told the cabinet that Israel held the Palestinian 
Authority, its Hamas government and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, 
''responsible for this event -- with all this implies.''  
The Israeli government urged Mr. Abbas to act to free the soldier.  
Mr. Abbas condemned the raid, saying it was against ''the national consensus.'' In a statement, 
he said, ''We have always warned against the danger of certain groups or factions leaving the 
national consensus and carrying out operations for which the Palestinian people will always 
have to pay the price.'' 
Mr. Abbas, who has been trying to get Hamas to at least implicitly recognize Israel's right to 
exist, was embarrassed by the raid. He called off meetings with Hamas leaders scheduled for 
Sunday. 
The attack is the latest in a cycle of violence and reprisal as Palestinian guerrillas have fired 
inaccurate Qassam rockets into Israel to retaliate for Israeli attacks on militants, who Israel has 
said were either firing rockets or planning attacks.  
In an effort to stop the Palestinian rockets, the Israeli military has stepped up its actions, but 
some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilians in recent weeks, 
not including 8 killed on a Gaza beach, for which Israel has denied responsibility. That in turn 
has led the military wing of Hamas to renounce the truce it declared in February 2005, and 
helped open the way to the attack on Sunday. 
The last Israeli soldier known to have been kidnapped was Cpl. Nachshon Waxman, 19, seized 
by Hamas in 1994 and killed in a rescue operation. 
A former Interior Ministry spokesman, Elias Zananiri, suggested that Hamas's military wing 
attacked on orders of its leadership abroad, in particular Khaled Meshal, the leader of the 
Hamas political bureau, while the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, was kept in the dark. 
But Israeli officials noted that Hamas, if not officially claiming responsibility for the raid, seemed 
to welcome it. ''The operation is a natural response to the occupation's crimes and massacres 
against the Palestinian people,'' a spokesman for Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, said on Al Jazeera 
television. ''Hamas will continue to resist as long as there is occupation.'' 
Mr. Regev, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, waved away questions about whether the Hamas-
led government should be held responsible. ''What part of Hamas is responsible is irrelevant,'' he 
said. ''Hamas as an organization has endorsed it. And maybe for those in the international 
community who are talking about whether there is a new, pragmatic Hamas, this is a wake-up 
call.'' 
Ms. Livni, the Israeli foreign minister, urged Mr. Abbas to remain in Gaza and act quickly to 
release the soldier. ''This is an opportunity for Abu Mazen to prove how serious his intentions 
are,'' she said. ''He has all the necessary resources, including military means, to secure the 
release of the soldier.'' 
Mr. Regev said: ''Abu Mazen goes to foreign capitals and says, 'I'm the partner you want. I'm the 
address.' But if he's not a partner in stopping violence, how can he be a partner for peace?'' 
If the soldier ''isn't returned immediately, then Israel will have to act,'' Mr. Regev said. 
In his statement, Mr. Hamad, the Hamas spokesman, said, ''The government is following this 
issue and there are many contacts between many sides, and the Egyptians and the president 
are trying to reach a solution for this problem.''  
But another Hamas spokesman, Mushir al-Masri, a member of parliament, welcomed the attack. 
''We consider this operation a part of the natural response to Zionist crimes, especially after the 
series of killings of children, women, old men and whole families in Gaza,'' he said. ''It is the right 
of our people to defend themselves with all the means available.'' 
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The spokesman for the Popular Resistance Committees, Abu Mujahid, said the attack was to 
avenge Israel's assassination of the group's leader, Jamal Abu Samahdana, on June 8. Mr. 
Samahdana, who had been wanted by Israel, had also been serving the Hamas-led government 
as commander of a new ''executive force,'' a mostly Hamas militia that has clashed with Fatah-
dominated security forces. 
No Palestinian spokesman would admit to holding Corporal Shalit. 
Israeli officials said Sunday that the tunnel, which extended from Gaza at least 600 yards and 
emerged behind Israeli lines, had taken many weeks, if not months, to dig. Israel clearly had 
warnings of an attack and had closed the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel and Gaza for 
several days last week for security reasons. That closing meant that the nearby Rafah crossing 
between Egypt and Gaza was also shut, because the European monitors for Rafah get there via 
Kerem Shalom. 
On Sunday, Israel quickly shut all crossings into Gaza and kept them shut, even to journalists, 
who protested. 
The Israeli Army outpost that was attacked is near the Egyptian border, but not at the Kerem 
Shalom crossing point. According to reports, the eight Palestinian fighters emerged from the 
tunnel near the spot where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet, about 5:15 a.m., and splitinto small 
teams. One blew up an armored personnel carrier, which was empty, and another threw 
grenades into an Israeli Merkava tank, killing First Lt. Hanan Barak, 20, from Arad, and Sgt. 
Pavel Slutzker, 20, from Dimona. Antitank missiles were also fired toward the vehicles from 
Gaza, the Israeli Army said. 
Another Israeli soldier who was seriously wounded and the missing soldier, Corporal Shalit, 
were also in the tank, the army said. A third group moved about a half mile northeast to the 
outpost near the kibbutz and attacked it. The Palestinians then blew a hole in the fence 
separating Gaza and returned with Corporal Shalit. The two Palestinians who died in the attack 
were apparently killed as they tried to climb up the side of the outpost. They were identified as 
Muhammad Farawneh and Jihad Rantissi. 
Afterward, Israeli tanks supported by a helicopter crossed into Gaza to search and to investigate 
the tunnel. 
Mr. Abbas's scheduled meetings with Mr. Haniya and other Hamas officials, which he canceled, 
had been intended to discuss a united political position, based on a document drafted by 
prisoners, that calls for a Palestinian state in pre-1967 borders and a focus on ''resistance'' 
against Israel in the occupied territories. 
Mr. Abbas has expressed hope that agreement would allow Western aid to flow again to the 
Hamas-run Palestinian Authority and give him a platform for negotiations with Israel. 
But the dialogue has been difficult, Palestinian officials have said, and Mr. Abbas's allies say that 
Hamas has been reluctant to recognize Israel or to agree that attacks should be limited to 
occupied territory. Israel has said that the document is an internal Palestinian issue and will not 
affect its view of Hamas. 
The attack on Sunday morning was inside pre-1967 Israel. An aide to Mr. Abbas, Nabil Abu 
Rudeineh, said, ''What occurred today brings us back to zero'' in the talks. 
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Israel promises revenge for soldier deaths  
· Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid 
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· Abbas ordered to secure seized corporal's release 
 
Conal Urquhart in Tel Aviv 
Monday June 26, 2006 
 
Israel has warned Hamas that it will pay a "deadly price" for a daring raid on Israeli positions 
yesterday in which militants killed two soldiers and kidnapped a third.  
Members of Hamas played a leading role in the pre-dawn attack, in which gunmen took Israeli 
forces by surprise and raised the prospect of a major escalation of violence.  
Israeli officials also told Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, that they held him 
responsible and expected him to remain in Gaza until he secured the release of the kidnapped 
Israeli soldier.  
The attack, which was carried out by Hamas with the Popular Resistance Committees and a little 
known group called the Islamic Army, overshadowed attempts yesterday by Mr Abbas to come 
to an agreement with Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister.  
They were due to meet to discuss a joint platform, commonly known as the "prisoners' 
document". This would entail implicit recognition of Israel and end Palestinian infighting and the 
isolation of the Palestinian Authority.  
The dawn raid seemed likely to undermine the credibility of Hamas as a political player and 
forced Mr Haniyeh to postpone the meeting to avoid potential assassination by Israel.  
It was the first attack by Palestinian militants in Gaza against the Israeli army since it withdrew 
from the strip last year. In a series of statements, the militants said that the attack was in 
response to Israeli assassinations and attacks on civilians in recent weeks.  
The kidnapped soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, 19, is said to have been injured in the stomach but 
is receiving treatment in Gaza from his captors.  
Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister, said that he held the Palestinian Authority responsible 
for the attack, including the president and the Hamas-led government, "with all that implies".  
Israeli ministers met last night to discuss a response to the attack. Options include a full-scale 
invasion of Gaza or the targeting of Hamas's political wing, its leaders and ministers. Israel may 
feel that any action it takes could endanger the life of Cpl Shalit.  
Last night, the Palestinian deputy prime minister, Nasser Shaer, called on the kidnappers to 
release Cpl Shalit.  
Hamas ministers began taking security precautions yesterday while Mark Regev, a spokesman 
for the Israeli foreign ministry, said the ministry expected Mr Abbas to secure the release of the 
soldier. "Mr Abbas has all the necessary resources, including military resources, to ensure the 
release of the Israeli soldier. He must prove the seriousness of his intentions. We call on him to 
remain in Gaza and act immediately to resolve this crisis," he said.  
Aides of Mr Abbas said they believed the Israeli statement carried a veiled threat that he would 
not be allowed to leave Gaza. Israeli officials denied that the Palestinian president had been told 
he could not leave.  
Kidnapping an Israeli soldier has been a key aim of Palestinian militants for years. They believe 
it is the only way to force Israel to release Palestinian prisoners.  
The Israeli army said that at around 5.30am eight gunmen from Hamas and the Popular 
Resistance Committees entered Israel using a tunnel dug under the security fence. The tunnel 
extended 300 metres (985ft) past the fence guards.  
The gunmen split into three groups and approached their targets from behind. One group 
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attacked an empty armoured personnel carrier and another group threw grenades at the tank, 
which exploded inside, killing two soldiers and severely injuring a third. The last group attacked a 
23-metre high observation post.  
While the three groups attacked, others fired anti-tank weapons from inside Gaza.  
The spokesman said at least two of the gunmen were killed but the rest managed to escape to 
Gaza through holes in the perimeter fence.  
The two dead Israeli soldiers were named as Hanan Barak, 20, who was buried yesterday, and 
Pavel Slutsker, 20.  
Dan Halutz, the Israeli chief of staff, warned that a major invasion of Gaza was possible. Amir 
Peretz, the defence minister, said the militants would pay a "deadly price" for the attack.  
Some Palestinians reacted with jubilation to the success of the attack while others condemned it 
and tried to distance themselves from it.  
Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesman, said: "This is a natural response to the Israeli crimes of 
killing women and children and the assassination of two leaders."  
Members of Hamas in government took a different tone. Ghazi Hamed, the government 
spokesman, told reporters in Gaza City that it had learned of the kidnapping from the Israeli 
media.  
"We are calling on the resistance groups, if they do have the missing soldier ... to protect his life 
and treat him well," he said.  
In a statement, Mr Abbas said that the raid, near the Kerem Shalom crossing, "violated the 
national consensus". He called on the international community "to prevent Israel from exploiting 
the attack to carry out large-scale aggression in the Gaza Strip".  
He said that the attack contradicted all assurances he had been given by militant groups in 
recent negotiations.  
Trading Bodies  
Kidnapping and the macabre trade of bodies has long been a strategy followed by all sides in 
the Middle East conflicts. In 2004, Israel released 429 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners and 
returned 59 corpses in return for the release of one Israeli and three corpses.  
At the Erez border crossing between Gaza and Israel there is a poster promising a reward of 
$10m (£5.5m) to anyone who can provide information about four Israeli servicemen who 
disappeared during Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. Two of the men have been missing 
since 1982.  
The Israeli state's pledge to bring home its soldiers and civilians, whether dead or alive, has 
encouraged militant groups to make kidnapping Israelis a priority.  
The Israeli army has said that a number of cross-border raids by Hizbullah militants in recent 
years were attempts to kidnap soldiers. Palestinian militants have also declared their aim to 
kidnap Israelis to secure the release of their prisoners but have rarely been successful.  
The last time Palestinians kidnapped an Israeli soldier was in 1994. Arial Nachson Waxman, a 
19-year-old Israeli-American, was killed with his three captors when the house where he was 
being held was stormed by Israeli commandos.  
In 2004 Palestinian groups seized body parts of Israeli soldiers in two separate incidents after 
they were spread around areas of Gaza in large explosions.  
The Israeli army embarked on large operations to recover the body parts which were eventually 
transferred through the Red Cross after negotiations. 
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Soldier kidnapped in deadly tunnel ambush 
 
Ian MacKinnon in Kerem Shalom and Stephen Farrell in Erez 
Israeli troops were hunting last night for a soldier who is thought to have been kidnapped after a 
Palestinian ambush on a military post near the Gaza border that left two other soldiers dead. 
Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted when Palestinians, including Hamas members, launched a 
pre-dawn raid on Kerem Shalom beside southern Gaza, emerging from a tunnel to hurl bombs 
and grenades at the base. 
The Israeli Government held the Hamas-led Government responsible for the first such attack 
since Israel withdrew from Gaza last summer, and the security Cabinet met last night to consider 
its response.  
The raid, which used a secret tunnel bored from inside Gaza to 300m (980ft) beyond the Israeli 
fence that seals off the Palestinian strip, also left two Palestinian fighters dead. It triggered a 
brief Israeli incursion into the strip. 
Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, issued a thinly veiled threat against the Palestinian 
Authority, making no distinction between the new Hamas-led Government and President 
Mahmoud Abbas. "We in Israel view the Palestinian Authority, headed by Chairman Abu Mazen 
(Mr Abbas) and the Palestinian Government, responsible for this incident, with all that implies," 
Mr Olmert said. 
Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas-led Government, denied all knowledge of the 
kidnapped soldier. "We appeal to all the resistance factions if they have the kidnapped soldier to 
preserve his life and treat him well," he said. 
He added that the Government was talking to President Abbas, the Egyptians and other parties 
to resolve the issue. 
Shalit, 19, from Mitzpe Hila, is the first Israeli soldier to be kidnapped since 20-year-old Corporal 
Nachshon Wachsman was snatched by Hamas in October 1994 north of Jerusalem. He was 
killed in a raid mounted to free him. 
Brigadier-General Aviv Kochavi, head of the Gaza Division, described the apparently well-
planned assault as a "complex" operation. 
"They divided into three cells. One attacked an armoured personnel carrier. The APC was 
empty. Another group attacked a tank with grenades...causing two deaths and one serious 
injury," he said. 
The raid was claimed as a joint operation by the People's Resistance Committees, the 
previously unknown Army of Islam -thought to be a PRC splinter group -and Hamas's armed 
wing. They said that it was retaliation for Israel's assassination on June 8 of Jamal Abu 
Samadhana, the PRC leader, and the deaths of seven members of a single family on a Gaza 
beach during Israeli shelling. Israel denies responsibility. 
The Hamas Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Shaer, made a direct appeal for the soldier's release 
last night, but the call was rejected. 
Israeli troops mounted a ground assault on the outskirts of Gaza, with tanks rolling half a mile 
into the strip while helicopter gunships fired into open fields. The Israeli Defence Forces said that 
it was designed to destroy the tunnel. 
The attack strains to breaking point the tattered ceasefire observed by Hamas for 16 months 
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until it restarted launching rockets into Israel after the recent beach deaths.Yesterday's violence 
embarrassed Mr Abbas, coming as he held talks with Hamas to persuade it to give up attacks. 
 
Appendix 6 - The Reports of 7th July 2006  
 
The Arab News  
Israeli Missiles and Shells Kill 21  
Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News — 
 GAZA CITY, 7 July 2006 — Israeli tanks moved deeper into Gaza Strip and its forces killed at 
least 21 Palestinians yesterday in the bloodiest day since the Jewish state invaded Gaza on 
June 28 over a soldier’s capture. During yesterday’s operation, one Israeli soldier was also killed 
and five were injured. 
In Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Council agreed to send a fact-finding mission to the 
Palestinian territories to report back urgently on rights violations by Israel. 
The 47-member forum adopted a resolution put forward by the member states of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference that demanded a halt to Israel‘s ―extensive military operations‖ against Palestinians. 
The decision, announced by Council Chairman Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, was taken on a majority 
vote at the end of a two-day special session. 
―It (the Council) decides to dispatch an urgent fact-finding mission... on the human rights situation in the 
occupied Palestinian territories,‖ the resolution read. 
The vote was 29 delegations in favor, 11 against, with five abstentions and two delegations absent for the 
vote. 
Those who voted against the resolution were Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Britain. 
The abstaining members were Cameroon, Mexico, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Switzerland. 
The 29 countries which voted in favor of the resolution were Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zambia. 
John Dugard, UN special rapporteur on human rights in the territories, will head the fact-finding team. 
The Council vote also condemned Israeli action and called for the release of Palestinian officials and 
civilians arrested during the offensive. 
Throughout the day, Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians with missile strikes, while Israeli tanks took up 
positions between tightly packed homes. Apache helicopters hovered overhead, firing flares and machine 
guns to support ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes with Palestinian fighters. 
Israel said it decided to step up the offensive, launched last week in response to the capture of the Israeli 
soldier, after Hamas activists fired two upgraded rockets into the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon. No one 
was hurt, but the rockets were the first to reach the city of 110,000, infuriating Israeli leaders. 
In the worst incident, nine Palestinians were killed, including two Hamas activists, and at least 24 
wounded in an Israeli bombardment on the northern Gaza town of Beit Lahiya, medics said. 
Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, whose Hamas-led government has been directly targeted in the 
offensive, slammed the assault as ―collective punishment‖ on his people and demanded international 
intervention. 
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The massive predawn land and air assault on Gaza sent terrified residents scurrying from their homes with 
babies and belongings. ―We woke up and the tanks were right there. There were fighters in our garden. 
We had to flee to protect the children,‖ said one father, fleeing a Beit Lahiya neighborhood with his wife 
and four children. In northern Gaza, ground forces, armored vehicles and sappers advanced up to five km 
in a bid to expand a unilaterally declared security zone aimed at preventing rocket attacks on Israel. 
The Palestinian death toll is the highest in a single day since Israeli forces killed 16 people in October 
2004 in a raid on a Khan Younis refugee camp. 
Defense Minister Amir Peretz said that although Israel quit Gaza last year after 38 years of occupation, 
―no one should see that as a guarantee that we cannot reach territory in which we feel we have no choice 
but to operate.‖ 
―We have no intention of sinking into the Gaza swamp,‖ he added. 
Twenty-seven Hamas ministers and MPs appeared before Israeli military tribunals yesterday to be 
remanded further in custody after being arrested last week in a massive West Bank sweep. 
Local Government Minister Issa Al-Jaabari, Employment Minister Mohammed Barghouti and Jerusalem 
Affairs Minister Khaled Abu Arafeh, along with six lawmakers appeared before a court in Ofer, near the 
West Bank town of Ramallah. 
Finance Minister Omar Abdelrazeq, Planning Minister Samir Abou Eisheh, Prisoner Affairs Minister 
Wasfi Kabha and Social Affairs Minister Fakhri Turkman, together with 10 MPs, appeared before another 
tribunal in Salem. 
The mayors of the West Bank towns of Qalailya and Jenin appeared before the same tribunal. 
On Wednesday, the military tribunal in Ofer remanded Religious Affairs Minister Nayef Rajub and four 
MPs in custody for a further five days. 
Sixty-four members of Hamas, including a third of the Cabinet and 26 MPs, were arrested in a massive 
Israeli operation in the occupied West Bank on June 29. 
The father of the captured Israeli soldier appealed to the government to swap Palestinian prisoners for his 
son and back down on its refusal to negotiate with his captors. 
Fighters linked to Hamas captured Cpl. Gilad Shalit, 19, on June 25 after tunneling through from Gaza to 
southern Israel and attacking a military post just over the border. 
His captors have demanded that Israel release 1,500 of the 9,000 Palestinian prisoners it holds, but Israel 
has refused, demanding unconditional freedom for its soldier. 
Noam Shalit said he did not expect the Palestinians to give up his son for nothing. 
―Everything has a price. I don‘t think there will be any sort of move to free Gilad without a price,‖ the 
elder Shalit told Army Radio in his first comments on the government‘s handling of the affair. ―That‘s not 
the way it works in the Middle East.‖ 
There has been no sign of life from the soldier since he was seized, but he is presumed to be in Gaza. 
— Additional input from agencies 
 
The New York Times 
 
Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in Gaza  
 
By STEVEN ERLANGER and GREG MYRE 
BEIT LAHIYA, Gaza Strip, Friday, July 7 — A member of Hamas was reported killed in an 
airstrike Friday, less than 24 hours after Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their 
most intense battles since Israel re-entered the Gaza Strip last week to secure the release of a 
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captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel. 
The death toll had risen throughout Thursday in sometimes fierce fighting involving everything 
from rifles to airborne missiles.  
It was one of the bloodiest days in Gaza since the uprising began in 2000. The death toll varied 
and the Palestinians provided no official figures. The Associated Press counted at least 21 dead 
Palestinians, and Reuters 19. One Israeli soldier was reported killed by a sniper. Reuters 
reported Friday that the militant was killed after an Israeli plane fired at four armed men near the 
scene of the worst violence from the day before. 
Most of the deaths Thursday were in northern Gaza, where after days of sporadic clashes Israeli 
forces moved south from the destroyed former Israeli settlements to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya. 
There, in the northwest corner of Gaza, Palestinian fighters had been preparing earthen 
barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting. 
Israel's defense minister, Amir Peretz, said that although Israel pulled out of Gaza last year, "no 
one should see that as a guarantee that we cannot reach territory in which we feel we have no 
choice but to operate." 
Heavy fighting erupted in and around Beit Lahiya, especially in the western neighborhoods of 
Atatrah and Salatin near the sea, with Palestinian militants using light weapons like 
Kalashnikovs, M-16's and antitank grenades, fighting running battles with Israeli troops in 
armored personnel carriers, modern tanks and armored D-9 bulldozers. 
Palestinians were seen planting explosives in manholes, hoping to blow up a vehicle as it drove 
by. One masked fighter rode away on a bicycle after laying such a charge, a spool of electrical 
wire unrolling from the back of his bike. 
Israeli tanks fired shells at houses where Palestinian fighters sheltered, and soldiers fired at 
groups of armed Palestinians who fought in the streets, sometimes surrounded by curious and 
excited children. At times, Israeli soldiers fired near groups of children in what appeared to be an 
effort to get them to scatter. 
The Palestinian interior minister, Said Siam, who is responsible for most of the security services, 
declared a state of emergency. His spokesman said the minister "called on all Palestinian 
security and military services to participate in the moral, national and religious duty to defend our 
people." 
The Palestinian prime minister, Ismail Haniya, called on Arab and international groups to help 
the Palestinians and to press for an end to the Israeli offensive. 
"Solving issues can't be through military escalation or expanding their scope, but through 
stopping the aggression, and respecting the will of the Palestinian people and answering to their 
just nationalist demands," Mr. Haniya said. 
Three separate airstrikes accounted for the deaths of six Palestinians near Beit Lahiya. The 
Israeli military said all six were gunmen, while Palestinian officials, medical workers and 
witnesses gave conflicting information on how many were militants and how many were civilians. 
In the same area, gunmen from various Palestinian factions fired automatic rifles and antitank 
rockets at the Israeli troops. Israeli tank fire killed two militants, Palestinians and the Israeli 
military reported. 
About 30 Palestinians were wounded in the Beit Lahiya area, according to the Palestinian 
medics. 
Also, an Israeli soldier was shot in the head and killed in Beit Lahiya, apparently by a sniper, the 
military said. The Popular Resistance Committees, a faction of gunmen from various groups, 
claimed responsibility. A second soldier was wounded in the area, the military added. 
Before dawn, a Hamas militant and a Palestinian policeman were killed in an Israeli aerial attack 
on a beach in northern Gaza, the Palestinians and the Israelis said. 
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In southern Gaza, an Israeli airstrike killed two militants from Islamic Jihad in Abasan, near the 
southern town of Khan Yunis, Palestinian witnesses and security officials said. The men were 
firing an antitank rocket at Israeli tanks and troops positioned there. 
Israel's military has re-entered both the north and the south of Gaza for what it says is a two-
pronged mission. 
In the south, the troops were sent in shortly after Cpl. Gilad Shalit, a tank gunner, was captured 
just inside Israel by militants and taken to Gaza on June 25. Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the 
Palestinian Authority, said the sides should seek a diplomatic solution that would lead to 
Corporal Shalit's release. 
"We don't want Gaza destroyed, nor do we want attacks," Mr. Hamad told Israel radio. "And you 
want him to return to his family." 
However, Israel says it will not negotiate for the release of the soldier, and has rejected 
Palestinian demands that large numbers of Palestinian prisoners be freed. 
The militants have at various times demanded that all women and youths held by Israel be 
released, and they have also said that 1,000 prisoners of various nationalities must be freed. But 
the militants, and Hamas leaders, say that the corporal should not be released without some 
kind of Israeli prisoner release in return. 
The Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, which is based in London, reported Thursday that 
militants had revised their demands, saying that Corporal Shalit could be freed if all Palestinian 
women are released from Israeli jails along with 30 men who are serving long-term sentences. 
There was no independent confirmation of that report. 
The Israeli military said Palestinians fired eight rockets from Gaza at Israel on Thursday, but only 
four made it into Israeli territory and none caused injury. Three apparently landed inside Gaza 
and one fell in the sea, the military added. 
In the north, Israeli troops began edging into the territory on Monday with the aim of preventing 
Palestinian rocket fire on southern Israel. 
But until Thursday, the armored forces, consisting mostly of tanks and armored personnel 
carriers, had ventured only about half a mile into northern Gaza, remaining outside the 
Palestinian towns, and there was only occasional shooting. 
As the Israeli troops moved on Beit Lahiya on Thursday, the fighting quickly escalated. Israeli 
tanks also entered three former Israeli settlements on the northern edge of Gaza that were 
evacuated last year. 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his aides have said the current offensive is not an 
attempt to reoccupy Gaza. But Mr. Olmert, along with some political and security officials, has 
urged the Israeli public to be patient and suggested that the operation could be quite lengthy. 
Over all, nearly 20 Palestinians have been killed since the Israeli incursion began, most of them 
militants.  
 
The Guardian 
 
18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year  
Conal Urquhart in Beit Lahiya 
Friday July 7, 2006 
 
At least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were killed yesterday in the most serious violence 
since Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip last year.  
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The Israeli army said its incursion into Gaza was designed to prevent rocket fire at Israel and put pressure 
on the captors of Corporal Gilad Shalit.  
A spokeswoman for the army said that it killed 10 militants in five separate attacks. The number of 
civilian deaths was not immediately clear. In the early hours of this morning Israeli forces took over 
settlements they evacuated 10 months ago in northern Gaza and pushed to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya.  
There has been little progress in international negotiations on the release of Corporal Shalit, 19, who was 
abducted by Palestinian militiamen on June 25, but Israel increased its offensive after three Qassam home-
made rockets hit central Ashkelon, an area previously out of range. The army said eight more Qassam 
rockets were fired yesterday.  
At least two of the Palestinians were killed after firing a rocket towards Israel but the rest of the casualties 
occurred in northern Gaza. Supported by navy gunboats and helicopter gunships, Israeli tanks and 
bulldozers were destroying orchards and crops when Palestinian gunmen began to attack them.  
About 100 metres from Israeli positions two ambulances waited for the all clear to pick up casualties. 
Mohammad Farajalah, 24, an ambulanceman, said they were aware of four casualties nearby but they were 
waiting for the Red Cross to negotiate a safe passage. "We were called out to a casualty and we found 
ourselves in front of a tank," he said. "There was shooting all around us and we had to wait there two 
hours until they allowed us to go. While we were there I saw a bulldozer tearing down trees, protected by 
three tanks."  
As the ambulancemen waited, three Hamas gunmen, followed by three from Fatah, moved along the road. 
One Hamas man carried an anti-tank weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs at the roadside and 
rolled out command wires.  
The first victim of the fighting was a farmer, Mohammad Atari, 25. Abdul Hadi Atari, 36, said tanks and 
bulldozers were moving around their home when gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew in the 
back. The ambulances came two hours later. By the time they reached the hospital he was dead.  
 
The Times 
 
Death toll rises in north Gaza despite lull in fighting 
BY JENNY BOOTH AND AGENCIES  
 
The death toll rose again in northern Gaza today as Israeli forces and militants continued 
desultory exchanges of fire after the bloodiest day of clashes in the strip since Israel withdrew 
last summer. 
Twenty-four Palestinians and one Israeli soldier have now been killed in fighting that broke out in the area 
after Israeli tanks and troops, backed by aircraft, seized control of a ribbon of land in an attempt to win 
freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants‘ increasingly longer rocket range. 
After sunrise, Israel renewed its assault with two airstrikes, killing one militant from the Palestinians‘ 
ruling Hamas Party, and wounding three, party and hospital officials said. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) 
said that aircraft fired at four armed Palestinians in an area where there had been exchanges of fire. Two 
were wounded in the second airstrike, hospital officials said. 
In a separate incident, a Palestinian teenager was killed by Israeli tank fire. 
Israel, meanwhile, signalled its intention to reduce the scope of its operation near two Palestinian towns it 
invaded yesterday. Lieutenant Colonel Yaniv, a battalion commander, said he expected troops to wind up 
their mission on the outskirts of Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun within a day or two because their mission 
there would be accomplished.  
A mile across a sandy waste from Beit Lahiya lie three deserted, rubble-strewn Jewish settlements, which 
Palestinian militants used as cover to fire 14 missiles towards and into the southern Israeli city of 
Ashkelon earlier in the week, more than seven miles north of the border.  
 259 
The latest rocket attacks have caused concern for Israeli army chiefs and panic among civilians as they 
reached significantly farther inside Israel than at any time before. 
Steve Farrell, Times Middle East correspondent who is in Beit Lahiya, said: "We had a look today at the 
Palestinian village of Atatra, about a mile from Beit Lahiya, which is the one populated Palestinian area 
where Israeli tanks did take up positions yesterday. The tanks were pulled up right in amongst the houses, 
inside the urban area, and there was fighting.  
"The tanks have pulled back slightly now and there is a lull. It is Friday prayers and also the Jewish 
Sabbath, so I think both sides have decided to take it easy. There will probably be a lot of funerals later, 
which will keep people off the streets."  
Amid the fighting, there was still no word on the fate of Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured on June 25 by 
militants affiliated to Hamas. 
Israel insisted it was not planning to reoccupy Gaza, but military commanders said they had orders to win 
the soldier‘s release and prevent militants from firing rockets, even if that meant repeated short-term 
incursions. 
This morning Amir Peretz, the Israeli Defence Minister, and Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the IDF chief 
of staff, toured a base in southern Israel that is a staging area for the operation. 
"We have no intention of sinking in the Gaza mire," Mr Peretz repeated. On the other hand, "we will find 
a way to hurt anyone who tries to hurt Israeli citizens," he added, accusing militants of using Palestinian 
civilians as human shields. 
Lieutenant General Halutz refused to say when Israeli forces would pull back from Palestinian territory. 
"It doesn‘t mean there won‘t be Qassam (rocket) fire if we leave tomorrow or the day after," he added. 
"But it does mean that terror organizations will pay a high price for every Qassam (missile) fired." 
After touring Gaza‘s main hospital, Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian Prime Minister, called for international 
intervention to stop the Israeli offensive, which he called a "crime against humanity." 
His ruling Hamas movement, which has so far refused to recognise Israel, also issued a statement, saying 
that Israel‘s expanded military offensive in Gaza had set back efforts to resolve a crisis over an abducted 
soldier, and hardened the defiance of militants. 
Yesterday more than 20 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier died as heavy clashes escalated throughout the 
day. Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinian militants with missile strikes, while Israeli tanks took up positions 
among Palestinian homes. Apache helicopters hovered overhead, firing flares and machine guns to support 
ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes with masked Palestinian gunmen. 
An Israeli soldier died in one of the skirmishes - the first Israeli casualty. Israel Radio and Army 
Radio said the army was checking the possibility that he was killed by errant Israeli gunfire. The 
army spokesman’s office said he was killed by a Palestinian gunman. 
 
